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Abstract
This thesis is an exploration of the relationship between participation and international 
human rights law. It places participation in a human rights context through examining the 
concept of participation, and determining what types of participation are most appropriate 
for human rights. In order to do this it establishes and applies a four-point analytical 
structure of the modes, purposes, feasibility and norms of participation. The thesis 
compares the types of participation required in theory by human rights to the practices of 
human rights. It considers what kinds of participation are reflected in principles of 
international human rights law, through examining both the rights which explicitly 
protect forms of participation, and principles which enable the enjoyment of such rights. 
It then examines the ways in which participation is manifested in structures of human 
rights law-making, paying particular attention to the role of non-governmental 
organisations. The substantive analysis finally examines the forms of participation 
reflected in structures of access to human rights mechanisms, focussing on individual 
access to complaints procedures. This examination of participation in the principles and 
structures of international human rights law facilitates the identification of significant 
contradictions between participation in human rights theory and human rights practice. 
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This thesis is an exploration of the relationship between participation and human 
rights. The primary research aim is to determine the type of participation appropriate 
for human rights, as derived from its inherent characteristics and underlying ideology, 
and to compare this to the types of participation manifested both in international 
human rights legal principles, and in practical structures concerning the construction 
of and access to international human rights law. This will allow consideration of the 
implications for human rights of any inconsistencies between the type of participation 
appropriate for human rights and that reflected in human rights, and the ways in 
which participatory elements of human rights could or should potentially be 
developed in order to make them more suitable and effective.
Participation in international human rights law as considered in this thesis therefore 
entails two forms of involvement: the definition of human rights principles and the 
application and accessibility of human rights standards. Participation in the definition 
of human rights law encompasses the development of the specific content of rights, 
the determination of legitimate participants in law-making, and of legitimate sources 
of law, and the construction of the fundamental principles which underlie human 
rights and themselves control what human rights is and by whom it may be 
developed. Understanding participation as the application of the law is concerned 
with two main issues: whether and how the law applies. Firstly, it questions whether 
the law is applicable to a particular individual or group, that is, whether they receive
1
theoretical protection from the law. Secondly, it is concerned with the accessibility of 
the law: how and to what extent those individuals and groups to whom the law applies 
are able to make use of its structures in order to safeguard their human rights
It is important to note that these two elements are not distinct but rather impact on one 
another. Participation in the definition of law may include participation in the 
development of legal principles regarding who the law applies to, and how it may be 
accessed. The way in which the law is used can in turn affect the future development 
both of the content of the law and the principles which control participation in law­
making.
Furthermore, this study of participation in international human rights law 
encompasses the ways in which different actors are included in or excluded from the 
definition and the application of international human rights law, and examines the 
structures, practices and principles which enable or constrain such participation. 
Whilst the focus is on individual participation in human rights, participation of other 
actors must also be considered insofar as it enables or constrains individual 
participation, and to enable evaluation of the extent of individual participation 
compared to that of other actors. In this context, it should be noted that this thesis 
does not include substantial consideration of state obligations concerning 
participation, as the focus is on individuals’ rights of participation and the 
opportunities for individual participation in human rights.
This thesis therefore has three main research objectives. Firstly, it must determine 
what type(s) of participation are required by human rights, in order for human rights
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both to be internally consistent with regards to its theoretical and philosophical basis, 
and to be practically effective: to achieve its purpose of universal protection of 
individuals. The second objective is to identify what the legal principles and practical 
structures of human rights concerned with participation indicate about the 
conceptualisation of participation within human rights regarding both the definition 
and application of human rights. Thirdly, this analysis will enable comparison of the 
type of participation appropriate for human rights and that manifested within human 
rights, in order to highlight any contradictions and explore their implications.
Part 1: The importance of a participatory analysis of human rights
The rationale for the selection of this issue necessitates further explication. The 
relationship between human rights and participation requires specific and detailed 
examination because participation engages with numerous foundational issues 
regarding human rights, yet human rights has received very little analysis from a 
participatory perspective.
1.1: Participation as a conceptual connection within human rights
A participatory perspective is of value for analysis of international human rights law 
because it provides a means by which to examine a multiplicity of different issues and 
debates within the human rights discourse in a comprehensive and comparative way. 
Centralising the theme of participation within human rights can therefore provide a 
useful analytical context to conceptualise and analyse several fundamental themes.
3
Firstly, a participatory approach provides a means to assess international human rights
law in relation to its own self-imposed standards of universality, non-discrimination
and equality:1 the inclusivity of human rights. The centrality of the principles of
universality, non-discrimination and equality, whether real, rhetorical, aspirational or
perceived, demonstrate the fundamentality of the principle of inclusion to human 
• 2rights. Human rights are therefore by nature inclusive, which requires that they are 
universally applicable. Participation understood as the applicability of human rights3 
interrogates the extent of universal human rights in practice.
Secondly, a participatory approach provides a useful perspective from which to 
explore the historical and legal contexts for the development of human rights. It may 
provide a less politicised means to engage with debates regarding the contextual and 
biased nature of human rights principles than current attempts utilising the 
universalist/cultural relativist dichotomy. It also provides a means to analyse the 
normative development of the human rights discourse.4
Thirdly, participatory analysis is a means to engage with challenges to the legitimacy 
of human rights. International human rights law has been challenged as illegitimate on 
the basis of exclusion from its development.5 It has also been argued that there is no 
sense of ownership of the international human rights system, both on the individual 
and cultural levels, for many of the world’s peoples.6 As participation is claimed to be
1 See Chapter 1, section 2.1 for more detailed discussion o f the relationship between the universality of 
human rights and participation.
2 Schneider, 2000: 146
3 This is further explored in Chapter 4.
4 Structures of participation concerning the development o f international human rights law are 
examined in Chapter 3.
5 See Chapter 3, section 3.4
6 Allott, 1990:298-99, 16.8
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of value through enabling actors to become more engaged with both processes and 
outcomes and thus enhancing commitment to such processes and outcomes,7 this lack 
of ownership may result in a lack of legitimacy and therefore of respect for human 
rights. Application of a participatory perspective to human rights allows both 
assessment of the validity of these claims, and potential means to resolve these
o
problems.
Fourthly, a participatory approach provides a useful means to examine the 
relationship between human rights and international law; primarily in relation to 
themes of justice and representation on the international level.9 A participatory 
approach examines human rights in the context of wider international law and has 
implications for understanding the dialectical relationship and interchange of 
influence between human rights and international law. A participatory analysis 
provides a means to critique the disparity between human rights principles and the 
structural constraints of international law.10 McCorquodale considers that 
international law requires a new conceptual framework based on participation, where 
“actual actions are given acknowledgement in terms of their impact on this system, 
rather than there being a prior, state-based, determination as to what actions will be 
taken into account”. The use of participation as a conceptual approach allows 
examination of involvement and inclusion in international law,11 as well as in human 
rights.
7 Chapter 1, section 1.2.2
8 The relationship between legitimacy and human rights is discussed throughout the thesis, and 
especially in Chapter 5.
9 These themes are explored in Chapter 5, sections 2 and 4
10 This issue is examined in Chapter 5, section 4
11 McCorquodale, 2004: 481-2
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In summary, the application of participatory principles to human rights law provides a 
means to firstly assess that law from a participatory perspective, and secondly 
consider if the enhancement of participatory aspects of human rights law would be 
beneficial in terms of greater respect for and enforcement of human rights. 
Participation may well be a useful tool for understanding and addressing some of the 
weaknesses of current human rights principles and/or practice. Participation has been 
identified in areas such as the right to development as a vital tool for the realisation of
1 9all human rights; the application of a participatory analysis of human rights allows 
the assessment of such declarations as rhetoric or reality. Enhanced, inclusive 
participation in international human rights law may have the potential to address some 
of the problematic aspects of the operation of this law.
1.2: Shortcomings of current analysis
It is clear that applying a participatory perspective to human rights would be of value, 
and that participation is an important means to conceptualize human rights. However, 
numerous analyses of human rights do not apply a specifically participatory 
perspective; many accounts of human rights provide no analysis of participation.13 
Furthermore, those analyses which have addressed the relationship between 
participation and human rights display significant limitations, as they consider the 
connection between participation and human rights in a peripheral and fragmented 
rather than centralised and systemic manner. For example, whilst there has been
12 Declaration on the Right to Development, Article 8(2)
13 See inter alia Steiner, Alston and Goodman, 2007; Donnelly, 2003. Haas, 2008; Gearty and 
Tomkins, 1996; Meron, 1984
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considerable analysis of participation in the developmental14 and environmental15 
contexts, and in relation to children’s rights,16 these studies do not explore the 
relationship between participation and human rights but rather consider participation 
as one element (among others) of particular rights. Such analysis does not therefore 
constitute a consideration of human rights from a participatory perspective. 
Consequently, there are comparatively few analytical accounts of participation 
specifically as an element of human rights.
Furthermore, within those analyses that do specifically explore participation from a 
human rights perspective, there is a tendency to correlate the concept of a “right” to 
participation with political rights of participation. Either participation is expressly 
associated with political rights,17 or discussion of rights and participation is placed 
within a political context, thus creating a more implicit connection.18 This approach is 
typified by Waldron’s account of the right to participation, which exclusively equates 
it with the political rights of the citizen.19 However, this conceptualisation of 
participation is overly restrictive and reductive, and consequently fails to take account 
of the varied potential meanings of participation and how these can affect human 
rights.20
14 See inter alia Twomey, 2007; Zillman, Lucas and Pring, 2002; Parfitt, 2004; Oakley et al, 1991; 
Ginther, 1992.
15 See inter alia Steele, 2001; Lee and Abbot, 2003; 2002; see also the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
which is the only international treaty to explicitly deal with rights o f participation.
16 Ang et al, 2006; Byrne, 2003
17 See inter alia Vidar, 2005, 157; see also the index listing in Steiner and Alston, 2000, 1486.
18 De Waart, 1995: 49-50; Fredman, 2008: 33-40
19 Waldron, 1998: 311-312
20 See Chapter 1, section 1 for examination o f the meanings o f participation, and Chapter 2, section 1.1 
for examination o f both political and non-political participatory rights.
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In addition, there have been a number of assertions of the value of participation in 
human rights but, fundamentally, extremely little analysis of what form this 
participation should take, and why it is so important. Where participation and human 
rights have been linked, the analysis has not been developed sufficiently in relation to 
why participation is essential to human rights, nor what that participation would 
entail.21
Whilst there are several areas of study concerned with issues of representation and 
exclusion in human rights, such analyses have not been specifically oriented to 
exploring what participation as a concept means, or should mean, for human rights; 
rather they have focussed on particular forms or lack of participation by certain actors. 
For example, critical analyses of international law such as Third World Approaches to 
International Law22 or feminist23 approaches address the exclusion of the third world 
or women24 respectively from the development of human rights, and consequently 
challenge the ability of human rights principles to represent and protect the concerns 
of these groups. However, such analysis is specifically concerned with the 
experiences of particular groups rather than the implications for the overall 
relationship between human rights and participation of such exclusion. Literature 
from the cultural relativist/universalist debate25 has also considered issues of 
representation and exclusion in relation to human rights, but has not situated this in an
9 ftexplicit context of participation. In addition, analyses of the role of non-state actors
21 See for example Kenny, 2000: 18-21; Kllnnemann, 2004: 22-25. Whilst Kenny does offer a more 
developed understanding o f participation in a human rights context than Kiinnemann, the analysis is 
limited to participation in the context o f development and is therefore not fully developed concerning 
the relationship between human rights and participation.
22 Mutua, 2000
23 Charles worth and Chinkin , 2000: 49; Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, 2001: 644
24 Ward, 1998, 161
25 See Chapter 5, section 1.2
26 Clapham, 2006; Alston, 2005; Butler, 2007
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are concerned with structures of participation in the construction and implementation 
of human rights law, but do not explore how this impacts on the conceptual 
relationship between participation and human rights.
All these analyses reflect an implicit concern with the issue of participation in 
international human rights law but do not provide a specifically participatory analysis 
of human rights. Fundamentally, participation as previously considered has been an 
adjunct to the main issue under investigation, not the primary concern of analysis, and 
has consequently not received the detailed exploration required to enable a 
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between participation and human 
rights.
Finally, analyses of participation have not adopted a human rights approach. Such 
studies are largely concerned with forms of participation, in particular political 
participation and its relationship to democracy, how and why individuals and groups
27participate in society, and what barriers may exist to this participation. They do not 
in general explore participation as a right, nor consider how it both does and should 
function in the context of international human rights. In consequence, there is little 
explicit analysis from either the discourse of participation or from human rights 
research concerning the relationship between participation and international human 
rights law.
27 See for example Verba et al, 1978; Pateman, 1970; Lucas, 1978 and more recently Fung, 2003; 
Creasy, 2007.
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Part 2: Key Questions
There is consequently a need for analysis of international human rights law from an 
explicitly participatory perspective. Such analysis must specifically explore the extent 
to which the type of participation reflected in human rights is the most appropriate 
form of participation to achieve the goals of human rights. Applying a participatory 
analysis to human rights requires consideration of a number of key issues. Firstly, the 
concept of ‘participation’ must be explored, in order to gain a full understanding of 
the phenomenon to be applied. Secondly, the type of participation required by human 
rights must be identified. Next, analysis of the type of participation reflected within 
human rights requires consideration of how participation is conceptualised in both 
human rights principles and in practical structures of participation relating to the 
definition and application of human rights. This will enable comparison between the 
type of participation required by human rights and the type found within human 
rights, and will consequently facilitate exploration of the implications of this 
evaluation.
Part 3: Methodology 
3.1: Theoretical approach
In order to address these key questions, this project adopts a socio-legal approach to
analysis of participation in human rights. Participation is a social phenomenon, of
28which existing analysis has predominantly come from the social sciences. 
Furthermore, the aim of this thesis is to examine how participation is conceptualised 
by international human rights law, and to compare this with the form of participation
28 See section 1.2 above; also Chapter 1, section 1
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appropriate for human rights. While investigation of legal instruments and 
jurisprudence plays a role in this enquiry, a purely ‘legal’ approach focussing on these 
formal sources cannot enable analysis which goes beyond assessment of the legal 
rules of participation, to identify what that participation means, or should mean, for 
human rights, and how that meaning is constructed. Fundamentally, it would not 
encompass exploration of how informal structures of participation impact on how 
participation is conceptualised by human rights. An approach to participation which 
does not take account of both formal and informal, or legal and social, elements 
would restrict the ability of this project to further existing knowledge. Consequently, 
this project will of necessity have an interdisciplinary character.
3.2: Empirical research methods
In addition to textual analysis, this thesis explores the participatory roles of Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) through use of data collected via a series of 
qualitative interviews conducted with members of human rights NGOs. 26 interviews 
were carried out: 7 via email, 5 in person and 14 via telephone. A range of 
organisations took part in the research ranging from international groups with a global 
reach concerned with the totality of human rights to national or locally based groups 
which focussed on one specific area of rights.29 Target organisations were selected on 
the criteria that they are major participants in the international system, explicitly
30concerned with the promotion and protection of participatory rights or have a 
specific mandate to enable others to participate, for example through provision of 
information on the United Nations (UN) system.
29 A more detailed guide to the categories o f participant NGOs is found in Appendix 1. The interviews 
are held on file with the author, and are referenced by ID number and date.
30 Chapter 2 explores the full range o f participatory rights.
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The interviews31 were based towards the unstructured end of the continuum32 to allow 
for maximum versatility.33 The questioning process was of necessity reflexive in 
response to the development of other strands of the research. Such non-directive 
questioning techniques were used in order to allow the interviewee to tell their own 
story34 and to “discover the unexpected and uncover the unknown”35 via the interview 
process. As Jones argues, an inflexible questioning structure indicates that the 
researcher has prestructured the enquiry within their own frame of reference, and thus 
leaves little space for the respondents to elaborate their own perspectives.36
The aim of this study is to explore the concept of participation in international human 
rights law, both in theory and in practice. A key aspect of such study is the 
exploration of the multiplicity of experiences of participation in human rights. 
Qualitative methods are most therefore appropriate to the nature of the research, as it 
is exploratory and stresses the importance of context and the participants’ own frames 
of reference.37 Specifically, this aspect of the research project constitutes an 
exploration of the phenomena38 of participation in international human rights law via 
the perspectives and experiences of those social actors who operate under the practical 
realities of the human rights regime, and who may have experience both of the 
constraints imposed by a lack of formal participatory rights, and the effects and 
potential benefits of more inclusive, but informal, modes of participation. Thus the
31 A sample interview is provided in appendix 2.
32 Denscombe, 2003: 167; Arksey and Knight, 1999: 4-9
33 Taylor and Bogdan, 1984, 77
34 Nievaard, 1996: 44
35 Gerson and Horowitz, 2002: 204
36 Jones, 1985:46
37 Marshall and Rossman, 1999, 58
38 Maso, 1996: 34
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understanding of participation produced by this research will be oriented to how these 
actors perceive the reality39 of participation within international human rights law.
Furthermore, this research is intended to explore and develop the concept of 
participation within international human rights law as a dynamic process, rather than 
impose preconceived static categories on the people and events observed.40 This 
research project thus requires an interpretavist methodological approach, proceeding 
from an epistemological position that knowledge is contextual, provisional and 
complex 41
Moreover, whilst the qualitative research initially proceeded from the identification of 
themes and concepts arising from the literature study, the analysis is emphatically not 
intended to be limited to such previously identified issues. Rather, it is intended to be 
reflexive in relation to potential new themes and concepts which may arise from the 
interview research process. The use of qualitative research techniques allows the 
researcher to be more responsive and flexible in relation to both the needs of 
respondents and the nature of the subject matter.42
In addition, qualitative methods are necessary for research with an ethical perspective 
that identifies the importance of inclusion to human rights. It is therefore necessary to 
enable a multiplicity of different voices to contribute to the analysis. The use of 
qualitative interviews offers a means by which to incorporate the experiences and 
understandings of groups who may be marginalised within the formal structure of
39 Taylor & Bogdan, 1984, 2
40 Gerson and Horowitz, 2002: 199
41 Arksey and Knight, 1999: 19
42 Walker, 1985: 3
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international human rights law into an enhanced understanding of participation. 
Furthermore, it is ethically appropriate when analysing the participatory experience of 
NGOs to inform the research through utilising such experience directly, rather than 
relying on mediated accounts from other sources.
Finally, although a range of organisations and consequent experiences of participation 
were explored, this data is emphatically not intended to be representative of a general 
NGO perspective on participation. Rather, it is designed to explore and illuminate the 
ways in which NGOs participate themselves and enable others to participate, and their 
rationales for doing so. The epistemological perspective of this project does not view 
social knowledge as objective and absolute, but rather as situated and partial. In this 
way it rejects the assertion that social research both should and can provide objective 
truths or facts about the world. As Hammersley and Atkinson contend “the aim is not 
to gather ‘pure’ data that are free from potential bias. There is no such thing”.43 The 
fundamental concern of this research project is to explore how the meaning(s) of 
participation in international human rights law are understood. This will of necessity 
entail the collection of contextual data. The project is not concerned with uncovering 
the ‘true’ meaning and function of participation in international human rights law, but 
rather what different meanings exist, how and why these have been constructed and 
what impact they have on individuals’ and groups’ experiences of international 
human rights law, as “separating the truth or falsity of people’s beliefs from the 
analysis of those beliefs as social phenomena allows us to treat participants’ 
knowledge as both resource and topic”.44
43 Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 131
44 Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 126
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3.3: Definitions: human rights
‘Human rights’ in this project refers to international human rights law. The analysis 
consequently examines the concept of participation reflected in human rights 
principles as expressed through international legal documents encompassing both 
hard and soft law, jurisprudence and attendant commentary. In addition, the structures 
of participation regarding the definition of and access to this law are considered, 
including analysis of the legal principles regarding sources of law. This is a 
necessarily reductive approach to the concept of participation in human rights. 
‘Human rights’ has a meaning beyond that expressed in international legal principles; 
it is also mutually constitutive of a wider discourse of social ethics. A comprehensive 
approach to participation in human rights would therefore entail consideration of this 
wider discourse of human rights, requiring the exploration of the construction of its 
meaning beyond the definition of law, and the exploration of access to both legal and 
non-legal structures for the realisation of human rights. However, whilst such study is 
a logical continuation both of the themes and methodological approach of this thesis, 
it is beyond the scope of the current project.
Part 4: The role of NGOs
The analysis, particularly in Chapters 3-5,45 includes considerable discussion of the 
participatory role of human rights NGOs46 in international human rights law. Whilst 
other actors such as global corporations and international financial institutions also
45 See the Chapter Overview in Part 5 below.
46 The term ‘human rights NGOs’ is used in this thesis to mean NGOs concerned with the promotion 
and protection o f human rights.
15
participate in human rights to the degree that their actions affect the definition and 
application of human rights,47 they are not considered in this thesis.
This analysis focuses specifically on the participatory role of human rights NGOs for 
several reasons. This project must of necessity focus on particular aspects of 
participation; a comprehensive account of the influence of all participants within the 
international system on human rights is unrealistic. This thesis is primarily concerned 
with individual participation in human rights; however the major participants in 
international law are states. It is therefore important to consider the participatory role 
of NGOs as they are the major non-state participant in the definition and application 
of international human rights law. The importance of NGO participation is well 
recognised,48 and it is contended that “the entire UN human rights system would quite 
simply cease to function without the NGOs”.49 Furthermore, NGOs offer a means to 
examine alternative and/or intermediary structures of participation in human rights. A 
focus on NGOs enables examination of modes of participation that exist between the 
level of the state and that of the individual; they offer a means to bridge the gap 
between law and policy.50 Although NGOs have some formal rights of participation51 
a key aspect of this thesis is to also explore the implications of NGOs’ use of informal 
methods of participation. As active participants in the development of the rights, 
norms, values and facts of participation in international human rights law, they 
consequently provide a means to consider participatory structures outside the 
established hierarchy of participation.
47 See inter alia Skogly, 2001; Howse, 2002; Clapham, 2006: 161-270; E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, 2 
August 2001, Section II
48 Steiner, 1991: 1
49 Brett, 1995: 100
50 Breen, 2005: 102
51 See Chapter 3, section 1.2, and Chapter 4, section 2.2.1
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Most importantly, NGOs have a vital, although informal, representative role within 
human rights in acting as a conduit for participation in international human rights law 
by other groups and individuals.52 Although this thesis is predominantly concerned 
with the relationship between participation and human rights as it applies to 
individuals, individual participation in human rights is very much reliant on the 
activities of NGOs, and it is therefore essential to consider how these organisations 
themselves participate and how this affects other structures of participation in human 
rights.
The definition of an NGO53 is problematic,54 and there is no clear definition in 
international law.55 As Chamovitz identifies, “everything about NGOs is contested, 
including the meaning of the term”.56 However, when discussing the nature of NGOs,
57certain characteristics are usually emphasized. NGOs are private organisations. 
They are non-profit making,58 and are composed of individuals acting of their own 
volition.59 The focus of an NGO is defined via reference to a particular set of 
principles, and action is premised around the realisation of these values through 
shaping policy.60 Furthermore, ‘human rights’ NGOs are distinct from other political 
actors as they seek to protect the rights not only of their own constituency but of all
52 See Chapter 5, section 2.2 for further discussion o f NGOs’ representative role.
53 As Gordenker and Weiss identify (1996: 18) there are at least ten other terms used to refer to these 
actors; see also Chamovitz, 1997: 186-188.
54 For a more detailed discussion o f the definition o f NGOs see Butler, 2007: 146-150, also Willetts, 
1996a: 2-3.
55 Simma, 2002: 1072; Kaminga, 2005: 95; Brett, 1995: 97-99
56 Chamovitz, 2006: 351
57 Hartwick, 2001 :218
58 Gordenker and Weiss, 1996: 20
59 Gordenker and Weiss, 1996: 20
60 Breen, 2005: 102; Kaminga, 2005: 96; Thurer, 1998: 43
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members of society.61 This study follows the broad categorisation of human rights 
NGOs as dependent on the nature of the claims made and goals pursued, rather than 
requiring specific criticism of state conduct via reference to international human 
rights law.
This study will therefore consider human rights NGOs as international or national 
private bodies with a focus on the realisation of either general or specific human 
rights principles though influence over policy-making and implementation. Such 
NGOs have a dual participatory role in human rights; they are both participants in 
their own right, and are also potential facilitators of participation by others. The ways 
in and extent to which human rights NGOs enable participation by other individuals 
or groups is a key aspect of the analysis in this thesis.63 However, regarding NGO 
participation in their own right, the purpose of this project is to explore what the ways 
in which NGOs participate in human rights indicates about the conceptualisation of 
participation as reflected in human rights. The nature of human rights NGOs and their 
main participatory activities as regards the definition and implementation of 
international human rights law will consequently not be detailed in depth. A short 
overview will therefore suffice.64
Firstly, it is important to emphasize the diverse nature of human rights NGOs as a 
sector, and in consequence that these groups participate in different ways. Human
61 Brett, 1995: 97
62 Steiner, 1991: 5
63 See in particular the discussion o f representation in Chapter 5, section 2.2 and discussion o f how 
NGOs enable individual access to human rights in Chapter 4, sections 2.3 and 3.3.
64 There is a large and expanding literature on human rights NGOs and their role regarding human 
rights law. See for example Otto, 1996; Willetts, 1996; Korey, 1998; Chamovitz, 1997, 1999; Welch 
2001; Clark, 2001; Alger 2002; Butler, 2007.
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rights NGOs may be national65 or international,66 concerned with matters within or 
across state borders respectively.67 They may be single-issue,68 deal with a range of 
concerns grouped around a particular area of human rights69 or geographical region,70 
or deal with human rights in their entirety.71 Some human rights NGOs have a large 
supporter base which they can mobilise to campaign on a particular issue.72 Other 
NGOs target their activities more towards research and information dissemination.73 
Most NGOs consist of a small group of policy makers and administrators, and others 
are effectively one-to-one organisations.74
Secondly, human rights NGO activity in the international system is not a new 
phenomenon. As Chamovitz details, NGOs have been active in relation to 
international human rights concerns since the 1700s,75 on issues including anti-slavery 
campaigns,76 and workers’77 and women’s78 rights. However, many of the major 
global human rights NGOs were founded in the post-war period; for example the 
International Commission of Jurists in 1952, Amnesty International in 1961 and 
Human Rights Watch in 1971,79 although it should also be noted that the International
65 For example, Albanian Centre for Human Rights, SERAC
66 For example Human Rights Watch, International Federation for Human Rights
67 Hartwick, 2001:218
68 For example, National Coalition to abolish the Death Penalty http://www.ncadp.org/
69 For example Article 19, who campaign on the issues impacting on freedom of expression, or 
International Women’s Rights Action Watch, which focuses on the protection o f women’s human 
rights.
70 For example Human Rights in China, who campaign for the promotion and protection o f human 
rights in China.
71 For example Amnesty International is concerned with enjoyment o f all o f the rights contained in the 
Universal Declaration o f Human Rights (http://www.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID= 10091). 
It should however be noted that Amnesty traditionally focussed on civil and political rights and have 
only relatively recently expanded their mandate to include economic, social and cultural rights.
72 For example Amnesty International
73 For example, International Service for Human Rights, International Council on Human Rights Policy
74 Steiner, 1991:77
75 Chamovitz, 1997: 189-268
76 Chamovitz, 1997: 191-192
77 Chamovitz, 1997: 193-194; 204-205
78 Chamovitz, 1997: 214-215
79 Originally Helsinki Watch
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Committee of the Red Cross was founded in 1863. This parallels the overall 
expansion in the number of NGOs which increased exponentially in the late twentieth 
century, growing by approximately five times between 1970 and 2000.80 247 
international human rights NGOs were identified in 2000.81
Thirdly, NGOs participate in both formal and informal ways. Some NGOs have 
consultative status with the UN, which entitles them to formally participate in specific 
ways in particular UN bodies.82 It must however be emphasized that not all NGOs 
have consultative status, and consequently many participate via more informal means. 
Although such participation in human rights takes a range of different forms, common 
methods include lobbying of governments officials, Inter-Governmental 
Organisations (IGOs) and/or private individuals, fact-finding regarding human rights 
violations, information provision to decision-makers in national governments, IGOs 
and to the wider public, and media campaigns regarding particular issues.
Finally, human rights NGO activity whether formal or informal is usually targeted 
towards two main areas. Firstly, NGOs are have significantly contributed to the 
advancement of international standards in the field of human rights protection;83 it is 
“beyond doubt that NGOs...have participated in the creation [and] development...of 
international law”,84 and the degree and significance of NGO and private sector 
participation in law-making continues to increase.85 They influence the development 
of human rights principles through processes of ‘consciousness-changing’ -  bringing
80 Butler, 2007: 151; see also Welch, 2001: 1
81 Butler, 2007: 152
82 NGOs consultative rights are detailed in Chapter 3, section 1.2
83 Martens, 2003: 8; Steiner and Alston, 2000: 940
84 McCorquodale, 2004: 496
85 Chamovitz, 2005: 543
20
a particular issue to the attention of law makers - and agenda-setting -  persuading 
delegates to discuss such issues in international forums.86 NGOs can then have an 
influence over norm construction via formal and informal participation at conferences 
and in treaty negotiations.87 NGOs use various lobbying techniques to impact on law­
making: participation in the preparatory processes, coordinated lobbying during the 
conference, circulation of information and personal contact with conference 
delegates.88
There are numerous illustrations of how NGOs have influenced the development of
OQ
international human rights principles. The experience of workers’ and employers’ 
groups through the International Labor Organization (ILO) is one of the earliest forms 
of participation by private groups in the formation of human rights standards.90 In 
addition, NGO participation in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) has been described as “instrumental”;91 for example, much of articles 16 and 
18 can be attributed to input from NGOs.92 An often-cited case is the role of Amnesty 
International and other NGOs in the development of international standards on the 
prohibition of torture, from awareness-raising regarding the practice of torture and the 
need to condemn and outlaw it, to the elaboration of the Committee Against Torture 
(CAT) in 1984.93 “It seems reasonable to infer... that were it not for the systematic 
campaign organized by Amnesty International, it would have been much more 
difficult to achieve such a wide, almost universal, condemnation of torture”.94 Other
86 Butler, 2007: 169-174
87 Wedgwood, 1998: 25
88 Friedman et al, 2005: 42-7, see also Lindblom, 2005: 473-4
89 This issue is further considered in Chapter 3.
90 Bianchi, 1997: 186
91 Korey, 1999: 154; see also Morsink, 1999: 4; 9
92 Van Boven, 1989: 211
93 Cook, 1996: 189-191; see also Brett, 1995: 100; Clark, 2001: 37-69; Tolley, 1994: 167
94 Bianchi, 1997, 186
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examples include the role of NGOs in the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child95 and the role of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court regarding 
the drafting of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).96 NGOs 
also influence the development of human rights through interpretation of the law.97
Secondly, NGOs are involved in various ways in human rights implementation,98 and 
have a role in both monitoring and enforcement of human rights.99 A key method used 
for human rights implementation by NGOs is information provision.100 For example, 
NGOs participate in the work of the treaty monitoring bodies primarily via 
information provision to pre-sessional working groups, committee members and 
Country Rapporteurs.101 These UN human rights institutions rely heavily on the 
information collected by NGOs regarding human rights violations.102 NGOs also have 
an intermediary role in the dissemination of human rights principles and treaty 
obligations to the wider public.103 Via fact finding missions, NGOs use information to 
impact government implementation of human rights,104 as publicizing a state’s poor 
human rights record “creates an aura of hostility and widespread negative attitude 
towards it”105 and may consequently influence the state to change their behaviour. 
NGOs also provide assistance to treaty bodies through the provision of background 
knowledge and the documentation of violations,106 and increasingly international legal
95 Bianchi, 1997: 186-7; Longford, 1996: 214-240
96 see Pace and Thieroff, 1999; Tomquist-Chesnier, 2004: 256-257
97 Chamovitz, 2006: 352-353; see also Chapter 3, section 1.1
98 Wiseberg-Scoble, 1979, cited in Bianchi, 1997: 188
99 Hafher-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005: 1385
100 Welch identifies information provision as ‘perhaps the central goal’ o f human rights NGOs 
(2001:5).
101 Drzewinski, 2002: 5-6
102 VanBoven, 1989: 207
103 Wedgwood, 1998: 23; Bianchi, 1997: 188
104 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, 1982: 187; see also Brown, 2001: 74
105 Bianchi, 1997: 191
106Breen, 2005: 113; Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 11,17
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processes are dependent on NGOs for their effectiveness.107 In addition, NGOs may 
affect human rights implementation through participation in legal proceedings. This 
may be indirect, though the provision of legal assistance to victims,108 or direct 
participation via the use of amicus curiae briefs.109 Finally, NGOs may be directly 
involved in the fulfilment of rights via development programmes.110
Part 5: Chapter overview
The starting point for understanding the relationship between participation and human 
rights must be to determine the meaning of participation in the context of human 
rights. Part 1 of Chapter 1 explores the concept of participation through examination 
of the various ways in which it can be understood. This analysis utilises a range of 
philosophical and theoretical approaches in order to consider diverse understandings 
of participation in political, social and religious contexts. These various meanings of 
participation are analysed in relation to the four key concepts of modes, purposes, 
practicalities and norms of participation. The use of this four-point analytical structure 
-  modes, purposes, practicalities and norms of participation - throughout subsequent 
Chapters allows a clear comparison between the nature of participation required by 
human rights as identified in Chapter 1, and the forms of participation as manifested 
in the principles and structures of human rights relating to participation as examined 
in Chapters 2 - 4. It must be noted however that neat categorisation is impossible, 
particularly regarding exploratory and interdisciplinary work, and consequently some 
issues may cut across these groupings.
107 Cullen and Morrow, 2001:13
108 Welch, 2001:6
109 Bianchi, 1997: 187; see also Chapter 3, section 1.1
110 For example Oxfam, ActionAid
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In Part 2, Chapter 1 considers what type of participation is required or implied by 
human rights in relation to these four elements. Key characteristics of human rights 
are identified. The various modes, purposes, feasibility and norms of participation are 
then analysed in relation to these fundamental principles of human rights, in order to 
determine the form of participation most appropriate for human rights.
Having established the nature of participation required by human rights, the thesis 
must then consider the central question regarding the extent to which this type of 
participation is manifested in the principles and structures of participation found 
within international human rights law. This substantive analysis of participation in 
human rights begins in Chapter 2, which examines international legal principles 
concerned with participation as expressed through both hard and soft international 
legal instruments. The central concern of this Chapter is to compare the concept(s) of 
participation as manifested in participatory principles of human rights law with the 
type of participation required by human rights, as identified in Chapter 1.
The analysis then proceeds to consideration of the structures of participation in 
international human rights law, firstly through examination of participation in the 
definition of human rights law in Chapter 3. The study here focuses on the structures 
of participation regarding human rights law-making, paying particular attention to 
both the historical and ongoing role of NGOs in human rights norm construction and 
standard-setting in contrast to traditional understandings of the centrality of state 
participation and the established sources of law. As with Chapter 2, participation 
concerning both hard and soft law instruments is considered.
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Examination of the structures of participation in international human rights law 
continues in Chapter 4, which considers participation in the application of human 
rights law through analysis of individual access to complaints mechanisms. This a 
particularly important form of participation in international human rights law as it is 
the only way in which the individual is directly and actively able to claim their rights 
on an international level. Participation in human rights is not just concerned with 
determining what human rights are, it also requires being able to make use of them; 
being included in a system of human rights protection and being able to hold entities 
accountable for abuse. Access to legal structures therefore provides an opportunity for 
participation through rights claiming, law enforcement and expanded protection.111 
This Chapter identifies three elements required for individual access to human rights 
structures: determination of the applicability and content of state obligations, access to 
information concerning the content of rights and avenues for complaint, and the 
availability of mechanisms through which the individual can bring a grievance 
regarding human rights violations.
Both Chapters 3 and 4 facilitate comparison between the type of participation required 
by human rights and that reflected in structures concerning the definition and 
application of human rights law. However, the focus of these Chapters is substantially 
different with regard to the actors under consideration. Chapter 3 compares NGOs and 
states as the means by which individuals participate in law-making; Chapter 4 is more 
directly concerned with the role of individuals.
Having examined the extent to which the concept(s) of participation as reflected both 
in international human rights legal principles, and in structures of participation in the
111 Cichowski, 2000: 51
25
definition of and access to human rights, reflects that required by human rights (as 
identified in Chapter 1) the implications of this analysis is considered in Chapter 5. 
In particular, the themes of representation and democracy, accountability, informal 
and formal participation and the normative construction of participation are analysed, 
and contradictions and inconsistencies identified.
Finally, the Conclusion demonstrates how the research questions have been 
answered. It considers the extent to which the types of participation identified in 
Chapter 1 as being most appropriate for human rights are actually manifested in the 
principles and structures of international human rights law. The Conclusion then 
discusses potential means by which the contradictions identified in Chapter 5 might 
be addressed, through identifying areas for further research and reform.
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Chapter 1: The Concept of Participation
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the concept of participation in order to 
identify what kind(s) of participation are appropriate for human rights in terms of 
being both implied by the underlying principles of human rights and required in order 
to achieve the goals of human rights. However, whilst ‘participation’ may be broadly 
defined as ‘to take part, to be or become actively involved [or] to share’,112 it is both 
in practice and theory a complex and variable concept, and consequently a 
multiplicity of different understandings of it exist. As Lucas states, “there is no one
I 1 n
thing called participation”. Pateman agrees: “’participation’ is used to refer to a 
wide variety of different situations by different people”.114 Participation is therefore 
“characterised by its diversity of practice and theory...with many different players 
using different definitions”;115 its meaning is “elastic”,116 and its role, function and 
importance are variable and contextual within and across geographic regions and 
cultures.117 Fundamentally, “participation defies any single attempt at definition or 
interpretation”.118
Furthermore, the concept of participation has historically lacked and continues to 
require its own theoretical base. Parfitt argued in 1976 that participation is “a practice 
in search of a theory”;119 Involve identified in 2005 that
112 Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11th Edition, 2006; Collins Cobuild English Language 
Dictionary, 1987: 1045; Nagel, 1987: 1
113 Lucas, 1976, 136
114 Pateman, 1970:1
115 Involve, 2005b: 16; see also McCaul, 2000: 92
116 Drydyk, 2005:248
117 Pring and Noe, 2002: 15-16; Wengert, 1976: 23
118 Oakley et al, 1991: 6
119 Parfitt, 1976
27
Currently the w ays in which participation is assessed is based on an amalgam o f  the 
values and principles from the different fields in which participation began. For 
exam ple, social scientists tend to focus on understanding the context and the people 
and their interactions, developm ent studies is sensitive to the wider cultural pressures 
people may face (e.g. prejudice, oppression etc.) and political science often interprets 
people's actions as part o f  wider social movements. Each one o f  these perspectives is 
equally valid and must be considered as part o f  any new  theoretical m odels.120
As identified in the Introduction,121 this diversity is reflected in analyses of 
participation which consider it in relation to different fields, including political 
participation, or participation in planning, development or environmental policies -  in 
essence a case study approach - rather than considering participation of itself as a 
concept. The analysis in this chapter is consequently drawn from these various 
sources in order to explore the key elements of participation.
It is clear that participation does not have one clearly defined meaning but rather 
several. In order to determine the type(s) of participation appropriate for human 
rights, this chapter must firstly consider the various ways in which participation is 
understood. Part 1 will therefore explore the different meanings of participation in 
relation to its modes, purpose, practicalities and norms.
Part 2 will then establish which of these various understandings of participation is 
most appropriate for human rights. It will firstly identify the fundamental principles 
and goals of human rights, in order to then consider what participation should mean 
and how it should be used in a human rights context.
120 Involve, 2005a: 19
121 Introduction, section 1.2
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Part 1: Understanding the concept of participation
Participation will be examined in relation to four elements: modes, purpose, 
practicalities and norms. ‘Modes’ refers to the what and the how of participation, and 
examines the range of activities which may be considered participatory and the 
contexts in which these take place. Consideration of the ‘purpose’ of participation 
requires exploration of why or to what ends it is used, and whose interests it furthers. 
Examination of the ‘feasibility’ of participation considers who has the opportunity and 
ability to participate, and the factors which affect this participation. Finally, analysis 
of the norms of participation applies these questions to the concept of participation 
itself, essentially questioning how, by whom and to what ends are structures of 
participation determined.
1.1: Modes of participation
‘Participation’ encompasses a multitude of different activities. This section does not 
propose simply to list these, but rather to consider the ways in which these forms of 
participation can be conceptualised. It does this by exploring three dichotomies within 
the concept of participation -  public/private, formal/informal, and 
direct/representative -  and by identifying and examining the different gradations of 
participation and the various levels at which participation occurs. The order in which 
these issues are considered is not meant to imply a hierarchy; rather it should be noted 
that these various aspects of participation are in reality interwoven with each other, 
and to some extent the divisions drawn here are imposed, but are necessary for the 
purpose of clarity in analysis.
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1.1.1: Public (political) and private participation
Firstly, definitions and analyses of participation often understand it as a purely 
political, or public,122 activity. Macridis and Burg consider political participation as a 
fundamental process associated with the organisation of consent within political 
systems, viewing it as an important foundation of political order through providing 
active communication and interaction between the citizenry and those in control.123 
Hague et al define political participation as “activity by individuals formally intended 
to influence who governs or the decisions taken by governments”.124 Similarly, 
participation is defined as “actions through which ordinary members of a political 
system influence or attempt to influence outcomes”,125 and as “the concept that the 
governed should engage in their own governance”.126 Participation is thus understood 
as a public, political activity which influences and regulates relationships between 
governments and citizens.
Such political or public participation is concerned with the state’s relationship with its 
citizens and how public business is carried out.127 It takes many forms, both formal 
and informal,128 including voting and standing for election, public enquiries and 
consultations, negotiated rule making, policy dialogues, citizens’ juries and 
involvement with NGOs.129 As Pring and Noe identify, “’public participation’ is an
122 Pring and N o6 ,2002: 16
123 Macridis and Burg, 1991, 10-11
124 Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 1998: 80
125 Nagel, 1987: 1
126 Pring and Noe, 2002: 11
127 Barton, 2002: 77
128 See Chapter 1, section 1.1.2 below
129 For a more extensive list see Barton, 2002: 80; see also Involve, 2005b: 53-105 which lists a range 
of modes o f public participation.
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all-encompassing label used to describe the various mechanisms that individuals or 
groups may use to communicate their views on a public issue”.130
Furthermore, social forms of participation may have an effect on political decision­
making. Creasy distinguishes between social and political forms of participation in the 
UK context: “whether marching in Whitehall, signing petitions in their town squares 
or buying wrist bands to “Make Poverty History”, the British public is giving time 
and energy to social rather than political outlets for their opinions”.131 This blurs the 
boundary between social and political participation; these actions are not ‘formally’ 
political, but are intended to influence the political process.
However, it is clear that people can find fulfilment within society via modes of 
participation other than the purely political. Participation can have a cultural or 
spiritual role in society, which may be either linked to or separate from political 
modes of participation. Multiculturalist approaches132 view modes of participation 
which emphasize the political rather than the cultural as inherently exclusionary as 
they are oriented to a particular rather than universal understanding of participation, 
which prioritises the majority over the minority perspective.133 Other forms of 
participation, such as social and cultural participation, exist which are not necessarily 
linked to political participation. The function and forms of participation within non­
secular societies also indicates the importance of non-political participation. For 
example, Islamic philosophy is understood to “capture within itself the attempt to
130 Pring and Noe, 2002: 15; see also Parry, 1972: 3
131 Creasy, 2007: 2
132 See Farrelly, 2004: 119-121; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000.
133 Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 9; see also Wheatley, 2003:519
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reproduce politically the spiritual dimension of reality”.134 Within Islamic political 
philosophy, participation within society is the means by which both the individual and 
the group become closer to God; such participation is inherently spiritual and cultural 
but not necessarily political. Fundamentally, it propounds that all people can 
participate appropriately and effectively in society without having to necessarily 
participate politically.135
In consequence, understandings of participation which consider participation to be 
inherently public and political; as involvement in political decision-making either 
regarding public issues or as decision-making via a public forum, are incomplete. 
‘Private’ participation in the social and cultural discourse which defines the context 
for such political participation is equally important. This is reflected in Ross’s wider 
definition of participation as “efforts on the part of members of a community to 
influence, either directly or indirectly, the authoritative allocation of values in their 
community”.136 It is also identified by Drydyk’s broad understanding of ‘political 
activity’ as taking place in any sphere of life;137 consequently ‘political’ participation 
may take place beyond what is traditionally considered the political realm, and may 
encompasses other forms o f ‘private’ or ‘social’ participation.
Furthermore, these public and private aspects of participation each influence the 
other. Participation in the construction of the norms and values of a society inevitably 
affects modes and structures of participation in political decision-making processes. 
Private motivations and beliefs can influence such public participation; for example
134 Leaman, 1999: 135
135 Leaman, 1999: 125
136 Ross, 1988: 74
137 Drydyk, 2005: 253
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religion plays at least a passive role in influencing voting behaviour in many 
countries, and may also affect the existence or absence of protest against the current
• 1 3 8  • •  i o n
regime. Feminist analysis rejects the public/private distinction by arguing that 
the personal is political; that the private lives of women indicate the public dominance 
of male hegemony.140 Thus women’s ability to participate in public forums is 
constrained by ‘private’ gender roles and relationships. Similarly, participation in 
private spheres such as religion and other group membership has an impact on public 
participation. This is seen in the varied relationships between church and state in 
different societies, which may serve to link or to separate public and private forms of 
participation. The two aspects of participation cannot be separated but are intrinsically 
linked.
The public-private distinction can also be understood through consideration of the 
actors involved. Public actors are those individuals who act as organs of the state, 
including the government and the judiciary. They consequently participate in public 
forms of decision-making concerning the actions of the state. However, as well as the 
interplay between private and public forms of participation as noted above, public 
forms of participation are also influenced by private actors. These actors do not solely 
participate in private realms, but in public participatory processes. For example, both 
private individuals and NGOs, which are organisations consisting of private 
individuals, participate in and/or seek to influence a range of public processes, such as 
elections, policy-making and law-making. This interaction is also demonstrated by the 
rise of public-private partnerships, where private companies enter into partnership
138 Moyser, 1991: 7-8
139 It should however be noted that feminist philosophies are hugely diverse and do not represent a 
unified position (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: 38; Fellmeth, 2000: 664)
140 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, 1991: 626
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with the state to deliver public services, thus indicating an expansion of private actors 
into the public realm. The relationship between public and private actors and public 
spheres of participation therefore demonstrates a further way in which the public and 
private aspects of participation interact with one another.141
1.1.2: Formal and informal participation
Secondly, a distinction may be drawn between formal and informal modes of 
participation. Formal modes of participation are official and required structures. 
Verba et al term these “activities “within the system”...’’regular” and legal ways of 
influencing politics...legitimate channels”.142 Such formal practices are often codified 
in legislation or regulations and constitute rights usually protected by law, or statutory 
requirements in relation to a particular process. Within a democratic political process, 
for example, formal participation encompasses activities such as voting and standing 
for election.143
In contrast, informal modes of participation encompass activities which are outside 
this formalised sphere. These actions are intended to influence the formal procedure 
which is taking place, and are often undertaken by actors who either have no formal 
right to participate in that process, or who wish to enhance their formal participation 
by use of informal methods. These types of participation tend to be more wide 
ranging, and may include more innovative or unconventional activities. They may 
include activity on behalf of social movements, which use a hugely diverse range of
141 Note that Chapter 2 focuses on the extent to which both public and private forms of participation are 
manifested in human rights, whilst Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on participation by public and private 
actors.
142 Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 48
143 Involve, 2005a: 25
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techniques of participation, which may be non-conformist or illegal in character, for 
example petitioning, lobbying, protests, marches, civil disobedience and direct 
action.144 Use of media campaigns is another important type of informal participation. 
A further informal mode of participation is via political violence,145 which can be 
committed by a state against its citizens, by individuals or groups against the state, or 
by one social group against another. For example, there are a number of Palestinian 
groups which have carried out politically motivated violence in attempts to influence 
their political relationship with Israel, and the violence and intimidation during the 
2008 elections in Zimbabwe was intended as a means to influence the internal 
political processes.
It must however be noted that there is not a clear distinction between formal and 
informal modes of participation; rather, participation exists along a continuum and 
such activities are viewed differently in different contexts. The activities of trade 
unions, NGOs and other pressure groups seek to influence decision-making 
procedures through activities which are not directly part of that process, although they 
are not formally represented in decision-making bodies.146 However, the informal 
forms of participation which are used could be considered formal in the sense that 
they are protected by law. Again this is contextual, as different processes provide for 
different levels of formalised participation, which means that the same type of activity 
may represent formal participation in some cases, but not in others. Furthermore, the 
same actors may participate in a decision-making process in both formal and informal 
ways. For example, Greenpeace took part as a formal stakeholder in the UK
144 Myntti, 1996:4
145 Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 48
146 Myntti, 1996:4
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government’s recent consultation on the use of nuclear power,147 and participated 
through the formal process of initiating a judicial review of a previous phase of the 
consultation,148 but also used informal types of participation to influence the same 
decision.149
The crucial distinction is that informal modes of participation are not guaranteed 
influence in the same way as formal types of participation. Formal modes of 
participation require that that participation is taken into account in decision-making; 
informal modes do not. Habermas distinguishes between influence (informal) and 
power (formal), arguing that influence can only be translated into power when it 
affects authorized decision-makers. It is thus transformed into power only through 
institutionalised procedures.150 A formal right to participate in an established 
structure, such as the right to vote, provides a guarantee of influence over the outcome 
in a way that a public protest, or media campaign, does not. This is not to say that 
informal participation cannot be hugely influential in decision-making, rather than 
when justifying actions decision-makers must demonstrate how this is a result of 
formal participation. For example, an election result is justified by the number of 
votes cast for particular candidates, not by how much media coverage they received, 
although this informal mode of participation may be extremely influential or even 
crucial in determining the result.
147 Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008: para. 1.47
148 Greenpeace Limited v. Secretary o f  State for Trade and Industry CO/8197/2006 [2007] EWHC 311 
(Admin)
149 For example, Greenpeace encourage their supporters to lobby the government and the publicize 
opposition to the use o f nuclear power. See http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/nuclear/what-you-can-do
150 Habermas, 1996a: 363
36
1.1.3: Direct and representative participation
Thirdly, participation can be direct or representative. Direct forms of participation
entail the participant having unmediated input into the decision-making process. In
contrast, within representative structures, a representative makes decisions or inputs to
decisions on behalf of a wider group of individuals. Consequently, in structures of
representation individuals do not participate directly in decision-making but rather
through the selection of decision-makers.151 Once selected, representatives then serve
as a conduit between a particular constituency and other constituents, interest groups
and decision-makers, as well as providing a means by which different groups
1communicate with each other. Representative structures therefore may be 
considered to offer indirect forms of participation as influence over decision-making 
is mediated through representatives, rather than comprising the direct involvement of 
individuals.
The distinction between representative and direct participation is illustrated by 
debates regarding representative or deliberative democratic participation. 
Representative forms of democracy are, obviously, structured around individuals 
voting for representatives who then make decisions on behalf of their constituents. 
Deliberative democracy may be broadly defined as the principle that legitimate
1 co
lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens. It therefore envisages a 
far more direct role for individuals, which goes beyond voting in elections to 
encompass public action via active participation in policy-making.154
151 Myntti, 1996: 2-3
152 Mansbridge, 2000: 99
153 Bohman and Rehg, 1997, ix
154 Lauber and Knuth, 2000: 11; Pateman, 1970: 25
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There is an important relationship between formal and informal types of participation, 
and direct and representative structures. Where formal participation is, for the 
majority, limited to the selection of representatives, informal modes can provide more 
direct forms of engagement. For example, taking part in a protest is an informal, but 
active and direct way to engage with an issue, whether political or non-political.
Interestingly, direct forms of democracy are older than current, more representative 
forms, with the concept of citizen in ancient Athens entailing direct participation in 
the affairs of the state.155 However, current democratic structures generally favour the 
representative paradigm. Policy development and implementation in most democratic 
states is via structures of representation, where most people participate through voting 
on the selection of political representatives, and a few participate more directly 
through being selected and then making policy decisions. However, there are 
exceptions to this model, such as the Swiss cantons, which operate a more direct form 
of democracy.156 In addition, more direct approaches to participation are developing 
at the local level regarding budgeting,157 development planning,158 and school and 
police systems.159
Furthermore, there have been numerous critiques of the capacity of representative 
democracy to enable empowering, inclusive and meaningful participation by all 
sections of society. Firstly, there is a fundamental contradiction between the equality 
of opportunity for participation inherent in the ideal of democracy, and the profound
155 Held, 1995: 6. It should be noted that the exclusionary aspects of Athenian politics have received 
considerable criticism; see for example Hewlett, 2000: 168.
156ICA, 2004: 1-2
157 Wampler, 2007; Shah, 2007; Baiocchi, 2003
158 Isaac and Heller, 2003
159 Fung, 2003
38
inequalities of participation in democratic practice. Citizens within a democracy are 
differentially placed in terms of both their desire and their ability to participate in 
public life. Many citizens lack resources or operate within structures that create a 
sense of powerlessness that dissuades political organizing and expression.160 Those 
higher on the social and economic hierarchies within a society are better able to 
participate in public life and thus to influence political decisions.161 The assumption 
that participation through representative democracy will inevitably lead to equality is 
therefore incorrect in the context of current democracies in practice.
In addition, representative democracy may be viewed as competitive and majoritarian; 
it is essentially a system of aggregation of interests, rather than inclusion of interests. 
As Wheatley argues, the aggregative model of democracy is centred around 
competition via elections, and in extreme cases does not represent the rule of the 
people but rather the rule of the elected representative.162 Government elites are often 
culturally distinct from the people whom they govern, and adopt policies in relation to
i c n
national (or personal) interest as they see it rather than wider cultural values. Such 
elites may have more in common with the elites of other states than the people within 
their own territory.164 Once the representative is elected, the ability of the people to 
participate in political decision-making is fundamentally diminished, at least until the 
next election. As Spiro identifies “the franchise is a crude tool for keeping 
government authorities in line”...governments can get away with an awful lot before 
having answer to their memberships”.165 Furthermore, both in established and new
160 Wapner, 2002: 199
161 Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 5
162 Wheatley, 2003: 509
163 Freeman, 1998: 28
164 McCorquodale, 2004: 483
165 Spiro, 2002: 164
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democracies, voting and elections can be manipulated to be wholly unrepresentative. 
In addition, under a majoritarian electoral system, effective participation by minority 
groups may well be marginalised, as they do not possess the strength of numbers 
required to succeed in the competition to have their interests incorporated into 
political decisions.166
In response to these evaluations of representative democracy, more deliberative or 
direct forms of participation have been advocated. However, direct democracy has 
also received criticism. Farelly identifies two major challenges which deliberative 
democracy theory needs to address: firstly, that deliberation may have a destructive 
effect, and secondly, that the ideal of deliberative democracy is fundamentally 
utopian. Concerns regarding the potential destructive effect of deliberation centre 
around the time-consuming process of achieving consensus, particularly when 
addressing issues which may require immediate action.167 Lucas contends that greater 
freedom to participate may force involvement from those who would prefer to remain 
aloof from the political process, in order to challenge opposing interests.168 It is 
argued that is simply not realistic to combine mass participation and deliberation, 
given the size of modem democracies.169 Certainly, current structures of political 
participation in modem democracies could not support this, although new modes of 
communication and interaction may offer greater opportunities for inclusion.
166 Problematic elements o f representative forms o f participation are further explored in Chapter 5, 
section 2.
167 Farelly, 2004: 150-151
168 Lucas, 1976: 161
169 Farelly, 2004: 152
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1.1.4: Gradations o f participation
Fourthly, different degrees of participation can be identified. A distinction between
‘active’ and ‘passive’, or ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ is commonly recognized in analyses of
participation. For example, Amstein considers that “there is a critical difference
between going though the empty ritual of participation and having the real power
needed to affect the outcome of the process”.170 Hunt et al agree:
The degree o f  public participation in decision-m aking depends on the amount o f  
power transferred from the responsible authority to the public. Although the word is 
used loosely  to indicate taking part in a process, and although participation can take 
place solely through taking account o f  a wider range o f  view s, the strong sense infers 
participation in taking decisions, not m erely in consultation on those decisions.171
There exist various models of the different grades of participation, with an early 
example being Amstein’s ‘Ladder of Participation’ and more recently studies 
producing similar structures which identify a continuum from weaker to stronger 
forms.172
Active or strong forms of participation entail a deliberate attempt to effect change and 
the potential to actually influence outcomes, with participants having either full or 
partial authority to develop approaches to problems and to authorise a course of 
action.173 This level of participation may therefore be characterised as meaningful, 
which further requires it to be voluntary.174 Such participation requires commitment 
from those in power to follow through the outcome of participation or consultation.175 
This type of participation is considered ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ participation.176
Amstein, 1969: 216
171 Hunt, Day and Kemp, 2001: 4
172 Drydyk, 2005: 259-260, Interact, 2001, 14-15
173 Interact, 2001, 14-15
174 Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 10
175 Creasy, 2007: 3
176 See Chapter 1, section 1.4 below
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In contrast, within weak or passive forms, participation is either directed by others or 
the participant makes no contribution, either deliberately or through no such 
opportunity being available. Such passive participation may be characterised as 
manipulative or tokenistic.177 It has been used in political processes in totalitarian 
states to use inclusion to add greater legitimacy to outcomes, whilst effectively 
excluding individuals from any genuine participation which might challenge the status
178 • • • •quo. As Parry identifies, such participation is ‘unreal’ because the outcome is 
structurally predetermined.179 Participation is thus irrelevant, except in order to add a 
veneer of legitimacy. This demonstrates how participation and inclusion can be
• 1 ROmanipulated for particular ends. Alternatively, an individual may be part of a
particular community without being an active participant in that group. For example,
only 59.4% of UK voters participated in the 2001 election,181 and 61.4% in 2005, with
182over seventeen million people not participating who were entitled to vote. 
Participation simply understood as inclusion can therefore be passive.
Passive participation in the public realm has been characterised as activities such as 
socialising with a neighbour, using local facilities or voting in a television 
programme, as compared to active engagement such as charity work or the 
organisation of community events.183 The LITMUS levels184 consider information 
provision and consultation to be activities in which the public is either the passive
1 RSrecipient of information, or the passive source of ideas and concerns. Similarly,
177 Amstein, 1969: 217
178 Pring and Noe, 2002: 21
179 Parry, 1972: 16
180 See discussion in Chapter 1, section 1.2.3 below on participation as control or empowerment
181 Electoral Commission, 2005: 5
182 Electoral Commission, 2005: 7
183 Harrison and Singer, 2007: 55
184 Interact, 2001: 14-15
185 Interact, 2001: 14
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some analyses consider passive participation to be a technical means for the more 
effective implementation of a project, and active participation as a process of building 
confidence and solidarity.186
1.1.5: Levels o f participation
Finally, participation is commonly conceived as operating at the national level in its 
public/political role of regulating relations between state and citizen, as examined in 
section 1.1.1 above. However, it is important to recognise that participation can take 
place at different echelons of social and/or political structures, and may therefore 
enable influence over decision-making at different levels of society. These include the 
individual, family, community, national and international levels. For example, an 
individual would participate in different ways at different levels within the UK 
political context; depending on whether they participated as a voter, a local councillor, 
a national MP, an MEP or a Cabinet minister. Similarly in the context of the Catholic 
Church, participation could take place, for example, at the level of a local parishioner, 
a priest, a bishop, a cardinal or the Pope. There are hierarchies of participation within 
social and political structures. The impact of decisions therefore depends on the level 
at which they are being taken. For example, decisions taken within a national 
parliament will have effects across the state, whereas those taken at local government 
level will affect a much smaller area. Significantly, the level at which participation 
occurs may affect who is able to participate. For example, certain qualifications 
and/or experience may be required for participation at particular points in a hierarchy.
186 Ginther, 1992:73
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In addition, it must be recognised that due to the increasingly globalised and 
interconnected nature of the international system, participation in one area or on one 
level can increasingly affect participation in another. Participation that may have 
been hitherto understood at the local or national level can also have an international 
element. Decisions taken by states and other organisations exert influence over 
individuals and groups over great distances; global interdependence is increasing.187 
This requires further consideration of participation at the international level, and has 
led to participatory critiques of international decision-making structures; the 
‘democratic deficit’ of regional or global bodies such as the EU and UN188 resulting in 
global inequalities of access to participation.189 It is argued that individuals should be 
more able to directly influence decision-making structures in such institutions that 
have increasing influence over their lives.190 It has also been contended that due to 
‘blocked’ opportunities for participation at the national level social movement actors 
are increasing their operation at the international level,191 demonstrating the potential 
for participation beyond the national sphere.
It is therefore important to consider at what level particular structures of participation 
operate. Individuals may be able to influence decisions which affect them at one level 
but not at another. Furthermore, the identification of hierarchies of participation is one 
means to examine power relationships within structures of participation, as is further
192explored in the norms section below.
Keohane, 2005: 121
188 Scholte, 2004: 428-9; Held, 1995: 273-275; De Waart, 1995: 59
189 Benner et al, 2004: 195
190 Scholte, 2004: 420
191 Khagram et al, 2002: 19
192 Chapter 1, section 1.4
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1.2: The purpose of participation
In addition to the different ways in which participation occurs, examination of the 
concept of participation requires consideration of the ends to which it is oriented. As 
noted, participation is not a definite concept; it may therefore be used to achieve 
various different purposes. It is important to note this as there may be a tendency to 
automatically attach positive connotations to a process described as ‘participatory’.
1.2.1: Individual or communal
One perspective conceives of participation as an individual right which functions to 
protect individual interests within society, and to regulate the individual’s 
relationships both with government and with the other individuals who make up that 
society. This approach is fundamentally based in liberal political philosophy, which 
views participation as a way to assert and protect individual rights: it is a means by 
which citizens pursue their own interests.193 Furthermore, many justifications of the 
desirability of public participation are made on the basis of participation as an 
individual right.194 The function of the participation of the people in a representative 
democracy is to ensure good government is achieved through the sanction of loss of 
office. It thus functions to protect the interests of private individuals.195 Participation 
is also seen as the only means by which to gain knowledge of individual interests.196 
This position presents an understanding of participation as competitive in character; it 
is a means by which to regulate different interests. Similarly, representative models of 
democracy use political participation as a means by which to aggregate individual
193 Lauber and Knuth, 2000: 3
194 Barton, 2002: 87
195 Pateman, 1970: 19
196 Lucas, 1976: 143-144
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interests rather than to ensure inclusion of and consensus around all interests. This 
implies participation to be an adversarial rather than collective activity.
The contrasting perspective understands participation as a collective rather than 
individual activity with an orientation to a common good, rather than to separate 
interests. Non-secular societies tend to understand participation in this way, as 
religious belief is viewed as having a hierarchically superior claim over both the 
individual and the social order.197 The particular religious belief orders the specific 
mode and purpose of participation. The function of participation is to order society in 
line with principles derived from the religious beliefs of that society. This may be 
seen, for example, in Islamic philosophy, where the religious imperative is 
hierarchically superior to the political. Thus participation within Islam is oriented to 
the common goal of developing society in line with Islamic principles, which is of 
benefit to all members of society.198 Similarly, the communitarian political 
perspective sees participation not as a means to facilitate the assertion of individual 
interests, but as fundamentally oriented to the community and the common good;199 it 
thus has a collective rather than competitive purpose. Understandings of participation 
as a collective activity are also found in some analyses of traditional African social 
organisation, which emphasize the value of membership of a group and the role of 
participation within that group as a means by which to ensure social cohesion.200
In addition, some understandings of participation contain elements of both the 
individualist and communal perspectives. Deliberative understandings of democracy
197Moyser, 1991: 9-10
198 See for example Eisenstadt, 2002: 151, Leaman, 1999: 128-129
199 Selznick, 1998: 15
200 Marasinghe, 1984: 33; however, see also Cohen, 1993: 13-16 on the existence o f both communal 
and individualistic perspectives within traditional African societies.
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view enhanced participation as a means by which to improve the decision-making
processes within a society, and consider that harmony can be achieved for all
members of society rather than that competition between competing interests is 
• • 201inevitable. However, the deliberative perspective also emphasises the individual 
right to choose whether or not to participate as an integral aspect of participation. This 
perspective thus considers participation as having both individual and collective 
characteristics. Similarly the Confucian tradition sees participation as having both an 
individual and a collective role. The individual has a duty to participate in society in a 
manner conducive to the development of that society oriented to Confucian principles. 
Yet the individual is not entirely subsumed to the needs of society; through correct 
participation in this way the individual helps to achieve harmony on both personal and 
communal levels.202 The emphasis in feminist theories on the acceptance of 
difference203 also has both individual and communal aspects. Whilst inclusion of 
different individual or group interests is fundamental, this has a collective rather than 
competitive orientation. However, such collectivity is negotiated, diverse and 
contextual, rather than related to unchanging and over-ruling principles, as in 
religious societies.
1.2.2: Instrumental or substantive
A further duality in the way that the purpose of participation is understood is whether 
it is instrumental or substantive, or both. For example, some elements of deliberative 
theories of democracy see participation as having a substantive role. Such theories to 
some extent views participation as purely substantive: the participatory and
201 Cohen, 1997: 68, 72-75
202 Yao, 2000: 254
203 Grimshaw, 1986: 96; Cole, 1993: 2
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deliberative process itself is of value, regardless of the outcome produced, and the 
legitimacy of an outcome is achieved via its being produced via such a process.204
However, understandings of participation as instrumental consider participation 
primarily as a means to achieve certain ends. Firstly, it is contended that the 
involvement of larger numbers of people will mean that more information is fed into 
the decision-making process, thus leading to better decisions.205 Greater participation 
may also bring different perspectives to a debate,206 and participation can therefore be 
a means of resolving uncertainties and thus reaching more effective decisions207 
Participation is thus understood as a contribution to problem-solving208 and a means 
to enhance the quality and practical applicability of services, programmes and 
policies.209
Secondly, it is argued that a decision that is publicly arrived at will be better 
understood and more acceptable; conversely, that the demand for participation arises 
when there is discontent with the decisions taken.210 Inclusion in a process of 
decision-making enhances the legitimacy of the final outcome. Participation can 
therefore help to build confidence in decisions211 and in processes of decision-making.
Third, participation is viewed as a means to create a more cohesive and unified 
society; it offers a means to bring diverse and/or excluded groups together, overcome
204 Cohen, 1997: 73, Christiano, 1997: 244-245
205 Pring and N o6 ,2002: 22; Lucas, 1976: 139
206 Lucas, 1976: 139-140
207 Steele, 2001:416
208 Steele, 2001:417
209 Involve, 2005a: 14; Creasy, 2007: 2
210 Lucas, 1976: 141; Pring and No6, 2002: 22
211 Steele, 2001:416
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tensions or conflicts, and build relationships to consequently enable different interests 
to work together.212 In this way trust and cohesion within communities will be
i n
achieved.
A  good participatory process w ill engender consensus-building, help reconcile 
differences, and create a dynamic, inclusive vision for the future that gamers a shared 
sense o f  ownership. Participatory events are important not only for their outputs, but 
also because they bring com m unities together in a positive w ay, revealing shared 
values, mutual interests and com m on goals and helping to enhance social capital.214
Deliberative democracy ideology is centred around the premise that harmony within 
society can be achieved from the plurality of citizen’s interests, rather than this 
inevitably resulting in competition and strife, and that enhanced participation is the 
means to achieve this.215 This understanding of participation is also reflected in 
Islamic and Confucian philosophy, where norms of political participation are variable, 
and are legitimised solely by orientation to how far they achieve the end of improving 
society in line with Islamic or Confucian principles. Representative democracy also 
views participation as having instrumental value; voting is a means by which to 
achieve the ends of equality, inclusion and peace within society. Participation is 
therefore a means to achieve a common good.
Perspectives which consider participation as instrumental therefore imply that a 
participatory process itself does not have inherent value, as it is a means to an end. 
This further indicates that other means may be of equal or greater value if they 
achieve the identified end more effectively. This is in contrast to substantive
212 Involve, 2005a: 13; Wengert, 1976: 26-27
213 It should however be noted that Lucas (1976: 157) contends that enhanced opportunities for 
objection may lead to social discord and partisanship.
214 Thompson, 2004: 58
215 Bohman and Rehg, 1997: x; Johnson and Gavelin, 2007: 9
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understandings of participation which consider the participatory process itself as 
being of value, irrespective of the outcome.
However, some understandings of the purpose of participation mediate between these 
two outlooks. Positions which emphasize the benefits accrued to the individual 
through taking part in a participatory process view participation as instrumental as it 
is a means by which people engage with and learn about a process, but also indicate 
that involvement in the process of participation may also have independent value and 
may be an end in itself, on both the individual and societal levels. These perspectives 
identify that participation is self-enhancing; “the more the individual citizen 
participates, the better able he is to do so”.216 In addition, understanding participation 
as substantive implies that it is a means by which people engage in meaningful 
activity, which affects their own perceptions of their role as agents within society. It is 
argued that deliberative democracy has a transformative nature, as it enables citizens 
to adopt an ideal of the common good.217 The distinction between instrumental or 
substantive participation is also reflected in understandings of participation as 
mechanistic or humanistic. A mechanistic understanding views participation as a 
practical means to get input on something, whereas a humanistic conception of 
participation considers its function to be the expansion of people’s horizons and social 
contacts, and sense of their own power and ability.218 A differentiation may therefore 
be identified between participation as a means to gain information, and participation 
as a means of empowerment. Further, participation as a source of information may be 
considered a passive form, whereas participation as empowerment implies activity.
216Pateman, 1970: 25, 31
217 Hunt, Day and Kemp, 2001: 3
218 Involve, 2005b: 18
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1.2.3: Participation as control and empowerment
The purpose of participation is therefore linked to issues of control within societies, as 
it may provide a means by which to support or to challenge existing power structures. 
As Kenny identifies, “the essential element is control: who makes decisions, where, 
and how”.219
Firstly, participation can be a means by which people exercise control over those in 
power. Under democratic theory, both representative and deliberative, participation is 
understood as a means by which citizens of a state exercise control over those in 
authority. Whilst in the Western, post-Enlightenment tradition this perspective is 
firmly rooted in liberal theory, there are echoes of the social contract perspective in a 
number of other philosophical traditions. Within Islam, the Shari’a does not designate 
any particular political system but rather emphasizes good governance based on
9 90justice, equity and responsibility, thus implying that a poor ruler may legitimately
be removed. Similarly, Confucianism operates via the principle that “Heaven created
kingship for the people, not the people for the kingship”.221 Pre-industrial societies
also demonstrate this principle that the ruler maintains their position by the grace of
222their people and by their conduct. In societies without concentrated structures of 
power and authority participation may be a mechanism to achieve compliance with 
decisions, which cannot be enforced by other means 223 This implies the existence to 
some extent of cross-cultural agreement on participation as a means by which citizens 
may exercise control over those in authority, and identifies participation as a potential 
means to enable accountability.
219 Kenny, 2000: 18
220 Baderin, 2003: 157
221 Yao, 2000:168
222 Schapera, 1956: 211
223 Ross, 1988: 84
Furthermore, participation as control has an individual and personal aspect. The level 
of both perceived and actual control by the individual over decision-making processes 
can affect both the ability and the motivation to participate. Pateman identifies issues 
of control in Rousseau’s theory of participation; the individual’s actual and perceived 
freedom and control over his own destiny is increased via participation in decision­
making.224 Issues of participation are linked to how far the individual or group’s 
participation is felt to be meaningful; participation is thus a means for the individual 
to actively exercise control over their world.225 Lack of participation may therefore 
not be due to restricted opportunities, but result from cynicism concerning how far 
such participation would be effective.226
Similarly, some analyses also consider participation implicit in the concept of 
empowerment; empowerment should mean that people are able to participate actively 
in influencing and implementing decisions about their lives regarding political, 
economic, social and cultural issues.227 Participation may therefore be a means to 
challenge and redefine existing power relations. Particularly in the development 
context, participation is considered a means for the marginalised, deprived and/or 
excluded to exercise control over decision-making which affects them, and therefore 
to become more empowered.229 Participation is consequently an instrument of change
* 230which can help to overcome exclusion.
Pateman, 1970: 26
225 Ross, 1988: 74
226 The issue o f motivation is further discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.3
227 Drydyk, 2005: 247-248
228 Wengert, 1976: 26
229 McCaul, 2000: 92
230 McCaul, 2000: 94
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However, participation may also be used as means by which the powerful protect their 
position. Structures of participation may reflect existing patterns of power within a 
community and consequently exclude the already marginalised.231 The modes and 
orientation of participation may be controlled and directed in order to preserve 
particular power structures. This may clearly be seen in non-democratic regimes, 
which despite the expansion of democracy on the global level over the last fifty years, 
still govern a significant proportion of the world and exert considerable influence on 
understandings of history and politics.232 Under non-democratic regimes, rulers seek 
either to limit political participation or to direct it through tightly controlled channels, 
with the objective of limiting any threat to the regime posed by unregimented 
participation. Many authoritarian military governments adopted an exclusionary 
approach to participation in the second half of the twentieth century, and continue to 
do so, with methods of exclusion including execution, imprisonment or exclusion of 
political activists. This approach may be seen in, for example, Chile under Pinochet, 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and the current political regime in Burma. Limiting 
participation to elites is thus of form of social control. Alternatively, patron-client 
networks, particularly found within the developing world, also operate as a means by 
which to control participation, both in democratic and non-democratic regimes. The 
higher status patron is able to control the political behaviour -  voting or more 
informal means of support - of the client in exchange for protection and security in a 
context of inequality.233
In addition, mass participation may also be used as a means of control. Whilst mass 
participation in communist regimes always exceeded participation in liberal
231 Barton, 2002: 109; Williams, 2004: 562
232 Brooker, 2000: 1
233 Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 1998: 88
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democracies, these governments demanded political participation from all citizens as 
a means of demonstrating support for the regime, and all such participation was 
controlled and directed according to Party guidance.234 Inclusion as a participant can 
therefore itself be a form of control, as bringing the formerly excluded into a process 
can itself disempower them to challenge the power relations which led to their 
exclusion, whilst failing to offer genuine empowerment.235 For example, Banda notes 
that in the African context indigenous men were included in the redefinition of 
customary law by the colonising powers in order to secure their cooperation.236 In the 
development context, the use of participatory processes can be used as means to 
demonstrate the success of a scheme and secure donor approval, rather than being
937oriented to genuine empowerment.
Participation may therefore underlie control and power structures or may provide a 
means to challenge them. There is an inherent ambiguity within participation meaning 
that it is a contested ground between those who would use it as a means to achieve
238certain ends and those who emphasise its emancipatory and empowering potential. 
This ambiguous nature of participation as enabling both empowerment and control 
means that it “may indeed be a form of ‘subjection’, but it can also provide its 
subjects with new opportunities for voice, and its consequences are far from pre­
determined”.239
234 Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 1998: 84
235 Kothari, 2001: 142-143
236 Banda, 2003: 8
237 Williams, 2004; 563
238 Parfitt, 2004: 555
239 Williams, 2004: 559
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1.2.4: Participation and legitimacy
Finally, an important purpose of participation can be to confer legitimacy on 
outcomes. Participation may increase the legitimacy and therefore the acceptability of 
decisions, rendering them more credible particularly in the eyes of those who have 
been involved in making them.240 As Bodansky identifies “participation can 
contribute to popular legitimacy by giving stakeholders a sense of ownership in the 
process”.241 For example, in the democratic tradition, the authority to exercise power 
is rendered legitimate via its foundation in the collective decisions of the members of 
the society governed by that power.242 In representative democracy this is expressed 
via the election of officials. In deliberative democracy243 legitimate decision-making 
emanates from the public deliberation of citizens;244 “a public sphere of deliberation 
about matters of mutual concern is essential to the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions”.245 The deliberative process is therefore required to confer legitimacy on 
the outcome. Legitimacy within democracies is thus dependent on the political 
participation of citizens, whatever form that may take.
Participation as legitimacy may also operate in a more indirect manner. For example, 
Gluckman identifies that in some traditional societies legitimacy is dependent on the 
ruler providing for the people, and they may oust him if he fails in this.246 Similarly, 
rulers within Muslim societies must adhere to a particular social and moral code, and 
their legitimacy is thus determined by the wider Islamic religious community via
240 Barton, 2002: 105; Lee and Abbot, 2003: 85
241 Bodansky, 1999; 617, see also Involve, 2005a: 72
242 Cohen, 1996:95
243 See section 1.1.3 above concerning deliberative forms of democracy
244 Bohman and Rehg, 1997: ix, also Dryzek, 2000: 1, Goodin, 2000: 82
245 Benhabib, 1996: 68
246 Gluckman, 1965: 124, 133
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informal rather than institutionalised forms of accountability.247 This implies a right to 
participate in the political and social structure, albeit indirectly, as people participate 
in determining whether a particular ruler is legitimate or not. The legitimacy of 
authority is therefore dependent on participation, as in modem democratic states.248
These two conceptualisations of the relationship between participation and legitimacy 
reflect Scharpf s theory of input and output legitimacy,249 which further illustrates the 
importance of participation to legitimacy. Participation in democratic political 
systems, both representative and direct, reflects input legitimacy, as decisions are 
legitimised through the participation of the population, either through voting or more 
direct forms. Decisions are therefore legitimate because there has been appropriate 
participation in taking them. The right to challenge an ineffective ruler represents 
output legitimacy, as the ruler’s authority is judged according their effectiveness. 
Whilst these are two different ways of establishing the legitimacy of decisions, they 
both indicate a central role for participation, either in the original process of decision­
making, or in evaluating the effects of the decision.
Conversely, restricted participation can provoke dissatisfaction on the part of those 
who have been excluded.250 This may lead to accusations of illegitimacy on the basis 
of a lack of participation. For example, a lack of participation leads to the democratic 
deficit critique which has been levelled at regional251 and international252 decision­
247 Eisenstadt, 2002: 152-154
248 It should be noted that the legitimacy o f the ruler as being dependent on democratic forms of  
participation is a relatively new phenomenon; there has been a long tradition o f more absolute forms of  
governance throughout Europe and beyond. However, these absolute forms still allowed for the 
legitimacy o f the ruler to be addressed by more indirect forms of participation.
249 Scharpf, 1997
250 Bodansky, 1999: 617
251 Bodansky, 1999: 618, Scharpf, 1997: 19
252 See Chapter 5, section 2.1 for discussion o f the democratic deficiencies o f the UN
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making institutions. This has in turn led to complaints that such institutions are not 
legitimate decision-makers, as they limit or exclude participation. This illustrates how 
legitimacy can be challenged on participatory grounds.
In addition, the role of participation in enhancing the perceived legitimacy of 
decisions means that it may be used as a technique to gain political support and
• • • 253  • • • •legitimation. Participation via inclusion can be used to legitimate a particular 
process or specific power relations without offering a means of empowerment. For 
example, a consultation on a particular issue may be used to legitimate the final 
decision, even if the results of the consultation have been ignored or the consultation 
itself is flawed. This contention was implied by Greenpeace against the UK 
government concerning the consultation on the use of nuclear power.254 The examples 
given above concerning participation in totalitarian states also show how participation
*)ce
is manipulated to provide legitimacy. This demonstrates that due to the relationship 
between participation and legitimacy, even passive or misrepresented forms of 
participation can be utilised in order to enhance the authority of a particular process or 
decision.
It must finally be noted that participation is not the only source of legitimacy. 
Although a participatory process can confer either genuine or manipulated legitimacy 
on outcomes, participation is not an inherent requirement for legitimate decision­
making, unless of course that process requires certain forms of participation in order 
to be legitimate. For example, legitimate decision-making can also ensue from the
253 Wengert, 1976: 26
254 Greenpeace Limited v. Secretary o f  State for Trade and Industry CO/8197/2006 [2007] EWHC 311 
(Admin), para. 44
255 See Chapter 1, section 1.1.4 above
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independence and expertise of those making the decision, or legitimate decision­
making authority can derive from a particular source, such as God, or from the 
success of the outcome.256 However, if participation is considered instrumental rather 
than substantive, legitimacy is one of the ends to which it may be oriented.
1.3: The feasibility of participation
Feasible participation is determined by the existence of both opportunities for 
participation and the ability and motivation to make use of those opportunities. 
Barriers to participation consequently result in a lack of opportunities and access,257 
and result from socio-economic, cultural, resource-based and physical factors.
Opportunities for participation are clearly the first requirement for participation to 
occur; if such options do not exist, then participation cannot ensue. For example, an 
individual has no opportunity to participate through voting for a political 
representative in a state which does not hold elections. The opportunity to participate 
therefore entails the existence of possibilities for participation. These opportunities 
take the form of modes of participation as examined above. Furthermore, the 
existence of such opportunities is affected by participation in other areas, in particular 
participation in constructing the norms of participation.258 However, opportunities for 
participation only indicate the potential for participation. If opportunities for 
participation are to translate into effective participation, the ability and desire to make 
use of those opportunities are also required.
256 Bodansky, 1999:612
257 Johnson and Gavelin, 2007: 12
258 See Chapter 1, section 1.4
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People are differently placed in terms of both their desire and ability to participate in 
public life, as both the ability and the desire to participate are affected by socio­
economic status. Comparisons both within and across societies show higher levels of 
participation correlating with higher socio-economic status,259 and the lowest levels of 
both formal and informal participation among the poorest in society.260 Hague et al 
identify a ‘law of increasing disproportion’: “the higher the level of political 
authority, the greater the representation for high-status social groups”.261 Verba et al 
agree with this analysis of the inequality of participation within democratic systems; 
that those higher on social and economic hierarchies within a society are better able to 
participate in public life and thus to influence political decisions,262 as members of 
higher socio-economic groups are more likely to have both the resources and the 
motivation to participate.263
In addition, particular groups may face specific exclusion or marginalisation. As 
Amstein identifies, racism and paternalism constitute considerable roadblocks to 
effective participation.264 Ethnic identity can affect participation, with ongoing 
inequalities as well as outright discrimination and racial abuse remaining significant 
barriers.265 For example, participation in UK local government has been criticised as 
profoundly unequal, primarily representing a “pale, male and stale” perspective, with 
ethnic minorities remaining “grossly under-represented”.266 This is further reflected in 
the UK House of Commons, with 17.9 percent of all MPs being women, and 1.8
259 Ross, 1988: 73
260 Johnson and Gavelin, 2007: 12
261 Putnam, quoted in Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 1998: 82
262 Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 5
263 Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 1998: 82
264 Amstein, 1969:217
265 Johnson and Gavelin, 2007: 14
266 Johnson and Gavelin, 2007: 11
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percent being ethnic minorities in 2001.267 Men are more likely than women to 
participate politically, with the disparity becoming greater as one moves from mass 
activities such as voting to more specific acts such as occupying office.268 Children, 
of course, are almost totally excluded.
Exclusion of particular groups from specific forms of participation can operate in both 
the public and private spheres. Banda notes how power differentials within private 
social structures such as the family can impact on the ability to participate.269 For 
example, certain cultural or social norms deem that women should not vote. This may 
be formalised, such as in Saudi Arabia, or more implicit, where women do not have 
the resources to travel to the ballot box, or are prevented from gaining education. In 
the former cases, the opportunity (and therefore ability) to participate is denied, in the 
latter, restriction of ability impedes participation. Other vulnerable groups may be 
similarly marginalised in this way, either explicitly or implicitly. For example, black 
people were formally denied the right to vote in apartheid South Africa, and literacy 
tests have been used in the US to informally disenfranchise African-Americans. 
Similarly, the elections in Zimbabwe in 2008 did not formally prevent anyone from 
voting, but the use of violence and intimidation prevented people from participating in 
this way.
Consequently, the marginalisation of vulnerable groups affects both formal and 
informal modes of participation. It should also be noted that informal means of 
participation may develop in response to the restriction of formal means, in terms of 
both opportunity and ability. For example, exclusion from formal decision-making
267 Peele, 2004: 204-205
268 Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 234-235
269 Banda, 2003: 2
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processes may lead to attempts to influence the outcome of those processes by use of 
public pressure directed through the media or through forms of public disobedience. 
Nonetheless, marginalised groups can also be excluded from informal participation. 
The interests and preferences of dominant groups are more highly represented than 
marginalised communities both in formal structures of participation and in informal 
modes, such as the media.270
Participation is also affected by both the level and the organisation of resources within
• on i •a society. The availability of resources affects both individual ability to participate 
and institutional provision of opportunities for participation. Costs to institutions 
include the direct costs of staff time, running events and participant expenses, indirect 
costs such as the provision of new skills via training, and the potential reputational 
cost to the institution.272 Costs to individuals or groups vary dependent on the 
particular participatory activity. For example, voting is relatively cost free, unless the 
individual has to pay for transport to the polling station. Informal campaigning could 
be extremely expensive; international organisations fly to meetings around the world, 
and produce large amounts of campaigning literature.
Non-monetary resources also affect participation. Time pressure affects levels of 
participation across different social groups, with Harrison and Singer contending that 
women feel more pressured than men, the young more than the old, and parents more 
than the childless, which shapes the degree to which these groups engage with the 
public realm.273 For example, local government meetings in the UK are open to the
270 Wheatley, 2003: 514
271 Ross, 1988: 73
272 Involve, 2005a, 79-81
273 Harrison and Singer, 2007: 50. Note this is in the UK context
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public, but usually take place during working hours. Few people are able to take time 
off work to attend such meetings. This inevitably restricts participation to particular 
groups, such as students or retired people. Similarly, time and numbers are the 
primary problems associated with deliberative models of democracy. “The challenge 
facing deliberative democrats is thus to find some way of adapting their deliberative 
ideals to any remotely large-scale society, where it is simply infeasible to arrange 
face-to-face discussions across the entire community”.274 This demonstrates how 
practical factors can affect the realization in practice of theoretical forms of 
participation.
Knowledge and skills constitute additional resources which affect the ability to 
participate. Participation requires firstly the existence of knowledge that particular 
opportunities for participation exist. For example, if an individual is unaware that they 
live in a democracy and have a right to vote then they will not make use of this form 
of participation. This is a specific form of knowledge related to the processes of 
participation. Other forms of knowledge also impact on the ability to participate, 
including subsidiary or constitutive forms of knowledge such as literacy and 
education. For example, if an individual is unable to read they will not be able to vote 
in a system which requires putting a mark next to a candidate’s name on a ballot 
paper. As Creasy identifies, some groups may “be overwhelmed and excluded 
because they don’t understand the language or structures used”.275
Physical access can also affect the ability to participate. Individuals with physical 
disabilities may not be able to access a particular building or room, and may therefore
274 Goodin, 2000: 82
275 Creasy 2007:4
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not be able to participate in a meeting held in that location. However, other barriers 
deriving from physical access may be more subtle. For example, the need to travel to 
a location with a lack of public transport would implicitly exclude those who do not 
have access to a private car.
Finally, motivation also affects the ability to participate. Harrison and Singer point to 
“strong attitudinal barriers to engagement” among lower income working people.276 
Verba et al also link higher socio-economic status to interest in political 
participation.277 Motivation to participate can be linked to the extent to which people 
feel that their participation will make a difference to the outcome. For example, low 
turnouts in the 2001 and 2005 UK general elections are considered to have been due 
to a combination of the result being seen as a foregone conclusion, and the difference
978between the parties as too narrow. In consequence, voting was seen to make little 
difference to the outcome.
The issue of motivation illustrates that the factors identified which affect the 
feasibility of participation act in conjunction with each other. If an individual or group 
perceives that they are excluded from opportunities and/or the ability to participate in 
a certain way, this will affect their motivation to do so. Similar relationships exist 
between other restrictions on the ability to participate. Time and financial pressures 
also affect motivation, as participation is not prioritised.
Fundamentally, this analysis must emphasize that opportunities for and the ability to 
participate are unequal. This results in disproportionate levels of participation from
276 Harrison and Singer, 2007: 54
277 Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 291
278 Electoral Commission, 2005: para 4.2
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higher socio-economic groups and the “usual suspects”.279 In addition, participation 
has the potential for reproducing social inequalities if it only gives voice to particular
elements within communities and therefore enables them to extend their power and
280 • •influence. Participation spaces are not used in an equal way as power and privilege
shape the dynamics of participation 281 “Unequal levels of participation, both formal
and informal, are a vicious cycle that leads to increased disempowerment and 
• 282inequality”. Current forms of participation affect future structures of participation, 
as will now be considered.
1.4: The norms of participation
Sections 1.1 to 1.3 above have considered the forms participation may take, the 
purposes it serves and the practical factors which may enhance or restrict it. However, 
such analysis has not examined structures of participation concerning how such norms 
of participation are themselves determined, by whom, and to what purpose.
Examination of the norms of participation consequently entails looking at 
participation itself from a critical perspective. This aspect of participatory analysis is 
particularly important because it enables consideration of the power relationships and 
implicit assumptions which may underlie traditional or accepted forms of 
participation, and it interrogates how far structures of participation are actually 
empowering or inclusive.
279 The ‘usual suspects’ are those who habitually participate in various processes; see Involve, 2005b: 
35.
280 Drydyk, 2005:261
281 Gaventa, 2002: 7
282 Johnson and Gavelin, 2007: 15
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Firstly, analysis of the norms of participation must consider who has constructed 
particular forms of participation and what interests and power relationships are 
represented or reproduced. As Gaventa identifies, no spaces for participation are 
neutral, “but are shaped by the power relations which both enter and surround them”; 
more attention must therefore be paid to who is creating these participatory spaces
283  • • •and why. A distinction may be drawn between top-down and bottom-up 
participation. Top-down participation implies determination of participatory norms by 
those in power, and consequently of participation directed by and oriented to their 
needs. In contrast, a bottom-up approach to participation considers people as active 
agents rather than passive clients or subjects of participatory processes.284 These 
approaches centralise autonomous forms of actions though which people determine 
their own terms of engagement, rather than merely accepting invitations to 
participate.285 Similarly, ‘downstream’ and ‘upstream’ approaches have been 
contrasted, which distinguish between, respectively, forms of participation which are 
predetermined by those in power, and forms of participation which are open to 
redefinition as part of the process of participation by the participants involved. The 
upstream approach is described as an “honest and reflexive mode of listening and 
exchange”,286 indicating that structures of participation which are open and inclusive, 
and which allow for ongoing self-definition of participants are considered more 
genuine.
Consideration of the norms of participation interrogates the process by which 
participants are included, and the principles on which such inclusion or exclusion is
283 Gaventa, 2002: 7
284 Kannan and Pillai, 2005: 213
285 Cornwall, 2002: 50
286 Wilsdon and Willis, 2004: 56
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based. Williams identifies the dangers of the naturalization of arbitrary spatial 
divisions in terms of both power structures and potential for exclusion from 
participation of those who fall outside these boundaries.287 This demonstrates how 
construction of the geographical norms of participation may function to exclude, 
perhaps deliberately, certain groups from structures of participation. For example, 
determination of the boundaries of constituencies may function to the advantage of 
certain candidates.
The way in which a debate is framed -  the lens through which it is viewed288 - affects 
the norms of participation in decision-making regarding that issue, as “some framings 
are clearly associated with particular social groups and their values and worldview”, 
and concerns that do not fall within the traditional framing of an issue may be 
excluded 289 Therefore, the way in which an issue is framed and the participants who 
frame it have a fundamental impact on what is under consideration and how it is to be 
considered. The twenty-first report of the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution identifies the importance of taking wider social or ethical values into 
account in decision-making, rather than just focussing on a narrow band of factors 
regarding a particular issue.290 This indicates the importance of framing the context of 
a debate, and of determining what range of issues can be taken into account when 
making a decision. The way in which people participate and the outcome of that 
participation is affected by the norms and values which frame the debate. 
Furthermore, as Knop identifies, the various participants may view the same debate in 
different ways in relation to their own interests and expectations; “participation is
287 Williams, 2004: 561-562
288 Hunt, Day and Kemp, 2001: 3
289 Hunt, Day and Kemp, 2001: 3; Lee and Abbot, 2003: 87
290 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1998: 101
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experienced and processed through an idea of participation”.291 It is therefore 
necessary to examine how the same participatory process may be framed differently 
by different participants in order to examine how that participation is understood and 
to what ends it is directed.
Consequently, the degree of inclusion of different participants which exists in 
determining the norms of participation, or the extent to which it is possible for 
participants to challenge or redefine existing norms, affects the extent to which 
participation can be considered effective and legitimate. Such ‘genuine’ participation 
is considered to require ‘front-end’ participation in determining what the problems are 
and what constitutes a legitimate decision making process.292 Kenny also identifies 
the importance of participation in the diagnosis of the problem to be addressed and the 
design of policies to address it. This indicates that genuine participation goes 
beyond inclusion in the assessment of policies, but must also include participation in 
determination of the terms of a debate, which of necessity involves shaping the forms 
and purpose of structures of participation. As Hunt et al note, failure to allow a 
reflexive process of framing “will tend to compromise the legitimacy of a 
consultation, and hence the durability of any decisions, because participants will feel 
that they have not been given any real place in the decision-making process”.294 
Furthermore, it is contended that genuine participation requires “organic entities 
created by the people for collective operations, and shaped and patterned according to 
their design”.295 Construction of the norms of participation though bottom-up
291 Knop, 2002:215
292 Hunt, Day and Kemp, 2001: 12
293 Kenny, 2000: 8
294 Hunt, Little wood and Thompson, 2003: 27
295 Ginther, 1992: 73
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processes is therefore considered to produce correct and effective structures of 
participation.
Furthermore, as discussed above, participation can have various purposes, in 
particular regarding power and control. The construction of the norms of participation 
has a fundamental impact on what that participation will achieve, and whose interests 
it will promote. A common criticism of participatory practices is that although 
stakeholders may be able to influence decision-making, the wider range of options has 
already been established.296 Alarms have been raised particularly in the development 
context regarding the ‘rhetoric’ of participation, where those in power seek to retain 
control rather than to enable genuine grassroots empowerment.297 Limited 
participation in the construction of the norms of participation limits the emancipatory 
potential of participation, as “what people are ‘empowered to do’ is to take part in the 
modem sector of ‘developing’ societies”.298 This reflects not reflexive participation 
but participation oriented to a pre-determined and unchallenged goal. If the goal of 
participation is empowerment, then genuine participation in the construction of the 
norms of participation is essential.299
This analysis indicates that ‘genuine’ participation should be inclusive and open to 
processes of redefinition. It should be oriented to the determination of an acceptable 
result, rather than the ratification or legtimation of a pre-determined outcome. 
Confrontation between individuals and those in power often occurs due to a lack of a 
truly participatory process; that people are frustrated when they are not given the
296 Drydek, 2005:263
297 Ginther, 1992; 73
298 Henkel and Stirrat, in Williams, 2004: 563
299 Parfitt, 2004: 539
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opportunity to develop and consider alternative courses of action, rather than merely 
to comment on predetermined plans.300 Participation in the construction of the norms 
of participation can affect the extent to which a participatory process is considered 
legitimate; “if any step—determining who participates, how they deliberate, what 
information will be provided and by whom, how decisions will be made and the 
influence they will have—is judged to be insufficiently equitable by any of those 
involved or affected by the deliberation, the whole process tends to fall into 
disrepute”.301 This indicates the importance of participants’ ability to challenge or 
redefine how a participatory process is conducted. “Public and stakeholder 
involvement in determining the guiding principles is increasingly recognized as 
essential for establishing the legitimacy of the overall process”,302 which leads to 
wider public acceptability of decisions.303
Furthermore, participation in the definition of the norms of participation is considered 
to produce more effective structures of participation. Involve304 identify that in order 
to address problematic aspects of participation the perspective of the participants must 
be taken into account. These perspectives are critical to defining the true costs and 
benefits of participation. Inclusion of participants in evaluation regarding structures 
and processes of participation can enhance other participatory methods. 
Furthermore, such “participatory evaluation of participatory programmes provides 
“continuing opportunities for people to engage in the decisions and processes which
300 Thompson, 2001: 59
301 Hartz-Karp, 2007: 18
302 Hunt, Day and Kemp, 2001: 23
303 Hunt, Littlewood and Thompson, 2003; 6
304 Involve, 2005a, 16
305 Interact paper, 2001: 5
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affect their lives”.306 In this way participation itself extends and enhances 
participation; through participating in a process, people are able to evaluate how a 
process of participation should be designed and conducted in order to be most 
effective, inclusive and genuine.
Normative participation is therefore linked to understandings of participation as active 
or passive. Involvement in the construction of norms of participation implies a 
fundamentally active form of participation contrasted to that in which participatory 
norms are already determined and/or not open to challenge. It also emphasizes the 
voluntary aspect of participation: that it is a choice, rather than people being coerced 
into participation. Furthermore, participation in constructing the norms of 
participation may be via formal or informal means; participation outside accepted 
structures can include either subversion or rejection of predetermined norms, which 
itself constitutes potentially new forms of participation.307
However, the problem with considering participation in the construction of the norms 
of participation is that the question is constantly raised as to who has determined a 
particular participatory process and to what ends, and it is impossible to provide a 
definitive answer. It is possible that this can be addressed to some extent through 
emphasizing a continuous process of reflexivity within participation, although this 
itself would raise the question of who determines what constitutes a reflexive process 
of participation. Nevertheless, consideration of how participatory norms have been 
constructed is essential if the power relationships and interests behind participation 
are to be fully understood.
306 Interact paper, 2001: 10
307 Williams, 2004: 566; Kothari, 2001: 142
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Part 2: Participation and human rights
Part 1 has discussed the various ways in which participation can be understood and 
the factors which influence the degree and type of participation found in a particular 
context. It has shown that participation can serve different interests and produce 
various outcomes; that it is by no means an inherently positive force. It is therefore 
vital to consider the specific ways in which participation should be used in a human 
rights context, rather than simply assuming that enhanced participation in human 
rights is of value.
Having discussed the conceptualisation of participation in the abstract, this chapter 
now applies these understandings of participation to the specific context of human 
rights. Part 2 will assess which of these various forms of participation is most 
appropriate for human rights, in relation both to its underlying principles and 
fundamental purposes. The aim of Part 2 is therefore to identify firstly what is meant 
by human rights, and consequently to derive what type of participation is most 
appropriate for human rights. This will then be used in chapters 2 to 4 as a reference 
point to compare the extent to which the principles and structures of international 
human rights law manifest these particular types of participation.
2.1: The meaning of human rights
Understandings of the basis, meaning and content of human rights are also hugely 
variable, and mean different things to different people.308 As Henkin identifies, 
“’human rights’ is common parlance, but not all agree on its meaning and
308 Clapham, 2007: 1-4. See Woodiwiss, 2005 for comparative study o f understandings of human rights 
in different contexts.
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significance”.309 Human rights consequently have different meanings in different 
contexts, and can be understood from legal, academic or practitioner perspectives. 
Key debates include consideration of the philosophical basis of human rights310 and 
assess whether the source of human rights stems from positive or natural law and 
whether they should be considered legal or moral obligations.311 There is considerable 
disagreement regarding a definitive list of rights and the extent to which these are 
universal and/or represent customary law, ranging from the full scope of rights 
contained in the UDHR,313 to definitions which focus on basic314 or subsistence rights, 
or civil and political rights,315 to narrower understandings based on peremptory (jus 
cogens) norms of international law. Other debates consider the nature of ‘rights’ in
^ 1 f tterms of their justiciability, or as being inherent or conferred, and the relationship 
between rights and responsibilities. Human rights have also been considered in terms 
of the obligations deriving from them.317 Finally, challenges have been made, and 
defences mounted, to the universal basis of human rights.318
This variety is further reflected in the interview data collected for this study. The 
question of ‘what are human rights’ elicited a multiplicity of answers, which 
demonstrated reflection in practice of the conceptual debates identified regarding the 
nature of human rights. ‘Human rights’ was understood as a means to limit
309 Henkin, 2000: 5
310 Freeman, 1994, Henkin, 2000: 4-7
311 Nickel, 2007: 10
312 Clapham, 2006: 86
313 see for example Gibney, 2008: 3
314 Shue, 1996: 18-34; see also Donnelly, 1989: 37-45
315 See Donnelly, 1989, 28-37 on the civil-political/economic-social-cultural dichotomy in human 
rights, also Arambulo, 1999: 16-20; Woodiwiss, 2005: 121.
316 Arambulo, 1999: 83-88
317 Skogly, 2006: 57-72; Clapham, 2006; Shue, 1996
318 See inter alia Mutua, 2002; Woodiwiss, 2003; Cema, 1994; Penna and Campbell, 1998; Baderin, 
2001; Pannikar, 1982
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government behaviour,319 and as a means to enhance individual freedom.320 Human 
rights were perceived as inherent,321 but also contextual.322 They were considered 
both as being manifested through international law323 and as having a more personal 
significance.324 Human rights were also identified as having legal, political and 
theoretical meanings.
Clearly, a detailed examination of all of the various meanings and understandings of 
human rights is beyond the scope of this project. However, for the purposes of this 
analysis four key concerns of human rights are identified: universality, empowerment, 
dignity and justice.
Firstly, although neither the content of current human rights nor the entire concept of 
human rights is universally accepted, universality remains “a central tenet in human 
rights discourse”. Human rights define themselves as universal; they are “the rights 
that one has simply because one is a human being”.327 If human rights were not 
universal, they would not be human rights.328 Furthermore, positive international 
human rights law also confirms universality as a key characteristic of human rights. 
The first major statement of human rights in international law, the UDHR, by its very 
name explicitly proclaims itself as a statement of universal principles. This 
universality is further declared through reference to the rights of “all members of the 
human family” and “all peoples and all nations” (Preamble); consequently the UDHR
319 ID 50, 29/01/08
320 ID 33, 15/01/08
321 ID 32, 17/01/08
322 ID 26,30/10/07
323 ID 9, 17/10/07
324 ID 41, 16/01/08; ID 11, 10/01/08
325 ID 20, 25/01/08
326 Banda, 2003: 3
327 Donnelly, 2003: 10
328 Panikkar, 1982: 93
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“constitutes a manifesto advocating the universality of human rights”.329 The principle 
of the universal application of human rights is accentuated in subsequent instruments. 
The Preambles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) both 
refer to “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”, and 
use language such as “all peoples”,330 “every human being”331 and “the right of 
everyone”332 to underline the universality of the rights codified within them.333 
Similar statements of universality, both implicit and explicit, are found in other 
human rights conventions.334 Finally, Article 1 of the Vienna Declaration335 explicitly 
confirmed that “the universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond 
question... they are the birthright of all human beings”.
In addition, the principles of equality and non-discrimination which underlie the 
concept of human rights further testify to their intrinsic universality. These principles 
are reiterated in numerous human rights instruments, including the ICCPR336 and 
ICESCR and more specifically the International Convention on the Elimination of
329 Tomuschat, 2003: 58
330 ICCPR, Article 1; ICESCR Article 1
331 ICCPR, Article 6
332 ICESCR, Articles 6-9
333 As Tomuschat identifies, exceptions to the universal nature of the rights contained within the 
ICCPR are related to the substance o f the rights concerned , for example Article 13 on the expulsion of  
aliens, and Article 25 on the political participation o f citizens (2003: 59). While such exceptions exist, 
normative human rights principles are fundamentally universal.
334 For example, “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out [within the UDHR]” 
(Preambles to the International Convention on the Rights o f the Child and the International Convention 
on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination); “all members o f the human family 
(Preambles to the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and the International Convention on the Rights o f the Child)”, “universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights” (Preamble to the International Convention Against 
Torture); “the universality... o f all human rights” (Preamble to the International Covenant on the Rights 
of People with Disabilities).
335 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, as adopted by the World Conference on Human 




All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (ICEDAW)338 and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).339 
This additional emphasis that human rights are to be enjoyed by all, equally and 
without discrimination, requires human rights to be universal. Furthermore, the 
inalienability of human rights is additional testament to their inherent universality, as 
it means that the inescapable fact that human rights are not universally enjoyed in 
practice does not detract from their innate conceptual universality. This inalienable 
quality of human rights is underlined within the human rights discourse, with the first 
principles of the Preambles to the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR all making 
reference to “inalienable rights”. As Skogly identifies, human rights exist irrespective 
of their respect in practice; that “even though the substance of the right is taken away, 
the right as such remains”.340 Consequently, universality must be considered an 
inherent characteristic of human rights.
Secondly, human rights are concerned with freedom. The form that this freedom 
takes, its limits and how it is negotiated are debated, but the central tenet of human 
rights as an expression of freedom remains. As reflected in Roosevelt’s Four 
Freedoms speech of 1941,341 human rights encompasses both freedom from  (for 
example, hunger, poverty, abuse; Roosevelt identified ‘fear’ and ‘want’), and freedom 
to (Roosevelt specifying freedom of speech and religion). Freedom in human rights 
therefore encompasses both emancipation and empowerment. The capabilities 
approach to freedom links these two elements of freedom through positing it as the
338 For example, Articles 1 and 3
339 Articles 1(1) and 2(1)
340 Skogly, 2001:48
341 Henkin, 2000: 4
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capability to fulfil those aspirations the individual has reason to value.342 This 
approach establishes freedom within human rights as empowerment, through 
identifying freedom as the power to exert control over one’s own life, including the 
fulfilment of human rights.
Furthermore, situating suffering in the context of human rights is a means of 
empowerment,343 because “human rights express not merely aspirations, suggestions, 
requests, or laudable ideas, but rights-based demands for social change”; they 
therefore empower citizens to act to claim the fulfilment of these standards and to 
defend their rights against abuse of power.344 As Shue identifies, “a right is the 
rational basis... for a justified demand”.345 Empowerment is therefore the means to 
effect human rights change.346 In addition, the typical tripartite theory of human rights 
obligations identifies the obligation to facilitate as part of the obligation to fulfil,347 
which entails enabling and empowering people to enjoy human rights. Empowerment 
of individuals is therefore recognised as part of the state’s obligations concerning the 
protection of human rights. Whilst there remains disagreement over the meaning and 
application of empowerment, in the final analysis rights are fundamentally concerned 
with empowerment348 and it must therefore be considered one of the main goals of 
human rights.
342 Sen, 1999: 18; Kannan and Pillai, 2005: 209
343 Clapham, 2007: 162
344 Donnelly, 1989: 15; Petersmann, 2001: 10
345 Shue, 1996: 14
346 Kenny, 2000: 19
347 Skogly, 2006, 7; see also E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12, 28 June 1998, para 52 (c)
348 Coomaraswamy, 1994: 45
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Thirdly, human rights are oriented to the dignity of the human person, “described as 
the ‘super-value’ for the justification of human rights”.349 Dignity is central to the 
philosophical foundations of the UDHR as set out in Article 1, which specifically 
stresses the inherent value of human dignity,350 and it is further referenced in other 
human rights instruments.351 It has also been identified by the General Assembly as an 
essential reference point for the development of human rights standards.352 
Furthermore, the concept of dignity is a recurring theme throughout the human rights 
discourse, even its more critical elements. This can been seen for example 
regarding Mutua who, whilst heavily criticising “current official human rights 
rhetoric”, nonetheless centralises the protection or enhancement of human dignity as 
the goal of a reformulated human rights,354 This position indicates that acceptance of 
the concept of human rights entails recognition of the centrality of human dignity to 
that concept.
Finally, human rights are concerned with justice and accountability. The concept of 
human rights invokes the principle that states are not free to treat their citizens 
however they wish, as human rights impose a minimum standard of protection355 on 
states through the establishment of limits on legitimate state behaviour.356 This 
concern with justice is further demonstrated by the human rights focus on injustice;357
349 Baderin, 2001:90
350 Clapham, 2007: 43
351 For example, the Preamble to the ICCPR refers to “the inherent dignity...of all members of the 
human family”, as do the Preambles to the ICAT and the ICPD. Article 1 o f the ICPD also determines 
the purpose o f the treaty as being the promotion o f  respect for the dignity o f persons with disabilities. 
See also Clapham, 2006: 537, at note 14.
352 General Assembly Resolution 41/120, 1986, para 4(b)
353 Mutua, 2002: 8; see also Clapham, 2006: 533, and for discussion o f the concept o f dignity in human 
rights Clapham, 2006: 535-544.
354 Mutua, 2002: 8
355 Shue 1996, Nickel 2007: 3
356 Skogly, 2006; 47
357 Nickel, 2007: 3
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human rights are a means to achieve justice by overcoming injustice. It is also 
reflected in the concept of equality within human rights; that a just system requires 
equality of protection in order to be fair. Furthermore, human rights reflect the 
principle that states both are accountable and should be held accountable for their 
behaviour towards their citizens; that states have a duty of protection of human rights. 
The Vienna Declaration reiterated that ‘the promotion and protection of human rights 
is a legitimate concern of the international community’;358 consequently, the way in 
which a state treats people within its territory is not just a matter for that state
359alone. Justice and accountability are therefore additional fundamental goals of 
human rights.
2.2: Identifying the type of participation appropriate for human rights
It has been identified that human rights are concerned with four fundamental 
principles: universality, empowerment, dignity and justice. Centralising these 
principles in relation to the forms, purpose, feasibility and norms of participation 
therefore enables evaluation of the type of participation most appropriate for human 
rights.
2.2.1: Modes o f participation required by human rights
As identified in Part 1.1 above, understandings of participation are limited insofar as 
they tend to focus on political or public participation. Firstly, the concerns of human 
rights are broad ranging, and, most importantly, deal with both public and private
358 Para. 4
359 McCorquodale, 2004: 487
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issues and the ways in which these intersect. Although many approaches to human 
rights have conventionally focused and continue to focus on their public element, as 
reflected in the traditional prioritisation of civil and political rights, human rights must 
also have a private element as enjoyment of human rights is affected by action in the 
private sphere. This is particularly identified by the feminist critique of conventional 
approaches to human rights, which argues that human rights are traditionally 
concerned with public and thus masculine concerns, and therefore ignore the private 
sphere identified with women. They argue that human rights must take account of this 
private sphere if they are to achieve the goals of emancipation and empowerment.360 
In addition, identification of the importance of social, economic and cultural rights 
and their inclusion in human rights instruments indicates that participation in human 
rights must extend beyond the political arena. Consequently, understandings of 
participation in human rights must consider participation in all of these different 
arenas of social life. Solely political participation may well not be sufficient to fully
If* 1achieve the goals of human rights.
Secondly, issues of public and private participation in human rights are concerned 
both with the ways in which individuals participate, and the actors who participate. As 
noted, participation in human rights must not just encompass the public and political 
realm, but also the private and social. Participation in human rights therefore must 
incorporate the actions of private individuals acting in both private and public ways. 
Furthermore, human rights are the rights of private individuals, conceived as such to 
regulate the actions of the state. Participation in human rights must therefore reflect 
participation by individuals as private actors. If principles and structures of human
360 Byrnes, 1992:225-6
361 Public and private participatory rights are explored in Chapter 2, section 1.1.
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rights reflect only state-dominated forms of participation, they will not achieve this 
goal. Essentially, private individuals must be able to participate in human rights in 
order for human rights to serve their interests, as is its function.362
Thirdly, participation in human rights must encompass both the formal and informal 
arenas. If human rights are to be a means to effectively challenge unjust power 
structures and abuses, it may well be necessary to participate in ways outside a formal 
structure of participation. Human rights must therefore protect and enable both formal 
and informal means of participation. However, as noted in section 1.1.2 above, 
informal modes of participation cannot guarantee influence over outcomes. Human 
rights are oriented to the needs of individuals, to their empowerment and dignity. 
Individuals’ formal rights of participation as guaranteed by human rights must 
therefore be extensive enough to ensure this.
Fourthly, participation in human rights must take place on different levels. Human 
rights are concerned, as identified, with both private and public elements; they 
regulate relationships primarily between the individual and the state but also impose 
obligations on the state regarding matters between private individuals (obligation to 
protect, children’s rights etc). Participation in human rights must therefore take place 
at the level of the individual and the level of the state. Furthermore, participation in 
human rights at the international level is essential. Human rights represent the 
principle of the protection of the individual, irrespective of the actions of the national 
state. If the individual is unable to participate internationally, and participation in
362 The issue o f public and private actors’ participation in the structures o f human rights is considered 
in Chapter 3, section 1.1, and Chapter 4, section 2.1.
363 Formal and informal modes o f participation in human rights are considered throughout subsequent 
chapters, and most specifically in Chapter 5, section 2.2.3.
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human rights is effectively limited to the national level, the individual continues to 
rely on the national state for the protection of their rights, and the international 
element of human rights protection is severely diluted.364 Participation is therefore a 
condition for the effective exercise of human rights at both the national and 
international levels.365
Fifthly, participation in human rights entails activity. For human rights to be a way to 
protect citizens from the actions of the state and/or to hold the state accountable for its 
actions, active participation by individuals is required. Participation in human rights 
cannot be a means to hold the state accountable if the state controls avenues of 
participation and participation is oriented to the ends of the state. Furthermore, the 
centrality of dignity to human rights also entails an active conception of the 
individual; that a person is not the instrument or object of the will of others but has 
the right to make choices about their life.366 Finally, the goal of empowerment further 
requires active participation in human rights; it requires that this individual take active 
control over their life, and is enabled to actively pursue and fulfil their rights.
Sixthly, participation in human rights must be both effective and meaningful. This 
requires that participation in human rights is genuine, rather than tokenistic; that it has 
a demonstrable effect over outcomes. Again, this conforms to human rights being 
oriented to the interests and empowerment of individuals. Participation in human 
rights, particularly through the ability to access human rights and use them as a means 
of protection and accountability, cannot be effective if it is open to manipulation and 
control by states. Furthermore, the degree to which participation in human rights is
364 This is particularly examined in Chapter 4, section 2.4 and Chapter 5, section 4.1.
365 De Waart, 1995: 50
366 Clapham, 2006: 544-545
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effective is linked to how far it is perceived as meaningful. Effective participation in 
structures of human rights protection means that human rights is considered as 
something that can make a difference to the individual; that can enhance their life in a 
meaningful way. Meaningful participation in human rights also entails that principles 
of human rights are considered to be representative of and oriented to the concerns of 
the individual. If they are perceived as being irrelevant, then they become 
meaningless. Participation in human rights must therefore be active, effective and 
meaningful if human rights are to become ‘real’ on a universal basis. As Gaventa 
observes, rights will only become real if people are truly engaged with the decisions 
and processes that affect them.
Finally, the need for participation in human rights to be active, effective and 
meaningful further requires that it also is to a great extent direct. If human rights law 
is something in which the state participates directly, and individuals only indirectly 
through state representation, then those individuals are less likely to have an active 
and meaningful relationship with international human rights law. Moreover, forms of 
participation conducted entirely through representation are inherently passive, as 
human rights law becomes something remote from the individual through being 
placed in the realm of states. Furthermore, it is necessary for the individual to have a 
direct relationship with human rights in order to be effectively empowered.
Fundamentally, direct forms of participation bypass representation by the state, and 
enable access at the international level. This is particularly important because the state 
is the entity which has the greatest power to violate human rights; it is consequently
367 Gaventa, 2002: 2
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vital that individuals are not dependent on representation by the state in order to have 
their rights protected.
2.2.2: The purpose o f participation in human rights
Participation may be understood as fulfilling an individual or communal function. 
Similarly, human rights is understood as both of these. Human rights are primarily 
understood as individual rights, directed towards the dignity and empowerment of the 
individual. However, new categories of collective or peoples’ rights, whilst not 
uncontroversial, indicate a more collective element to human rights, through 
identifying rights that are exercised community with others. . Furthermore, human 
rights are aimed at (assumed) common goals: universal protection of human rights, 
and enhanced peace and security. It is therefore unclear whether human rights 
prioritises an individual or communal understanding of the purpose of participation; it 
clearly reflects both meanings. In consequence, participation in human rights must 
enable both individual and communal forms of participation. Furthermore, human 
rights has been accused of placing too much emphasis on the rights of the individual 
to the exclusion of more communal functions. Understanding the purpose of 
participation in human rights should therefore emphasize its collective elements, in 
order to present a more comprehensive understating of the purpose of human rights.
As regards understanding participation as instrumental or substantive, human rights is 
clearly concerned with both means and end. The goals of human rights enjoyment 
must not be achieved by methods which violate human rights. This indicates concern 
with both process and result. This is reflected in General Comment 12 of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) which states that the
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right to food implies enabling the accessibility of food in ways which do not violate 
other human rights (emphasis added).368 The importance of participation as a process 
in human rights is further illustrated by the various references to participation as a 
right of itself,369 as well as a means to achieve other human rights. “Meaningful 
participation in decisions which affect one’s life is a human rights issue: it is both a 
means to the enjoyment of human rights and a human rights goal in itself’.370 
Participation in human rights is therefore valuable of itself, not just as a means to 
achieve human rights goals.
Participation in human rights is therefore both a substantive end in itself, and an 
instrument to achieve better implementation and enjoyment of human rights. 
Regarding its instrumental role, human rights is clearly concerned with empowerment 
of individuals rather than with control by those in power. Participation in human 
rights should therefore be oriented towards greater empowerment of individuals and 
groups; as a means to enable them to claim their rights. Consequently, the purpose of 
participation in human rights should be both as a means of empowerment and a means 
of accountability. Participation in human rights should be directed towards enabling 
individuals to hold those in power accountable for their obligations regarding human 
rights. This further conforms with participation as a human rights goal. As Kenny 
identifies, “the right to participate in decisions which affect one’s life is both an 
element of human dignity and the key to empowerment”.371 Participation is therefore 
considered a means to achieve the fundamental goals of human rights: empowerment 
and justice.
368 CESCR General Comment 12, 12 May 1999, para. 8
369 Gaventa, 2002: 3; Involve, 2005a: 74; Kannan and Pillai, 2005: 215
370 Kenny, 2000: 7
371 Kenny, 2000: 18
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Finally, participation was shown to be one means to achieve legitimacy. This is 
certainly the case in the human rights context. Challenges to human rights legitimacy 
have been made on participatory grounds: that certain groups did not participate in its 
construction and that it continues to represent particular interests to the exclusion of
372others. Increased participation in human rights is therefore potentially a means to 
enhance its legitimacy and consequent respect.
2.2.3: The feasibility of human rights participation
The universal basis of human rights clearly requires universal opportunities for 
participation: that these opportunities are available without discrimination on the basis 
of factors such as gender, race and socio-economic status. Participation in human 
rights would not reflect human rights principles if it operated in an exclusive way. 
Furthermore, exclusion is identified as one of the root causes of human rights 
crises;373 consequently, both in relation to the principles of human rights and in terms 
of ensuring more effective protection opportunities for participation in human rights 
must be universally available. Human rights’ basis in empowerment also indicates 
that there should be a general opportunity to participate as people cannot be 
empowered without the means to do so. The principles of universality and 
empowerment within human rights therefore indicate that participation in human 
rights should be inclusive as regards opportunities for participation.
372 See Chapter 5, section 1.2.
373 Kenny, 2000: 7
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However, human rights present a potential contradiction as regards the ability to 
participate. The universal basis of human rights implies that all people should be able 
to participate and that this participation should be enabled and assisted where required 
in order to facilitate equality of participation as regards both opportunity and ability. 
However, the way in which human rights obligations have been interpreted takes into 
account different resources available for the achievement of rights: the concept of 
progressive realisation.374 This would seem to indicate that human rights ideology 
recognises that abilities to participate will vary and that whilst the highest level of 
participation should be achieved this requirement is not absolute but rather 
conditional and variable. Whilst practically realistic, this does however present a 
conceptual contradiction. Universal application of human rights and empowerment 
require universal access to human rights; to use participation as a means to enable 
empowerment and accountability, as discussed above. Such universal access requires 
the barriers as identified in part 1 to be universally overcome, but it is unclear how far 
human rights require this to an absolute standard. It is furthermore unclear how far the 
concept of progressive realisation should apply to participation, as it is primarily 
related to obligations deriving from economic, social and cultural rights, whereas 
many ‘participatory’ rights are civil and political, thus requiring immediate 
implementation according to a traditional human rights typology. Furthermore, a 
participatory analysis of human rights questions how such availability of resources for 
the achievement of all rights including the enabling of participation is determined, and
0 7 c
examines who participates in this and how such participation is itself determined 
There is also a potential contradiction between the requirement for universal
374 CESCR General Comment 3, 14/12/90, para 1
375 This project does not further examine States’ obligations regarding the allocation o f  resources for 
participation, nor participation in how such resources would be allocated.
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participation, and the legitimate limitations on participation found, for example, in 
relation to the right to vote.376
2.2.4: Determination o f the norms ofparticipation in human rights
Participation in human rights, as identified above, is required to be active, effective 
and meaningful participation. Ang et al argue that the concept of active or genuine 
participation entails the active involvement of individuals in defining the basis, setting 
and objectives of participation itself, in order to avoid tokenism.377 As identified in 
section 1.4, inherent in such genuine participation is the requirement of participation 
in constructing the norms of participation. Therefore, the emphasis on participation 
being active, effective, genuine and meaningful as discussed above indicates that such 
participation must encompass determination of the norms of participation.
Furthermore, if participation in human rights is to be empowering, both in terms of 
enabling people to have the capacity to make decisions and in terms of those decisions 
effecting genuine change, then those individuals must also participate in the 
determination of the norms of participation in human rights. Human rights is 
concerned with the empowerment of the many, rather than the tyranny of the few. It 
therefore requires that its norms, including norms of participation, are not just 
developed by and therefore reflect the concerns of those in power but provide a means 
to include the voices and protect and promote the interests of all individuals, and in 
particular the disempowered and marginalised. In order for human rights to enable 
empowerment, the way in which people participate in its definition and application
376 Limitations on participatory rights are further examined in Chapter 2, section 3.1
377 Ang et al, 2006: 232
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must be open to challenge and redefinition, rather than being immutable and 
incontestable. The norms of human rights must be meaningful to those whom it is 
intended to protect, otherwise human rights runs the risk of being co-opted as a means 
of control oriented to particular interests. Only such bottom-up participation will bring 
about real change, as existing power structures are unlikely to volunteer to relinquish 
sufficient power to bring about such change.378
However, this is a difficult and complex issue. It is easy to say that human rights 
requires participation in the construction of the norms of participation, that it implies a 
right to define how and who and to what end participation occurs. Universal 
participation in the definition of the norms of participation is, however, impossible to 
achieve. Such norms would constantly be challenged and redefined and therefore 
there would be no basis upon which to ground legitimate participation. Human rights 
therefore requires in theory a concept of participation in the norms of participation 
which is not achievable in practice. This demonstrates an inherent tension concerning 
participation in human rights; however it is essential to consider this issue, as it is a 
means to examine underlying power structures. The analysis must therefore focus on 
the extent to which human rights requires the existence of opportunities to challenge 
and redefine the norms of participation, as this clearly cannot be absolute.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has recognised that participation is a complex, contextual and contested 
concept. However, it is possible to explore the various meanings of participation in
378 Kenny, 2000: 18
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relation to its modes, purposes, practicalities and norms. Concerning the modes of 
participation, discussion of private and public forms of participation identified the 
importance of understanding public and private participation in terms of both actors 
and spheres of action. Analysis of formal and informal participation showed that 
whilst informal activities may be hugely influential, only formalised types of 
participation can provide a guaranteed input into decision-making. Exploration of 
direct and representative forms identified significant problems with reliance on 
representative democracy, but also acknowledged problematic elements of more 
direct forms. The discussion of gradations of participation demonstrated that it may be 
active or passive, and that it may be manipulated and tokenistic. Finally, consideration 
of the levels of participation identified the importance of participation beyond the 
national sphere, particularly in an increasingly globalised world.
The analysis then considered the purposes to which participation may be oriented. It 
discussed how participation has both communal and individual aspects, and has been 
considered both as a substantive end in itself, or as a means to achieve other purposes. 
Participation could be used either as a means to empower or to control, and it was also 
identified as an important way to confer legitimacy on outcomes. Discussion of the 
feasibility of participation identified that there are significant barriers to both the 
opportunity and the ability to participate, including socio-economic status, ethnic or 
gender identity, educational background and motivation. Finally, analysis of the 
norms of participation demonstrated how participatory structures are themselves 
defined by different types of participation, and revealed how different interests exert 
control through determining norms of participation.
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In Part 2, this chapter identified key characteristics of human rights: universality, 
empowerment, dignity and justice. It applied these fundamental principles to the 
concept of participation, in order to produce a human rights based typology of 
participation. This chapter has established that human rights requires active, reflexive 
and meaningful participation with broad application oriented to enabling individuals 
both to enjoy their rights and to hold states accountable for failures. The application 
of the key principles of human rights has resulted in a specific understanding of the 
type of participation most appropriate for human rights. The task of the following 
three chapters is to consider how far the principles and structures of human rights 
reflect this particular concept of participation.
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Chapter 2: Participation and principles of 
human rights law
Chapter 1 identified that participation is a complex, contested and contextual concept, 
with a multiplicity of potential meanings and understandings.379 It subsequently 
identified the particular type(s) of participation appropriate for human rights, as 
derived from the fundamental characteristics of human rights.380 Chapter 2 now 
begins the substantive analysis of the degree to which this particular concept of 
participation is manifested in and enabled by the principles and structures of 
international human rights law. The purpose of this Chapter is to analyse how far the 
concept of participation reflected in principles of international human rights law 
corresponds to the type of participation identified as appropriate for human rights. 
This comparison consequently enables assessment of the degree to which human 
rights legal principles manifest human rights ideology in the context of
• • • 381participation.
As Redgewell identifies, there is no single international instrument which gives a 
general right of participation. Consequently, various principles of international 
human rights law concerned with participation will be examined in order to identify 
what concept of participation human rights law as a whole reflects. These principles 
may be considered ‘international participatory rights’, and consequently function 
either directly or implicitly to enable participation. They comprise both specific norms
379 Chapter 1, Part 1
380 Chapter 1, Part 2, Section 2.2
381 This Chapter w ill not explore the implications o f  this comparison as these w ill be addressed in 
Chapter 5.
382 Redgewell, 2002, 189
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which protect rights of participation -  for example the right to participate in culture, 
rights of political participation, and rights which protect vulnerable groups’ 
participation -  and rights which can enable participation, which include the rights to 
freedom of expression and education.
The discussion will in Parts 1 to 4 respectively examine these participatory rights in 
relation to the four elements of participation identified in Chapter 1: the modes, 
purpose, feasibility and norms of participation. This will enable consideration of what 
the content of these participatory rights indicates about the meaning of participation 
displayed by principles of international human rights law. This analysis will facilitate 
comparison between the type of participation appropriate to human rights and the type 
reflected in human rights principles.
The analysis will draw upon both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law,383 including consideration of 
the UN Declarations on the right to development and the rights of minorities and 
indigenous peoples. The intention is not to consider the legal status of participation 
within human rights, but rather to explore what concept of participation is presented 
by the principles of international human rights law. Soft law instruments are therefore 
of value, as they enhance understanding of the normative content of human rights.
383 Soft law is also considered in Chapter 3
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Part 1: Modes of participation as reflected in principles of
international human rights law
1.1: Public and private participation: political, cultural and social rights
The protection of public and political forms of participation is clearly reflected in 
principles of human rights law. The right to participate in the public arena is primarily 
protected via the various political participatory rights, which govern how and on what 
basis individuals may participate in political, and therefore public, activities.
The right to vote in elections is the main way in which individuals exercise their 
rights of political participation. The right to participate via voting in elections is found 
in the UDHR Article 21(3), the ICCPR Article 25(b), and in the American384 and 
European systems.385 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) 
does not specify the right to vote in elections but the more vague right to “participate 
freely in government... through freely chosen representatives”.386 The content of the 
right to vote in elections has received specific development within the Human Rights 
Committee’s (HRC) General Comment 25 (GC 25) which identifies that it must at a 
minimum satisfy several basic criteria comprising elections by free and universal 
suffrage, by secret ballot, at periodic intervals, and without discrimination against 
voters or candidates.387 The right to vote in elections therefore provides for a specific 
means of public participation.
384 Article 23(b) o f  the American Convention on Human Rights
385 Article 3 o f  the First Optional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms
386 AfCHPR Article 13
387 HRC General Comment 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.7, 12 July 1996, paras. 9-11, see also Fox 
(1992), 552
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A broader concept of public participation is indicated by the right to participate in
public affairs.388 GC 25 elaborates the content of the right to participate in public
affairs in paragraph 5:
The conduct of public affairs, referred to in paragraph (a), is a broad concept which 
relates to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, 
executive and administrative powers. It covers all aspects of public administration, 
and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, regional 
and local levels. The allocation of powers and the means by which individual citizens 
exercise the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs protected by article 25 
should be established by the constitution and other laws.
GC 25 also identifies the rights of freedom of expression, assembly and association as 
constitutive aspects of the right to participate in public affairs,389 and recognizes the 
right to vote and to stand in elections as one means to participate in the conduct of 
public affairs.390 The HRC has stated that “the rights enshrined in article 25 should 
also be read to encompass the freedom to engage in political activity individually or 
through political parties, freedom to debate public affairs, to criticize the Government 
and to publish material with political content”.391 The right to participate in public 
affairs therefore potentially provides for a wider range of public participatory
• • • 392activities.
Rights which protect public forms of participation are also found within 
environmental law, which has been described as “the ‘crucible’ in which the
‘3 Q '3
international law of public participation has been forged foremost and furthest”. It 
is therefore of value briefly to examine how environmental law conceives of these 
rights by way of comparison with international human rights law. The Convention on
388 UDHR, Article 21(a); ICCPR, Article 25(a); AmCHR, Article 23(a); AfCHPR, Article 13(1)
389 Para. 8
390 Paras. 6 and 9
391 Aduayom, Diasso and Dobou v. Togo (422-424/1990), A /51/40 vol. II, 12 July 1996, 17, para 7.5
392 A lso see further discussion in sections 1.2 and 1.3 below o f  the content and implications o f  the right 
to participate in public affairs.
39 Pring and N oe, 2002: 28
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Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) is the only international legal 
instrument which specifically places participation in the context of rights, and is 
concerned with a ‘right to participation’. The Convention explicitly protects the right 
to public participation.394 Participatory rights as protected in the Aarhus Convention 
enable the public to submit, either in writing or in person, any comments, information,
o n e
analyses or opinions that it considers relevant to the proposed activity. The right to 
public participation is further supported by the rights of access to justice396 and to 
information. However, participation in the Convention is restricted to decision-
TORmaking concerning particular environmental activities, as detailed in Annex 1, or as 
determined by States parties.399 This does not allow for any wider participation in 
determining when the public can participate. In addition, it has significant limitations 
concerning the actions of private entities, whom States parties may only “encourage” 
to disseminate information,400 and who can refuse disclosure on the grounds of 
commercial confidentiality.401 Whilst the Aarhus Convention is important because it 
integrates human rights and environmental norms402 in the context of participation, 
and explicitly links decision-making with access to information and to justice,403 it 
presents a narrow and restricted concept of public participation.
Private rights of participation are also recognised and protected by international 




397 Article 4 and 5
398 Article 6(1) (a)
399 Article 6(1) (b)
400 Article 5(6)
401 Article 4(4) (d)
402 Morgera, 2005: 139
403 See also discussion in Chapter 4 on access as a form o f  participation in human rights.
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in a range of human rights treaties.404 Although the exact content and scope of this 
right is unclear, due to the difficulty in defining ‘cultural life’ 405 state reports and the 
concluding observations of the CESCR indicate a broad concept of cultural life, 
which includes visual and performing arts, folk arts, literature, crafts, cultural 
industries and institutions, such as cinemas, theatres and museums, the protection of 
cultural heritage, and the situation of minority cultures 406 Cultural participation can 
include particular use of land resources through economic activities such as hunting 
and fishing,407 or animal husbandry,408 and also requires inclusion in the sources of 
cultural expression and communication 409 The right to participate in cultural life 
therefore provides for participation via a range of private, or non-political, activities. 
Furthermore, the right to religious participation implicit in the right to freedom of 
religion410 demonstrates the protection of an additional form of private participation, 
related to cultural rights of participation.
The right to participate in family life also indicates the recognition and protection of 
private forms of participation, although this right is more implied than specific within 
international human rights law. The right to family life is found in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR)411 and the American Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR)412 which give 
men and women of marriageable age the right to marry and found a family. However,
404 inter alia ICERD Article 5(e)(vi); ICCPR Article 27; ICESCR Article 15; ICEDAW Article 13(c); 
ICRC Article 31
405 Donders, 2008: 2
406 Donders, 2008: 5-6
407 Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia (760/1997), A /55/40 vol. II, 25 July 2000, 140, para. 10.6; see also 
Howard v. Canada (879/1998), A /60/40 vol. II, 26 July 2005, 12, para 12.4
408 Aarela andNakkdlajarui v. Finland (779/1997), A /57/40 vol. II, 24 October 2001, 117, para 7.5
409 Smiers, 2008: 2




whilst Article 10 of the ICESCR refers to the special protection of the family as the 
“natural and fundamental group unit of society”, it does not indicate a specific right to 
participate in family life. The AfCHPR, similarly to the ICESCR, provides for special 
protection for the family as a unit but does not give a specific right to participation in 
family life.413 The ICEDAW414 and the International Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (ICRC)415 imply a general right to participate in family life through 
guaranteeing the specific rights of women and children to such participation. The 
right to participate in family life is important as it contains both the right to participate 
in the private, internal structures of participation within the family unit, and the right 
to participate in the private decision to create a family unit.416 The human rights 
norms of non-discrimination and equality are also applied to the private rights of 
participation both to create and within the family.417
It is clear, however, that the public and private elements of participation are not 
conceived as separate by international human rights law principles. Rights of 
assembly, association and expression enable both private and public forms of 
participation, as they support both public and private participatory rights. Baderin
• • d  1Ridentifies that these rights, among others, enable participation in cultural life; 
Franck that they are “essential preconditions for an open electoral process”.419 This is 
specifically illustrated in Article 16(1) of the AmCHR which protects freedom of 
association "for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, 
sports, or other purposes”, thus expressly recognizing both the private and public
413 Article 18(1)
414 Article 16
415 ICRC Articles 7(1) and 9
416 HRC General Comment 19 refers to the “right to found a family”, 27 July 1990, para. 5
417 ICEDAW Article 16; see also Article 5 o f  Protocol 7 to the ECHR; AmCHR Article 17(3) and 17(4)
418 Baderin, 2003: 214
419 Franck, 1992: 61
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elements of this right.420 Similarly, the right of freedom of religion incorporates both 
aspects of participation as it may be exercised both in public and in private.421 
Furthermore, Article 8(2) of the Declaration on the Right to Development (DRD) 
explicitly links participation with the realisation of all other human rights, thus 
identifying the importance of participation in both the public and private spheres.
Principles of human rights law recognise that private and public forms of participation 
interact with and impact upon one another. For example, in centralising the family as 
the fundamental unit of society422 and emphasizing the importance of the family for 
personal development and socialisation423 such private structures of participation are 
presented as having a wider influence. Private norms of participation may specifically 
affect public structures: as the CEDAW has identified, “in all nations, cultural 
traditions and religious beliefs have played a part in confining women to the private 
spheres of activity and excluding them from active participation in public life”.424 In 
addition, participation in political or public life and decision-making processes 
“determine the pattern o f... daily lives and the future of societies”;425 consequently 
public participation can also affect private forms. Principles of human rights therefore 
recognise both the existence of and the mutually constitutive relationship between 
private and public forms of participation.
420 See also Wallman v. Austria (1002/2001), A /59/40 vol. II, 1 April 2004, 183, para 9.4 regarding the 
right to association as protecting participation in private organisations.
421 ICCPR 18(1); ECHR, Article 9(1); AmCHR Article 12(1)
422 ICRC Article 10, ICMW Article 44(1), ICESCR Article 10(1)
423 CRC/C/24, 8 March 1994, Annex V, para. 2.2
424 CEDAW  General Recommendation 23, A/52/3 8/Rev. 1, 1997, para 10
425 CEDAW  General Recommendation 23, A /52 /38/Rev. 1, 1997, para 9
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It must be noted that human rights has been accused of prioritising the public over the 
private,426 which echoes the focus on public forms of participation with theories of 
participation.427 Whilst this was clearly reflected in the traditional focus on civil and 
political over economic, social and cultural rights by States and some NGOs,428 
principles of human rights law themselves have from the UDHR onwards taken 
account of private as well as public forms of participation, and, in principle if not in 
practice, have not prioritised the latter over the former. Furthermore, the lower status 
accorded to the private sphere has been implicitly recognised as a problem to be 
addressed:
Public and private spheres of human activity have always been considered distinct, 
and have been regulated accordingly. Invariably, women have been assigned to the 
private or domestic sphere, associated with reproduction and the raising of children, 
and in all societies these activities have been treated as inferior. By contrast, public 
life, which is respected and honoured, extends to a broad range of activity outside the 
private and domestic sphere. Men historically have both dominated public life and 
exercised the power to confine and subordinate women within the private sphere.429
Unfortunately, this General Recommendation does not identify that one solution is the 
recognition of the equal status of the private sphere; rather, it is concerned with the 
promotion of participation by women in the public sphere.430 The ICEDAW is, 
however, essentially concerned with the promotion of the equality with women, and 
this implies enhanced status for the private participation with which women are 
traditionally associated.
426 Peterson, 1990: 315; Bym es, 1992: 213
427 Chapter 1, section 1.1.1
428 Mutua, 2001: 155-157
429 CEDAW  General Recommendation 23, A/52/3 8/Rev. 1, 1997, para 8
430 In particular see para. 17
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1.2: Rights of formal and informal participation
Formal modes of participation are primarily reflected in political participatory rights, 
which protect formal participatory activities including voting, standing for election 
and taking part in public affairs. As detailed above, this latter right includes 
participation in legislative, executive and administrative matters, and in the formation 
of policy. In addition, rights which provide for legal participation, that is, the rights of 
recognition as a person before the law,431 or recognition of legal status,432 and to 
effective remedy,433 also enable formal means of participation. Both of these 
principles protect the right to participate in formally constituted legal structures which 
guarantee the protection of human rights.
Political rights, in particular the right to participate in public affairs, also indicate the 
potential for recognition and protection of informal modes of participation. There are, 
however, differing interpretations of the rights to participate in public affairs. The 
right to participate in public affairs is found in Article 25(a) of the ICCPR and Article 
23(a) of the AmCHR. In contrast, Article 21(a) of the UDHR and Article 13(1) of the 
AfCHPR refer to the right to take part in government. This implies a more restricted 
concept of participation, as it implicitly excludes non-governmental political activity 
such as participation in civil society, the media and protest against the government, 
and therefore only protects formal modes of participation.
Furthermore, GC 25 reflects a narrow understanding of participation in public affairs 
as it relates only to public administration and the formulation and implementation of 
public policy. A more extensive right of participation in public affairs is reflected in
431 UDH R Article 6, ICCPR Article 16, AmCHR Article 3
432 AfCHPR Article 5
433 ICCPR Article 2(3); ICERD Article 6; ECHR Article 13, AmCHR Article 25, AfCHPR Article 7.1
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the ICEDAW, which expands the content of the right to specify additional rights to
participate in non-governmental organisations434 and to participate on the
international level either as government representatives or through the work of
international organisations 435 General Recommendation 23 also widens the concept
of the right to participate in public affairs, through adding the following to the
definition in GC 25:
The concept [of the political and public life of a country] also includes many aspects 
of civil society, including public boards and local councils and the activities of 
organizations such as political parties, trade unions, professional or industry 
associations, women's organizations, community-based organizations and other 
organizations concerned with public and political life.436
The ICEDAW thus indicates a broader concept of participation in public affairs, 
reflecting a definition of public political activity which goes beyond formal 
participation in government institutions and structures to include informal 
participation in wider civil society 437 This interpretation is also reflected in the 
International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ICPD), which 
considers participation in both “non-governmental organizations and associations 
concerned with the public and political life of the country” and in “organizations of 
persons with disabilities to represent persons with disabilities” as included in the 
content of the right of persons with disabilities to participate in public affairs 438 Both 
the ICEDAW and the ICPD therefore recognise that participation in public affairs 
encompasses both formal and informal modes of participation.
434 Article 7(c)
435 Article 8
436 CEDAW  General Recommendation 23, A/52/3 8/Rev. 1, 1997, para. 5
437 Drydyk,2005: 253-254
438 ICPD, Article 29(b)
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Constitutive political participatory rights of freedom of expression, assembly and 
association also protect informal modes of participation. They support and promote 
participation in the public and political arenas, through providing means for 
individuals’ voices to be heard and for them to have influence over political decision­
makers. The rights of freedom of association, assembly and expression therefore 
imply a right to political participation via modes other than by participation in the 
formal governmental structures of a state. For example, the right to freedom of 
expression enables different forms of participation though protecting the right of the 
individual to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice”.439 Activities such as banner waving,440 issuing a statement in 
support of a strike 441 reading out and distributing printed material,442 creating a work 
of art443 and participating in peaceful demonstrations444 which are protected under the 
right of freedom of expression constitute examples of informal modes of participation. 
Furthermore, the HRC has interpreted the means of expression protected by Article 19 
as broad ranging, and not solely limited to political expression:
Article 19, paragraph 2, must be interpreted as encompassing every form of 
subjective ideas and opinions capable of transmission to others, which are compatible 
with article 20 of the Covenant, of news and information, of commercial expression 
and advertising, of works of art, etc.; it should not be confined to means of political, 
cultural or artistic expression.445
439 ICCPR, Article 19(2); see also ICRC Article 13(1); ICMW Article 13(2)
440 Kivenmaa v. Finland(412/1990), A /49/40 vol. II, 31 March 1994, 85, para 9.3; see also Dergachev 
v. Belarus (921/2000) A /57/40 vol. II, 2 April 2002 ,252 , para. 7.2
441 Sohn v. Republic o f  Korea (518/1992), A /50/40 vol. II, 19 July 1995, 98, para 10.2-10.4
442 Kim v. Republic o f  Korea (574/1994), A /54/40 vol. II, 3 November 1998, 1, para 12.4; see also 
Laptsevich v. Belarus (780/1997), A /55/40 vol. II, 20 March 2000, 178, para 2
443 Shin v. Republic o f  Korea (926/2000), A /59/40 vol. II, 16 March 2004, 118, para. 7.2
444 Park v. Republic o f  Korea (628/1995), A /54/40 vol. II, 20 October 1998, 85, para 2.4
445 Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada (359/1989 and 385/1989), A /48/40 vol. II, 31 March 1993, 91, 
para. 11.3
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This right protects informal means of participation in both the public and private 
arenas, and provides for a wide range of informal participatory activities. It should be 
noted that the right to assembly does not extend to violent protest,446 thus indicating 
limits on the types of informal participation protected.
1.3: Human rights principles and representative and direct participation
Understandings of participation as direct or representative are most clearly illustrated 
in the political context.447 Examination of political participatory rights is therefore a 
useful indicator of the extent to which human rights principles conceive of 
participation as representative or direct.
Firstly, the right to self-determination448 potentially implies a radical and expansive 
understanding of the right to political participation, as it could be interpreted as 
requiring an absolute right to participate in the determination of a group’s political 
destiny, either within or outside a state, thus implying a right of secession or 
independence.449 This interpretation of the right to self-determination would enable 
broad ranging rights of participation in public affairs, to the extent of facilitating 
direct participation in the definition of both public affairs and structures of 
participation separate to state-defined norms of participation. It furthermore 
potentially implies a radical reconsideration of inclusion regarding direct forms of 
participation in political decision-making.450
446 AmCHR Article 15, ICCPR Article 21
447 See Chapter 1, section 1.1.3 on the distinction between representative and direct forms o f  
democracy.
448 Common Article 1 o f  the ICCPR and ICESCR; Un Charter, Article 1(2)
449 Myntti, 1996: 14
450 Knop, 2002: 13
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However, in practice the right to self-determination operates within a specific post­
colonial political context and has not been considered to give a general right of 
secession. There are therefore major uncertainties regarding the application and 
interpretation of the right to self-determination outside the colonial context,451 and it 
cannot be considered to enable such broad and revolutionary direct rights of 
participation. The participatory aspects of the right to self-determination are 
considered satisfied in a non-colonial context by the fulfilment of rights of political 
participation in a non-discriminatory manner 452 The CERD considers the internal 
elements of the right to self-determination to be linked to the right to take part in 
public affairs without discrimination and the obligation of the government to 
represent the whole population without distinction 453 The right to self-determination 
is therefore fulfilled though representation; that a government represents the whole of 
the people within its territory in a non-discriminatory way.454
Secondly, the right to participate in public affairs would seem to indicate more direct 
forms of participation than the right to vote in elections, which is clearly a 
representative means to participate. For example, the right to stand in elections as 
found in the ICCPR455 and the AmCHR456 is identified by GC 25457 as providing a 
potential means for the individual to directly participate in public affairs.458 
Furthermore, the elements of the right to participate in public affairs as understood by
451 Crawford, 2005: 10
452 Supreme Court o f  Canada, Reference re Secession o f Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 130
453 CERD General Recommendation 21, 23 August 1996, para. 4
454 Crawford, 2005: 57
455 Article 25(b). In addition, Fox 560-565 identifies case law o f the European Commission and Court 
as indicating that the ECHR provides similar guarantees to those contained in the ICCPR.
456 Article 23(b)
457 Paras. 6 and 9
458 See also Bwalya v Zambia (314/1988) CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988,27 July 1993, para. 6.6 which 
identifies the right to stand for election as part o f  the right to participate in public affairs.
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both the CEDAW and the HRC seem to envisage direct forms of participation, 
whether these are limited to participation in public institutions and the formation of 
public policy, or extended to participation in civil society and on the national level.459
However, the exact forms of participation required by the right to participate in public 
affairs are unclear. In contrast to the right to vote in elections, the content of the right 
to participate in public affairs remains vague and abstract 460 Very little attention is 
given in GC 25 to the content of the right to participate in public affairs in comparison 
to that given to the right to vote in elections: it is much less developed and specific. 
Fundamentally, the right to participate in public affairs is fulfilled through 
representative forms of participation. The phrase used in the ICCPR Article 25461 
“directly or through freely chosen representatives” (emphasis added) indicates that the 
right to participate in public affairs does not require opportunities for direct 
participation in particular decision-making processes by individuals but would be 
satisfied via the right to vote in democratic elections. The HRC has viewed the right 
to participate in public affairs as being fulfilled through debate and dialogue with 
representatives, and the right to form associations, rather than through direct influence 
over decision-making processes.462 In Mikmaq Tribal Society v Canada, the 
Committee determined that public affairs are the task of representatives as “article 
25(a) cannot be understood as meaning that any directly affected group, large or 
small, has the unconditional right to choose the modalities of participation in the 
conduct of public affairs. That, in fact, would be an extrapolation of the right to direct
459 See Chapter 2, section 1.2 above
460 Steiner, 1988: 78
461 A lso AmCHR, Article 23(1 )(a)
462 Beydon v France, (1400/2005) CCPR/C/85/D/1400/2005, 28 November 2005, para. 4.5; Brun v 
France (1453/2006) CCPR/C/88/D/1453/2006, 23 November 2006, para. 6.4
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participation by the citizens, far beyond the scope of article 25 (a)”,463 consequently 
indicating that the right to take part in public affairs is fulfilled via representative 
rather than direct means.
Furthermore, the concept and promotion of a ‘right to democracy’ indicates that the 
essential way in which rights of political participation are conceived within 
international human rights law is via representative structures. Whilst Steiner argues 
that the ICCPR Article 25 does not prioritise one political tradition over another,464 
more recent commentary proposes that the right to vote in elections, as an essential 
element of the right to a democratic system of governance, is developing the status of 
a universal norm.465 Whilst recognising that “the right to political participation leaves 
room for a wide variety of forms of government”, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) has emphasized the “fundamental 
importance of representative democracy as a legitimate mechanism for achieving the 
realization of and respect for human rights; and as a human right itself’ and that it is 
“therefore of the view that those provisions of the system’s human rights instruments 
that guarantee political rights...must be interpreted and applied so as to give 
meaningful effect to exercise of representative democracy”.466 The General Assembly 
also considers the right to participate in government via elections as essential for the 
realisation of other human rights.467 Furthermore, the ECHR only recognises political 
participation via the right to vote in elections, making no mention of participation in 
public affairs. Representative participation via the right to vote in elections is thus
463 Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada (205/1986), A /47/40, 4 November 1991, 205, para 5.5
464 Steiner, 1988: 87
465 Fox, 1992: 588; Franck, 1992: 46-91
466 Statehood Solidarity Committee vs. United States, Case 11.204, Report No. 98/03, para 85-87
467 Resolution 46/137, 17 December 1991, para. 3
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essentialised as the primary means by which individuals exercise their political 
participatory rights.
This analysis demonstrates that, although initial examination of the content of 
political participatory rights indicates the potential for direct and wide ranging forms 
of participation, in practice these rights predominantly defer to representative means. 
The right to vote in elections is clearly structured around participation via 
representation; furthermore, the rights to self-determination and to participate in 
public affairs are also considered fulfilled via representative means. The right to self- 
determination is fulfilled by the right to participate in public affairs and the right to 
participate in public affairs is fulfilled by the right to vote in elections. It should 
however be noted that although participation in public affairs is satisfied by 
representative structures of participation, the HRC has indicated that this does not
468necessarily exclude its fulfilment via more direct forms of democracy.
However, although the basic political participatory rights prioritise representative 
participation, constitutive political rights are more clearly concerned with direct 
participation. Freedom of association may lead to direct participation in an 
organisation such as a trade union or NGO. Within these organisations, modes of 
participation may then be oriented towards direct or representative structures.469 Such 
activities may consequently promote more direct and active forms of political 
participation than those oriented to structures of representation.
468 A /53/40 Vol. I, 1998, para 135
469 See Chapter 5, section 2.2.1 for analysis o f  the internal decision-making structures o f  human rights 
NGOs.
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Direct forms of participation are also implied by rights which provide for legal 
participation as detailed above.470 The travaux preparatoires of the ICCPR confirm 
that the right to recognition as a person before the law is intended to ensure the 
recognition of the legal status and capacity to exercise rights of every individual471 
This importance of recognition of legal status as a means to exercise rights has also 
been corroborated by the CERD 472 The right to effective remedy requires that victims 
have access to remedial procedures 473 These rights of legal participation operate on 
an individual basis and therefore require the individual to have direct access to legal 
means to challenge rights violations and receive redress. The right to have the 
capacity to exercise rights and to a remedy cannot be fulfilled through mediated or 
representative formats; they must be enjoyed directly by the individual.
Finally, the importance of direct forms of participation is recognised by the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which has stated that
It is important that Governments develop a direct relationship with children, not 
simply one mediated through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or human 
rights institutions. In the early years of the Convention, NGOs had played a notable
role in pioneering participatory approaches with children, but it is in the interests of
both Governments and children to have appropriate direct contact.474
The CRC therefore prioritizes direct forms of participation over representative 
structures. Such direct participation is considered important as it is in many cases the 
only way to ascertain the extent to which children’s rights are being protected.475 
Similarly, the CESCR has identified that participation via voting in elections is “not 
enough to ensure that those living in poverty enjoy the right to participate in key
470 Chapter 2, section 1.2 above
471 Bossuyt, 1987: 336
472 A /59 /18, 2004, para. 193
473 Shelton, 2005: 8
474 CRC General Comment 5, CRC/GC/2003/5, 27 November 2003, para 12
475 CRC General Comment 5, CRC/GC/2003/5, 27 November 2003 para 50
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decisions affecting their lives”.476 It is therefore clear that there is some recognition 
within human rights principles of the value of and need for direct forms of 
participation.
1.4: Gradations of participation: active, effective and meaningful
There are numerous references within human rights principles to the nature of the 
participation required., The value of active participation is clearly recognised within 
Article 2(3) of the DRD, which explicitly identifies that participation is to be ‘active, 
free and meaningful’., By presenting individuals as the subjects rather than objects of 
development477 the right to development reflects an active rather than passive concept 
of participation., The right to recognition as a person before the law through 
protecting the capacity to exercise rights of every individual478 presents a concept of 
autonomous individual participation. Similarly, the ICPD emphasizes the importance 
of active participation in decision-making concerning persons with disabilities, to 
enable their own individual autonomy and independence.479
The right to participate in cultural life also indicates an active rather than passive 
concept of participation. Thomberry considers the right to take part in culture as 
having a “dynamic, agency-directed aspect”.480 Both Smiers and Donders argue for an 
active interpretation of participation in cultural life; Donders by contrasting activity to
481 • •access, and Smiers active creation to passive consumption of cultural
476 E /C .12/2001/10, 10 May 2000, para 12
477 Salomon, 2003: 4
478 See Chapter 2, section 1.2 above
479 ICPD, Preamble, paras, (n) and (o), see also Article 4 (3)
480 Thomberry, 2008: 7
481 Donders, 2008: 5
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expressions.482 Individuals living within groups are free to participate or not in the 
cultural practices of the group and no negative consequences may ensue because of 
their choice; the cultural autonomy of the individual is guaranteed.483 The right to 
participate in culture therefore promotes an active conception of participation; 
moreover, such active participation is voluntary rather than coerced. For example, 
Article 31 of the ICRC refers to the right of the child to ‘participate freely’ in cultural 
life. The right to freedom to have or adopt religion is also to be free from coercion 484 
In addition, a concept of participation as active and voluntary is reflected in the right 
to freedom of association which requires that such association must be voluntary; no 
one should be compelled to join an association against their will.485 Principles of 
human rights law therefore present a concept of participation as being active and 
freely undertaken.
The importance of active participation by children is also specifically identified. The 
principles of ‘the best interests of the child’486 and ‘the right of the child to be
4R7heard’ present a concept of active participation, as the identification of the child’s 
interests as separate from those of the parents identifies the child as an autonomous 
individual. The CRC considers ‘active’ participation as being in the spirit of Article 
12,488 generally considers “the child as an active participant in the promotion, 
protection and monitoring of his or her rights”,489 and specifically identifies
482 Smiers, 2008: 2
483 Stamatopoulou, 2008: 6
484 ICCPR, Article 18(2)
485 Bossuyt, 1987: 433; AfCHPR, Article 10(2)
486 ICRC 3(1)
487 ICRC Article 12
488 CRC/C/121 11 December 2002, para. 58(a)
489 CRC General Comment 5, CRC/GC/2003/5, 27 November 2003, para 12
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adolescents as “active rights holders”.490 Active rather than passive participation by
children is considered more beneficial for the protection of their rights:
Interventions have been found to benefit children most when they are actively 
involved in assessing needs, devising solutions, shaping strategies and carrying them 
out rather than being seen as objects for whom decisions are made.491
In addition, human rights principles consider that participation should be meaningful
and effective. The ICPD emphasizes the importance of “full and effective participation
and inclusion in society” 492 Similarly, the CRC refers to “meaningful and effective
participation”,493 and indicates that this entails that children are “adequately informed
on how they can have input into policies that affect them, [and] how their views will
be taken into consideration once they have been solicited”.494 GC 5 elaborates:
If consultation is to be meaningful, documents as well as processes need to be made 
accessible. But appearing to “listen” to children is relatively unchallenging; giving 
due weight to their views requires real change. Listening to children should not be 
seen as an end in itself, but rather as a means by which States make their interactions 
with children and their actions on behalf of children ever more sensitive to the 
implementation of children’s rights 495
Similarly, minorities “have the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, 
social, economic and public life”,496 and states are obliged to “ensure the effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them” 497 
The conditioning of participation as effective implies a significant role in the 
formulation and implementation of policy 498 Such participation requires that states 
consult with and seek the consent of these groups prior to the implementation of
490 CRC General Comment 4, CRC/GC/2003/4, 1 July 2003, para 7; see also para. 8 which refers to the 
equal participation o f adolescents in the decision making process.
CRC General Comment 3, CRC/GC/2003/3, 17 March 2003, para 12
492 Article 3(c)
493 CRC/C/121, 11 December 2002, para. 122
494 CRC/C/118, 3 September 2002, para 112
495 CRC General Comment 5, CRC/GC/2003/5, 27 November 2003, para 12
496 DRM, Article 2(2)
497 HRC General Comment 23, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.5, 08/04/94, para 7; see also DRM Article 2(3)
498 Myntii, 1996: 11.
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public policies which will affect them.499 States are also required to obtain the consent 
of indigenous peoples before adopting measures that may affect them; the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DIP) determines that such consent is to be “free, 
prior and informed”.500 This consent consequently must not be manipulated or 
coerced, and should be accurate and accessible, and provided in a spirit of good 
faith.501
Effective and meaningful participation is also identified as important in other areas of 
international human rights law. The HRC has recognised that political participatory 
rights should be exercised “meaningfully”.502 The term ‘genuine’ is also used in 
relation to the right to vote in elections,503 and is further qualified by the phrase 
“guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”.504 Similarly, the Inter- 
American Commission has emphasized that “the reference to “genuine” elections 
implies the existence of a legal and institutional structure conducive to election results 
that reflect the will of the voters”.505 Genuine participation in elections therefore 
requires that both the process and result are free from manipulation, coercion and 
intimidation.506 The HRC has also identified that it is implicit in the enjoyment of the 
right to participate in government through representatives that “those representatives 
do in fact exercise governmental power and... are accountable for the exercise of that
499 E/2002/22 (Supp), 2002, para 782; A/57/18, 2002, para. 304; E/2005/22, 2004, para. 301.
500 Article 19
501 A/HRC/6/15, 15 Nov 2007, para 23
502 Arenz v. Germany (1138/2002), A/59/40 vol. II, 24 March 2004, 548, para 8.6
503 UDHR, Article 21(3); ICCPR, Article 25(b)
504 ICCPR, Article 25(b)
505 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1989, Chapter VIII, para 1
506 Fox, 1992: 567
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power”.507 Sengupta also argues that ‘effective’ participation in the right to 
development requires transparency and accountability.508
Finally, the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and 
Transformation (Charter of Arusha) notes that meaningful participation requires the 
protection of all human rights, making explicit reference to freedom of expression, 
and also identifying the importance of freedom from fear.509 Armed conflict is 
consequently identified as a major barrier to effective participation.510 This expands 
the concept of effective participation as being free from coercion and manipulation to 
consider the wider human rights context in which such participation takes place. 
Effective and meaningful participation is therefore identified both as necessary for 
and affected by human rights protection.
1.5: Participatory rights at the national and international levels
Participation at all levels of national society is recognised and protected by human 
rights principles. For example, Article 5(c) of the ICERD protects the right to take 
part in public affairs at any level, the right of women to participate in policy formation 
and hold public office at all levels is protected by Article 7(b) of the ICEDAW, and 
the importance of child participation at different levels of society has been 
established.511 The right of minorities to participate at the national, and potentially the 
regional level is recognised,512 and the general provision concerning indigenous
507 HRC, General Comment 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.7, 12 July 1996, para 7
508 Sengupta, 2000: 12
509 Charter o f Arusha, para 17
510 Charter of Arusha, para 18
511 CRC, 29 September 2006, para 18
512 DRM, Article 2(3), see also Article 2(2)
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peoples’ participation in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State513 
also indicates recognition of the importance of participation at different levels.
Article 29 of the AfCHPR implies the importance of participation at different levels 
of society through identifying the duties of the individual towards the family, state 
and the wider African community. Article 32 (1) of the AmCHR similarly recognises 
duties towards the family, the community and mankind. Whilst these provisions do 
not give a right of participation at these levels, they do indicate a conceptualisation of 
the individual as participating on different levels, thus implicitly recognising the 
importance of the different levels of participation.
However, participatory rights are predominantly conceived as operating on the 
national level; they are concerned with participation of individuals in relation to a 
state. Consequently principles of international human rights law fail to protect a right 
of participation at the international level. Although the ICEDAW Article 8 protects 
the right of women to participate on the international level, this is only regarding 
participation through representation of their state, or taking part in the work of 
international organisations, rather than on an individual basis. Likewise, the ICPD 
provides for the right of persons with disabilities to participate at the international, 
national, regional and local levels through “forming and joining organisations of 
persons with disabilities to represent persons with disabilities”.514 Whilst these 
provisions indicate some rights of international participation, this can only take place 
as via participation in an international organisation, rather than constituting direct 
individual participation at the international level.
513 DIP, Article 5,
5,4 ICPD, Article 29(b) (ii)
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Few human rights principles therefore recognise or protect individual participation in 
matters that affect them above the level of the state. However, some elements of 
human rights do allude to this international participation. The CESCR General 
Comment 14 refers to “the participation of the population in all health-related 
decision-making at the community, national and international levels.”515 This 
potentially indicates a right of individual participation in decision-making at the 
international level, although it may well be that the participation of the population at 
the international level is satisfied by participation by the state. The right of assembly 
also protects the right to form an NGO through which individuals can potentially 
participate on the international level. However, this does not constitute an individual 
right of participation at the international level; as with the provisions in the ICPD, it 
allows organisational rather than individual international participation. The Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health has, however, underlined the importance of 
participation above the national level in relation to recipient participation in the design 
and implementation of foreign donors’ policies of international assistance.516 This is 
an explicit recognition of the value of individual participation at the international 
level.
The restriction of individual participation to the national level conforms to 
understandings of human rights as a relationship between a state and those within its 
jurisdiction. However, analysis of the extra-territorial obligations of states could 
indicate an expansion of this concept of participation. Skogly argues for the existence 
of clear obligations in relation to extraterritorial assistance and cooperation stemming
515 CESCR, General Comment 14, E/C. 12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 11
516 A/HRC/7/1 l/Add.2, 5 March 2008, para. 27(c)
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from the provisions of various human rights treaties.517 This implicitly recognises that 
states have extra-territorial influence over the enjoyment of human rights in other 
states. Consequently, if individuals have a right to meaningful and effective 
participation over human rights issues that affect them, they should be able to 
participate in the decisions made by these other states which affect their human rights. 
Although this is a logical corollary of extra-territoriality, the literature has thus far 
focused on obligations of states rather than extra-territorial rights of individuals which 
would entail a right of participation at the international level.
1.6: Discussion
Chapter 1 identified that the modes of participation appropriate for human rights must 
be broad ranging; that they should incorporate both public and private, and formal and 
informal means of participation. Participation in human rights needs to take place on 
different levels, including the international level, and should be direct, active, 
effective and meaningful.
Principles of international human rights law reflect a concept of participation as 
taking place in both the public and private spheres, and furthermore that such 
participation encompasses a range of activities including political, social, cultural and 
economic participation. Principles of human rights law therefore manifest the type of 
participation appropriate to human rights, and further identify the interplay between 
public and private modes of participation. The way that participation is reflected in 
human rights law does not prioritise public over private participation, although the
517 Skogly, 2006: 83-108
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different levels of attention given to rights in practice, and patterns of violation, may 
indicate a greater concern with public participatory rights.
Similarly, principles of human rights law protect both formal and informal modes of 
participation, although there do exist conflicting interpretations in different areas of 
human rights law regarding the extent to which political participatory rights 
encompass informal rather than formal modes of participation. Some formulations of 
rights of political participation do not include the right to participate in public affairs, 
and therefore implicitly exclude informal modes of participation from this particular 
right. However, those instruments which do this -  the UDHR and the AfCHPR -  both 
also include constitutive rights of political participation, which do protect informal 
participation. Furthermore, whilst GC 25 does not provide for an extensive 
understanding of participation in public affairs, and appears to subsume it to the right 
to vote, thus prioritising formal modes of participation, the conceptualisation of 
participation by the CEDAW and within the ICPD support more informal modes of 
participation. Additionally, the ICCPR itself protects informal rights of participation, 
via the various constitutive participatory rights. Principles of human rights law 
therefore present a conflicting concept of informal participation. In particular, the 
concept and content of the right to participate in public affairs, and its relationship 
with constitutive political participatory rights, requires greater attention.
Principles of human rights law clearly identify that participation must be active, 
effective and meaningful, and participation is characterised in this way with regard to 
a range of human rights issues. This supports Thomberry’s argument that that the use 
of the term “effective” in the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
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National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (DRM) has a fundamental 
effect on how participation should be understood in relation to other human rights: 
“the adoption by the General Assembly of the word ‘effective’ to condition 
participation can be transferred to condition the term in analogous instruments which 
address general rights”.518 Whilst the rights of marginalised groups may require 
specific protection due to their particular vulnerable status, this does not require 
higher standards of participation than those required by other individuals. 
Consequently, the type of participation found in vulnerable group rights is also 
appropriate for rights with general application. The type of participation reflected in 
human rights principles with regard to gradations of participation therefore 
corresponds to that identified as appropriate for human rights.
However, regarding both the levels at which individuals may participate, and the 
nature of that participation as direct or representative, participation as reflected in 
human rights principles diverges from the type of participation appropriate for human 
rights, which required direct forms of participation at both the national and 
international levels. Fundamentally, human rights principles do not protect the right of 
individuals to participate above the national level in any way separate from their state. 
This is due to representative forms of participation being prioritised over direct forms, 
particularly in the political sphere. Although human rights principles do recognise the 
value of direct forms of participation, those rights which would enable direct and 
definite participation in decision-making by the state are considered fulfilled by 
representative forms.
518 Thomberry, 2008: 8
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Human rights principles therefore present a contradiction regarding modes of 
participation. Whilst the value of effective, active and meaningful participation is 
clearly identified, the ability of participation in human rights to fulfil these criteria is 
restricted by its being limited firstly to the national level and secondly to fulfilment 
via representative means. Direct participation provides a greater guarantee of 
meaningful and effective influence over decision-making at all levels than that which 
is mediated through representatives. Direct participation also provides greater 
opportunities for activity than fulfilment of participatory rights through voting for 
representatives, as people may not take part, or may feel that their vote counts for 
nothing. Critically, reliance upon representative rather than direct participation limits 
the ability of human rights to offer protection above the level of the state. Active, 
effective and meaningful participation in human rights therefore requires direct 
participation at the international level.519 However, this form of participation is not 
reflected in principles of international human rights law.
Part 2; The purpose of participation as manifested in human rights 
principles
2.1: Individual and communal participation
Human rights primarily operate on an individual basis, through protecting the rights 
of individuals. Participatory rights are therefore protected on an individual basis, as
• • • ^90demonstrated by terms such as “undertake to ensure to all individuals”, and “the 
right of everyone”.521 This indicates that human rights principles consider
519 See Chapter 5, section 2 for a more detailed analysis o f the implications o f this contradiction.
520 ICCPR, Article 2
521 Inter alia ICESCR, Articles 6, 7, 8, 11; CERD Article 6
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participation as an individual activity oriented to the protection of individual human 
rights interests.
There also exists recognition within human rights principles of participation as a 
communal activity oriented towards collective goals. The right to collective 
participation is explicitly protected via the right of freedom of assembly. As the HRC 
has identified, this is a right that “may be enjoyed in community with others”.522 In 
addition, principles which protect the right of individuals to participate in 
communities demonstrate recognition of participation as a collective activity. For 
example, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) protects the right of migrant 
workers and their families to participate in or be consulted on decisions concerning 
the life and administration of local communities.523 Similarly, the ICPD identifies the 
obligation of states to facilitate participation in the community by persons with 
disabilities,524 and the DIP recognises that participation may be a communal activity, 
by protecting the rights of indigenous peoples to belong to a community. These 
principles constitute further rights of communal participation. The importance of 
participation as part of a community is indicated by provisions regarding individual 
duties; the AfCHPR recognises the importance of participation as part of a community 
through asserting the duty of the individual towards the national community and the
522 HRC General Comment 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13, 29 March 2004, para 9
523 ICMW Article 42; note that this only applies to migrants with regular or documented status
524 ICPD, Article 19
525 DIP, Article 9
526 AfCHPR, Article 29(2)
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wider African community,527 and the AmCHR recognises the individual duties 
towards the community and mankind.528
Certain principles of human rights indicate that participation is not conceived as either 
individual or communal, but that it can be oriented to both types of interest. This is 
reflected in Article 1 of the DRD which demonstrates both individual and collective 
understandings of participation: that the right to development protects both the right 
of “every human person” and “all peoples” to participate in development. Similarly, 
the DRM also recognises that the rights it protects may be exercised both individually 
and communally.529 Waldron identifies that the right to (political) participation 
implies the right of the individual to play a part in government, along with an equal 
part played by other individuals,530 thus identifying participation as an individual right 
exercised in community with others. Similarly, the right to freedom of religion is 
recognised by the ECHR as a right which may be exercised both on the individual and 
communal levels.531 The concept of participation reflected in children’s rights 
considers it to be beneficial for the individual, the family, the community, the State 
and for democratic society,532 further identifying that participation can be oriented to 
both collective and individual activities.
327 AfCHPR, Articles 29(7) and 29(8)
528 AmCHR, Article 32(1)
529 DRM, Article 3(1)
530 Waldron, 1998:312
531 ECHR Article 9(1); see also AmCHR, Article 12(1)
532 CRC, 29 September 2006, Preamble to the Recommendations
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2.2: Instrumental or substantive participation
Certain elements of international human rights law recognise the importance of 
participation as a substantive end in itself. The clearest example of this is found 
within article 2(1) of the DRD: “the human person is the central subject of 
development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to 
development” (emphasis added). This provision identifies development as a process533 
and therefore gives a right to participate in that process. Both the developmental 
outcome to be achieved and the process by which it is achieved must fall within a 
participatory human rights framework; consequently participation in the process by 
which the right is achieved is as important as the realisation of the right itself,534 
Similarly, the Charter of Arusha considers that the process of popular participation is 
itself of value, as well as being an instrument of development.535 It is an end in itself 
because it is “the fundamental right of the people to fully and effectively participate in 
the determination of the decisions which affect their lives at all levels and at all 
times”.536
The same principle is found in the context of children’s rights. The CRC has 
identified that the means by which a participatory right is achieved must be via a 
process which protects rights of participation; “thus, for example, education must be 
provided in a way that respects the inherent dignity of the child and enables the child 
to express his or her views freely in accordance with article 12 (1) and to participate
54 J Obiora, 1996: 362
534 Sengupta, 2000: 6; Orford, 2005: 138-9
535 Ginther, 1992: 59
536 Charter o f Arusha, para 10
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in school life”.537 Similarly, the CESCR has identified the importance of obligations 
of both conduct and result concerning the implementation of rights.538
Human rights principles also recognise participation as fulfilling an instrumental role, 
and a number of outcomes are identified as resulting from it. Firstly, participation is 
considered a means to overcome conflict. For example, the preamble to the ICED AW 
identifies that equal participation of women is required for development, welfare and 
peace, thus indicating that exclusion or non-participation is a cause of conflict. 
Democratic participation is also propounded as a means to promote non-aggression.539 
Furthermore, one purpose of education is to overcome conflict and promote 
understanding between nations, ethnic, racial and religious groups.540
Secondly, participation is considered essential for the achievement of other human 
rights. The DRD identifies participation as a means to realise all other human rights, 
as per Article 8(2), thus implying an instrumental role for participation in human 
rights enjoyment. Similarly, the free and equal participation of indigenous peoples is 
identified as a requirement for the effective protection of their human rights.541 
Participation is specifically linked to economic and social development, with the 
Charter of Arusha promoting popular participation as essential for nation-building and 
the improvement of economic conditions,542 and identifying it as “the centrepiece in 
the struggle to achieve economic and social justice for all”.543 Likewise, the ICPD 
considers “full participation by persons with disabilities will result in...significant
537 CRC General Comment 1, CRC/GC/2001/1, 17 April 2001, para 8
538 CESCR General Comment 3, 14 December 1990, para. 1
539 Franck, 1992: 88
540 CESCR General Comment 13, E/C. 12/1999/10, 8 December 1999, para 4




advances in the human, social and economic development of society and the 
eradication of poverty.544 More specifically, the CESCR General Comment 15 
identifies that “the right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-making 
processes that may affect their exercise of the right to water must be an integral part 
of any policy, programme or strategy concerning water”.545 Similarly, General 
Comment 4 identifies public participation as “indispensible” for the realisation of the 
right to adequate housing.546
Political participatory rights are particularly identified as “an essential precondition to 
the enjoyment of all other rights”.547 For example, the CESCR considers that 
democracy is “a prerequisite for the development of a system of government that
c a Q
promotes full respect for economic, social and cultural rights”; implying that 
democratic forms of political participation are necessary for the protection of human 
rights. The General Assembly has also identified that the right to participate in 
government is “a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a wide range of 
other human rights”.549
Finally, participation is identified as a means to achieve better outcomes. The 
Preamble to the Aarhus Convention posits that improved public participation in 
decision-making enhances “the quality and implementation of decisions”. The Human 
Rights Commission has identified that “in a democracy the widest participation in the 
democratic dialogue by all sectors and actors of society must be promoted in order to
544 ICPD, Preamble
545 CESCR GC 15, E/C. 12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, para 48
546 CESCR General Comment 4, 13 December 1991, para 9
547 Fox, 1992: 595
548 E/1999/22, 1998: 27, para 130
549 GA Res 45/150 (Dec 18, 1990)
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come to agreements on appropriate solutions to the social, economic and cultural 
problems of a society”.550 The CESCR has stated that “a policy or programme that is 
formulated without the active and informed participation of those affected is most 
unlikely to be effective”.55 ^ h e  participation of indigenous peoples is identified as 
contributing to more effective development outcomes.552 The CRC explicitly 
identifies participation as producing more effective human rights protection,553 and 
also identifies that if national strategies or actions plans for children are to be 
effective, they must be produced in consultation with children.554
2.3: The balance between control and empowerment
Several principles of international human rights law present participation as a means 
of empowerment. Firstly, the participatory aspects of the right to education are 
oriented towards empowerment, as education is identified as “an empowerment 
right... the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults 
and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate 
fully in their communities”.555 As Baderin observes, “education is the key to mental
liberation”.556 The DIP also links education to empowerment,557 as does the ICPD,
• • •which identifies the role of education in enabling effective participation.
50 E/CN.4/1995/60 (1995), Preamble
51 E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2000, para 12
52 A/HRC/6/15, 15 Nov 2007, para 28-32
53 CRC, General Comment 3, CRC/GC/2003/3 17 March 2003, para 12
54 CRC General Comment 5, CRC/GC/2003/5, 27 November 2003, para 29
55 CESCR General Comment 13, E/C. 12/1999/10, 8 December 1999, para. 1
56 Baderin, 2003:210
57 DIP, Article 17(2)
58 ICPD, Article 2 4 ( l)(c )
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Participation in development is also linked to empowerment. Ginther argues that 
article 13 of the Charter of Arusha promotes popular participation as a means to 
ensure community empowerment and self-development.559 Furthermore, the active 
concept of participation presented in the DRD as discussed above560 identifies 
participation as a means of empowerment to build confidence and solidarity.561 Whilst 
the degree to which participatory development practices achieve the goal of 
empowerment has been challenged,562 the extent to which development projects 
promote active participation is in practice variable and the emancipatory possibilities 
of participation as presented by the right to development therefore remain.563
In addition, rights of legal participation564 demonstrate participation as empowerment 
in relation to claiming rights and challenging abuse. Access to justice is identified in 
the Aarhus Convention as a means to enable other forms of participation and to ensure 
accountability. This empowers the individual as it enables them to have greater 
control over both the way in which decisions are taken and the decisions that are 
taken. Political participation also is considered a means of empowerment; it is the 
means by which citizens exercise control over the decisions of their government.565
Finally, participation is specifically acknowledged as a means for marginalised groups 
to become empowered. The CEDAW considers that “women's full participation is 
essential...for their empowerment”.566 The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples
559 Ginther, 1992: 59; see also para. 11 o f the Preamble to the Charter o f Arusha
560 Chapter 2, section 1.4 above.
561 Ginther, 1992: 73; Obiora, 1996, 358
562 See generally Cooke and Kothari 2001; for a response see Parfitt, 2004
563 Parfitt, 2004: 555
564 Chapter 2, section 1.2 above.
565 Fox, 1992: 595
566 CEDAW General Recommendation 23, A/52/3 8/Rev. 1, 1997, para 17
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has identified that indigenous peoples’ participation in determining the forms of 
development suited to their needs is a means of empowerment.567 This is further 
reflected in the Preamble to the DIP which identifies that indigenous peoples’ “control 
over developments affecting them and their lands” enables them “to promote their 
development in accordance with their aspirations and needs”; the lack of their 
exercise of this right being previously identified with “historic injustices”. 
Consequently, participation is considered a form of control as it is a means to 
overcome exclusion and injustice.
However, certain rights of participation indicate the potential for control rather than 
empowerment. Private participatory rights such as cultural or religious participation 
or participation in family life may promote and legitimate particular power structures 
which may conflict with other forms of participation. For example, the ICCPR and 
HRC569 implicitly recognise the potential for religious participation to restrict the 
enjoyment of other rights through their permissible limitations on the right to religion. 
Similarly, the CRC has observed that traditional practices and attitudes may conflict 
with the implementation of Article 12 requiring that the views of the child be taken 
into account in decisions affecting the child.570 It has also noted the potential for 
discrimination against children resulting from their participation in particular religious
c n  1
or other social groups.
567 A/HRC/6/15, 15 November 2007, para 18(c)
568 Article 18(3)
569 HRC General Comment 22, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.4, 30 July 1993, para 8
570 CRC/C/111, 28 November 2001, paras. 110 and 179
571 CRC GC 7, CRC/C/GC/7/Rev. 1, 20 September 2006, para. 11(b) (iv)
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2.4: Legitimacy and participation in principles of human rights
Certain elements of human rights law specifically identify that participation can
contribute to legitimacy. For example, the HRC has
emphasised that the acceptability of measures that affect or interfere with the 
culturally significant economic activities of a minority depends on whether the 
members of the minority in question have had the opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether they will continue 
to benefit from their traditional economy.572
This recognises the importance of participation in enhancing legitimacy, through 
correlating the acceptability of decisions with participation in processes of decision­
making by those affected. Similarly, the CESCR has repeatedly identified the need for 
individuals and groups affected by policies relating to the rights to food, health and 
water to be included in the development of those plans,573 which implies that failure 
to ensure such widespread participation will mean that the policies lack legitimacy. In 
addition, Orford argues that Article 2(3) of the DRD “qualifies the legitimacy of state 
development policies by reference to participation”.574 Participation is therefore 
considered as a means to enhance the legitimacy of processes and policies concerning 
the fulfilment of particular rights.
The way in which political participation is conceptualised within principles of human 
rights law further identifies how participation can enhance legitimacy. In identifying 
in Article 21(3) that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections”, the 
UDHR explicitly equates political participation with governmental legitimacy. This is
572 Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand (547/1993), A/56/40 vol. II, 27 October 2000, 11 para 9.5; also I. 
Lansman et al. v. Finland, (511/1992), CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, 8 November 1994. paras. 9.6 and 9.8
573 CESCR General Comment 5, 9 December 1994, para 14; General Comment 12, E/C.12/1999/5, 12 
May 1999, para 23; General Comment 14, E/C. 12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 11; General Comment 
15, CESCR GC 15, E/C. 12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, para 48
574 Orford, 2005: 138
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further reflected in Fox’s argument that political participatory rights promote a 
concept of popular sovereignty,575 and that this is “the most enduring theory of 
domestic political legitimacy”.576 Concepts of a right to democracy577 further 
centralise the principle that the legitimacy of governments is dependent on the 
political participation of citizens.
These elements of international human rights law indicate recognition that 
participation can contribute to legitimacy. However, the way that this is 
conceptualised is limited to participation in the application of human rights. The 
legitimacy of how rights are fulfilled is linked to participation, but the legitimacy of 
the rights themselves is not. There is no application of the norms reflected in 
principles of human rights law to the formation of the law itself concerning the 
relationship between participation and legitimacy. The concept of participation 
reflected within human rights principles is therefore only concerned with participation 
as application and excludes participation as definition.
2.5: Discussion
Regarding the purpose of participation, Chapter 1 identified that participation in 
human rights should incorporate both individual and communal elements, and that 
participation can be a means to emphasize the communal elements of human rights. 
Clearly human rights principles are predominantly concerned with the rights of 
individuals and are oriented to the protection of human rights on an individual basis. 
This reflects a concept of participation in human rights as directed to the protection of
575 Fox, 1992: 543
576 Fox, 1992: 551
577 Chapter 2, section 1.3
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the individual. However, principles of human rights law also reflect participation 
oriented to collective ends. This is most clearly demonstrated by the ‘third-generation’ 
group rights: the rights of minorities, indigenous peoples, and the right to 
development. It is also reflected in the various references to the protection of 
participation as part of a community: the rights to religious and cultural participation, 
and the right to association. Furthermore, the language of human rights law can also 
be interpreted to imply universal and thus communal participation. A participatory 
analysis of human rights principles therefore does not exclude a collective orientation 
but rather can be a way to emphasize the collective aspects of human rights.
In addition, Chapter 1 identified that participation is both a means and an end, and 
that participation is a right of itself, and should not therefore be reduced to a means to 
achieve human rights goals. Participation is clearly reflected in human rights 
principles as a means to achieve human rights goals including reduction of conflict 
and better protection of human rights. It is also viewed as an essential underlying 
element for the realisation of all human rights. Furthermore, the importance of a 
participatory process is reflected in some human rights principles. Less clear is the 
identification of participation as a right of itself. Certain areas of human rights law 
identify participation as a right. Other areas of human rights law instead reflect 
‘participatory rights’ related to specific spheres of life such as political, cultural or 
social participation, rather than an overarching right to participate in matters that 
affect the individual. Human rights principles therefore indicate some recognition of a 
right to participate, but cannot yet be said to have solidified this right as one with 
comprehensive application. Participation as a right of itself under international human 
rights law can be considered as emerging; as yet, it remains indeterminate.
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Consequently, although some elements of human rights identify participation as an 
end in itself, overall its instrumental purposes have received greater emphasis. More 
general recognition of participation as a right in itself would rectify this.
Chapter 1 also specified that participation in human rights should be oriented towards 
empowerment and accountability. Human rights principles primarily reflect this 
concept of participation, expressly recognising it as a means to achieve 
empowerment, and more implicitly as contributing to accountability and legitimacy. 
However, participatory rights themselves may enable control and restriction of the 
enjoyment of other rights. Although human rights principles state that the exercise of 
participatory rights must not incur violations of other human rights, this issue requires 
more attention in order to resolve these conflicts.
Part 3: Principles of human rights concerning the feasibility of 
participation
3.1: Opportunities for participation and the ability to participate
As identified in Chapter 1, the feasibility of participation is concerned with both the 
opportunity and the ability to participate. Some elements of human rights make 
specific reference to opportunities for participation; for example GC 25 identifies that 
“the Covenant requires States to .. .ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to 
enjoy the rights it protects”.578 Similarly, the ICEDAW refers to the objective of 
“equality of opportunity” for women.579 These provisions therefore recognise the 
importance of the existence of opportunities for participation.
578 HRC, General Comment 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.7, 12 July 1996, para 1
579 Article 4(1)
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However, the concept of participation as generally reflected in human rights 
principles does not clearly distinguish between these two elements of opportunity and 
ability. There exist numerous principles which indicate the importance of equal access 
to participation regarding both opportunity and ability. For example, the provisions of 
the DRD,580 DRM581 and DIP582 which refer to a general right to participate imply 
rights of participation both regarding opportunity and ability. The right to participate 
as presented in these instruments encompasses both the existence of opportunities for 
participation and the ability to make use of these opportunities.
Human rights principles recognise the existence of barriers to participation, which 
constrain both the opportunity and the ability to participate, thus implicitly 
recognising the importance of ensuring opportunities and abilities for participation. 
Socio-economic status is recognised as a potential obstacle to participation. CEDAW 
identifies that both time and financial dependence on men are limiting factors 
regarding women’s participation in public life.583 The HRC identifies poverty as a 
potential impediment to the exercise of the rights to vote.584
There exist numerous principles within both human rights law with general 
application and within instruments concerned with the rights of particular groups 
which identify that members of marginalised and/or vulnerable groups may face 
specific barriers regarding both opportunities for their participation and their ability to
580 Article 3(c)
581 Article 2(3)
582 Article 18, which gives a general right of indigenous peoples “to participate in decision-making in 
matters which would affect their rights”.
583 CEDAW General Recommendation 23, A/52/3 8/Rev. 1, 1997, para 11
584 HRC, General Comment 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.7, 12 July 1996, para 12
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participate. The specific protection of participation for vulnerable groups clearly 
illustrates recognition that discrimination against these groups constitutes a barrier to 
participation; consequently numerous principles have been reiterated to counter this.
For example, Article 8 of the UN Charter protects the equal rights of men and women 
to participate in its principle and subsidiary organs. Women have specifically 
protected rights of participation in development, as per CEDAW Art 14 (2(a)) which 
refers to the specific rights of rural women to participate in development planning and 
implementation and the DRD Article 8(1) “Effective measures should be undertaken 
to ensure that women have an active role in the development process”. Women’s 
rights of political585 and legal586 participation are protected, and the right of women to 
participate in cultural587 and family588 life is emphasized.
Similarly, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 1990 reiterates these groups’ participatory 
rights; for example freedom of expression,589 rights of legal participation,590 
participation in trade unions and other organisations,591 cultural participation592 and 
access to education,593 which are to be enjoyed on an equal basis with the nationals of 
the State concerned. Likewise, the CPD is concerned with enabling equal and non- 
discriminatory participation by persons with disabilities in society.594 Article 2(2) of 
the DRM states that minorities have “the right to participate effectively in cultural,
585 See note 51
586 See note 92
587 ICEDAW Article 13(c)
588 ICEDAW Article 16
589 Article 13(2)
590 Articles 16-20 and 24
591 Article 26
592 Article 43(1 )(g)
593 Article 30
594 See for example Articles 5, 9, 12, 13, 19, 29
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religious, social, economic and public life”, thus supporting the principle of inclusion 
in mainstream structures of participation. This is further supported by Article 4(1) 
which identifies rights of legal participation through guaranteeing full equality before 
the law, and Article 4(5) which guarantees the right of opportunities for participation 
in economic matters. The DIP underlines also the principle of non-discrimination as 
reflected in the right of indigenous peoples to “participate fully in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of the State”.595 The CERD guarantees the rights of 
everyone to political participation, irrespective of race, colour or national or ethnic
• • 596origin.
Resource barriers to participation are also recognised within principles of 
international human rights law. The CPD explicitly recognises disability as a barrier 
to “participation as equal members of society”.597 Persons with disabilities are 
recognised as facing direct physical barriers to participation as well as more implicit 
barriers resulting from access to information, communication and facilities and 
services.598 The CRC identifies that children with mental or physical disabilities 
should be able to participate actively in the community,599 thus indicating recognition 
of disability as a potential barrier to participation. The need for positive action to 
enable the full participation of persons with disabilities has also been recognised by 
the CESCR.600
595 Article 4. The right o f indigenous people to participate in economic development is also found in 
Articles 7 and 15 o f the International Labour Organisation Convention 169 : Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention 1989 {hereafter ILO 169).
596 Article 5(c) and 5 (d) (viii) and (ix)
597 ICPD, Preamble, para (e); Article 1
598 ICPD, Article 9
599 ICRC, Article 23(1)
600 CESCR General Comment 5, 09/12/94, para 9
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Issues regarding knowledge, education and literacy are recognised as impacting on the 
ability to participate. The ICESCR specifically identifies education as a means to 
“enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society”.601 Education is 
identified as necessary to ensure the ability to exercise the right to vote;602 CEDAW 
identifies illiteracy, and lack of knowledge regarding both candidates and procedures, 
and the impact that these may have on their lives, as factors which impede women’s 
exercise of their right to vote.603 Illiteracy is also recognised by the HRC as a 
potential impediment to the exercise of the right to vote, and states are required to 
take measures to overcome this.604 The HRC has further identified that lack of 
proficiency in the official language is not a legitimate barrier to standing for 
election,605 and also that language barriers must not restrict the ability to vote in 
elections.606 Furthermore, the relationship between motivation and participation is 
implicitly recognised in the Preamble to the CPD, which recognises “attitudinal 
barriers” which hinder the “full and effective participation in society” of persons with 
disabilities.
These provisions indicate that not only does human rights law recognise the existence 
of a variety of barriers to participation, it places some obligations on states to 
overcome these obstacles. However, these are primarily negative rather than positive 
obligations. Fundamentally, states must enable equal opportunities for participation. 
Furthermore, states’ obligations regarding certain rights are not absolute. Those rights 
protected under the ICESCR, including the right to education, a key right for enabling
601 ICESCR, Article 13(1)
602 HRC, General Comment 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.7, 12 July 1996, para 11
603 CEDAW General Recommendation 23, A/52/3 8/Rev. 1, 1997, para 20(a)
604 HRC, General Comment 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.7, 12 July 1996, para 12
605 Ignatane v. Latvia (884/1999), A/56/40 vol. II, 25 July 200, 191
606 HRC, General Comment 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.7, 12 July 1996, para 12
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other forms of participation, are subject to the principle of progressive realisation. 
This requires that states refrain from discrimination, and ‘take steps’ towards meeting 
their obligations,607 but recognises that states are differently placed in terms of their 
ability to ensure the enjoyment of these rights. Therefore, whilst states must not 
directly limit the enjoyment of participatory rights, and must remove barriers 
stemming from discriminatory practices, the extent to which they are obliged to 
commit resources to explicitly facilitating participation is unclear.
In addition, political participatory rights, in particular the right to vote, constitute an 
important exception to the principle of universal access found within human rights 
theory. Primarily, the right to vote is restricted to citizens, a limitation supported in 
the CERD Article 1(2). The CMW also extends the right to vote and to participate in 
public affairs only to those migrant workers who are “documented or in a regular 
situation in the state of employment”; these rights of political participation do not 
extend to migrant workers who are “non-documented or in an irregular situation”.609 
States are consequently not required to provide opportunities for political participation 
by non-citizens.
Finally, states are able to suspend the enjoyment of some participatory rights in 
certain circumstances. The ICCPR permits derogation from most participatory rights 
“in times of public emergency”610 including the right to vote and to participate in 
public affairs, and rights of assembly and association, although it does not permit
607 CESCR General Comment 3 , 14 December 1990, paras. 1 and 2
608 ICMW, Articles 36 and 41
609 Article 5(b)
610 Article 4 ( 1)
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derogation from the right to freedom of religion.611 The ECHR and AmCHR contain 
similar provisions,612 although there is no derogation clause in the AfCHPR. The
American Convention does not, however, permit derogation from the right to
• • ( \ 1 ^participate m government, and therefore gives more extensive protection than the
ICCPR. Whilst the decision to derogate from these rights is subject to reasonably
strict criteria,614 the decision concerning what constitutes a state of emergency
requiring derogation is ultimately taken by the state, and the extent to which the
individual can challenge this decision is unclear. Principles of human rights law
therefore reflect considerable deference to state determination of opportunities for the
enjoyment of participatory rights.
3.2: Discussion
Consideration of the feasibility of participation presents a somewhat contradictory 
account of participation as reflected in human rights principles. Chapter 1 identified 
that human rights require universal opportunities for participation, and that these be 
available on a non-discriminatory basis. The concept of participation reflected in 
human rights principles clearly conforms to this. Numerous principles of human 
rights law refer to the prohibition of discrimination concerning the enjoyment of 
participatory rights, including in relation to the progressive realisation of these rights. 
Furthermore, human rights principles clearly identify several of the factors identified 
in Chapter 1 as practical barriers to participation, including socio-economic status, 
discrimination against particular groups and lack of resources including skills and
611 Article 4 (2)
612 ECHR, Article 15; AmCHR, Article 27
613 Article 27(2)
614 See generally HRC General Comment 29, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 11, 31 August 2001
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knowledge. This is demonstrated by the development of extensive provisions of 
human rights law directed at these issues.
However, it is also clear that opportunities for the enjoyment of participatory rights 
may vary considerably between states. Participatory rights are subject to limitations 
regarding how far states are required to provide opportunities for and enable the 
ability to participate. Some participatory rights can be limited in the case of a public 
emergency and with regard to the states’ available resources. Therefore, human rights 
principles do not present an absolute concept of the feasibility of participation, as the 
state does not have an absolute obligation to provide opportunities and enable the 
ability to participate in all cases. Furthermore, the state retains a great deal of control 
concerning the determination of the scope of its obligations. In consequence, human 
rights principles do not demonstrate a requirement for universal opportunities for 
participation.
This seems to contradict the requirement of universality concerning opportunities for 
participation identified in Chapter 1. However, Chapter 1 also noted that human rights 
is internally contradictory regarding this issue, requiring universality in principle, but 
recognising that in practice states have different levels of resources. It is unsurprising 
that this contradiction is reflected in human rights principles. It would, however, be of 
value to further consider firstly, the content of state obligations for the facilitation of 
participation, and secondly, individual participation in determining both the necessity 
of derogation and states’ allocation of their resources concerning the enjoyment of 
participatory rights.
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Part 4: The right to construct the norms of participation
Chapter 1 identified the importance of analysis of normative participation: 
understanding how participatory norms and structures are determined, and who 
participates in this and on what basis. Such analysis serves to uncover the power 
relations and interests which underlie structures of participation. Sections 1 to 3 have 
examined the types of participation reflected in human rights principles, the ends to 
which they are oriented and the factors which enable or constrain participation in 
different forms and by different groups. This Chapter must now examine the extent to 
which principles of international human rights law recognise and protect means of 
challenging or redefining concepts, norms and practices of participation, or whether 
they present an understanding of participation as fixed and unchanging. Whilst this 
question relates to how rights of participation in international human rights law have 
been initially constructed, that issue will be examined in depth in Chapter 3 which 
examines law-making. The following discussion will therefore examine how 
principles of human rights law conceive of participation regarding the determination 
of who participates, what form that participation takes, and to what ends it is oriented.
4.1: Principles of international human rights law concerned with normative 
participation
The right to self-determination illustrates the importance of normative participation 
with regard to participants. ‘Peoples’ have the right to self-determination; however, a 
people cannot participate in this way until it is first determined who is a ‘people’, and, 
as Summers identifies, the state is the entity that has the power to make this decision
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under international law.615 Consequently, the state retains an important framing power 
regarding the nature of the participatory right conferred by the right to self- 
determination. However, with regard to other forms of participation by indigenous 
peoples, international human rights principles appear more self-reflexive. Indigenous 
peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership,616 implying the 
right to participate in the determination of what constitutes a participant of an 
indigenous group. This indicates a contradiction between the normative determination 
of participants as reflected in indigenous peoples’ rights and the right to self- 
determination.
Furthermore, the content of some participatory rights presents predetermined and 
static categories regarding how a ‘participant’ is determined. For example, the rights 
to vote and to take part in public affairs are limited to citizens. A citizen is determined 
by the rules of nationality, in whose construction the state is the primary participant. 
Whilst a child has the right to a nationality,617 there is no right for any individual to 
demand a particular nationality which would confer the participatory rights of 
citizens. Similarly, within the right to family life the definition of what constitutes a 
family seems to rest with the state.618 The CMW also indicates the fundamental role 
of the state in determining who may participate, as per article 42(3) “Migrant workers 
may enjoy political rights in the State of employment if that State, in the exercise of 
its sovereignty, grants them such rights”. Consequently, participation in determining 
who may participate seems, with the exception of indigenous peoples, to be restricted 
to the state.
615 Summers, 2005: 328
616ILO 169 Article 1(2); DIP Article 33(1)
6,7 ICCPR, Article 24(3), ICRC, Article 7(1)
618 HRC General Comment 19, 27 July 1990, para 2
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Participation in challenging or redefining what form participation can take is also 
recognised to a greater extent in human rights principles. As Eide identifies, rights of 
cultural participation give the individual the right to challenge and change particular 
cultural practices.619 They can therefore provide the individual with the means to 
develop alternative participatory structures to those found in traditional culture(s). 
The right to participate in cultural life thus offers a potential means to assert 
alternative structures of participation against dominant practices, whether those of a 
particular cultural group or of a society as a whole. Baderin supports this 
interpretation of the right to participate in cultural life, arguing that it protects “the 
right of individuals to lead their own way of life as members of [a] community in 
distinction from others. It...signifies the right to be different”. This individualised 
concept of the right to cultural participation is also supported by the Reporting 
Guidelines of the CESCR which refer to “the right of everyone to take part in the 
cultural life which he or she considers pertinent, and to manifest his or her own 
culture”.621 This understanding of the right to participate in cultural life implies more 
extensive rights of determining norms of participation as it gives the right to 
participate in or to challenge cultural practices which create and support particular 
principles and structures of participation.
The right of ‘everyone’ to take part in cultural life suggests, in a differentiated or 
multicultural society, that there are ‘cultural’ dimensions to the enjoyment of 
culture.622 What counts as ‘taking part’ will, beyond a certain minimum platform,
619 Eide, 2001:291
620 Baderin, 2003: 214
621 E/C.12/1991/1, 17 June 1991: 19; see also McGoldrick, 2007: 453
622 Thomberry 2008: 8-9
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vary with the cultural perspectives, values and contexts of the participants,623 
indicating the opportunity for a degree of participation in determining how 
participation will take place. This understanding of the right to participate in cultural 
life is reflected in interpretations of the core content of this right as including 
participation both in the identification of issues to be addressed by policy makers and 
in the development and implementation of policies and laws,624 thus indicating that 
this right encompasses participation in determining how the right itself will be 
protected and to what ends such protection is oriented.
Similarly, the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples illustrate opportunities for 
the determination of forms of participation. Article 2(1) of the DRM protects the right 
of minorities to “enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, 
and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference 
or any form of discrimination”. The DIP also emphasizes the rights of indigenous 
peoples to practice their own culture625 and religion626 and to use their own 
language,627 and to “participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, 
social and cultural life of the state”.628 These provisions consequently imply that 
minorities and indigenous peoples have the right to participate in determining whether 
they would prefer to participate in the majority and/or minority culture, through 
emphasizing the right to use their own language and practice their own religion. This 
conforms with the general provisions of the right to culture which gives the right to 
either participate in or to challenge the dominant culture. These provisions also
623 Thomberry 2008: 8-9
624 Fisher et al, 1994: 50
625 Article 12
626 Article 13
627 Articles 14 and 15
628 DIP, Article 5
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indicate that minorities and indigenous peoples have the right to participate in 
determining what constitutes their culture, which would include the participatory 
norms of that culture.
Indigenous peoples have more explicit rights to determine their own norms and 
structures of participation. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain distinct 
political, economic, social and cultural characteristics and legal systems,629 and to 
determine their own structures of decision-making.630 They have the right to 
participate in the establishment and implementation of processes to adjudicate their 
rights regarding lands, territories and resources.631 They have the right to “determine 
the structures and select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their 
own procedures”.632 States are required to consult and cooperate with indigenous 
peoples in order to achieve the enjoyment of their rights,633 indicating a right of 
participation for indigenous peoples in determining how best to protect their rights, 
including participatory rights. They have the right to promote, develop and maintain 
their institutional structures and their distinctive juridical customs.634 The state is 
obliged to “establish means for the full development of these peoples' own institutions 
and initiatives, and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this 
purpose”.635 These provisions indicate far reaching rights of participation in 
determining norms and structures of decision-making across a range of social arenas.
b2y DIP Article 5
630 DIP Article 18
631 DIP, Article 27
632 DIP, Article 33(2)
633 DIP, Article 38, see also Article 36(2); also ILO 169 Articles 2(1) and 33(2)
634 DIP Article 34
635 ILO 169 Article 6(1 )(c)
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A somewhat conflicting account of normative participation is presented regarding 
political rights. Constitutive political participatory rights provide for means to 
influence decision-making both within and outside established political structures,636 
and thus may facilitate opposition to or redefinition of such structures. Constitutive 
political participatory rights therefore both support conventional forms of 
participation and enable new methods and challenges. For example, the HRC has 
indicated that it considers encouragement of non-cooperation with a regular process 
of participation in order to challenge the legitimacy of that process as consistent with 
the protection offered by the right of freedom of expression, and potentially of the 
right of political participation. This implies recognition of non-participation in 
current channels as a means to challenge and potentially redefine the norms of 
participation. The Inter-American Commission has further identified that there should 
be popular input into the drafting of laws governing elections,638 again indicating the 
desirability of upstream forms of participation639 in determining norms of political 
participation.
However, in the Miqmak case the HRC stated that the modalities of political 
participation are determined by the state.640 This indicates that the right to freedom of 
expression provides for more extensive participation in determining the norms of 
political participation than Article 25 of the ICCPR. An alternative interpretation is 
that the HRC supports a passive form of normative participation -  rejecting elections
636 As Myntti (1996: 4) identifies, the activities of trade unions and pressure groups may enable 
political participation by individuals who might otherwise not take part in such activities.
637 Individual Opinion o f Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring), Svetik v. Belarus (927/2000), A/59/40 vol. II,
8 July 2004, 125
638 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1989, Chapter VIII, para 1; Fox, 1992: 567
639 ‘Upstream’ refers to forms o f participation which are open to redefinition as part o f the process of 
participation by the participants involved; see Chapter 1, section 1.4.
640 Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada (205/1986), A/47/40, 4 November 1991, 205, para 5.5
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-  but not more active participation in determining what participation in public affairs 
should constitute.
The DRD also presents a conflicting account of how the norms of ‘participation in 
development’ are to be determined. Article 2(3) identifies that “states have the right 
and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies”, thus indicating 
that individual ‘participation in development’ does not include determination of 
policy. The same provision, though, also refers to individuals’ “active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits 
resulting therefrom”. This indicates that ‘participation in development’ is not limited 
to sharing the benefits of development, but also incorporates determination of how 
and to what ends development takes place. Orford agrees that the key commitments of 
the right to development include both the right to participate in and control the 
direction of development, and to participate in the benefits of development.641 It is 
therefore unclear how far ‘participation in development’ includes participation in the 
determination of the norms of development and of, in turn, participation in 
development.
4.2: Discussion
Human rights principles acknowledge to some degree the importance of genuine 
participation and also recognise that participation in the production of norms of 
participation constitutes an important element of ensuring meaningful participation. 
Through emphasizing the importance of active, effective and meaningful
641 Orford, 2005: 146
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participation642 (as per part 1.4) human rights principles implicitly recognise the 
importance of participation in constructing the norms of participation.
However, such forms of normative participation are rarely explicit with human rights 
instruments. The major exception here is the DIP, which clearly provides far-ranging 
normative participatory rights for indigenous peoples, including the right not only to 
participate without discrimination in the participatory structures of the state, but also 
to develop and implement separate participatory norms, including structures of 
participation regarding the protection of rights. The principle of active, effective and 
meaningful participation requires that all individuals should enjoy these normative 
participatory rights, as identified in Chapter 1. Whilst it is unlikely that the rights of 
indigenous peoples are intended to be more extensive than those with general 
application, this area would merit further clarification.
Human rights principles also impose limits on the forms and purposes of 
participation. Primarily, these are in line with the underlying values of human rights; 
fundamentally, norms of participation must be inclusive and non-discriminatory. For 
example, whilst the DIP as identified above gives indigenous peoples the most far 
reaching rights found within human rights principles regarding normative 
participation, the exercise of these rights must accord with the respect of other human 
rights.643 This indicates limits on how far norms of participation may be challenged. 
For example, structures which systematically exclude particular groups from political 
participation violate the human rights principle of non-discrimination. However, this 
also risks excluding particular forms of participation and raises questions regarding
642 See Chapter 2, section 1.4 above.
643 DIP, Article 46(2)
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how appropriate forms of participation are determined. This issue therefore requires 
further consideration of participation in constructing the principles of human rights 
law which stipulate these normative restrictions on participation.644
Finally, it is clear that the state retains control over some of the norms of 
participation, particularly those concerning who is a legitimate participant. This 
conflicts with the type of participation required by human rights in several ways. 
Firstly, it excludes the individual from certain forms of participation, thus conflicting 
with the principle of universality. Secondly, it promotes state power and interest 
rather than individual empowerment. Thirdly, it restricts the ability of the individual 
to challenge or redefine the norms of their participation, as they may be prevented 
from participating in structures which would enable this.
Concluding Remarks
The way in which participation is reflected in human rights principles demonstrates 
the complex nature of participation. Human rights principles recognise various forms 
and purposes of participation, including normative participation. Conflicts between 
these different aspects of participation are also manifested in the concept of 
participation presented by principles of international human rights law.
It is clear that the concept of participation reflected in human rights principles broadly 
reflects, albeit with some exceptions, the type of participation appropriate to human 
rights as identified in Chapter 1. This is to be expected, as human rights principles as
644 Participation in the construction of human rights law is discussed in Chapter 3.
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manifested in international legal instruments could be anticipated to remain consistent 
with the underlying ideology and inherent characteristics of human rights. The 
principles of international human rights law recognise and protect rights relating to 
public and private, and formal and informal modes of participation. There is 
recognition of the value of effective and meaningful participation, and of normative 
participation, although the latter would benefit from further development. 
Participation is considered as both a means and an end, and is primarily oriented to 
individual empowerment, although there is also some recognition of its collective 
purposes. There is consequently substantial conformity with the type of participation 
identified as appropriate for human rights.
However, the exceptions identified to this are significant. The main divergences from 
the forms of participation required by human rights relate to the focus on 
representative over direct modes of participation, and the lack of participatory rights 
beyond the national level. As identified, these discrepancies limit the ability of human 
rights to offer protection above the level of the state. Because the only form of 
individual participation at the international level is via representative structures, the 
individual remains dependent on the state both to protect and to assert their 
interests.645 This is a clear contradiction to the structures of participation required by 
human rights.
The next analytical task is to determine how far the type of participation required by 
human rights is manifested in the practice of participation in human rights; essentially 
applying the type of participation promoted by human rights ideology and generally
645 See further analysis in Chapter 5
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reflected in human rights legal principles to the structures of participation in human 
rights law itself. This will now be examined in Chapter 3, regarding participation in 
the construction of human rights, and Chapter 4, concerning participation through 
access to human rights.
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Chapter 3: Participation in Human Rights Law- 
Making
As identified in the Introduction, there are two main elements to participation in 
human rights law: participation in the construction of the law, and participation in and 
through the application of the law. This Chapter will examine the first of these: 
participation in human rights law-making. The analysis will investigate the 
participants in human rights law making: which actors participate, how and on what 
basis. It will therefore also consider the structures of law-making which enable or 
constrain this participation. The aim of this discussion is to determine how far the 
concept of participation reflected by participation in law-making conforms to the type 
of participation identified as appropriate for human rights in Chapter 1.
Consideration of participation in law-making must first determine what is meant by 
‘law-making’. The analysis of participation in human rights law-making in this 
Chapter will therefore draw upon various different elements of this process. These 
firstly include the traditional foundations of law as identified by Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ): the major sources - treaties, custom 
and general principles, and subsidiary sources -  judicial decisions and the teachings 
of experts. The analysis in this Chapter will also draw upon participation in processes 
of law-making regarding both hard law, such as treaties or conventions, and soft 
law,646 which includes General Assembly resolutions, Declarations and treaty body 
General Comments or Recommendations. Furthermore, it will consider participation
646 For discussion o f the role o f soft law in law-making, see inter alia Chinkin, 1989; Shelton, 2000, 1- 
20; Boyle and Chinkin, 2007: 211-229.
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in human rights jurisprudence as a means to participate in human rights law-making. 
Here the analysis follows the position that the interpretation of the law plays a vital 
role in the evolution of law; that international law is dynamic, and thus its initial 
creation cannot be regarded as the end point of its development.647
As the focus in this Chapter is on the way different actors participate in law-making, it 
will centralise participation by NGOs. There are two reasons for a particular focus on 
NGOs. Firstly, NGOs are themselves major participants in law-making. As identified 
in the Introduction, they have had a fundamental effect on the development of new 
norms and legal principles within a variety of areas of human rights. Secondly, NGO 
participation is, as will be demonstrated, the main way in which the interests of 
individuals can be represented in law-making structures, other than through states. 
NGOs therefore have an essential enabling role concerning indirect individual 
participation in the construction of international human rights law.
This Chapter will follow the same analytical structure as Chapters 1 and 2, through 
considering participation in relation to its modes, actors, purpose, feasibility and 
norms. Part 1 will focus on the ways in which states and NGOs participate in law­
making, and how this is related to individual participation. Part 2 will examine the 
practical factors which affect these actors’ participation. Part 3 will consider the ends 
to which participation in law-making is oriented, and the way in which it both 
manifests and contributes to particular structures of power and legitimacy. Part 4 will 
consider the development of the norms of participation in law-making, and the extent 
to which these can be challenged or redefined. Within each of these sections, the
647 McCorquodale, 2004: 499; see also Schwebel, 1991: 970; Higgins, 1994: 202, Pellet, 2006: 789
648 Introduction, Part 4
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analysis will firstly examine what concepts of participation are manifested in 
structures of participation regarding human rights law-making. It will then compare 
these with the types of participation appropriate to human rights as identified in 
Chapter l .649
As this Chapter focuses on NGO participation as the means by which individuals 
participate in law-making, it will of necessity make extensive use of the data collected 
through the qualitative interviews.650 This data will be used to explore both how 
NGOs participate, and also how they perceive their representative role as the 
manifestation of individual participation.
Part 1: Modes of participation in human rights law-making
1.1: Public and private actors in law-making: states and NGOs
The structures and processes by which human rights law is constructed reflect, as 
noted, public forms of participation. Human rights law is primarily developed in 
international and regional inter-governmental organisations and judicial bodies, all of 
which are public forums. However, it is clear that both public and private actors, as 
represented by states and NGOs, participate in human rights law-making.
Firstly, states are the dominant participants in human rights law-making651 concerning 
the construction of human rights instruments. As only states can ratify human rights
649 Chapter 1, section 2.2
650 See Introduction, section 3.2 and Appendix I
651 Hobe, 2005: 319; Mutua, 2007: 586; Van Boven, 1989: 207
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treaties they are to be expected to have the most important role in drafting them.652 
States are therefore central to human rights law-making structures within the UN. 
Human rights law-making is mandated to the General Assembly and ECOSOC and 
their subsidiary bodies, as stated in Articles 13 and 62 respectively of the UN 
Charter.653 Human rights conventions have so far usually been drafted via the Human 
Rights Commission, as a subsidiary of ECOSOC, which set up working groups or 
committees to do this, although there are also examples of human rights treaty 
drafting by other ECOSOC bodies, such as the Commission on Status of Women,654 
or via the General Assembly.655 The work of the Commission has continued in its 
new incarnation as the Human Rights Council, a subsidiary body of the General 
Assembly whose Resolution 60/251 mandates the Human Rights Council to “make 
recommendations to the General Assembly for the further development of 
international law in the field of human rights”.656 The Working Groups on the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,657 the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous 
peoples658 and the draft convention on enforced disappearances have continued their 
work under the auspices of the Human Rights Council.659 Fundamentally, the main 
participants in all of these UN law-making bodies are state representatives, and these 
bodies would neither exist nor function without state participation.
LeBlanc, 1995: 26
653 Meron, 1986:272.
654 The Commission was responsible for drafting the ICEDAW, although the 3rd Committee of General 
Assembly was also involved.
655 For example, the Disabilities Convention and the Migrant Workers Convention were elaborated 
through the General Assembly (See Butler, 2007: 179; Meron, 1986: 272).
656 General Assembly Resolution 60/251, 15 March 2006, para 5(c)
657 Human Rights Council Resolution 1/3, 29 June 2006. Note that the Optional Protocol was adopted 
by the General Assembly on 10 December 2008 (A/63/435, 28 November 2008).




In addition, customary law-making is in principle dependent on the actions of states, 
as it is constructed via the general practice of states660 which is accepted and observed 
as law; it is thus determined by action taken as a result of states’ sense of legal 
obligation.661 It should, though, be noted that the ICJ is argued to also participate in 
customary law-making, through its interpretative role; Pellet alludes to “an impression 
of a complex and somehow mysterious alchemy through which the Court enjoys a 
rather large measure of discretionary power”662 over the determination of the content 
of customary law. It has also been suggested that NGOs contribute to the development 
of customary law. For example, Treves asserts that “the perception of the public (and 
therefore of NGOs seen as organised groups thereof) of what is permitted and what is 
prohibited to states in their relationship with other states influences the perception of 
governments and ultimately their opinion juris”.663 This indicates the potential for 
private actors to influence customary human rights law. Nonetheless, their role 
remains inferior to that of states, who are the central actors in customary law-making, 
and without whom customary law could not develop.
There is some opportunity for private actors to participate in other forms of human 
rights law-making. Firstly, there are some opportunities for participation by private 
individuals. Article 38 recognises this role in subsection 1 (d) which refers to the 
“teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”. It is clear that academic 
publications have been taken into account by courts when ruling on issues of 
international human rights law. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court when
660 Danilenko identifies that the practice of international organisations and international tribunals can 
also contribute to the formation o f customary law (1993: 82-83); however, this still reflects public 
rather than private participation.
661 Meron, 1989:3, see also Statute o f the ICJ, Article 3 8(1 )(b) of ICJ statute; Cassese, 2001: 119
662 Pellet, 2006: 749
663 Treves, 2005: 4
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considering the issue of the secession of Quebec drew upon work by Antonio Cassese 
concerning the right of self-determination.664 In addition, the treaty bodies participate 
in human rights law-making through the development of general comments or 
recommendations, or case law.665 The regional Commissions have a similar 
interpretative role.666 As these bodies are composed of individuals acting in a personal 
capacity, independent of governments,667 they constitute a further means for private 
individuals to influence the development of international human rights law. In 
addition, Article 38 recognises “judicial decisions” as a source of law. The bodies that 
make these judicial decisions are also composed of private individuals, acting 
independently of governments,668 and thus reflect similar forms of individual 
participation.
This indicates a range of opportunities for individuals to participate in human rights 
law-making on a private basis. However, Article 38 is clear that academic writings 
and judicial decisions are subsidiary sources of law and therefore accords them less 
status than treaties or custom, both state-centric sources of law. Furthermore, it must 
be noted that opportunities for individual participation in law-making are 
predominantly limited to experts669 and are thus neither wide-ranging nor inclusive.
664 Reference re Secession o f Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 114, 129, 131
665 Alfredsson, 2005: 559-565
666 AmCHR, Article 41(b) and (e); AfCHPR, Article 45(3)
667 ICERD, Article 8(1); ICCPR Article 28(3); 1CEDAW, Article 17(1); ICAT, Article 17(1); ICRC, 
Article 43(2); ICMW, Article 72(1 )(b); ICPD, Article 34(3); AmCHR, Article 36(1); AfCHPR, Article 
31(2)
668 Statute o f the ICJ, Article 2; Statute of the Inter-American Court, Article 4(1); Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Article 11(1); ECHR Protocol 11, Article 21(2)
669 See Chapter 3, section 1.3 below
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However, as identified in the Introduction, 670 NGOs as a group are a major actor in 
the development of human rights law, and the role of private actors in law-making is 
therefore predominantly represented by NGO participation. There are a number of 
ways in which NGOs participate in human rights law-making. Several examples of 
NGO participation in the development of norms and standards of hard law 
instruments were given in the Introduction.671 NGOs also participate in the 
development of soft law, as is discussed below.672
Some NGOs have specifically identified using cases and litigation as a means to
f . n ' i
participate in law-making. NGOs use case law to develop the law; for example one 
interviewee described how participation in cases was itself used to “create new 
grounds for case law”.674 Another described how litigation was used as part of a 
broader campaigning strategy to develop the norms and standards of law. For
/ \7 / \example, Interights identified Hadijatou Manx as a test case concerning the right to 
be free from slavery.677 Although slavery is prohibited under international human 
rights law, this case was instrumental in underlining this prohibition and in identifying 
actions which constituted slavery.
NGOs also participate in the development of the human rights law through
f i lRjurisprudence via the submission of amicus curiae briefs. Although amicus curiae
670 Introduction, Part 4
671 Introduction, Part 4
672 Chapter 3, sections 1.3 and 1.4
673 NGO participation in human rights cases and courts is further discussed in Chapter 4
674 ID 20,25/01/08
675 ID 24, 15/11/07
676 Hadijatou Mani v Niger, ECOWAS Community Court, 7 April 2008
677 http://www.interights.org/niger-slavery
678 See generally Bartholomuez, 2005, and Shelton, 1994 for further information on amicus curiae
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participation does not enable participation at the same level as parties to a case,679 and 
the submission of amicus briefs remains at the discretion of the court,680 they 
nonetheless provide an important means for NGOs to influence judicial decision­
making. Essentially, they are a way in which NGOs make particular information and 
legal interpretations, which may not be made available by the parties, known to the 
court. NGO participation in this way has, as Shelton identifies,681 been used by the 
European Court of Human Rights (European Court) when making decisions. For 
example, the Court referred to the submission from Amnesty International in its 
decision on the Soering case,682 and to the comments submitted by Article 19 in the 
Observer and Guardian case. Although without such explicit reference to NGO 
submissions it is difficult to determine a definite effect of amicus participation, 
comparison of submissions and judgements does indicate some influence, as can be
f . O A
seen in the Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court.
The involvement of NGOs in human rights law-making thus demonstrates the 
interaction between public and private forms of participation. Firstly, NGOs are 
private actors who participate in the public and political processes of human rights 
law-making. Secondly, NGOs (private) may work in partnership with governments 
(public) to develop principles of human rights law. The accepted current norm for 
drafting international Conventions is by ‘open-ended’ working groups, where
/ o r
participation is open to both states and non-state actors including IGOs and NGOs.
679 Bartholomeuz, 2005: 273
680 Bartholomuez, 2005: 276
681 Shelton, 1994: 636-637
682 Soeringv. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, Judgement of 7 July 1989, para 102
683 Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 13585/88, Judgement o f 26 
November 1991, para 60
684 Shelton, 1994: 639-640
685 LeBlanc, 1995: 25; Cook, 1996: 191-192
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NGOs also participate in working groups at the regional level.686 Furthermore, the 
advantages of collective public-private participation are recognised by both sides. The 
importance of working with governments was acknowledged by one NGO 
interviewee: “they’re the people who are dealing with the problem, they’ve got the 
capacity, or should have the capacity to deal with them and prevent them, and 
legislate against these things happening, so you’ve got to bring the government in”.687 
This illustrates recognition of governmental power to actually make law, as well as to 
apply it on the national level. Another interviewee identified the value of a 
collaborative rather than combative relationship as enabling greater influence over 
governments: “any criticisms that you make...are seen as objective...not from the
ifOQ
subjective”. Similarly, the importance of working with the private sector has been 
recognised, at least to some extent, by the UN; the Secretary-General’s Millennium 
report re-emphasised the importance of strengthening relationships between the UN
/OQ
and private actors. This interplay between State and private actors’ participation m 
law-making is also reflected in the structure of the ILO, which includes both 
representatives of Member States, and of employers and workers within those 
states.690
It is therefore clear that human rights law-making reflects participation by both public 
and private actors, and a high level of collaboration between the two. Nonetheless, 
states clearly retain the greatest power in determining the development of human 
rights law as they are central to both conventional and customary law-making due to 
the centrality of the principle of state consent. Whilst NGOs are hugely influential,
686 ID 26,30/10/07
687 ID 3, 03/03/07
688 ID 26, 30/10/07
689 Martens, 2003: 2
690 Constitution o f the International Labour Organisation, Article 3(1)
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they are not inherent participants in law-making comparable to states. Furthermore, as 
section 1.2 now considers, NGOs’ formal rights of participation in law-making are 
limited.
1.2: Formal and informal modes of participation in law-making
Much of human rights law is ultimately constructed via formal structures of 
participation. Treaty drafting is formally mandated to a committee or Working 
Group,691 and a treaty must be formally ratified by states in order to enter into force. 
For example, the Ad-Hoc Committee which developed the DRD was established by 
General Assembly Resolution 56/168.692 The Convention then entered into force on 
3rd May 2008 once it had been ratified by 20 states, as required by Article 45. 
Similarly, the process of the construction of most soft law instruments is also 
formalised, as these are both mandated and accepted by formal resolutions of a UN
jTQO
body. For example, a Human Rights Commission Resolution set up the Working 
Group which drafted the DIP, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 
49/124,694 and the DIP was finally adopted by a further General Assembly 
Resolution.695 It is therefore clear that both the process and the outcome of law­
making regarding hard and soft law are conditional on formalised structures of 
participation.
691 For example, the Working Group on the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR was established by 
Human Rights Commission Resolution 2002/24, para 9(f).
692 General Assembly Resolution 56/168, 19 December 2001; see also ECOSOC Resolution 2002/7, 24 
July 2002
693 Human Rights Comission Resolution 1995/32, 3rd March 1995, E/CN.4/RES/1995/32
694 General Assembly Resolution 49/214, 17th February 1995, A/RES/49/214
695 General Assembly Resolution 61/295, 13 September 2007, A/RES/61/295
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The predominant actors in these formal structures of participation are states. States are 
the only actors who have the formal right to negotiate the content of human rights 
legal instruments, and who have voting rights in UN bodies and who can thus at the 
final stage accept or reject human rights legal instruments. Individuals have no formal 
right to participate in the development of human rights law. Consequently, individual 
access to formal structures of human rights law-making is through representation by 
states and NGOs.696
NGOs are, however, recognised as vital and influential international actors by the
6Q7UN and have some formal rights of participation in UN human rights structures. 
NGO participation is formalised in Article 71 of the UN Charter698 which provides for 
participation in ECOSOC and subsidiary bodies via a consultative role.699 ECOSOC 
Resolution 1996/31 confirms the need to take account of NGOs and acknowledges 
such organisations’ expertise.700 This Resolution governs criteria for establishing 
consultative relations; the organisation must be concerned with matters within 
ECOSOC’s remit,701 must conform to ECOSOC aims and purposes,702 must be of 
recognised competence in its field, and must have democratic representation and 
accountability structures.704 Participation from developing countries is emphasized.705 
Decisions on the granting, withdrawal or suspension of consultative status are the
696 See Chapter 3, section 1.3 below for greater elaboration o f this issue.
697 A/53/170, July 10, 1998, para. 3
698 The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non­
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such 
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national 
organizations after consultation with the Member o f the United Nations concerned.
699 For further discussion of NGOs’ consultative role see Hartwick, 2001: 222-230




704 para 10, 11 and 12
705 para 6-8
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prerogative of states, acting through ECOSOC.706 Consultative status is defined as 
distinct from participation without vote.707 The purpose of NGO participation is 
twofold; to provide expert opinion and advice, and to enable representation of public 
opinion.708 There are different degrees of consultative status709 which govern the ways 
in which different NGOs may participate. NGOs may propose agenda items,710 sit as 
observers in public meetings,711 submit written statements712 and make oral 
presentations.713 NGOs with accreditation may attend UN conferences and 
preparatory committees, where they can submit written statements and make oral 
presentations, but this specifically does not entail a negotiating role.714
These norms govern NGOs’ formal participation in the Human Rights Council 
(formerly Commission on Human Rights)715 and the Advisory Committee (formerly
71 (\the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), and in 
UN conferences and preparatory committees.717 The ECOSOC rights consequently 
enable NGOs to formally participate in the development of human rights instruments. 
There are numerous instances of NGO participation in conferences, committees and 










715 Regarding the Human Rights Council, General Assembly Resolution 60/251 (15 March 2006, para. 
5(h)) acknowledged the role that NGOs play in the promotion and protection of human rights, and 
confirmed that arrangements for consultation should be based on ECOSOC Res 1996/31 and the 
previous practice of the Commission on Human Rights.
16 Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, 18 June 2007, section III
717 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, 25 July 1996, Part 771R
Introduction, Part 4
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contributing (as observers)719 to the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster 
Munitions which adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008,720 
participation in the Working Group on the draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, prior to the adoption of the Declaration in September 2007,721 
and extensive participation including written and oral presentations in the Ad Hoc 
Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,722 
which negotiated the CPD, which entered into force in May 2008.
Whilst the system of ECOSOC accreditation therefore allows NGOs some formal 
rights of participation in law-making, three important limitations must be noted. 
Firstly, whilst consultative status does allow written and oral contributions to debates, 
it does not entail a negotiating role or any voting rights concerning the final decisions. 
NGOs’ main formal role is therefore to provide information rather than to negotiate 
the content of human rights law. States then assume control at the later law-making 
stages,723 as one interviewee described: “We may go through periods when for twelve 
months we’ve been one of the most active participants in a particular debate, and then 
when crunch point comes we suddenly find ourselves locked out”.724 This is 
confirmed by Van Boven: “in the final analysis, governments are the decision-makers 
with regard to the content and adoption of...international human rights
719 Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, Rules o f Procedure, 
CCM/52, 19 May 2008, Rules 2 and 3
720 Pillai, 2008
721 For example, the draft report o f the working group, 5-16 December 2005, 
E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/CRP.6 details the various contributions made by NGOs and indigenous 
organizations to that particular meeting.
722 A/57/357, 29 July to 9 Aug 2002, para 10
723 Boyle & Chinkin, 2007: 63
724 ID 13, 18/10/07
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instruments”.725 Consequently, the degree to which formal NGO participation in 
human rights law-making can be active, genuine and meaningful is restricted, as they 
have no guaranteed influence over the final outcome of the process.726
Secondly, NGOS are almost entirely excluded from formal participation in UN bodies 
outside ECOSOC. Although they may attend meetings of the General Assembly as 
observers and assist in the implementation of resolutions,727 this status is by invitation 
and very few organisations have observer status with the General Assembly. NGOs 
also have no formal right to address the Security Council.728 This means that NGOs’ 
formal influence within these law-making bodies is extremely limited.
Thirdly, non-accredited NGOs are excluded from formal participation in human rights 
law-making. This means that the ECOSOC regime concerning formal NGO 
participation is doubly exclusive; both in the ways in which NGOs may participate, 
compared to states, and in making distinctions within the NGO sector itself. However, 
there have been some exceptions to this. Both accredited and non-accredited NGOs 
concerned with human rights were able to participate in both the preparatory meetings 
and as observers in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, thus widening 
participation to include NGOs without consultative status.729 There have also been 
incidences of participation in Working Groups by interested organisations who are not 
accredited. Sanders observes that “the Working Group on Indigenous Populations is 
the most open body in the entire history of the United Nations” as it extends 
participation to indigenous peoples and their representatives, rather than restricting it
725 VanBoven, 1989:212
726 See also discussion in Chapter 3, section 1.4 below.
727 Simma, 2002: 1078
728 Butler 2007: 265
729 Lindblom, 2005, 456-7
163
• 730  • • *to accredited NGOs. This indicates some potential for circumventing formal 
requirements to enable broader participation in formal structures.
Nonetheless, NGOs’ formal rights of participation are significantly limited in 
comparison with those of states, especially concerning participation in the formal 
negotiation of human rights legal instruments. However, human rights law-making is 
also clearly influenced by informal structures of participation. Reisman considers that 
“a substantial body of international law has not derived from formal law-making
• • • 7*3 1institutions”. Understanding informal modes of law-making is particularly 
important because NGO influence over law-making in these ways is far more 
extensive than through formal modes of participation. As Brett identifies “it would be 
altogether wrong...to measure the NGO contribution in terms of its formal 
volume”.732 Butler agrees: “the right to participate formally in the drafting process is 
not relevant to determining the degree of influence that NGOs can exercise over treaty 
formation at the more general level”.733
Informal participation by NGOs enables far greater influence over the development of 
human rights law than their formal rights of participation. It does this in several ways. 
Firstly, it allows them to have influence over decision-making structures to which 
they have no formal access. Informal NGO influence over human rights law can be 
traced back as far as the nineteenth century, when “there were NGO fingerprints on 
new international conventions regarding rules of war, intellectual property, admiralty,
730 Sanders, 1994: 12-13. Sanders also notes that the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery also allows participation from unaccredited NGOs (1994: 13, at note 34).
731 Reisman, 2005: 15
732 Brett, 1995: 100
733 Butler, 2007: 180
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prostitution, narcotics, labor, and nature protection”.734 This can also be identified 
concerning the League of Nations, where NGOs were able to informally influence the 
law-making activities of despite having no formal rights of participation.735 Through 
the use of informal, personal networks and contacts they are now able to influence 
most areas of law-making at the UN. Methods here include influencing the content of 
UN reports on particular issues,736 lobbying during the preparatory and conference
7 - 3 7  7 ‘3 Rstages, and one-to-one personal contact with governments. The importance of 
informal, personal networks of contacts was identified by one interviewee particularly 
in relation to smaller NGOs working with larger organisations including both NGOs 
and IGOs.739 Similarly, Tolley contends that the International Commission of Jurists 
was able to participate in the construction of the AfCHPR due to effective influence 
over key heads of state.740 As noted above, NGOs are formally excluded from the 
final negotiation stages of human rights instruments, but they may retain informal 
influence through relationships with states who are included in the final stages of the 
debate.741 Furthermore, although General Comments are formally developed by 
members of the relevant Committee, NGOs also have informal input into their 
construction. For example, the NGO FIAN participated in expert seminars regarding 
the content of the right to food and its ensuing obligations, which “influenced 
substantially the drafting of General Comment 12” of the CESCR.742 In addition,
734 Chamovitz, 1997: 212
735 Martens, 2003: 10-11
736 ID 50, 29/01/08
737 Friedman et al, 2005: 42-7, see also Lindblom, 2005: 473-4
738 ID 50, 29/01/08; ID 32, 17/01/08
739 ID 3, 03/03/07
740 Tolley, 1994: 181
741 ID 13, 18/10/07; Van Boven, 1989:211
742 Hamm, 2001: 177
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many suggestions received by the CESCR from NGOs regarding the content of 
General Comment 14 on the right to health found their way into the final text.743
Use of informal methods is especially important concerning influence over UN bodies 
outside ECOSOC. For example, one interviewee described how their organisation 
used its informal links with the UN secretariat, government missions to the UN and 
other human rights NGOs to pressure for a particular General Assembly resolution.744 
There is also some evidence for informal NGO influence over the Security Council; 
informal meetings between the NGO Working Group on the Security Council and 
ambassadors or UN officials means that major NGOs who are members of this 
working group are able to influence policy.745 Further informal contact between 
NGOs and the Security Council includes the Arria formula which, although opposed 
by some states, has “provided a very valuable and flexible instrument for the Council 
to obtain information and to hold dialogues with important parties in the international 
community”.746 NGOs also have informal individual relationships with members of 
the Security Council.747 It is therefore clear that informal modes of participation 
enable NGOs to access a range of law-making structures from which they are 
formally excluded, and consequently expand their influence over human rights law­
making.
Informal participation in law-making can give NGOs greater scope to determine the 
particular issues under consideration. Informal participation by NGOs contributes to
743 Reidel, 2005: 314





the “pre-normative process”748 of agenda-setting.749 A range of informal methods are 
used. NGOs may proclaim ‘new’ rights,750 or highlight particular human rights issues. 
For example, Korey identifies NGO participation at the Vienna World Conference in 
1993 as a major contributing factor to placing the issue of women’s rights on the 
international agenda.751 A current example of NGO agenda-setting is the Amnesty 
International campaign regarding a global moratorium on the death penalty,752 which 
is not currently prohibited under international human rights law.
Similarly, informal participation can mean that NGOs have greater control over the 
final instrument. Formally, they are excluded from the final negotiation stages, and 
can therefore have only indirect influence over the end result through their 
participation at earlier stages of the process. However, some soft law instruments, 
such as codes of conduct, guidelines and interpretative treaty commentaries, are 
directly produced by NGOs. For example, NGOs, in conjunction with academic 
institutions, took the initiative in producing two major statements of principle on 
economic and social rights: the Limburg Principles753 and the Maastricht 
Guidelines,754 as well as principles on women’s rights and universal jurisdiction.755 
The Limburg Principles, which were drafted at a 1986 meeting of experts convened 
by the International Commission of Jurists,756 have been circulated in UN documents, 
cited in UN studies and are occasionally referred to as an authoritative source by the
/48 Hobe, 2005:322
749 Butler, 2007: 169, 172
750 Alston, 1984: 610-611
751 Korey, 1999: 166
752 http://ww'w.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID=10323
753 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex
754 Maastrict Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1997
755 For these and other examples see Boyle and Chinkin, 2007: 89.
756 Tolley, 1989: 581
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CESCR.757 Through producing a soft law document through an informal process in 
this way NGOs are able to have far greater control of the final text.
As well as enabling NGOs to determine and define the particular issues under 
consideration, informal modes of participation also allow them to develop alternative 
structures of participation. For example, networking with other NGOs at UN 
conferences demonstrates the development of an alternative or parallel public sphere 
to the formal, state-centric arena.758 This enables greater potential for different forms 
of influence over law-making as it enables NGOs to circumnavigate the state- 
determined formal norms of their participation, and determine their own modes of
759operation.
Furthermore, informal types of participation mean that a broader constituency can 
indirectly participate in law-making. A fundamental way in which NGOs participate 
informally is to indirectly influence government decisions through the use of public 
pressure.760 This done by a process of consciousness-raising among the general public 
via dissemination of information about the issue with the aim of educating and 
persuading target audiences,761 and then encouraging these individuals to lobby their 
representatives in law-making forums. This was particularly identified by
• IfOinterviewees as an important element of campaigning; “getting our campaigns, 
objectives into the media, we recognise that that will have some resonance with how
Van Boven, 1989: 220
758 Friedman et al, 2005: 36; Lindblom, 2005: 457
759 The importance o f informal modes allowing NGOs to determine their own norms o f participation is 
further discussed in Chapter 3, Part 4.
760 ID 11, 10/01/08
761 Butler, 2007: 169
762 ID 33, 15/01/08
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decision-makers think”.763 As well as being an effective campaigning tool, this 
method means that individuals who have no formal rights of participation can have 
albeit indirect influence over the development of human rights law.
Fundamentally, informal modes of participation allow NGOs to do two things: 
increase their access to law-making processes, and allow them to set the agenda for 
their participation, in terms of both issues and methods. This is further illustrated in 
the way that the boundaries between formal and informal NGO participation are not 
always clear. Although there are no formal rules of procedure to provide for it, NGOs 
are “entitled” to submit draft proposals in their own name at the Working Group 
level.764 Examples of this are found in the drafting process of the ICAT,765 and in the 
submission of a draft text to the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women from the 
NGO All African Women’s Conference for the ICED AW.766 In addition, in 1988 
Reed Brody of the International Commission of Jurists co-authored the first draft of 
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, which was revised by a meeting of experts organised by the 
International Commission of Jurists, and by the Sub-Commission’s working group, 
before being forwarded to the General Assembly for approval. It was adopted in 
1 9 9 2  7 6 8  Thjs indicates how the boundaries between formal and informal NGO 
participation have blurred, to the extent where certain types of informal NGO 
participation are accepted as legitimate without being given formal status. It also
ID 32, 17/01/08
764 VanBoven, 1989: 218
765 Burgers and Danelius, 1988: 26; Tolley, 1994: 167
766 Connors, 1996: 160
767 Tolley, 1994: 171
768 General Assembly Resolution 47/133, 18 Dec 1992
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constitutes evidence of how NGO participation is changing the norms of participation 
in law-making.769
It is therefore clear that although NGOs’ formal rights of participation in law-making 
are restricted, informal modes of participation are far more extensive. Furthermore, 
NGO participation in law-making illustrates the interaction between formal and 
informal modes of participation. Consultative status provides both formal rights of 
participation and “opens the door”770 to other forms of interaction and influence. For 
example, one interviewee identified that although NGOs’ formal rights under 
ECOSOC are restrictive in terms of participating at the General Assembly, because 
they only give access to ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies, ECOSOC rights provide 
access to the UN building, and that enables NGOs to establish informal relationships 
with UN staff and/or diplomats, and consequently influence decision-making in the 
General Assembly.771 In addition, accredited NGOs are able to conduct parallel events 
during the meetings of the HR Council.772 Willetts further identifies the legitimacy 
which consultative status confers on NGOs’ informal activities; “the NGO activist is 
seen as having a right to be involved in the process”.773 Formal rights are thus used to 
extend informal participation. Another NGO considered that formal and informal 
modes of participation by NGOs are in “constant interaction... what we say publicly 
and formally provides us with the basis upon which we can lobby and advocate
774informally.. .the influence comes from the interaction between the two”.
See Chapter 3, Part 4.
770 Cook, 1996: 185
771 ID 50, 29/01/08; see also Willetts, 1996b: 43; Alger 2002: 95
772 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/8session/events.htm
773 Willetts, 1996b: 43; see also Breen, 2005: 105
774 ID 13, 18/10/07
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This interplay between formal and informal structures of participation in law-making 
is also illustrated by the role of ‘soft’ law norms. Soft law instruments can be 
considered informal, as they do not impose legally binding obligations.775 However, 
they affect the development of human rights law in two ways. Firstly, soft law 
principles can impact on the development of international treaties or customary law. 
In some cases, the development of soft law principles is the precursor to the drafting 
of a treaty which then gives those norms binding status.776 Alternatively, soft law 
principles can solidify into binding customary law if they are reflected as such in state 
practice and opinio juris777. Soft law may therefore be evidence of hard law.778 The 
UDHR is an example of this, although many of the principles within the UDHR have 
also been developed into treaty norms. In addition, soft law principles may be treated 
as a source of law for judicial decisions, for example the ICJ may use General 
Assembly resolutions as evidence of state practice when determining the existence of 
a customary norm. Consequently, there is not a clear distinction between hard and soft
• 779international law; the two are rather interwoven.
Secondly, soft law principles may reflect or develop a degree of normative agreement 
in the international community. As Boyle and Chinkin identify in relation to the 
comments, reports and recommendations of the treaty bodies, whilst these are not 
formally binding, “their constant repetition creates a consensus”.780 Soft law is
775 Cassese, 2001: 161; Boyle and Chinkin, 2007: 212
776 For example, the Declaration on the Rights of the Child (General Assembly Resolution 1386, 20 
November 1959) preceded the ICRC, and the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (General Assembly Resolution 2263, 7 November 1967) preceded the ICEDW.
777 Chinkin, 1989: 857
778 Boyle and Chinkin, 2007: 211
779 Shelton, 2000: 449
780 Boyle and Chinkin, 2007: 156
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informative and educational.781 It consequently both develops and disseminates 
human rights norms, irrespective of their legal status.
1.3: Representative and direct: individual participation through NGOs
There are some opportunities for direct individual participation in human rights law­
making. Firstly, there are examples of particular individuals having a direct impact on 
the formation of particular legal principles; the term ‘genocide’ and the impetus 
behind the Genocide Convention are attributed to an individual lawyer, Raphael 
Lemkin, who performed a “lobbying miracle” to gain acceptance of the convention,782 
although such examples are exceptional rather than usual. In general, individual 
participation is via expert participation in the committees and/or working groups 
which draft human rights instruments. The contribution of such individuals can have 
an important impact on human rights norms. For example, the Hague, Oslo and Lund 
Recommendations on the education, linguistic and political rights of minorities were 
drafted by groups of individual experts, and, although they have not been formally 
adopted by states, have been widely translated and are in active use in the work of the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities.783 As noted in section 1.1, the writings of 
jurists and academics are a source of law, and members of treaty bodies can have 
direct influence over the development of soft law instruments. Nonetheless, jurists, 
academics and treaty body members are all clearly experts on international human 
rights law. Individuals can also participate in the work of the International Law 
Commission on an independent basis, rather than as representatives of
81 Chinkin, 1989: 862
782 Korey, 1999: 154
783 Alfredsson, 2005: 569
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784governments; however, such participation is restricted to experts; “persons of 
recognised competence in international law”.785 Finally, the state representatives who 
dominate UN law-making processes786 demonstrate direct individual participation; 
this is not, however, on an individual basis as they are participating as organs of their 
state. Similarly, individuals who participate as NGO representatives display direct 
forms of participation, but not on an individual basis, as they are promoting the 
concerns of the organisation.
In addition, there are examples of individuals who would be specifically affected by 
the particular instrument having direct influence over the construction of the 
respective legal principles. McCorquodale identifies that “the role of groups of 
people, as ‘peoples’, was crucial in the legal development of the right of self- 
determination”, contrary to the wishes of powerful colonial states”.787 
Representatives of indigenous peoples participated fully in the working group which 
developed the DIP;788 constituting “one case where the victims developed the 
standards by which they want to be governed”.789 Law-making through the ILO also 
provides an example where those affected by the law are able to participate in its 
construction, as representatives of both employers and workers, as well as Member 
states, have voting rights and participate in the General Conference which develops 
Conventions and Recommendations.790 Whilst these constitute important examples of 
direct non-expert individual participation in human rights law-making, it must be 
emphasized that they are exceptions.
784 A/CN.4/325, 1979, para. 4
785 Statute o f the ILC, Article 2(1)
786 See section 1.1. above
787 McCorquodale, 2004: 492
788 McCorquodale, 2004: 493
789 Mutua, 2007: 598
790 Constitution o f the ILO, Articles 3(1) and 4(1)
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Therefore, most forms of individual participation are specific rather than general, and 
experts are selected and invited. This does not constitute an open means for any 
individual to directly participate in the law-making process, as direct individual 
participation in human rights law-making is almost entirely restricted to individual 
experts: academics, jurists or Committee members. Consequently, Mutua argues that 
the victims of human rights abuse “rarely own the standards relevant to their plight”, 
because “standard setting in human rights is an elite-driven and not victim-centred 
process”.791 This contention has merit; the structures and processes of international 
human rights law-making are prohibitively remote from most of those individuals 
whom the law is designed to protect, and rely on expert knowledge rather than the 
experience of the victim when constructing the law.
The non-expert, non-elite individual, participation in human rights law-making is thus 
primarily via representation by states, and the actions of NGOs. A state will in theory 
represent the interests and concerns of those within its jurisdiction in law-making 
forums.792 However, as Tolley identifies “diplomats who negotiate international law 
only indirectly represent the people...private citizens who seek protection need some 
mechanism to influence diplomats who give top priority to maintaining state 
sovereignty”.793 NGOs are therefore an essential means for the interests of individuals 
to be represented in international law-making processes, and this is part of the 
rationale for granting them formal rights of participation via ECOSOC 
accreditation.794
791 Mutua, 2007: 578
792 See further discussion in Chapter 5, section 2.1.
793 Tolley, 1994: 112
794 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, para 20; Van Boven, 1989: 209
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NGOs may also provide a means to enable more direct participation in law-making 
for victims of abuse. NGOs can be a forum to enable the perspectives of victims can 
be directly heard by law-making bodies; for example, one interviewee described how 
their organisation had taken victims of abuse to speak at the General Assembly 
regarding the particular issue that affected them.795 Another described how their NGO 
worked with victims of abuse in order to feed their voices into the language of a 
particular convention.796 Individuals may also be able to participate in law-making 
through bringing cases, litigation and individual petitions. Most NGOs who worked 
on the development of law through jurisprudence recognised the importance of direct 
participation by the individual(s) affected in determining the priorities of the case and 
how it should be conducted,797 and one interviewee considered that this enabled the 
greatest level of participation in law-making by affected groups.798 NGOs therefore 
enable beneficiaries to directly feed into different law-making processes.
However, in general NGOs participate on behalf of their various constituents rather 
than enabling such direct participation, as the NGO is the primary participant in the 
various law-making forums to which they have access, rather than their utilising 
access to facilitate participation by individuals. They consequently have an extensive 
representative role. A number of questions have been raised concerning the degree to 
which NGOs are, or can be, truly representative of any and all of their constituents.799 
NGO representativeness regarding human rights law-making is part of this broader 
issue, which questions the extent to which NGOs’ members, staff and beneficiaries
795 ID 50, 29/01/08
796 ID 20, 25/01/08
797 inter alia ID 9, 17/10/07; ID 33,15/01/08; ID 25, 03/12/07
798 ID 9, 17/10/07
700
See Chapter 5, section 2.2.1.
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are able or welcome to participate in the formation of policy, which then determines 
how the NGO participates in law-making. These issues are considered in depth in 
Chapter 5.
1.4: Gradations: active, effective and meaningful participation in law-making
As section 1.3 has identified, direct individual participation in human rights law­
making is limited, and individuals predominantly participate in human rights law 
through structures of representation, being represented either by their state or by 
NGOs. The extent to which individual participation in human rights law-making is 
active, effective and meaningful is therefore to a great extent dependent on the 
activity and efficacy800 of state and NGO participation.
Firstly, whilst state participation in law-making is generally more active, effective and 
meaningful than NGO or individual participation, due to the centrality of states’ 
power and interest within the system, there are still distinctions to be identified. There 
are discrepancies between states concerning the degree to which their participation in 
active, effective and meaningful regarding both treaty and customary law. 
Participation in treaty-making by certain states may be more heavily influenced by the 
position of other, more powerful states. Smaller states may have difficulty in
O A 1
attending conferences and committees due to a lack of resources or expertise. Their 
participation in treaty drafting would clearly therefore be less active and effective than 
that of larger, richer states who are better able to assert their interests over the 
development of human rights law.
800 Chapter 5 explores the efficacy o f NGO participation in depth.
801 This is further discussed in Chapter 3, section 2.1
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Secondly, customary law-making arguably reflects passive state participation. It has 
been asserted that states’ participation as regards the creation of customary law can be 
considered as less intentional than the more purposeful participation in the 
construction of treaty law; customary international law being viewed as a side effect 
of state practice oriented to particular economic or political interests rather than a 
deliberate process.802 States are then bound by something that they did not necessarily 
intend to construct. In addition, to be exempt from customary international law, a 
state must actively oppose a particular principle. Passivity is regarded as 
acquiescence.804 Chamey makes a similar argument in relation to the construction of 
general principles of law. If all major domestic legal systems employ a similar 
principle, then it may be considered a general principle of international law, and ICJ 
practice with regard to the determination of such general principles does not require 
proof that a state has actively accepted a principle as such, not that domestic practice 
has been actively intended to develop a general principle of international law.805
In consequence, states may not participate equally or actively in the construction of 
international human rights law. This translates into less active and effective 
participation by those individuals whom the state represents, as the state participates 
in law-making on behalf of its citizens.
Cassese, 2001: 119
803 It should be noted that there is disagreement on this point; Danilenko (1993: 79) argues that as a 
rule, states “are well aware o f the possible broad law-making implications of their conduct”. See also 
Chamey, 1993: 537
804 Hannikainen, 1988: 239
805 Chamey, 1993: 535-536
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Thirdly, the extent to which NGO participation in law-making reflects active, 
effective and meaningful forms of participation varies in relation to formal and 
informal participation, and hard or soft law. The importance of ‘active’ NGO 
participation in law-making is recognised in General Assembly Resolution 57/229, 
although it does not specify what such active participation would entail.806 However, 
Brett distinguishes between active and passive NGO participation in law-making: 
passive participation being to provide information which may or may not be used by 
government delegations or experts, whereas active participation comprises taking part 
in the drafting of resolutions and standards.807 If the General Assembly followed this 
interpretation, it would imply a far more extensive role for NGOs than is reflected in 
their current formal ECOSOC rights of consultation, where NGOs are excluded from 
the final drafting stages.
As noted above, formal NGO participation, particularly in the development of hard 
law, is profoundly restricted. The lack of a negotiating role means that NGOs’ formal 
participation is fundamentally limited to information provision, thus reflecting passive 
rather than active participation. Furthermore, reference has been made to NGOs
QAO
considering that they are not allowed to participate “meaningfully”. This implies 
that meaningful NGO participation at the UN would entail an expansion of their role, 
probably to incorporate formal negotiating rights over the content of human rights 
instruments. It is certainly questionable how far NGOs participation can be effective 
and meaningful when they are formally excluded from the final structures of decision­
making. Whilst they clearly have considerable influence over human rights law­
making through informal modes of participation, they do not have guaranteed
806 General Assembly Resolution 57/229, 18 December 2002, Preamble
807 Brett, 1995: 100
808 A/57/387, 9 September 2002, para 139(c)
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influence over the end document in the same ways as states, who have formal rights 
enabling definite participation regarding the acceptance or rejection of the final 
instrument.
However, NGOs can be much more involved in the development of soft law; as noted, 
some soft law instruments have been entirely produced by non-state actors. As 
Shelton identifies, “soft law allows for more active participation of non-state actors 
[permitting them] a role that is possible only rarely in traditional law-making 
processes”.809 NGOs have much more control over and are included to a greater 
degree in these forms of participation in law-making, and their participation in this 
way is therefore far more active, effective and meaningful than their formal 
participation in hard law.
Furthermore, whilst individual participation in human rights law-making is affected 
by the degree to which NGO participation is active, effective and meaningful, it is 
also affected by the type, extent and influence of individual participation encouraged 
and enabled by NGOs. In consequence, the internal structures of NGO participation 
affect the degree to which they enable active, effective and meaningful participation 
by individuals in law-making. As section 1.3 above identified, opportunities for direct 
participation in law-making are limited, and participation is therefore usually 
mediated through NGOs. In order to be actively involved in law-making via NGOs, 
individuals must be actively involved in the work of the NGO.
809 Shelton, 2000: 13
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Some of the ways in which individuals indirectly influence law-making via the work 
of NGOs reflect passive forms of participation. For example, one interviewee 
described how the case work that their organisation conducted fed into both the 
strengthening of existing legal instruments or the development of new ones, and 
specifically identified this as a means by which those individuals indirectly affected 
policy making within the organisation.810 The individual may or may not be aware 
that their experience is being used in this way, but they are still contributing to the 
development of law. If using cases in this way, NGOs may consciously seek 
particular cases on specific issues in order to use as part of a pre-determined policy to
Oi l
strengthen or develop an aspect of human rights law; the practice of “strategic
o p
litigation”. One interviewee identified the perspective of potential victims in 
feeding into the organisation’s position on a particular issue; that they were concerned 
with it “because people will be victims of it, and communities will be victims”.813 
This again indicates a more indirect or passive role for victims’ perspectives to 
influence NGO participation in law-making. The NGO determines how the victim’s 
experience will be used; whilst this is at least indirect participation by the victim, it 
may not be active.
In addition, there are different NGO accounts of the value of active and effective 
internal participation. The INGO Accountability Charter fails to develop an active or 
effective account of beneficiaries’ participation, stating only that
lu ID 10, 13/12/07
811 Examples o f this are given in ID 10, 13/12/07 and ID 24, 15/11/07.
812 ID 25, 03/12/07; ID 26, 30/10/07
813 ID 12, 18/02/08
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W e w ill listen to stakeholders’ suggestions on how w e can improve our work and will 
encourage inputs by people w hose interests may be directly affected. W e will also  
make it easy for the public to com m ent on our programmes and policies.814
There is no clear guarantee given that inputs, comments and suggestions will have any 
effective influence over NGO activities, and no opportunity for public and/or 
beneficiary participation other than commenting on pre-determined policies. The 
Charter therefore does little to ensure active and meaningful participation by 
individuals in the internal structures of NGOs.
However, the interview data indicated greater recognition from the NGO sector 
regarding the value of active, effective and meaningful participation by individuals. 
The key test for participation was identified as requiring it to be ‘active, free and 
meaningful’, but that what this means in practice was considered necessarily
01 r
contextual. Another stated that “we are actively planning into our work... the active 
participation (‘agency’) of people in those decisions which could affect their 
rights”.816 This indicates at least some NGO recognition of the importance of a 
particular form of participation, but less specification of what this entails in practice. 
One interviewee identified that effective, genuine and meaningful participation 
requires that the views of people affected by a process have to be fed into that 
process.817 This was specifically applied to participation in law-making by another 
interviewee “I’d like to have the [people] themselves have some input into what they
010
would like their rights to be, and campaigning for them themselves”.
814INGO Accountability Charter, 2005: 6, http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/download/ingo- 
accountability-charter-eng.pdf
815 ID 17, 04/09/07
816 ID 49, 08/02/08
817 ID 24, 15/11/07
818 ID 3, 03/03/07
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1.5: Interaction between the different levels of human rights law-making
International human rights law-making takes place by definition on the international 
level, being made through UN processes and by states in their relationships with each 
other. However, human rights law-making also takes place at the regional and local 
levels. The three regional human rights structures -  the European, Inter-American and 
African -  all construct principles of human rights law through the development of 
treaties, custom and case law. These different levels make use of each other’s 
jurisprudence when interpreting human rights principles. For example, as Pellet notes, 
the ICJ made reference to the practice of the HRC in the Wall case,819 and the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) has made reference to the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ820 and the European Court821 in its decisions.
In addition, practice at the local level, including the development of human rights 
legislation in national legal systems, can potentially affect international standards 
through being the source of general principles of international law. These ‘general 
principles’ identified as a source of law in Article 38 are generally accepted, and have 
been treated by the ICJ, as meaning principles common to the major legal systems of 
the world.822 It is clear that interaction between these different levels can affect the 
construction of human rights law, and therefore that participation at one level can 
affect how human rights law is constructed and/or interpreted at another.
819 Pellet, 2006: 788; see also Legal Consequences O f The Construction O f A Wall In The Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, ICJ Advisory Opinion Of 9 July 2004, para. 109
820 see for example, Godlnez-Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment o f January 20, 1989 (Merits) Series C No. 5, 
para 133
21 See for example Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of June 3, 1999 (Interpretation o f the Judgment 
of Reparations and Costs), Series C No.53 paras. 13 and 14
822 De Wet, 2004: 80, 88-89
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NGOs make use of these different levels when participating in law-making, as 
recognised by the Secretary General of the UN.823 As Chamovitz identifies, NGO 
participation in law-making must of necessity seek to go beyond the national level, as 
“the international causes of NGOs can only be achieved by intergovernmental 
cooperation”.824 One interview identified their NGO as contributing to law-making at 
local, national, regional and international levels, through both the development of new 
laws and intervention in legal cases.825 For example, one NGO interviewed was 
working on putting international legal norms into effect through the development of 
legislation at the federal, state and local levels.826 NGO participation in law-making 
thus takes account of and works with the different levels at which human rights law is 
constructed, which enables both direct and informal participation by NGOs at these 
levels.
NGOs also recognise and make use of different levels of law-making when exerting 
informal influence over these processes. For example, NGOs make use of small group 
and/or bilateral relationships to exert influence over government behaviour. NGO 
influence over the most powerful, and therefore influential, states is of fundamental 
importance.827 For example, NGOs may exert influence over government A, who then 
puts pressure on government B regarding support for a particular human rights 
instrument.828 One interviewee described how their organisation lobbied the Council 
of Europe regarding a certain issue, who then were able to exert pressure on a
823 A/57/387, 9 September 2002, para 133
824 Charnovitz, 2005: 549
825 ID49, 08/02/08
826 ID 3, 03/03/07
827 Korey, 1999: 174
828 ID 50, 29/01/08
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particular country to make a change in the law prior to accession to the EU.829 This is 
also seen regarding UN law-making. NGOs, with the exception of the Red Cross,830 
cannot participate officially in sessions of the General Assembly; consequently, one 
route to influence the text of a General Assembly resolution is through preliminary
n o  1
work in ECOSOC or at conferences. They may also informally lobby states in order 
to influence their participation in the General Assembly.
Furthermore, NGO participation in law-making at the local level provides a potential 
means for individuals to influence the regional or international law-making processes. 
For example, one interviewee described how their organisation’s partnership with a 
local NGO enabled the local group to have greater authority in influencing the 
development of law by the government,832 another how their role in the organisation 
involved “making the links between the local, national level work and the 
international level work”.833 Larger NGOs working in partnership with grassroots 
groups can provide a link between different levels of participation in law-making, and 
enable indirect forms of participation by smaller groups at the international level. For 
example, the various European ‘umbrella’ groups such as the European Disability 
Forum, the European Anti-Poverty Network and the European Network Against 
Racism provide a link between national organisations and the level of the EU, and 
consequently may provide a means for individuals and smaller groups to have 
influence at the higher levels of law-making within the European system.
ID 24, 15/11/07
830 The International Committee of the Red Cross has observer status with the General Assembly, as 
granted by Resolution 45/6, 16 October 1990.
31 Willetts, 1996b: 53
832 ID 3, 03/03/07
833 ID 35,22/01/08
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However, the construction and implementation of law at the local level must be 
considered a two-way process. Firstly, a larger NGO working with local groups can 
help to enhance such groups’ capacity to influence the development of law and can 
provide them with solidarity or protection when the issues promoted were not widely 
accepted within the community.834 Secondly, through working with local groups an 
NGO is able to learn about how best to promote certain norms within a particular 
context. Consequently, NGO participation in law-making is not just concerned with 
the development of standards at the international level, but also involves how those 
norms can be translated into local legislation. This indicates an important role for 
individuals in translating the meaning of international standards into acceptable 
human rights law at the local level.
Fundamentally, however, the role of individuals in law-making is limited to the 
interpretation and dissemination of human rights norms at this local level, rather than 
their initial development at the international level. Human rights law-making is 
therefore primarily a top-down process, with individuals’ only opportunity for 
influence over international standards being via NGO or state representation.
1.6: Discussion
Modes of participation in human rights law-making present a clear contradiction to 
the forms of participation identified in Chapter 1 as appropriate for human rights. This 
required that participation in human rights centralised the role of the individual, and 
furthermore that their participation was active, meaningful and effective. In the
834 ID 3, 03/03/07; ID 26, 30/10/07
835 ID 4, 05/11/07; ID 26, 30/10/0
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context of law-making, this would require direct and active involvement by the 
individual in the development of the law. Instead, the role of the state is clearly 
dominant and centralised, particularly regarding formal rights of participation in law­
making. Private forms of participation are predominantly represented by the NGO 
sector, whose formal rights of participation are considerably more restricted than 
those of states. There is little opportunity for direct participation by individuals in 
human rights law-making, unless those individuals are experts or jurists, and 
individuals have no formal rights of participation. Individual participation is therefore 
usually mediated through the actions of states or NGOs.
The degree to which both NGOs and states are an adequate means for individuals to 
participate in law-making is clearly variable, depending on the state or NGO 
concerned. However, it does not appear that individuals are able to participate via 
these other entities in human rights to the degree identified as appropriate in Chapter 
1. Participation mediated via NGOs is entirely dependent on the internal structure of 
individual NGOs and how much priority they accord to the inclusion of the voices of 
both members and beneficiaries. Equally, individual influence over state participation 
in law-making forums is dependent on the degree to which the state is receptive to 
public opinion.836
Analysis of informal modes of participation by NGOs presents a more inclusive and 
extensive account of participation in human rights law-making. It is clear that human 
rights law is created by both formal and informal processes837 and through the 
interaction between these. Furthermore, although NGOs’ formal rights of
836 This issue is further developed in Chapter 5, section 2.1
837 Reisman, 2005: 20
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participation are constrained, they have been able to develop informal structures to 
overcome these restrictions to some extent. This in turn affects individuals’ 
participation in law-making mediated by NGOs. Whilst structures of participation in 
human rights law-making are not as extensive or inclusive as are appropriate to 
human rights, the existence of these informal structures is encouraging.
Understanding law as emanating from both soft law and jurisprudence also allows the 
consideration of a wider range of actors and broader modes of participation. As Roben 
identifies “the increasing importance of non-conventional [non-treaty] international 
law goes hand in hand with the cosmos of actors that participate in the process of 
making international law.838 Consequently, broadening the scope of what counts as 
human rights law in turn presents a more expansive and participatory account of 
human rights law-making, closer to the type of participation identified as appropriate 
in Chapter 1.
Participation in law-making has been identified as occurring at different levels: the 
local, regional and international. NGOs are able to participate informally, and to some 
extent formally, in law-making at these different levels, and to enable participation by 
individuals by providing a link from one level to another. However, this usually 
concerns the interpretation and application of international standards at the local level. 
Whilst there are some ways in which local or regional standards can influence 
international human rights law, in general human rights law-making is a top-down 
process. It is constructed at the international or regional levels, usually without direct 
input from those whom it will affect, and is then put into force at the national level.
838 ROben, 2005: 511
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Consequently, participation by individuals at all levels, and particularly at the 
international level as identified as appropriate for participation in human rights in 
Chapter 1,839 is absent.
Finally, it must be emphasized that while NGOs’ have important informal influence 
over human rights law-making, their role is fundamentally limited by their exclusion 
from the final drafting stages; they consequently remain reliant on states to make 
appropriate decisions regarding the definite content of human rights law. Furthermore, 
NGOs’ informal influence over human rights law-making is also limited by practical 
factors, as will now be addressed.
Part 2: The feasibility of participation in law-making: resource 
constraints
Part 1 has identified that individuals have little opportunity for direct participation in 
human rights law-making, and therefore that they primarily participate through 
representation by states and NGOs. Part 1 compared the ways in which both states 
and NGOs participate, and examined some of the structural constraints on, 
particularly, NGO participation, in terms of their formal rights. This section will now 
consider the practical barriers to participation which affect both states and NGOs, and 
thus, indirectly, also impact on individual participation in human rights law-making.
2.1: Practical barriers to participation in law-making
Firstly, economic resources clearly affect participation in law-making, both by NGOs 
and states. Most NGO interviewees identified funding as an issue which affected
839 Chapter 1, section 2.2.1
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NGO participation, both in general and in relation to law-making activities;840 “every 
NGO you talk to will say inadequate resources”.841 This affects NGO participation in 
law-making, as international lobbying and networking require huge resources for 
travel, organisation and communication.842 This is especially illustrated regarding 
participation in law-making at the UN; few NGOs are able to afford to attend UN 
meetings in Geneva or New York, especially those from the global South.843 One 
interviewee identified how resource levels particularly affect informal participation by 
small NGOs: “if they can’t afford to have a permanent presence in New York and 
Geneva, then they’re more restricted because they just fly in and fly out, and that 
means they don’t have the informal network to the same extent [as larger 
organisations] of the Secretariat and the governments”.844 Larger and richer NGOs 
who can afford to maintain a permanent office in Geneva or New York have more 
consistent access to the UN and State decision-makers, illustrating disparities of 
participation. This problem was recognised and to some extent addressed by General 
Assembly Resolution 57/229 which established a voluntary fund to support the 
participation of NGOs and experts in the work of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the 
drafting of the Disabilities Convention,845 and there have been calls for a general 
Trust Fund to be established to assist NGOs from developing countries to directly 
participate at the UN,846 although this Fund is yet to be created. It should however be 
noted that General Assembly Resolution 50/156847 decided that the United Nations
ID 3, 03/03/07; ID 9, 17/10/07; ID 26, 30/10/07; ID 31, 06/02/08
841 ID 13, 18/10/07; see also Steiner, 1991: 78
842 Mutua, 2007: 605
843 Mutua, 2007: 594
844 ID 50,29/01/08; see also Longford, 1996: 230-231
845 General Assembly Resolution 57/229, 18 December 2002, para. 14
846 Lovald and Jenie, 2005: 4, Stiftung, 2006
847 General Assembly Resolution 50/156, 21 December 1995, para. 1
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Fund for Indigenous Populations should be used to enable participation by indigenous 
groups in the Working Group which drafted the DIP.
A similar situation is reflected regarding state participation in law-making, with 
developing countries claiming not to have the trained personnel and financial 
resources to enable participation on a level with developed states in law-making
OJ Q
forums. This is demonstrated by cases where NGOs with greater available 
knowledge and resources have provided experts for the delegations of developing 
states,849 or have been contracted to conduct negotiations on behalf of smaller 
states.850 Furthermore, it is contended that states from the global North dominate UN
Of 1
human rights law-making bodies. Although most Working Groups are fairly 
inclusive in terms of potential participation, it is likely that larger and/or richer states 
would have the time and resources to participate more effectively in these forums.
The way in which NGOs are funded also affects their ability to develop human rights 
legal principles regarding specific issues. Many NGO funders provide money for 
specific projects, rather than ‘core’ funding which the organisation may use as it 
chooses. This means that the organisation may not be able to pursue particular issues 
that they consider important as they are unable to do this work if funders are not 
interested in it.852 For some NGOs this means that they might be asked by donors to 
change the focus of a project;853 others only seek funding from donors who match
LeBlanc, 1995: 34
849 Butler, 2007: 181
850 Lindblom, 2005:477
851 Mutua, 2007: 606
852 ID 24, 15/11/07
853 ID 26, 30/10/07
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their own objectives.854 For example, Hudock argues that Southern NGOs are subject 
to external control from Northern resource providers due to the funding 
relationship.855 In consequence, the lack of core rather than specific funding may 
reduce NGOs’ ability to develop legal principles regarding particular issues. Although 
an NGO may identify an issue that it considers important, it may be unable to develop 
it if no funding is available to fund research and campaigning activities related to that 
particular issue.
The size of the organisation also affects NGOs’ ability to participate in law-making, 
particularly in relation to informal lobbying. Interviewees observed that larger NGOs 
have wider formal and informal networks which they can use to gain specific 
knowledge of a country or issue context, and thereby conduct more effective 
lobbying.856 Tolley also argues that large NGOs have the resources to pursue single 
policy issues on their own; smaller NGOs are more likely to form NGO coalitions in 
order to aggregate their influence.857 This may restrict the ability of smaller NGOs to 
pursue those issues that they think most important, and allow for greater influence 
over the law-making agenda by larger NGOs. However, one interviewee also 
considered that some small NGOs were able to be more flexible and immediate in 
terms of responding to debates as they did not have to refer to their head office before
o c o
making a statement of position.
In addition, communication resources and new communication technologies affect 
NGO participation in law-making. The internet is particularly useful for enhancing
854 ID 35, 22/01/08
855 Hudock, 1999: 5, 17-18
856 ID 50, 29/01/08; ID 32, 17/01/08
857 Tolley, 1994: 109
858 ID 13, 18/10/07
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and coordinating NGO lobbing regarding the development of human rights standards, 
as it enables NGOs to communicate quickly and cheaply with individuals, other 
NGOs and governments, to access information and so forth. Such technological 
factors have particularly affected the growth and impact of Third World NGOs,859 as 
well as those in more developed countries. For example, an NGO without a 
permanent presence at the UN would be dependent on formal and informal reports of 
Working Group meetings, which would be primarily distributed via the internet. 
Interviewees also identified communication resources as a problem when working in 
certain areas both for NGO participation and individual participation. For example, 
one interviewee observed that in certain parts of Africa, having access to the internet 
was not an option, and often there was also limited access to the telephone.860 
Participation in law-making structures which depends on access to these forms of 
communication will therefore be restricted and unequal.
Timescale factors also affect the development of human rights law, as UN law­
making is a lengthy process. One interviewee considered that “if you want to have a 
new treaty in an area of human rights law its generally going to take a minimum of 5 
years and probably 10”.861 For example, the original proposal for a Convention on the
O f / )
Rights of the Child was submitted to the Human Rights Commission in 1978; the 
final text of the Convention was adopted in 1989.863 Similarly, the two Covenants 
took 18 years between initial drafting and completion, and the Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR 16 years. The most extreme example of this is the development of the
Korey, 1999: 171
860 ID 26,30/10/07
861 ID 50, 29/01/08
862 LeBlane, 1995: 16
863 General Assembly Resolution 44/25, 20 November 1989
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ICC, with the concept being originally mooted in 1948, and the Rome Statute finally 
adopted in 1998.864
The timescale affects participation by both NGOs and states. Timescale issues were 
considered by NGO interviewees as constituting a challenge to participation in law- 
making, as the nature of law-making at the UN entails supporting documents, 
debates and decisions regarding the continuation of the law-making process.866 It may 
also be hard to maintain momentum on a campaign that lasts for several years, if not 
decades. One interviewee observed the need to take a long term perspective, implying 
that NGOs may become frustrated and disengaged due to the length of time required 
to achieve anything at the UN. The interplay between time and funding factors also 
affects NGO participation. Projects may stall for a while because one set of funding
O / O
has finished and a new set is not yet in place.
For states, the law-making timescale may mean a change of government and 
consequently diplomatic representation at the UN. This may mean the position of the 
government can change regarding the content of the proposed law, and/or the new 
representative may not have the requisite knowledge regarding the negotiations. 
Again, there is interaction between timescale and the economic resources required to 
fully participate in a UN law-making process.
Knowledge is a further issue affecting the ability to participate in law-making. Firstly, 
knowledge of the UN system affects the ability of NGOs to make use of that system
864 Mutua, 2007: 567
865 ID 47, 20/12/07
866 ID 50, 29/01/08
867 ID 50, 29/01/08
868 ID 31, 06/02/08
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both formally and informally. As Longford identifies, knowledge of UN procedures is 
essential for effective participation by NGOs.869 This problem is recognised by the 
ISHR, whose work is specifically directed to enabling other organisations to make use 
of the UN human rights system through the provision of information about UN human 
rights structures. In addition to knowledge of the systems, NGOs require knowledge 
of abuse in order to make the case for the development of law. This consequently 
requires resources for research. One interviewee considered that although NGOs do 
work cooperatively regarding the sharing of research and knowledge resources, some 
organisations are more protective of such resources due to the competition for 
funding.870
Finally, the specific political and cultural context can affect NGOs’ ability to 
participate, and their ability to represent the concerns of others in law-making 
processes. One interviewee considered that the country where their organisation 
worked was seen as less “attractive” and a more “difficult” place to work than other 
countries in the region, due to the particular political situation, and that this led to a
871 •lack of NGO participation in addressing the specific human rights concerns. This 
clearly affects the development of legal principles to deal with those issues because 
NGOs are such an important means to represent grassroots concerns in law-making 
processes.
Longford, 1996: 232




It is clear that the ability to participate in law-making is, for both states and NGOs, 
affected by resources issues which affect the ability to take advantage of the 
opportunities available. Factors affecting the ability to participate in law-making 
include financial and communication resources, knowledge base and timescale. 
NGOs’ ability to participate can also be affected by their size, and by obligations to 
donors concerning the specific content of campaigns and programmes.
Consequently, the importance of informal methods of participation by NGOs can 
result in exclusion. Use of informal methods means the degree of influence that an 
NGO has over human rights decision-making is very much dependent on the 
resources and status of the NGO, and could lead to the exclusion of smaller NGOs 
and consequently of the constituencies whom those NGOs represent. This could also 
affect individual participation though representation by a state. Smaller states are less 
able to participate in law-making than larger and richer states, and this, as with NGOs, 
may result in the indirect exclusion of the interests of their citizens from human rights 
law-making forums. This clearly contradicts the type of participation identified in 
Chapter 1, which required inclusive opportunities for participation.
Although there are references within international law concerning equitable 
participation by both states and NGOs, it is not clear that states have any obligations 
to enable more inclusive forms of participation, or to direct resources to facilitating 
participation by individuals, NGOs or other states. This may be encouraged, but is not 
required.
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Practical barriers to participation in law-making therefore illustrate the contradiction 
identified in Chapter 1: In principle, human rights requires inclusive and universal 
opportunities for participation, which, as regards law-making, would require the 
development of more direct forms of individual participation in law-making, and/or 
policies which enable more equitable participation by those NGOs and states with less 
access to financial, time and knowledge resources. However, human rights law does 
not oblige the allocation of resources to facilitate the ability to participate in this way. 
Practical barriers therefore constitute a significant barrier to the realisation of the 
forms of participation required by human rights.
Part 3: The purpose of participation in human rights law-making
Sections 1 and 2 have considered the ways in which states and NGOs participate in 
human rights law-making and the structural and practical factors which affect this 
participation. This section will now examine the ends to which participation in law­
making is oriented and will analyse the ways in which participation in law-making 
both reflects and contributes to wider structures of power and legitimacy.
3.1: Orientation to individual and communal ends
There is a tension within human rights law-making between participation oriented to 
particular or collective interests. Firstly, international law-making is essentially a 
communal activity, as it is constructed by interactions between states, IGOs and 
NGOs. Human rights treaties, if they are to be successfully adopted, must reflect
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common ground and be acceptable to diverse state interests.872 Customary human 
rights law also stems from the collectivity of state practice and opinio juris. 
Furthermore, human rights law is inherently collective, as human rights are supposed 
to represent common interests. This communal aspect of the development of human 
rights was emphasized by one interviewee “they are probably the only thing that 
humankind has built that has an ownership, a collective ownership”.873
However, individualistic elements can also be identified within human rights law­
making. States participate on an individual basis, and the promotion of individual 
state concerns can be seen in the negotiation regarding various human rights 
instruments. Mutua points to various modes of state obstruction within human rights 
law-making processes, including refusal to participate, delaying tactics including the 
blocking of consensus and the use of reservations to modify the final obligations 
incumbent on the state.874 Examples of instruments subject to these processes of state 
obstruction deriving from self-interest include the Optional Protocol to the CAT 
and the DIP.876 The persistent objector rule in customary law also implies that an 
individual state may except itself from a customary legal regime regarding human 
rights. In addition, states use reservations to human rights treaties to construct
• • • • 877individual exceptions to or reinterpretations of human rights principles. Whilst 
human rights law is initially constructed through a collective process and is in 
principle oriented to communal ends, the specific meaning of human rights principles
Mutua, 2007: 571
873 ID 35, 22/01/08
874 Mutua, 2007: 570-571
875 Mutua, 2007: 570
876 Mutua, 2007: 563
877 The issue o f reservations is further explored in Chapter 4, section 2.1.
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in different contexts allows for and can be oriented to more individual ends, at the 
level of individual states.
This tension between collective and individual interests unavoidably results in 
compromise. For example, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, the Chairperson of the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, refers to compromises between state and 
indigenous peoples concerning the issues of self-determination and territorial integrity 
as contributing to the length of time taken to complete the DIP.878 Compromise may 
not best serve the interests of those whom the law is intended to protect; such was the 
controversy resulting from the requirement that the ICCPR and ICESCR included an 
individual complaints mechanism that this was withdrawn from the final drafts, in 
order that negotiations could proceed.879 Whilst there is an Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR providing for this procedure, the separation of the two means that states can 
accept the principle of these rights without being subject to a direct form of 
accountability for individuals.880 In addition, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR has 
only just been adopted881 and is not yet in force. This meant that individuals were for 
decades denied a vital accountability mechanism concerning the abuse of their rights, 
due to the needs for compromise with state interests.
3.2: Instrumental purposes of participation in law-making
Participation in law-making is primarily instrumental, rather than substantive. Mutua 
argues that NGO participation is not concerned with process, but with the outcome of
878 http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/206/coverl .doc
879 McGoldrick, 1991: 121
880 This issue is further discussed in Chapter 4.
881 A/63/465, 28 November 2008
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influence over the creation of human rights standards.882 Thus NGO participation in 
law-making is not a goal in itself, but purely a means to influence the content of 
human rights law. Similarly, state participation in law-making is oriented to the 
construction of legal principles which comply with states’ interests, rather than being 
a substantive end.
However, regarding individual participation within NGOs, some interviewees 
identified that public participation in the work of the NGO was an end in itself, as 
well as a means to campaign for more effective human rights; for example, “its not 
just a question of effectiveness, its also a question of...the role of ordinary people”.883 
This was echoed by another interviewee: “the process of what you do is as important
RR4as the outcomes... if we are empowering others as effectively as we might do”. 
This indicates that participation in law-making as mediated through an NGO had a 
more substantive end for such participants, as such participation by individuals in the 
international system was considered of value, irrespective of how far that participation 
actually influenced the content of a particular legal norm.
A number of other instrumental purposes of participation in law making may be 
identified regarding both participation by NGOs and participation enabled or 
mediated by NGOs. Firstly, participation in law-making is a means to gather 
information. NGOs’ level of expertise and their capacity to support the work of the 
UN is acknowledged in Resolution 1996/31; “consultative arrangements are to be 
made, on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling the Council or one of its bodies to 
secure expert information or advice from organisations having special competence in
882 Mutua, 2007: 595
883 ID 33, 15/01/08
884 ID 24, 15/11/07
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the subjects for which consultative arrangements are made”.885 This demonstrates that 
the rationale for allowing NGO participation is to be able to make use of their 
expertise, and implicitly recognises the contribution that their knowledge can make to 
law-making. NGOs are closer to the victims and generally have a higher level of 
expertise than states,886 and consequently their participation in standard-setting 
provides much of the information on which to base more accurate legal principles. For 
example, NGO participation in the drafting of the CRC was considered of value as 
they generally had more experience in the field of children’s rights than the
00*7
government delegates. Similarly, participation by indigenous groups in the drafting 
of the DIP “allowed indigenous voices to contribute valuable information and unique 
perspectives that helped member States gain some normative clarity about the kind of 
instrument required”.888 This demonstrates that NGO participation is considered a 
means to enhance the quality of legal instruments.
Participation as providing more and better knowledge of a situation is also seen 
regarding participation within NGOs. Participation through inclusion of beneficiaries 
was identified as an information-gathering tool “they know what their most pressing
O Q Q  # t
needs.. .are, hence they also know best what they need from us”. A more inclusive 
approach was seen to give access to “inside knowledge”.890 Consequently, 
participation by victims/beneficiaries was identified as resulting in better outcomes 
which “will match their interests rather than what we think their interests are”.891 The 
inclusion of constituents in decision-making within NGOs is therefore in part oriented
885 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, 25 July 1996, para 20; see also Preamble
886 Mutua, 2007: 602
887 Longford, 1996: 224
888 International Service for Human Rights, 2007: 84
889 ID 41, 16/01/08
890 ID 31, 06/02/08
891 ID 47, 20/12/07; see also ID 35, 22/01/08
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to collecting better information on which to base the development of new or improved 
standards of human rights.
In addition, wider participation in law-making is considered to result in more effective 
and acceptable law. Chamey identifies that participation by the subjects of the law in 
the law-making process makes it more likely that they will comply with the law as it
RQ9reflects their interests. Participation is also linked to ownership over, and therefore 
commitment to, outcomes regarding both external and internal NGO participation. 
Referring to the participation of NGOs in Preparatory Committees, such “open and 
consultative” processes were considered to “inspire far greater ownership of the 
outcome”.893 This is also reflected in the internal structures of NGOs. Imposition of 
policy was seen as more likely to fail than inclusion of beneficiaries in policy 
development;894 “if  you lead people in directions that they do not fully support then 
you will find in the long term that the motivation towards and sustainability of those 
programmes will probably be weak”.895 Victims’ participation was identified as 
resulting in a sense of ownership over a process,896 and that having this sense of 
ownership gave people a stake in the outcome: “if it comes from them, then they’re 
going to protect it and look after it”.897 Participation as ownership was thus considered 
to translate into responsibility898, rather than letting “outsiders ‘fix their problem’”.899 
Victims’ participation was consequently identified as resulting in more sustainable 
outcomes;900 “when we go into a region we don’t expect we’re going to be in that
892 Chamey, 1993: 533
893 Eurostep et al, 2006: para 4
894 ID 3, 03/03/07
895 ID 11, 10/01/08
896 ID 47, 20/12/07; ID 10, 13/12/07
897 ID 4, 05/11/07
898 ID 10, 13/12/07; ID 11, 10/01/08, ID 26, 30/10/07
899 ID 41, 16/01/08
900 ID 47, 20/10/07; ID 4, 05/11/07
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region for ever... what we want to leave behind is a strong enough organisation to 
continue the work”.901 As applied to human rights law-making, this indicates that 
participation in the construction of norms results in greater support for and 
compliance with those norms.
Finally, NGO participation in human rights law-making contributes to the general 
status of NGOs in the international system. NGO participation provides a challenge to 
state-centric norms of law-making, and enhances the legitimacy of NGOs as 
international actors. NGO participation in law-making therefore has effects beyond 
the purposes identified above: the provision of information and increased support for 
the human rights principles that result from a particular process. Continued and 
expanded NGO participation should therefore also be considered as a means to 
enhance NGOs’ general status in the international system.
3.3: Control and empowerment: the centrality of state interest
Structures of participation in law-making processes are oriented towards both 
empowerment and control, and there is a struggle within them as to which end 
participation is directed. Law-making is therefore an area where power and influence 
over human rights is contested, as control over the normative content of human rights 
principles has far-reaching consequences. By exercising control over the content of 
human rights, states retain control over the obligations for which they will be 
accountable regarding the protection of human rights.
901 ID 31, 06/02/08
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To a great extent, international law, including human rights law, is the law of states, 
and reflects their interests. Hard and soft law instruments are agreements between 
states; state practice and opinio juris contributes to the construction of customary law. 
Furthermore, it is asserted that “traditionally, customary law has been made by a few 
interested states for all”,902 revealing the power structures within a hierarchy of states. 
Reliance on state practice regarding the formation of customary law presents a 
distorted, exclusive and self-interested concept of human rights legal principles.903 
Similarly, participation in the construction of jus cogens norms reveals how the 
development of law may be used to assert particular interests. Whilst the nature of 
these principles is defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties the process by which they are developed remains unclear. This lack of clarity 
regarding the normative procedures by which norms of jus cogens are identified may 
result in appropriation of the concept for partial or political ends.904 Participation in 
the development of peremptory norms is furthermore dependent on support from the 
most important members of the world community.905 Participation in the construction 
of these norms is therefore potentially unequal and may serve particular interests. 
Participation in law-making is thus both an assertion of and a means to perpetuate and 
enhance broader structures of state power and control.
NGO participation in human rights law-making provides a counterbalance to state 
control, as one interviewee identified: “just thinking what would happen if the UN
902 Chamey, 1993, 538
903 McCorquodale, 2004: 498
904 Danilenko, 1993: 214; 217
905 As Cassese (2001: 141) rightly identifies, it is unlikely that any State, even a Great Power, could 
oppose the formation o f a norm o f ju s cogens if this were supported by the majority o f States. 
However, a new norm would not develop unless it was supported by major States, as it would not be 
considered to be recognised as a peremptory norm by the international community o f States as a 
whole, as per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53.
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worked.. .without NGOs, and I think it would be a disaster...we would basically see 
processes where the state interest is...the defining interest in most things”.906 For 
example, the Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights appeared to reduce the 
impact of Asian states’ declaration regarding the cultural relativism of human 
rights.907 Chamovitz argues that NGO participation is particularly necessary to offset 
the parochial attitude of larger states, who often are less interested in the development 
of international law than small states.908 The growing power of NGOs in law-making 
has been considered a threat by some states, as identified in Martens and Paul’s 
critique of the Cardoso panel report on civil society and the UN,909 which argues that 
the report’s “genesis lay not in a generous UN commitment to strengthen the NGO 
role but rather in growing concern by governments that NGOs were now too strong, 
too numerous and too challenging to the status quo”.910 This recognizes that 
participation in law-making is a means to assert or challenge structures of power and 
control.
In addition, beneficiary participation in law-making was linked to empowerment by 
interviewees.911 Capacity-raising was seen as a means to empower people to make 
their own decisions regarding how human rights law should be developed.912 
Conversely, lack of inclusion could result in disempowerment; one interviewee 
identified that victims of abuse could feel a lack of control over their case when it is 
used by NGOs to promote a particular issue.913 Participation in law-making was
906 ID 20, 25/01/08
907 McCorquodale, 2004: 494
908 Chamovitz, 2005: 551
ono
A/58/817, 11 June 2004
910 Martens and Paul, 2004: 1
911 ID 47, 20/12/07
912 ID 26, 30/10/07
913 ID 25,03/12/07
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therefore specifically identified as a potential means of empowerment for those whom 
the law would protect, although present structures of participation in law-making do 
little to empower individuals, as they are primarily excluded from the processes.
3.4: Participation and legitimacy in human rights law-making
The role of participation as a contributing factor to the legitimacy of human rights law 
is reflected in the debates concerning the universality of human rights law. Relativist 
perspectives explicitly identify non-participation in the development of human rights 
principles as constituting a challenge to the legitimacy of human rights. They do this 
through the contention that human rights principles do not represent universal 
principles due to the lack of involvement of non-Western states in the drafting process 
of human rights instruments, in particular the UDHR, resulting in a pro-Western bias 
within human rights.914 They argue that there are in existence today more than three 
times the number of autonomous countries than voted for the UDHR,915 again 
implying that the human rights principles contained within the UDHR are either 
illegitimate or should not apply due to exclusion from process. This issue was also 
reflected in the interview data. One interviewee identified that in their particular 
context human rights law itself was regarded with suspicion as a Western imposition 
oriented to self-interest.916 This was located in the context of the power relationship 
between developed and developing countries.917 In essence human rights are posited 
as illegitimate because certain cultures or societies did not participate in the 
determination of those principles. Thus participation in the process of the definition of
914 Mutua, 2007: 553-555




human rights principles is explicitly identified as required for human rights to be 
considered legitimate.
However, defendants of the universality of human rights also utilise participation as a 
means to confirm the legitimacy of human rights principles. For example, it is 
contended that whilst certain states may not have been involved in the drafting 
process of human rights instruments, their consequent ratification indicates 
acceptance of the norms expressed within these documents.918 Bianchi argues that 
there was wide participation in the negotiations resulting in the adoption of the two 
Covenants and consequently these instruments “represent the contribution of different 
political, ideological and religious systems”.919 Waltz agrees that “a wide range of 
participants outside the Western bloc made significant contributions... and they were 
aware at the time of the significance of their words and deeds”.920 These positions 
thus use participation to defend the legitimacy of human rights. This demonstrates 
that both critiques and defences of human rights identify the importance of 
participation in law-making for the legitimacy of the resultant law.
It should be noted, though, that these debates consider legitimacy to be dependent on 
the participation of states, and to a lesser extent of NGOs. Direct individual 
participation is not recognised as required for legal principles of human rights to be 
legitimate. Although Mutua argues that the treaty bodies recognise the legitimacy that
• 091 •inclusion of different interests confers on human rights standards, there is little 
explicit evidence that NGOs, and individuals, are included in law-making processes in
918 Tomuschat, 2003: 63-65
919 Bianchi, 1997: 202.
920 Waltz, 2001: 50
921 Mutua, 2007: 591
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order to enhance the legitimacy of the resultant law. Rather, as discussed above, their 
participation is oriented to providing information that enables the production of more 
effective law that is more appropriate to its purpose, and more acceptable to those on 
whom it will impact. Human rights law is regarded as legitimate international law 
irrespective of whether those individuals whom it will affect participate in its 
construction. The relationship between participation and legitimacy is therefore 
primarily concerned with state participation as conferring legitimacy on the 
construction of law. This conforms to the dominant norm of state-centric participation 
in human rights law-making.
3.5: Discussion
Chapter 1 identified that participation in human rights must be oriented to the 
empowerment of individuals. Participation in law-making is clearly an arena where 
power and control are contested. Control over the construction of human rights norms 
has fundamental effects for individuals and states; it defines the legal rights to which 
individuals are entitled and the obligations incumbent on states. Structures of 
participation in human rights law-making therefore present a major contradiction. 
Although the NGO participation does provide some counterbalance to state power and 
interest in law-making forums, states are clearly the dominant actor and consequently 
retain a huge amount of control over the content of human rights law. Whilst 
participation in human rights law-making remains dominated by states, it is unlikely 
to enable the level of individual empowerment required. Some degree of individual 
empowerment may be identified through participation in NGOs, but the general
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exclusion of direct individual influence from participation and the centralisation of 
states demonstrate that this is fundamentally limited.
In addition, there is a conflict within human rights law-making structures concerning 
whether this form of participation is directed to communal or individual ends. Clearly, 
the construction of human rights law does reflect some form of collective decision­
making. Nonetheless, there is also a definite orientation to individual state interests. 
This is a clear contradiction to the form of participation identified in Chapter 1, as the 
purpose of human rights is to reflect and serve the common interests of humanity. The 
way in which states can pursue their own interests through participation in human 
rights law-making clearly restricts the ability of the resultant law to fully reflect 
collective interests.
Furthermore, Chapter 1 determined that the concept of human rights requires 
participation oriented to both means and end. Regarding both state and NGO 
participation, there is little indication that participation in law-making is considered a 
goal in itself; rather, it is a tool for more effective and legitimate law-making. 
Participation in law-making reflects previously identified instrumental purposes of 
participation. It is a means to gather additional and better knowledge about a situation, 
and therefore a means to ensure more effective outcomes. However, the indirect forms 
of individual participation enabled by participation within NGOs do display a greater 
orientation to a substantive purpose. There is consequently some recognition of the 
value of individual participation in law-making, but this does not extend to 
participation in the law-making structures themselves, as individuals are generally 
excluded from participation in these procedures.
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Finally, participation in law-making is also identified as contributing to the legitimacy 
of law; equally, exclusive forms of human rights law-making, whether actual or 
perceived, have led to challenges to the legitimacy of human rights. However, there 
has been little recognition of individual participation as a contributing factor to the 
legitimacy of human rights; rather, participation is considered in terms only of states.
Part 4; Determination of the norms of law-making: the formal- 
informal distinction
Structures of participation regarding the construction of norms of participation in law­
making must now be examined. Analysis of norms of participation in law-making 
requires consideration of how, by whom and with what purpose particular principles 
have been developed and whether they can be challenged or redefined. This is 
particularly illustrated through a comparison of formal and informal norms of 
participation in law-making. As there is little to suggest that individuals participate in 
the development of the norms of law-making, this analysis will focus on NGO 
participation as the vehicle for the inclusion of individuals.
4.1: Participation in the construction of the norms of law-making
As section 1.2 above discussed, NGOs participate in law-making in both formal and 
informal ways. A distinction may be drawn between normative participation 
regarding formal and informal modes of participation in law-making. Formal norms 
of NGO participation in law-making were initially laid out in Article 71 of the UN 
Charter. There is evidence of NGO influence over the determination of these formal
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norms of participation. For example, participation by representatives of over 1200 
NGOs at the founding conference of the UN in San Francisco in 1945 played a 
significant role in the inclusion of Article 71,922 which resulted in ECOSOC 
Resolution 1996/31 which in turn provides for NGOs formal rights of participation in 
developing human rights law. As Breen identifies “NGO input into the drafting of the 
Charter resulted in the carving of a role for NGOs themselves in standardsetting in the
Q9^field of human rights law”. A more recent example of such normative participation 
is the role of NGOs in determining the role for NGOs in the negotiation of the OP to 
the ICESCR.924 At a more general level, NGO participation in the drafting of the Bill 
of Rights can be viewed as a means to enable further NGO participation by informal 
means in law-making (and other activities) as it protects the rights of freedom of 
association and expression which enable NGOs to participate, both formally and 
informally. It is therefore clear that NGO participation in law-making can and does 
extend to some influence over the development of formal norms regarding law­
making, including how and when NGOs will participate in law-making.
Nonetheless, formal participation by NGOs is primarily subject to state control, as the 
granting, suspension and withdrawal of consultative status, as well as the 
interpretation of norms and decisions relating to it are the prerogative of Member 
States exercised through the Economic and Social Council and its Committee on Non- 
Governmental Organisations.925 NGOs have no legal claim to consultative status.926 
Particularly regarding the accreditation of human rights NGOs, this structure has been 
considered as “the fox guarding the hen house”; NGOs who criticize a particular
922 Alger, 2002: 93
923 Breen, 2005: 101
924 ID 20,25/01/08
925 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, para 15
Simma, 2002: 1074
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state’s human rights record are unlikely to receive a favourable consideration of their
• • 927  • •application by that state. This indicates considerable state control over formal 
modes of participation in law-making by NGOs.
However, as Bianchi identifies, although states are able to control formal NGO 
participation in law-making arenas, because NGOs achieve consultative status 
through state consent, states have more limited control over the actions of NGOs once 
they have achieved this status.928 McCorquodale agrees: “much [NGO] activity... is 
only possible because states allow it to happen, but not all of it is controlled by, or 
controllable by, states”.929 This indicates that although NGOs may have limited 
opportunity to shape the norms of formal participation in law-making, they have more 
flexibility regarding their modes of participation under consultative status. This is 
contradicted to some extent by Aston, who argues that whilst NGOs with consultative 
status must abide “by the rules of the game”, efforts by states on the NGO Committee 
to have consultative status suspended or removed on the grounds of misbehaviour is 
often a pretext for muzzling critical voices.930 It seems that NGOs are able to redefine 
to some extent how they will formally participate, but this is at the same time 
dependent on which particular interests such participation is challenging. For 
example, one interviewee identified that challenges to NGO participation at the UN 
depended on which states were being criticised by NGOs and that now there is more 
focus on Western democratic states some of those states are in turn questioning 
NGOs’ legitimacy as participants.931
Aston, 2001: 950; see also Simma, 2002: 1074
928 Bianchi, 1997: 191-2
929 McCorquodale, 2004: 496
930 Aston, 2001: 956; see also Otto, 1996: 116
931 ID 50, 29/01/08
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Whilst NGO participation in determining formal participation in law-making is
restricted, examination of informal participation in law-making reflects a broader and
more inclusive account of normative participation. The importance of determining
informal modes of participation in law-making is identified by Berman:
W e need to think o f  international law as a global interplay o f  plural vo ices, many o f  
w hich are not associated with the state, and... w e need to focus on how  norms 
articulated by a w ide variety o f  com m unities end up having important impact in 
actual practice, regardless o f  the degree o f  coercive power those com m unities 
w ield .932
This promotes a creative and open-ended concept of participation in determining the 
norms of law-making, implying space for redefinition and expansion of these norms. 
As McCoquodale comments, “the participation of non-state actors in the international 
legal system may not be the traditional method of international law-making, but it is 
now an accepted method”.933
As identified by Cook, “to be effective at the UN, NGOs must be opportunists, able to 
seize on the unexpected and make use of an unforeseen event”.934 The modes of 
participation utilised by NGOs to overcome the limitations of their formal position 
and the primary role of states in law-making have been described as “inventive, 
creative, active and ingenious”.935 NGO participation at international conferences is 
claimed to have “introduced a new dynamic of participatory democracy to the 
international community and to the shaping of international law”.936 The wide range 
of informal modes of participation both used and developed by NGOs in order to 
participate in human rights law-making demonstrates the ability to reconstruct these
932 Berman, 2007: 308
933 McCorquodale, 2004: 496
934 Cook, 1996: 184
935 Reidel, 2 0 0 5 :3 1 7
936 Otto, 1996: 120
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norms in response to the needs of the particular situation. As Chamovitz argues 
“NGOs will find a way to achieve influence in whatever formalities are used to pursue
Q 'in
world public order”.
The use of informal means of participation may provide NGOs with greater flexibility 
than participation via formal rights. Whilst formal methods of participation are 
primarily defined primarily by states, informal means are developed by NGOs 
themselves, and can therefore potentially be more suited to achieving the objectives of 
NGOs. Informal structures may be less restrictive than formal ones as NGOs are more 
able to change tactic in relation to the political climate, as was seen in the 1980s when 
NGOs began to specifically and politically target states which had violated their 
human rights obligations. NGOs are not obliged to respect formal decision-making 
resulting from a process from which they are typically excluded, and can therefore use 
informal methods to promote more comprehensive standards which are not reliant on 
compromise.938 For example, NGOs can argue that states are morally if not legally 
bound to respect more extensive human rights than those contained in the legal 
instruments to which those states are party.939
Furthermore, informal participation contributes to the development of an alternative 
public sphere, which may present a different and potentially more inclusive model of 
human rights norm construction, including the norms of participation in human rights. 
Informal modes of participation are more inclusive than formal participation requiring
Chamovitz, 2005: 544
938 Spiro, 2002: 166
939 see also discussion in Chapter 4, section 2.2.3
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accreditation by ECOSOC, as any NGO can participate in this way.940 This alternative 
sphere is important as it creates new and/or different structures of participation and 
legitimate constructions of meaning that are not dependent on state acceptance. This 
indicates the potential for NGOs to both expand and redefine the arena in which NGO 
influence over human rights law-making occurs.
4.2: Discussion
Chapter 1 identified the importance of participation in constructing the norms of 
participation, in order for such participation to be genuine and effective. 
Consideration of participation in the construction of norms of human rights law­
making presents a complex and contested account. This is to be expected, as there is 
no overall control over the “haphazard...almost anarchic”941 process of international 
law-making. A variety of different actors contribute at different levels and in different 
ways. This provides potential space for innovation and redefinition of the norms of 
participation in law-making, which is in line with the type of participation required by 
human rights. However, there remains considerable state control over the norms of 
participation in law-making, particularly regarding formal participation by NGOs. 
This then influences the extent to which individual participation mediated through 
NGOs can be effective. In addition, the degree to which individuals can affect the 
norms of NGO participation, as discussed in section 1.3 above, is subject to the 
particular structures of participation within NGOs.
940 Informal NGO participation can however be restricted by resources; see Chapter 3, section 2.1, and 
Chapter 5, section 2.2.3
941 Alston, 1984: 607. See also LeBlanc, 1995: 1-15
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Nonetheless, it is clear that participation in determining informal types of 
participation in law-making is broader and more reflexive than participation in the 
construction of formal modes. States clearly retain a great deal of power and influence 
over which NGOs may participate formally, and what such participation entails. 
However, regarding informal participation, NGOs are able to determine how and why 
they will participate in law-making to a much greater extent. This relationship 
between formal and informal sources of law is identified by Berman, who views 
international law-making as a “messy world, where official, quasi-official, and 
unofficial norms are pursued by multiple communities controlling various means of 
coercive and persuasive authority”.942
It is also clear that participation in law-making itself affects both formal and informal 
modes of participation in law-making. Where participation is determined by legal 
principles, input into those principles consequently affects the type and extent of 
participation allowed by those principles. This is illustrated by NGOs’ influence over 
the development of Article 71, and over the revisions to Resolution 1996/31. Thus, as 
legal norms of participation themselves affect further development of the norms of 
participation in law-making, structures of inclusion or exclusion can be perpetuated. 
However, this also demonstrates the difficulty of assessing participation in the 
construction of norms of participation as identified in Chapter 1; that there can be no 
final determination of how the initial norms regarding a specific process were 
constructed, as there is always a further structure which governs the development of 
the norms under consideration.
942 Berman, 2007: 303
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Concluding remarks
This Chapter has examined structures of participation in human rights law-making, 
and has compared them to the types of participation appropriate to human rights as 
identified in Chapter 1. Again the complexity of participation in human rights is 
demonstrated, with no clear account being discemable and various contradictions 
emerging dependent on which aspect of participation is examined. Clearly states 
retain a great deal of power and influence over the development of human rights 
norms; equally clear is the important if not fundamental informal role played by 
NGOs. Individual participation in human rights law-making is however extremely 
limited unless mediated by states or NGOs. This aspect of participation in law-making 
presents the clearest divergence from the type of participation identified in Chapter 1 
as appropriate for human rights. Individuals have little control or influence over the 
development of standards which are, in principle, oriented to their protection.
Chapter 4 will now investigate the extent to which this pattern is replicated regarding 
access to human rights protection, or whether this aspect of human rights reflects 
greater participation by individuals.
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Chapter 4: Participation through Access to 
Human Rights Protection Mechanisms
Introduction: the elements of access
The previous Chapter examined participation in the definition of human rights law 
through investigating participation in human rights law-making. This Chapter will 
now explore participation in the application of human rights law through considering 
access to human rights complaints mechanisms. Whilst there are numerous ways in 
which individuals could participate in the application of human rights law, access to 
complaints mechanisms reflects the clearest direct form of such individual 
participation. This Chapter will therefore focus on whether and to what extent 
individuals can participate in human rights law through accessing the structures which 
have been set up for the protection of their rights. In contrast to Chapter 3 which 
concentrated on NGO participation, this Chapter centres on participation by 
individuals. NGO participation is considered, but only insofar as it enables individual 
participation.
Access to, and therefore participation in, the protection mechanisms provided by 
international human rights law as examined here has three elements. It requires that 
the individual firstly be subject to the law, secondly be aware of the law and the rights 
to which they are entitled, and finally be able to bring a complaint regarding violation 
to an appropriate body. Consequently, individual access to human rights protection 
mechanisms firstly requires the existence of human rights obligations both regarding 
the right that has been violated, and held by the entity responsible. Access is
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dependent on the establishment and applicability of human rights obligations in a 
particular situation. Both the applicability of protection afforded by human rights 
obligations to individuals and groups, and participation in determining whether these 
obligations are applicable or not, must therefore be examined.
In addition, for an individual to bring a complaint, the existence of individual 
complaints mechanisms is obviously required. This Chapter will therefore examine 
the various mechanisms for individual complaint within both the UN and regional 
structures, the restrictions on access to these procedures, and participation in 
determining the powers and scope of these particular protection mechanisms. As 
noted, this analysis focuses on individual access to human rights, as a form of 
individual participation in human rights. It will not, therefore, consider in any depth 
the Charter procedures943 for holding states accountable, nor state reports to the treaty 
bodies, as these do not offer an individualised means of complaint,944 although they 
are a form of access to human rights procedures.
Finally, this Chapter is concerned with the role of access to information in enabling 
participation in human rights through both determining the applicability of obligations 
and in accessing protection mechanisms. In order to participate in human rights 
procedures, individuals and groups require access to information concerning their 
rights and consequent state obligations, the legal structures that protect them and the 
complaints mechanisms than can be accessed in response to abuse of these rights. 
Access to information as discussed in this Chapter therefore entails consideration of
943 The Charter processes encompass the work o f the country or thematic Rapporteurs, the Universal 
Periodic Review, and the 1503 and 1235 procedures.
All o f the Charter Procedures are directed towards general situations of systematic or widespread 
abuse rather than violations at the individual level, although the mandated experts can receive and act 
on individual complaints. The individual is the source o f information rather than an active complainant 
in the process.
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participation via the acquisition and dissemination of information specifically 
regarding human rights.
It must be noted that the issue of compliance will not be considered. This analysis of 
participation through access to human rights structures examines the existence of 
obligations and the ability to access protection mechanisms. Whilst the issue of 
compliance is fundamental for such access to be effective,945 it is also irrelevant 
without these two elements first being present. Neither does this Chapter examine the 
implementation of human rights. The concern of this Chapter is the degree to which 
individuals are able to participate in human rights through access to complaints 
procedures, rather than how far human rights are enjoyed by individuals, although this 
is also an element of participation in human rights. Furthermore, this Chapter will 
only consider treaty-based obligations, and will therefore not examine human rights 
obligations deriving from customary law. Although customary law would in theory 
create universal obligations, in practice there remains considerable debate over the 
scope and content of customary human rights obligations.946 The only forums in 
which states could be held to account regarding customary obligations are via the 
Charter procedures, which, as noted, will not be considered as they do not offer access 
to justice on an individual basis, or the ICJ, to which individuals do not have access.
This Chapter follows the analytical structure of Chapters 1 to 3, examining 
participation through access to human rights in relation to the modes, purposes, 
feasibility and norms of participation. Section 1 considers the purpose of access to 
individual complaints mechanisms and examines why these are such an important 
form of participation in human rights. Sections 2 and 3 analyse respectively how the
945 See note 948 below
946 See Chapter 1, section 2.1; also Clapham, 2006: 86
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structure of international human rights obligations and mechanisms constitute legal 
barriers to participation, and how lack of access to information and resources present 
practical barriers. Finally, section 4 examines participation in determining how and by 
whom human rights mechanisms are constructed, and consequently how the norms of 
participation through access to these structures are determined. This analysis will 
facilitate comparison between the aspects of participation reflected by access to 
human rights mechanisms, and the type of participation appropriate for human rights 
identified in Chapter 1.94?
Part 1: The purpose of individual access to complaints procedures
This Chapter considers individual participation in human rights through focussing on 
access to individual complaints mechanisms. This section examines the purpose of 
this form of participation, considering why it is important for individuals to be able to 
access human rights structures, and what the effects of this type of participation can 
be.
1.1: Substantive and instrumental purposes of individual complaint
Participation through access to human rights structures can be considered an end in 
itself. Access to complaints mechanisms can be a meaningful form of participation in 
human rights, even if the case is not decided in the individual’s favour, or, as is usual, 
there is little or no compliance with decisions.948 This is because, as noted in section 2 
below,949 being able to participate in human rights through accessing human rights
947 See Chapter 1, section 2.2.
948 Butler; 2007: 132-134; Bayefsky, 2001: 33-35
949 Chapter 4, section 2.3.
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complaints mechanisms is a means for individuals to actively engage with human 
rights, through the action of claiming them. Individuals therefore become more aware 
both of their rights, and of themselves as active rights-holders, through participating 
in a human rights structure.
Access to individual complaints mechanisms also serves a range of instrumental
purposes. Firstly, and obviously, an individual complaint mechanism is a means to
implement the rights contained in the relevant treaty. This is confirmed in the
Preamble to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which states that
“in order further to achieve the purposes of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the implementation of its provisions it would be appropriate for 
the Human Rights Committee... to receive and consider, as provided in the present 
Protocol, communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant”.
The importance of a complaints mechanism as a means of implementation has also 
been identified by NGOs calling for this process to be developed regarding the 
CRC.950 Individual complaints mechanisms are a form of implementation because 
they are a means for individuals to hold governments to account for their action or 
inactions concerning the protection of human rights.
Secondly, these structures are a means to improve understanding of the content of 
human rights and subsequent state obligations. The development of jurisprudence 
enhances understanding for states and individuals, and enables the body hearing the 
complaint to engage more fully with complex issues.951 Individual complaints 
therefore “play an important role in the interpretation of treaty provisions”,952 and are
950 A/HRC/8/NGO/6, 26 May 2008, 2
951 A/Conf. 157/PC/62/Add.5, 26 March 1993, Annex II para 34
Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 48
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considered more important in this respect than treaty bodies’ general comments or 
examination of state reports.953
In addition to this informative role concerning the interpretation of particular rights, 
the existence of an individual complaints mechanism is a means to more widely 
promote the general concept of the rights contained within the respective convention. 
Discussion during the development of the Optional Protocols to the ICESCR and the 
ICEDAW both highlighted an individual complaints mechanism as a means to 
enhance the status of the Convention, particularly in comparison with those 
instruments which already provided for individual complaint.954 In relation to the 
Optional Protocol to the ICEDAW, it was thought that “the elaboration of an optional 
protocol would be a sign of the importance that the international community accorded 
to equality between the sexes and might therefore influence attitudes”.955 Individual 
complaints mechanisms, through confirming the status of particular rights, are 
intended to enhance their respect.
Complaints mechanisms can also enhance human rights enjoyment at a more general 
level. All accountability structures, including individual complaint, arguably have a 
preventative role, through deterring future violations.956 The knowledge that they may 
be held to account for non-fulfilment of human rights obligations may contribute to 
greater state respect of human rights. The CESCR has identified this with respect to 
an Optional Protocol to the Convention: “the mere possibility that complaints may be 
brought in an international forum should encourage governments to ensure that more
953 A/Conf.l57/PC/62/Add.5, 26 March 1993, Annex II para 31
954 E/CN.6/1997/5, 18 February 1997, para. 17 (ICEDAW); A/Conf.l57/PC/62/Add.5, 26 March 1993, 
Annex II para 42-48 (ICESCR)
955 E/CN.6/1997/5, 18 February 1997, para 14
956 Ratner and Abrams, 2001: 155
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effective local remedies are available”.957 Arambulo agrees that “influencing national
legislation and policy positively is the function most effectively served by an
individual complaint procedure”.958 The CESCR also propounded that “the possibility
of an adverse finding by an international committee would give economic and social
rights a salience in terms of the political concerns of governments that those rights
very largely lack at present”.959 Similarly, the rationale for the development of an
Optional Protocol to the ICEDAW included strengthening the promotion and
protection of women’s rights,960 and the positive impact which this instrument would
have on State compliance with human rights principles,961 because “internationally
enforceable law [is] a powerful incentive for governments to live up to [their]
obligations”.962 Arguments concerning the development of an individual complaints
mechanism for the ICRC also contend that
The introduction of a communications procedure would both encourage States to 
develop appropriate remedies for breaches of children’s rights at national level, and 
provide an external mechanism for children and their representatives to appeal to 
when national remedies do not exist or are ineffective.963
The importance of litigation was identified by one interviewee: “governments respond 
to being sued in a way that they do not respond to training”.964 Another identified how 
bringing cases at the international level affected states’ national behaviour “the fact 
that we’ve been taking cases to... the international system has created conditions...to 
put pressure on governments at the national level, so they don’t get these cases at the
A/Conf. 157/PC/62/Add.5, 26 March 1993, Annex II, para 35
958 Arambulo, 1999: 179
959 A/Conf. 157/PC/62/Add.5, 26 March 1993, Annex II, para 37
960 E/CN.6/1996/10, 10 January 1996, para 34
961 E/CN.6/1996/10, 10 January 1996, para 42
962 E/CN.6/1996/10, 10 January 1996, para 54
963 A/HRC/8/NGO/6, 26 May 2008, 2
964 ID 9, 17/10/07
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international level”.965 A clear purpose of individual complaint is therefore to improve 
respect for and enjoyment of human rights.
Finally, an individual complaints procedure is a means to give human rights practical 
realisation. The CESCR has identified the value of access via an individual complaint 
procedure as it means that “the real problems confronting individuals and groups 
come alive in a way that can never be the case in the context of the abstract 
discussions that arise in the setting of the reporting procedure”.966 As asserted by the 
OHCHR
It is through individual complaints that human rights are given concrete meaning. In 
the adjudication of individual cases, international norms that may otherwise seem 
general and abstract are put into practical effect. When applied to a person's real-life 
situation, the standards contained in international human rights treaties find their most 
direct application.967
Part of the importance of access to individual complaints mechanisms therefore lies in 
their ability to forge a connection between conceptual human rights norms at the 
international level and practical experience at the individual level.
1.2: The purpose of individual complaint: Communal or individual interests?
Clearly, participation through access to individual complaints mechanisms reflects an 
orientation to individual interests. The main purpose of individual complaint is to 
achieve a remedy for the individual whose right(s) have been violated. The pursuit of
968accountability can also help victims achieve a sense of justice and closure.
5 ID 35, 22/01/08
966 A/CONF. 157/PC/62/Add.5, 26 March 1993, Annex 2, para. 33,
967 Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007
968 Ratner and Abrams, 2001: 155
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However, individual forms of complaint can potentially have an impact beyond the 
securing of remedy on an individual level. Section 1.1 identified that complaints 
mechanisms may serve a preventative role, can promote the rights in question, may 
encourage greater respect by states, and can contribute to the development of the 
content of the rights. These clearly have effects at the level of the community. The 
preventative potential of these structures has a wider effect than securing remedy or 
justice for one individual, as it may enhance general protection of human rights within 
states, in terms of both legal structures and political will, which is of benefit to a 
wider community. Through contributing to wider understandings and implementation 
of human rights, individual cases can have broader effects. Examination of individual 
complaints can focus attention on widespread patterns of abuse. This is illustrated 
through the discussions on the Optional Protocol to the ICEDAW, which identified 
that an individual complaints mechanism was a means to identify systematic cases of 
discrimination that might not be evident from state reports.969 An individual case 
could thus be the means to identify and address abuse which affect wider groups or 
communities.
It is of value to briefly note the existence of human rights accountability mechanisms 
which allow for collective forms of complaint. These include the Special Procedures, 
which although they allow for individual communications are oriented to the 
identification of patterns of gross violations, rather than abuse on the individual level. 
The ILO provides for collective complaint procedures, where claims can only be 
brought on behalf of a group,970 as does the European Social Charter.971 The inquiry
969 E/CN.6/1997/5, 18 February 1997, para 21
970 ILO Constitution Articles 24-26; Arambulo, 1999: 181
971 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System o f Collective 
Complaints, 1995
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procedures contained in various human rights treaties and Optional Protocols972 also 
indicate concern with more collective forms of complaint. Whilst these structures do 
not directly represent forms of individual complaint, they nonetheless are to some 
extent oriented to individual interests: those of the individuals who make up the group 
on whose behalf the complaint is brought.
It is therefore clear that although individual complaints mechanisms are in principle 
oriented to the interests of the individual concerned, such forms of participation in 
human rights can have a wider effect and can serve more communal ends. An 
individual case may have effects beyond the achievement of redress for a particular 
individual in terms of change in state practice. In addition, whilst collective 
complaints mechanisms are not directly oriented to individualised remedy, they can 
be of benefit to individuals. This indicates that participation in human rights through 
access to accountability mechanisms, whether individual or collective, cannot be 
judged solely to be oriented to either individual or communal ends; rather, it serves 
both purposes.
1.3: Individual complaint as a form of power and control
Participation through access to human rights structures is intrinsically concerned with 
issues of power and control. The existence of both human rights obligations and 
complaints structures provide a means for individuals to assert control over the 
actions of their state regarding human rights protection; equally the absence of 
structures enhances states’ power to be free from such restrictions on their behaviour.
972 ICAT, Article 20; Optional Protocol to the ICEDAW, Article 8; Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 
Article 11 (not yet in force)
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Discussions concerning the elaboration of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
identified that the purpose of the Covenant was to protect the individual against abuse
of power by the state; consequently there was a need for right of petition.973 One
interviewee considered how this relationship between power and access to human
rights was restrictive “[if] the power structure of the society is really unequal, does
not even allow them to know they have rights, much less to have access to the
instruments that are there really to be accessible to them, but that they don’t really
have access to”.974 This identifies the role of power and inequality in constricting
knowledge of obligations and structures of access, and also indicates that this affects
the ability to make use of these. Clearly, the existence both of obligations and of
structures of access to justice are an assertion of individual power, and a statement of
the limits of state control. This is reflected in the UNHCHR’s description of the
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR as
an important platform to expose abuses that are often linked to poverty, 
discrimination and neglect, and that victims frequently endure in silence and 
helplessness. It will provide a way for individuals, who may otherwise be isolated and 
powerless, to make the international community aware of their situation.975
The fundamental basis of human rights is that states’ treatment of those within their 
control is subject to certain limitations. In order for this to be effective, the individual 
must be able to hold the state to account regarding their actions. The absence of 
structures of accountability therefore allows state impunity and serves states’ rather 
than individuals’ interests.
Furthermore, access to human rights information is a means of empowerment for 
individuals, as it enables access to complaints mechanisms. Information allows
973 McGoldrick, 1991: 122
974 ID 35, 22/01/08
Qnc
United Nations Press Release, 18 June 2008
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people to scrutinise the actions of a government and is the basis for proper, informed 
debate of those actions;976 it “empowers communities to battle the circumstances in 
which they find themselves and helps balance the unequal power dynamic between 
them and their governments”.977 Consequently, access to information, as part of 
freedom of expression, is contended to be a ‘cornerstone’ or ‘empowerment’ right; 
one that enables other rights.978 This is clearly seen concerning the role of information 
in empowering individuals to claim their rights though complaining about abuse. One 
interviewee identified the empowering potential of information provision “I worked 
with an activist, who had no knowledge of the law, and he went to one of our 
trainings and suddenly he could see that he could use the law and it wasn’t a closed 
shop to him”.979
However, whilst access to human rights structures is a means of individual 
empowerment, equally denial or restriction of access is a means of assertion of state 
power. Issues of state power are clearly identifiable in the context of complaints 
mechanisms, with states trying to assert control over these structures in order to avoid 
or limit accountability for their actions. The orientation to state power can be seen as 
concerning those states which have not accepted any of the UN individual complaints 
mechanisms - Brazil, India, Egypt and Iran - all of which have either expressly stated 
or are thought to have declined to participate in these structures due to a desire to 
preserve state sovereignty and the pre-eminence of domestic jurisdiction.980 
Alternatively, states may seek to influence the operation of certain structures. 
Although individual members of human rights accountability structures are
976 Article 19, 1999: 7
977 Callamard, 2006: 8
978 Callamard, 2006: 7
979 ID 24, 15/11/07
980 Niemi and Scheini, 2002: 45-48
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independent experts rather than state representatives, as Odinkalu notes regarding the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) “In 
practice, as with other international institutions and mechanisms, the process of 
nomination and election to the Commission minimizes the likelihood of the body 
being composed of persons who may be substantially or rigorously impervious to
981 •state pressure”. It is clear that states have recognised human rights mechanisms as 
sites of contestation of power, and are seeking to maintain their interests through 
participation in these structures.
1.4: Discussion
It is clear that individual complaint structures are oriented to a range of purposes. 
Whilst their central concern is to provide a means for individuals to hold states 
accountable for their actions, they also serve other instrumental and collective ends. 
Some of these purposes of individual complaint as a form of participation in 
international human rights law are common to all forms of participation, as identified 
in Chapter 1: provision of information concerning the nature of rights, enhanced 
implementation of rights and the promotion of rights. Participation through access to 
human rights structures is clearly oriented to both individual and communal ends. 
This conforms with the purpose of participation in human rights as identified in 
Chapter 1.
Access to human rights structures is a substantive end in itself, as well having these 
instrumental effects. Consequently, this form of participation is itself of value,
981 Odinkalu, 1998: 366
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irrespective of the outcome. Having knowledge, and having the ability to bring a 
complaint, enables the individual to participate meaningfully in human rights. 
Irrespective of the success of the complaint, this demonstrates the growing role of the 
individual in a system still dominated by states. This is of vital importance because, as 
identified in Chapter 1, a major goal of human rights is protection of the individual 
from the actions of the state: this conforms to the type of participation identified in 
Chapter 1.
Finally, human rights are “a defence against despotism in the exercise of government
QR9power”. In order for human rights to fulfil this role, it is necessary to have 
structures which enable individual to hold states to account for their behaviour. It is 
clear that access to complaints mechanisms is a means of and is oriented to individual 
empowerment, and in this way this type of participation fulfils the criteria established 
in Chapter 1. However, the degree to which states retain control over access to human 
rights structures limits this emancipatory potential. Access to human rights structures 
is therefore an area where the limits of both state and individual power are contested. 
For access to human rights procedures to be truly and universally empowering, 
individuals require enhanced opportunities for determining whether they may have 
access to these structures.
Part 2: Participation in human rights protection mechanisms: actors 
and modes
Having considered why access to individual complaint is an important form of 
participation in international human rights law, this section will now examine how far
982 Burgers & Danelius, 1988: 5
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individuals are actually able to participate in this way, through consideration of the 
legal structures which enable or constrict such participation.
2.1: Public and private actors: the dominance of state participation
As noted in Chapter 1, access to human rights protection mechanisms is an inherently 
public form of participation, because these structures are public procedures 
undertaken in public forums. However, it is clear that there is a huge discrepancy 
between the degree of access available to public and private actors; between states, 
and individuals and/or NGOs.
Participation by the state dominates structures of access to human rights. Firstly, it is 
of value to contrast the difference in options available to states and individuals 
regarding access to human rights accountability mechanisms. States are able to bring 
complaints in all forums which consider violations of human rights. States can bring 
cases before the ICJ983 and all of the regional human rights commissions984 and 
courts,985 and can refer cases to the Prosecutor of the ICC.986 Most human rights 
conventions provide for an inter-state complaint mechanism,987 even if these are 
rarely, if ever, used.988 State representatives can also raise issues of concern within the 
Human Rights Council, which may lead to the creation or continuation of Special 
Procedures.
983 ICJ Statute, Article 34(1)
984 AmCHR, Article 45, AfCHPR, Article 47, ECHR, Article 24. Note that the European Commission 
has now been replaced by the European Court (Protocol 11 to the ECHR).
985 AmCHR Article 61(1); Protocol to AfCHPR, Article 5(1); ECHR, Article 44
986 Rome Statute, Article 14(1)
987 ICERD Article 11; ICCPR, Article 41; ICEDAW, Article 29; ICAT, Article 21; ICMW, Article 76. 
There is also provision for an inter-state complaint mechanism in Article 10 o f the Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR (not yet in force).
See discussion in Chapter 4, section 2.3.
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In contrast, private individuals are only able to bring a complaint to some of these 
bodies. Individual complaints to treaty bodies are either provided for in an Optional 
Protocol, as with the ICCPR, ICEDAW and the ICPD, or within the treaty itself, as 
with the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ICAT),989 the ICERD990 and the ICMW.991 The 
CRC and the CESCR992 are therefore the only bodies before which an individual 
complaint cannot potentially be brought. However, as is further discussed below, the 
availability of individual complaints procedures to the treaty bodies is conditional on 
state consent, and individuals cannot participate in determining whether they may 
have access. Regarding the Charter procedures, private individuals have no means of 
participation in the deliberations of the Human Rights Council, and limited scope for 
input into the work of Special Rapporteurs, or the 1235 and 1503 procedures. 
Individual participation is limited to the submission of a communication;993 there is no 
guarantee of response or that their particular situation will be investigated.
Concerning judicial mechanisms, the regional structures are fairly inclusive, with 
individuals having direct access to all regional commissions994 and courts,995 with the 
exception of the Inter-American Court,996 although in practice an unresolved 




992 Although the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR has been adopted by the General Assembly 
(A/63/465, 28 November 2008) it is yet enter into force.
993 Butler, 2007: 115-116
994 AmCHR, Article 44, AfCHPR, Article 55, ECHR Article 25(1).
995 Protocol to AfCHPR, Article 5(3); Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 34
996 AmCHR, Article 61(1)
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Court.997 It should however be noted that individual access to these bodies is 
geographically limited, as these structures do not have jurisdiction beyond a specific 
area or group of states. In consequence, there are significant regional disparities 
concerning access to individual complaints mechanisms, as neither Arabic nor Asian 
states are participants in a regional structure which allows individual complaint.998 
Private individuals are unable to bring a case before the international courts whose 
jurisdiction is not restricted to particular regions.999 Only states may be parties within 
ICJ proceedings,1000 and only states or the Prosecutor may refer a case to the ICC.1001 
Individual access to international judicial structures is therefore far more limited than 
that of states, although with respect to the regional structures, state access is also 
limited by the geographical restriction.
There is some scope for NGO participation in human rights protection mechanisms 
which individuals cannot access, which represents an expansion of participation by 
private actors. They have close relationships with Special Rapporteurs, and accredited 
NGOs have some rights of participation in the Human Rights Council.1002 They are 
able to participate in treaty body monitoring processes through the submission of 
parallel reports,1003 or states may consult with NGOs when preparing their reports for 
the treaty bodies, although not all states do this, and the degree to which NGOs are 
included in the process is variable.1004 This provides a potential means for the
997 Butler, 2007: 105
998 The Arab Charter does not allow for individual complaint.
999 The jurisdiction o f the ICC and ICJ is however limited by state consent; see note 1020 below
1000 ICJ Statute, Article 34(1)
1001 Rome Statute, Articles 14 and 15
1002 GA Resolution 60/251, 15 March 2006, para. 11 confirmed that NGO participation in the Human 
Rights Council would be based on the ways in which they participated in the Human Rights 
Commission.
1003 Clapham, 2000: 175-187 discusses NGOs’ use o f parallel reports to the HRC and the CAT; 
Bayefsky, 2001: 46-49 considers shadow reports to the CRC and the CEDAW.
1004 Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 8-19
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concerns of individuals to be brought before these bodies, even if the state concerned 
has not consented to an individual complaints procedure. It should however be noted 
that the treaty bodies can only monitor the behaviour of states who have ratified the 
relevant treaty and thus these procedures are also limited by state consent. It should 
also be emphasized that NGO participation in reporting procedures before the treaty 
bodies does not constitute or enable individual complaint.
Concerning judicial mechanisms, NGOs are not able to bring a case concerning 
violations of human rights before either the ICJ1005 or ICC, nor before the Inter- 
American Court.1006 NGOs may institute proceedings before the European Court,1007 
and NGOs with observer status may bring a case to the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Court).1008 However, this does not represent an expansion of 
individual access as individuals are also able to make complaints to these bodies. 
NGOs may also participate in judicial proceedings through the submission of amicus 
briefs,1009 but this does not constitute a means by which individual access is enhanced.
There is therefore a huge imbalance between the options available to public and 
private entities concerning participation in bodies which consider complaints of 
violations of human rights. States clearly have far more extensive access than private 
individuals, and NGOs’ potential to extend or enhance individual access is limited. 
This is particularly demonstrated in international (rather than regional) judicial 
mechanisms, to which only states have access. This further underlines the inability of
1005 ICJ Statute, Article 34(1)
1006 AmCHR, Article 61(1)
1007 Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 34
1008 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court o f Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 5(3)
1009 See Chapter 3, section 1.1.
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individuals to make a complaint concerning violations of customary obligations, as 
the ICJ is the only international forum which could consider such claims.
As noted, access to human rights protection mechanisms requires both the existence 
of obligations and access to complaints procedures concerning the particular right that 
has been abused. The determination of the existence of both of these elements again 
predominantly reflects forms of participation dominated by states.
Participation by public and private entities in the construction of international human
rights law which determines the content of obligations, including the development of
new standards, was discussed in the previous Chapter. However, following the
creation of principles of human rights law, the state concerned must have accepted
human rights obligations deriving from ratification of the relevant treaty in order for
these obligations to be applicable to the individuals and groups within its jurisdiction.
As Sachleben identifies “prior to observing human rights obligations states must
recognise obligations”.1010 The importance of state ratification is obvious, and has
been identified by the GA:
“ [i]t is o f  paramount importance for the promotion o f  human rights and fundamental 
freedom s that member States undertake specific obligations through accession to or 
ratification o f  international instruments in this Field”.
The importance of state ratification was also demonstrated by the establishment of a 
Working Group on the Encouragement of Universal Acceptance of Human Rights in 
1979 with a mandate to request from states information regarding difficulties
1U1U Sachleben, 2006: 161
1011 GA Res. 32/130, 18 December 1977, para. 1(g)
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preventing ratification, and to consider assistance from the UN to enable 
ratification.1012
Furthermore, individual states are able to modify the obligations undertaken when a 
treaty is ratified through the submission of reservations, provided these do not conflict 
with the object and purpose of the treaty.1013 The determination of the acceptability of 
reservations furthermore rests with states. As Schmidt notes, “in the final analysis, it 
must be for each State party to decide whether a certain reservation meets that 
test”.1014 However, the HRC has stated that certain provisions of the ICCPR may not 
be the subject of reservations, including those which represent customary law and/or 
norms of jus cogens.1015 The HRC also contends that it is inappropriate for states to 
determine whether reservations are compatible concerning human rights treaties, and 
that therefore this task should fall to the Committee.1016 Whilst the HRC’s reasoning 
here is sound, other treaty bodies have failed to make such an assertion,1017 and 
concerning other human rights treaties the determination of the compatibility of 
reservations remains with state parties. In the regional systems, the European Court 
does seems to agree with the HRC, as indicated in Belios v. Switzerland, when it 
asserted that “the silence of the depositary and the Contracting States does not deprive 
the Convention institutions of the power to make their own assessment [of the 
compatibility of reservations]”.1018 The American and African systems, however,
1012 E/CN.4/1350, 3 October 1979,42-43
1013 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties A19(c); see also HRC General Comment 24, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6, 4 November 1994, para. 6
1014 Schmidt, 1997: 21. See also ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
o f the Crime o f  Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 28 May 1951
1015 HRC General Comment 24, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6, 4 November 1994, paras. 8-11
10,6 HRC General Comment 24, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6, 4 November 1994, paras. 17 and 18
1017 For example, despite the large number of reservations to the ICEDAW, the CEDAW General 
Recommendations 4 (1987) and 20 (1992) demonstrate deference to state parties concerning 
determination o f compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.
1018 Belilos v. Switzerland, Application no. 10328/83, Judgement o f 29 April 1988 para 47.
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defer to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.1019 In 
general, therefore, both the existence and the extent of human rights obligations for a 
particular state remain predominantly dependent on participation by the state 
concerned.
Similarly to the applicability of obligations, access to complaints mechanisms is 
primarily determined through decision-making by states, and, fundamentally, is 
subject to the principle of state consent. States participate both in the construction of 
complaints mechanisms, and in determining whether they are subject to them. As 
detailed above, individual complaints to treaty bodies are either provided for in an 
Optional Protocol, or within the treaty itself. As discussed in Chapter 3, states have a 
major role in the development of human rights legal instruments, and therefore in 
constructing the protection mechanisms contained within them. Furthermore, in order 
for the individual to have access to these mechanisms, the state concerned must both 
have ratified the treaty containing the right which is alleged to have been violated, and 
also either ratified the relevant Optional Protocol or made a declaration under the 
relevant article of the treaty that it accepts the competence of the Committee to accept 
individual communications. Consequently, both the development and applicability of 
UN individual complaint procedures predominantly reflects forms of participation as 
represented by the dominant role of the state, and the centrality of state consent.
Judicial individual complaints mechanisms are also formed through treaty making 
processes, and their jurisdiction is subject to state consent. Although individuals 
cannot bring complaints before the ICJ and ICC, it should be noted that the
1019 Marks, 1997: 54, 60
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jurisdiction of these bodies is also dependent on state consent.1020 The regional bodies 
do offer a slightly more nuanced situation. As Butler notes, there is an element of 
compulsory jurisdiction within all of the regional systems. All contracting parties of 
the ECHR must accept the jurisdiction of the court, the Inter-American Commission 
may hear complaints concerning the violation by any Organisation of American States 
(OAS) state of the rights contained in the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man, and the African Commission can receive petitions concerning violations by state 
parties to the AfCHPR without their express consent.1021 However, this is still 
fundamentally subsumed to the principle of state consent. States must still become 
parties to the ECHR or the AfCHPR for the European Court or the African 
Commission respectively to have jurisdiction. Whilst the Inter-American 
Commission’s powers do go further than this, ultimately states must have first chosen 
to become members of the OAS in order for it to have jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
jurisdiction of both the IACtHR and the African Court requires express consent by 
states.1022 Therefore, the jurisdiction of the regional systems is still ultimately 
dependent on state consent, and does not extend to violations by states who are not 
members of the relevant regional organisation.
Participation by private individuals in determining both the content and applicability 
of obligations, and the existence of complaints mechanisms, is minimal. As Chapter 3 
concluded, direct individual participation in law-making, and therefore in the content 
of obligations, is limited, and therefore is manifested through the actions of NGOs. 
Similar forms of participation are found in relation to the applicability of obligations.
1020 Statute o f the ICJ, Article 35(1), see also Article 36; Rome Statute o f the ICC, Article 12
1021 Butler, 2007: 104-105
1022 AmCHR, Article 62. The jurisdiction o f the African Court is subject to ratification of the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment o f an African Court o f  
Human and Peoples’ Rights.
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Little pressure can be brought by individuals on governments to ratify human rights 
instruments. However, participation enabled and led by NGOs has influenced 
acceptance of human rights obligations. Examples of this include the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, whose focus has moved from influencing the content of 
the Rome Statute to lobbying states to ratify it,1023 and a specific NGO campaign 
concerning US ratification of the ICRC.1024 NGOs also sit on the Steering Committee 
of the Global Campaign for Ratification of the Convention on Rights of Migrants.1025 
Indirect NGO influence can be seen in the establishment of the Working Group on the 
Encouragement of the Acceptance of Universal Human Rights Instruments, which 
resulted from a statement submitted from NGOs to the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.1026 This role of NGOs was 
identified by one interviewee, who described how their organisation was lobbying a 
specific government to ratify a particular convention.1027
Private individuals also have little scope for participating in determining whether they 
are able to have access to forms of individual complaint, as this is determined by state 
consent to these procedures. An individual cannot select which mechanisms they may 
make use of as this decision is taken by the state. As with obligations, NGOs can 
provide a means for individuals to participate in influencing states to accept individual 
complaints mechanisms. For example, there is an NGO Campaign for the Ratification 
and Use of the Optional Protocol to the ICEDAW.1028 Niemi and Scheinin identify 
that NGO pressure is a major contributing factor to state acceptance of individual




1026 Weissbrodt, 1982: 419
1027 ID 33, 15/01/08
1028 http://www.iwraw-ap.org/protocol/campaign_efforts.htm
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complaints procedures,1029 and Lemer considers that public opinion can certainly 
influence this.1030
It is clear that participation by states dominates both options for participation in 
accountability mechanisms, and decisions concerning the applicability of obligations 
and individual complaint mechanisms. Whilst private participation by individuals is 
found in some structures, decisions on the applicability of both obligations and 
complaints mechanisms predominantly exclude individuals, and in consequence their 
only means of participation is via NGO activity.
The accountability of private and/or non-state actors is primarily subsumed to the 
state. Such actors do not, in general, hold human rights obligations; rather, the state 
has the obligation to protect individuals and groups from the actions of private 
actors.1031 It has been argued that there are exceptions to this as certain private entities 
do hold obligations under international human rights law. Individuals have 
responsibilities under international criminal law for which they can be held 
accountable. International Financial Institutions and corporations have been argued to 
have, at least in principle, responsibilities concerning human rights.1032 However, 
whilst the concept of non-state obligations may be recognised in theory, in practice 
current structures of access to justice only enable individual complaint to be brought 
against the state. An individual cannot bring a case regarding violations of 
international criminal law by another individual, as the ICC does not permit 
individual access, and all other bodies only consider complaints against the state. The
1029 Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 45
1030 Lemer, 1970: 91
1031 Skogly, 2006: 69; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12, 28 June 1998, para 52(b)
1032 See generally, Clapham, 2006
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treaty body procedures and regional complaints mechanisms are all structured around 
the state-individual relationship. Consequently, there is no structure for individual 
complaint against a private actor; rather, the individual must bring a complaint against 
the state for failure to protect. This again prioritises the state as the central participant 
concerning access to human rights procedures. Furthermore, it makes the 
accountability of private actors conditional on state consent; if the state does not 
consent to the various forms of individual complaint as detailed above, the individual 
cannot bring a complaint against the state for failure to protect. Thus, participation 
through access to human rights mechanisms is restricted as current structures 
predominantly apply only to public entities.
In summary, it is evident that participation in human rights through access to 
individual complaints mechanisms is centred on and dominated by the state. Not only 
does the state have far more extensive opportunities for access than any private actor, 
it is the dominant participant in determining both the content and scope of its 
obligations and whether those individuals within its jurisdiction can have access to 
any form of individual complaint mechanism. Furthermore, the state is the only means 
by which private actors could be held accountable for human rights violations. Whilst 
examination of participation as reflected in human rights principles1033 and structures 
of law-making1034 identified interaction between public and private forms of 
participation, the relationship between public and private entities concerning access to 
human rights is far more adversarial. Both individual and NGO participation is 
directed to holding the state accountable for its action or inaction. As individual 
complaints mechanisms are the means by which states can be held responsible, they
1033 Chapter 2, section 1.1.
1034 Chapter 3, section 1.1.
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are reluctant to allow expanded participation in determining the applicability of these 
structures.
2.2: Formal and informal participation: restricted and ambiguous rights of 
access
The extent to which individuals are able to access human rights mechanisms is clearly 
affected by their formal rights concerning both access to information and access to a 
complaints procedure. Information about rights, obligations and complaints 
procedures is necessary for individuals to be able to participate in human rights 
structures, as without this knowledge individuals will neither be aware that such 
structures exist nor how to make use of them.1035 Consequently, the right of access to 
information about human rights is paramount in enabling access to complaints 
mechanisms. However, the content of both individuals’ rights and states’ obligations 
concerning the acquisition and dissemination of human rights information are 
ambiguous.
2.2.1: The right to human rights information
The individual right to information is part of the right of freedom of expression, 
which includes the right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds”.1036 The ‘seek and receive’ elements of this indicate and have been interpreted 
as providing a right of access to information.1037 Although not specified, this right 
clearly includes access to information on human rights, as this would be encompassed
1035 See also Chapter 4, section 3.1
1036 ICCPR, Article 19; ECHR, Article 10; AmCHR, Article 13; see also Article 9 o f the AfCHPR 
which expressly protects the right to receive information, and to express and disseminate opinions.
1037 I/A Court HR, Reyes v. Chile, Judgment o f September 19, 2006. Series C No. 15, para 76-77; 
E/CN.4/1999/64, 29 January 1999, para 12
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in “information and ideas of all kinds”. This right should therefore enable individuals 
to request and obtain information on states’ treaty obligations and human rights 
policies at the national level, and the international complaints structures to which the 
state has consented. However, it is not clear that there exists an international right of 
access to information analogous to this, which would entail a right to human rights 
information held by inter-governmental organisations. Individuals require this 
information to be provided by these structures if their state is unwilling or unable to 
do so. Access to international human rights information, including that regarding 
obligations and complaints mechanisms to which a particular state has not consented, 
would also enable comparisons of states’ human rights records and enhance the ability 
to campaign for state ratification of human rights treaties.
Individuals and groups clearly have a right to disseminate human rights information, 
as part of the right to freedom of expression through the right to ‘impart’ information. 
The rights of individuals and groups concerning the acquisition and dissemination of 
human rights information is most clearly elaborated in the Declaration on Human 
Rights Defenders; that there is a right to promote human rights at the national and 
international levels1038 and to seek, receive and disseminate human rights 
information.1039 Whilst it must be noted that as a non-binding instrument this does not 
create formal rights, other elements of human rights law confirm the formal status of 
these principles. Resolution 1993/45 of the HR Commission recognised that part of 
the right of freedom of expression is to promote the right itself1040; logically, 
therefore, it should also include the right to promote other human rights, and general 
information about human rights. This indicates that part of the right of freedom of
1038 Article 1
1039 Article 6
1040 Paras. 3 and 12
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expression is a formal right to seek and to disseminate human rights information. The 
Kivenmaa case demonstrated the right of individuals to express opinions on human 
rights as part of the right of freedom of expression,1041 and the right of the media to 
criticize the government1042 also implicitly indicates a right to disseminate 
information about the government’s human rights record.
However, it is unclear to what extent a state may place restrictions on the exercise of 
the right to freedom of expression as it relates to the acquisition and dissemination of 
human rights information. The right of freedom of expression may be restricted by the 
state in order to “respect... the rights and responsibilities of others” or “for the 
protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals”.1043 
The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders contains similar provisions,1044 and also 
emphasizes that the acquisition and dissemination of information concerning human 
rights must be conducted peacefully.1045 Although it would seem difficult for a state to 
demonstrate that the acquisition and dissemination of human rights information 
constituted a threat to public order or national security, states have certainly 
prosecuted and imprisoned human rights activists on these grounds. For example, 
Amnesty International has expressed concern that China is using national legislation 
concerning crimes of “separatism”, “subversion”, “espionage” and “stealing state 
secrets” to detain and imprison human rights activists, and petitioners complaining 
about human rights abuse have been charged with “illegal assembly” or “disturbing
1041 Kivenmaa v Finland (412/90) CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990, 31 March 1994, para 9.3
1042 CCPR/C/79/Add. 106, 8 April 1999, para 22
1043 ICCPR, Article 19(3); see also ECHR Article 10(2), AmCHR, Article 13(2). The AfCHPR protects 
the right to express and disseminate opinions “within the law”.
1044 Article 17
1045 Articles 5 and 12
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social order”.1046 There are also numerous reports of the arrest and imprisonment of 
human rights activists in Iran on charges relating to national security.1047
It is also unclear how far states may restrict the dissemination of human rights
information in relation to ‘public health or morals’. The S. E. T. A. v. Finland case
indicated that the state could legitimately restrict the dissemination of information
concerning homosexuality by reference to public morals.1048 Although this case did
not concern the dissemination of specifically human rights information, it does imply
that the state could prohibit the dissemination of information about the rights of
sexual minorities if national legislation criminalised particular sexual behaviour. Open
Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland1049 concerning the provision of information
to pregnant women concerning travel abroad for an abortion also presents conflicting
interpretations of the level of restriction permissible in relation to public morals. The
European Court stated in this case that
it is appropriate to recall that freedom o f  expression is also applicable to 
"information" or "ideas" that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector o f  the 
population. Such are the demands o f  that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
without w hich there is no "democratic society .1050
This indicates that the provision of human rights information, even if it conflicted 
with certain perspectives on public morals, could be justified. However, the Court 
also notes that it is not illegal within Ireland to travel abroad for an abortion, implying 
that if it were illegal, the provision of such information could be legitimately 
restricted by the state, even through such a limitation could adversely affect a
1046 Amnesty International, 2004: 6
1047 see for example Human Rights First, 2007; FrontLine, 2006
1048 S. E. T. A. v. Finland(R. 14/61), A/37/40, 2 April 1982, 161 at paras. 2.1-2.5, 9.1-9.3, 10.1-10.4, 11
1049 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Application no. 14234/88; 14235/88, 29 October 
1992
1050 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Application no. 14234/88; 14235/88, 29 October 
1992, para 71
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woman’s right to health.1051 The Court also assessed the issue of proportionality,1052 
implying that a proportional limit on the dissemination of information conflicting with 
public morals which would also affect the enjoyment of human rights could be 
acceptable. For example, it is not clear that it would be acceptable to disseminate 
information about certain rights of women or the Optional Protocol to the ICED AW 
in states which assert the supremacy of certain interpretations of Sharia law over the 
provisions of the Covenant.1053
There are thus a number of unresolved issues concerning the content of the right to 
freedom of expression as applied to human rights information. There is a lack of 
specificity concerning the exact nature of the human rights information to which an 
individual is entitled, and whether this extends beyond the national to the international 
level. An individual’s right to disseminate human rights information is clearly not 
absolute. The degree to which the distribution of human rights information may be 
limited by reference to public morals particularly requires clarification. At present, 
despite the lack of directly applicable case law, it appears that a reasonable margin of 
appreciation is applied concerning the particular moral perspective of the state. In 
addition, although restrictions concerning the dissemination of human rights 
information on ground of national security have been heavily criticised,1054 there is a 
paucity of case law on this issue, and the exact extent to which states may limit the 
activities of human rights defenders on these grounds requires further elucidation.
1051 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Application no. 14234/88; 14235/88, 29 October 
1992, para 72. Note that the Court makes no judgement on the question o f a right to an abortion (para 
66 ).
l052Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Application no. 14234/88; 14235/88, 29 October 
1992, para 73-74
1053 See for example the reservations to the ICED AW made by Brunei Darussalam, Mauritania and 
Oman.
1054 Mukongv Cameroon, (458/91), CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, 21 July 1994 Para. 9.7
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There is consequently considerable uncertainty regarding the extent to which 
individuals are entitled to information concerning both state obligations and 
individual complaint mechanisms, and the degree to which they may disseminate such 
information.
2.2.2: States’ obligations concerning the provision of human rights information
Individuals’ right of access to human rights information implies a corresponding 
obligation on the state to provide that information. It is clear that states do have 
obligations concerning the provision of information about human rights. The general 
obligation to promote human rights is found in Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, and all 
of the major human rights treaties make either specific or implicit reference to this in 
their Preambles. However, it is not clear what this general and vague commitment to 
the promotion of human rights actually entails in terms of states’ obligations 
concerning the dissemination of specific information about the content of human 
rights and complaints mechanisms.
The right to education centralises the promotion of human rights. The ICESCR 
identifies that the objective of education is “the full development of the human 
personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”.1055 The purpose of human rights education is 
therefore to both build a universal culture of human rights1056 and to empower 
communities to identify their human rights needs and ensure they are met.1057 States
1055 ICESCR, Article 13(1); CESCR General Comment 13, E/C. 12/1999/10, 8th December 1999, para 
4, see also ICPD Article 24(1 )(a),
1056 A/59/525/Rev.l, 2 March 2005, para. 3
1057 A/59/525/Rev.l, 2 March 2005, para 8(d)
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are consequently obliged to ensure education is aimed at strengthening human 
rights1058 at all levels of the curricula.1059 The Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education has confirmed that “education should be a free space for the exercise and 
study of all human rights, responsibilities and capacities”.1060 These provisions imply 
more specific state obligations concerning the dissemination of information about 
human rights through education, but still do not clearly require that the state should 
provide details of its particular treaty obligations and the complaints mechanisms 
available to individuals.
The ICRC,1061 ICPD1062 and ICMW1063 also contain specific provisions obliging the 
state to publicize information about the Convention and/or state reports, and the 
CEDAW General Recommendation 6 obliges states to “ensure the dissemination of 
the Convention, the reports of the States Parties... and the reports of the 
Committee”.1064 However, the exact obligations concerning how and to what extent a 
state must publicize this information remains unclear, although the ICPD does require 
that the text of the Convention be made available in accessible formats.1065 For 
example, the fulfilment of this obligation through inclusion of these documents on a 
government website is qualitatively different to annually writing to every household 
or commissioning radio or television adverts concerning these issues. Furthermore, 
there is no obligation to disseminate contained within the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR. This indicates a fundamental omission.1066 If individuals are unaware that
1058 Vienna Declaration, part 1 para 33
1059 CESCR General Comment 13, E/C. 12/1999/10, 8th December 1999, para 49.








they have the right to make a complaint concerning violations, and are unaware that a 
structure exists which enables such a complaint, their use of this procedure is likely to 
be reduced. It should be noted that the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, although not 
yet accepted, does oblige state parties to disseminate and make widely known both the 
Covenant and the Protocol.1067 Article 13 of the Optional Protocol to the ICED AW 
imposes a similar obligation. This is a significant improvement, although it remains 
unclear what such dissemination would specifically require of states in practice.
It is thus uncertain whether the obligation to promote or publicize human rights 
requires the proactive dissemination by the state of information regarding both the 
rights to which the individual is entitled and the complaints mechanisms that they 
may access, or if it is limited to the provision of that information on request. This 
distinction is important because individuals will not request information about their 
rights under international law if they do not know that they have such rights. 
Obligations analogous to those found in freedom of information legislation would 
imply that a state would be obliged to provide information concerning its treaty 
obligations and the ways in which individuals could access complaints procedures 
only if that information was requested. Furthermore, it is not clear that a state would 
be obliged to disseminate information concerning treaties to which it is not a party, 
and complaints mechanisms to which it has not consented.
It is apparent that formal rights of participation through access to human rights 
information require significant clarification. Although the right of individuals to 
acquire and disseminate human rights information, and states’ obligations to
1067 Article 16
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disseminate such information both clearly exist, neither the right nor the obligations 
are clearly defined. If states are not required to actively provide information 
concerning human rights obligations and complaints mechanisms, and individuals do 
not have a clear right to seek and distribute that information without arbitrary 
interference from the state, then participation in human rights procedures is 
fundamentally limited, as effective access requires this particular knowledge. The lack 
of clearly-defined formal rights and obligations therefore restricts access to human 
rights complaints structures.
2.2.3: Structural barriers concerning formal access to complaints mechanisms
Whilst rights and obligations concerning access to human rights information remain 
in need of clarification, formal rules concerning individual access to complaints 
mechanisms also constitute significant barriers to participation. There are a number of 
accessibility requirements common to the regional systems and treaty bodies. 
Complaints must not be anonymous,1068 and the complainant must also have 
exhausted available domestic remedies, providing that these are not unduly prolonged 
or unlikely to be effective.1069 Most structures also require that the complaint is not 
pending before another national body,1070 and the regional structures that it is
1068 Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 35(2)(a); AmCHR, Article 46(l)(d); AfCHPR, Article 56(1); 
ICAT, Article 22(2); ICMW, Article 77(2); Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 3; Optional 
Protocol to the ICED AW, Article 3; Optional Protocol to the ICPD, Article 2(a); Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR (not yet in force), Article 3(2)(g)
1069 Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 35(1); AmCHR, Article 46(1 )(a); AfCHPR, Article 56(5); ICAT, 
Article 22(4)(b); ICMW, Article 77 (3)(b); Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Articles 2 and 5(2)(b); 
Optional Protocol to the ICEDAW, Article 4; Optional Protocol to the ICPD, Article 2(d); Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR (not yet in force), Article 3(1)
1070 Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 35(2)(b); AmCHR, Article 46(1 )(c); ICAT, Article 22(4)(a); 
ICMW, Article 77(3)(a); Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 5(2)(a); Optional Protocol to the 
ICEDAW, Article (2)(a); Optional Protocol to the ICPD, Article 2(c); Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR (not yet in force), Article3(2)(c)
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submitted within a reasonable timeframe,1071 specified as six months by the European 
and Inter-American systems.1072 The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR also requires 
that the complaint be submitted within one year after the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, except where this is demonstrably impossible.1073 Whilst these conditions 
may have some negative effect on individual access, they are not particularly onerous, 
provided that they are interpreted with some margin of discretion sympathetic to the 
individual.
However, the fundamental restriction on individuals’ formal rights of access to 
complaints mechanisms is the principle of jurisdiction. In order for an individual to 
bring a complaint before a particular body, that body must have jurisdiction ratione 
materiae: jurisdiction over both the right that has been violated and the state against 
which the complaint is brought. None of the structures before which a complaint can 
be brought have universal jurisdiction regarding either states or rights. The 
jurisdiction of the regional bodies is limited to either state parties to a convention, or 
member states of a regional organisation, as noted above.1074 The jurisdiction of the 
treaty bodies is subject to state consent, both to the relevant treaty and to a particular 
structure for individual complaint. This means that individual access to these bodies is 
inevitably partial.
The nature of the complaint which may be brought is also limited. Those treaty bodies 
which provide for an individual complaints mechanism can only hear complaints 
relating to the specific rights in the relevant treaty. For example, complaints can only
1071 AfCHPR, Article 56(6)
1072 Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 35(1); AmCHR, Article 46(1 )(b)
1073 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (not yet in force), Article 3(2)(a)
1074 Chapter 4, section 2.1.
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be brought before the HRC regarding violations of the rights contained in the ICCPR 
by individuals whose state has ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.1075 This 
structure is repeated for the other treaty bodies; the CAT may only consider violations 
of the ICAT by individuals whose states have ratified it,1076 and so on. Similarly, the 
European Court can only hear claims relating to the violation of rights contained in
1 0 77the ECHR and the Inter-American Commission claims concerning violations of 
the American Declaration and the AmCHR.1078 This indicates significant disparities 
concerning individual access to human rights structures regarding the nature of the 
complaint. The exception here is the African Court, whose jurisdiction extends to the 
AfCHPR, the Protocol establishing the Court, and “any other relevant Human Rights 
instrument ratified by the States concerned”,1079 thus giving this body potentially far 
greater scope concerning the nature of the complaints which may be brought.1080 It 
must be remembered, though, that the jurisdiction of the African Court is subject to 
state consent, so whilst it may hear complaints concerning a wider range of human 
rights instruments, its jurisdiction is still limited to state parties.
The principle of jurisdiction also limits the extent to which states can be held 
responsible for their actions, as states generally only hold human rights obligations to 
those within their jurisdiction.1081 Thus, if a complaints procedure exists, only those 
individuals within a state’s jurisdiction can make use of it. Those individuals outside 
the state’s jurisdiction whose enjoyment of their rights is affected by the actions of the
1075 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 1
1076 Article 22(1)
1077 Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 32(1)
1078 Statute o f the Inter-American Commission, Articles 19 and 20
1079 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment o f an African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 3(1)
1080 The Inter-American Court has interpreted its advisory jurisdiction to extend to other human rights 
instruments (see Advisory Opinion 1, OC-1/182, Series A 1, 24/9/82); this is not however, a means of 
individual complaint, and individuals cannot request an advisory opinion (AmCHR, Article 64).
1081 For example, see ICCPR, Article 2(1); ICAT, Article 2(1); ICRC, Article 2(1); ICMW, Article 7
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state have no structure to which they can bring a complaint. This was demonstrated in 
the Bankovic case, when the European Court ruled that the complaint was
inadmissible because the victims did not come within the jurisdiction of the
1082 • • respondent states. The test for establishing whether a state does have jurisdiction,
and consequently whether it has extra-territorial human rights obligations concerning
particular individuals, has received justified criticism.1083 In addition, although the
concept of extra-territorial obligations implies an extension of states’ jurisdiction so
that individuals should be able to bring a complaint regarding the extra-territorial
effects of actions of that state, as yet there is no structure of individual complaint
which may be used concerning the violation of extraterritorial obligations.1084
Formal rules concerning jurisdiction therefore constitute an intrinsic limitation on 
individual access to human rights structures. In order to have access to a complaints 
mechanism, an individual must be within the jurisdiction of a state which has 
consented to the jurisdiction of the relevant body, and has ratified the treaty 
concerning the right that has been violated. Crucially, the individual has no means to 
participate in determining whether a particular body may hear a complaint either 
concerning a particular state or concerning a specific right. Nor can the individual 
determine whether they are within the jurisdiction of the state which has violated their 
rights.
Consequently, formal structures of access to justice as a means of participation in 
human rights for individuals are partial and varied, rather than universal and inclusive,
1082 Bankovic and others v Belgium and others, Application no. 52207/99, 12 December 2001, para 82.
1083 Gibney, 2008: 65-78
1084 See Gibney (2008, 121-123) for discussion o f potential structures for individual complaints 
concerning extra-territorial obligations.
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because individual access is dependent on jurisdiction which is subject to state 
consent. There are major gaps in protection for individuals, and huge discrepancies 
concerning the availability of structures to which an individual may bring a 
complaint. For example, an individual in France or Germany whose right to a fair trial 
has been violated may make a complaint either under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, or bring a case before the European Court. An individual in the UK suffering 
the same violation can only bring a complaint to the European Court, as the UK has 
not ratified the Optional Protocol; therefore the HRC has no jurisdiction to hear the 
complaint. An individual in Cambodia cannot bring a complaint before any 
international body, as Cambodia is not party to the Optional Protocol and there is no 
alternative regional structure. An individual in China arguably does not have the right 
to fair trial at all, because China is not a party to the ICCPR and therefore has no 
obligations concerning this right.1085
NGOs’ formal rights of participation in these human rights structures are limited in 
comparison to those regarding standard-setting, and are accurately described as “ad- 
hoc and indirect”.1086 Most importantly, there is little opportunity for NGOs to enable 
individual participation beyond that allowed for individuals themselves. NGOs do 
have more extensive formal rights of participation than individuals concerning the 
treaty body1087 or Charter-based1088 monitoring procedures. However, these rights do
1085 The right to fair trial as a principle o f the UDHR could be contended to represent customary law, 
which would impose obligations on China. However, there is no international mechanism accessible to 
individuals before which a complaint regarding violation of this customary right could be brought.
1086 Breen, 2005: 109
1087 Different bodies provide for varying degrees of NGO participation, and the modalities o f NGO 
participation are usually found in the Rules of Procedure rather than the treaty itself. The CMW 
(A74(6) of the ICMW and Rule 28), CESCR (Rule 69.1), CAT (rule 62) and the CEDAW (Rule 47) 
allow NGOs to provide written information; the CEDAW (Rule 47) and CESCR (Rule 69.2 and 69.3) 
also allow them to make oral presentations to the Committee and pre-sessional working groups. The 
CRC (Rule 70) and the CPD (ICPD, Article 38(a)) may invite “competent bodies” to provide expert 
advice regarding the implementation o f the Convention. The CAT may obtain information from NGOs
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not relate to processes of individual complaint, and therefore are not a means by 
which formal NGO participation can enhance individual participation Similarly, 
whilst participation via amicus briefs, especially by NGOs, is an effective substitute 
for direct intervention given the limitations on non-state actors’ legal standing under 
international law,1089 such participation is not a formal right, being limited by the 
discretion of the court concerned,1090 and is not a form of individual complaint. Whilst 
NGOs have the formal right to bring cases in their own right under the African and 
American systems, the same rules of jurisdiction apply as to individuals: NGOs could 
not bring a case concerning violation by a non-state party. In consequence, NGOs’ 
formal rights of participation in human rights structures do little to extend individual 
access to human rights complaints mechanisms.
Informal participation by NGOs does however enhance the potential for individuals to
make a complaint regarding violations of human rights. NGO participation can enable
individuals to make use of a range of informal accountability mechanisms, and
thereby to complain about violations without the need for the formal right to bring a
case. NGOs constitute a potential means to hold states accountable for their actions
without the requirement of formal obligations. Although formal obligations are
required for a formal process of complaint to be available, NGOs
contribute to establishing a com m unicative process whereby the conduct o f  states is 
no longer assessed in terms o f  acting in conformity with international binding rules, 
but by a much less formal code according to which the legality o f  their behaviour
and individuals in relation to the inquiry procedure under Article 20 of the ICAT (Rule 76.4), and the 
CEDAW may do this in relation to the inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the ICEDAW 
(Rule 83).
1088 NGOs have some entitlements to participate through the provision o f information under the 1503 
procedure (Bianchi, 1997: 189), and can also provide information to the Special Procedures mandate 
holders.
1089 Bianchi, 1997: 187
1090 Bartholomeuz, 2005: 276
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largely depends on its being consistent with some basic understanding o f  human 
values the respect o f  w hich is perceived to be fundamental.1091
It is therefore possible for individuals to complain, through NGOs, about the conduct 
of their state concerning violations of human rights even if these form part of a treaty 
to which a state has not consented. For example, Amnesty International highlights and 
criticises violations of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion by 
China, even though China is not a party to the ICCPR in which these rights are 
contained. Its 2008 Report provides information concerning abuse of these rights at 
both the general and individual levels.1092 Other NGOs have criticised Iran regarding 
the protection of the rights of women, although Iran is a party neither to the ICEDAW 
nor its Optional Protocol.1093 NGOs thus provide informal means of individual 
complaint in the absence of formal obligations or access to formal procedures. Whilst 
these are more indirect methods of complaint, they may still be effective. For 
example, the ‘Urgent Action’ campaigns organised by Amnesty International are 
contended to have contributed to the release of various prisoners of conscience.1094 
Informal lobbying and campaigns by NGOs can also enhance the potential for 
effective forms of complaint at the national level. As one interviewee confirmed, 
“they [the victims] come to a situation where they feel some international pressure 
could be helpful...to get the issue on the national agenda”.1095 NGO participation 
enables expanded opportunities for informal modes of individual complaint.
Bianchi, 1997: 190
1092 Amnesty International, 2008a
|  AO'S
Human Rights Watch, 2008
1094 Amnesty International, 2008b
1095 ID 10, 13/12/07
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2.3: The limits on direct individual participation in complaints mechanisms
The centrality of state participation discussed in section 2.1 also has a major effect on 
how far individuals can directly access human rights. Firstly, direct individual 
participation in determining the content and applicability of obligations is clearly 
limited. Chapter 3 demonstrated that individual participation in law-making and 
therefore in the content of obligations is minimal, and in consequence that such 
participation relies on representation by states and NGOs. The discussion in section 
1.1 above has demonstrated that participation in decisions regarding the applicability 
of obligations also excludes direct individual participation. Individuals cannot select 
the rights that protect them, as ratification is a matter for the state, at times potentially 
influenced by NGOs. Individual participation in determining the applicability of 
obligations is therefore predominantly through representative forms.
In addition, some avenues for complaint reflect representative forms of participation, 
rather than direct access by individuals. In those structures where individuals cannot 
bring claims, any complaint concerning violations of individuals’ rights must be 
brought by the state. Crucially, such complaints are structured around violations of the 
complainant state’s interest by the violator state, rather than focussing on the ways in 
which the individual’s rights have been violated. In both the Avena1096 and Tehran 
Hostages1097 cases complaints concerning the violation of the rights of individuals 
were asserted in terms of the violation of international legal obligations owed to 
states. In such cases, the individual is a passive participant, and is reliant on their 
interests being represented by the state. The state and its interests becomes the central
1096 ICJ, Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States o f  America), 
Judgement o f 31 March 2004, para. 12(1)
1097 ICJ, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States o f  
America v. Iran), Judgement o f 24 May 1980, para. 8(a)
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participant in the case, despite the complaint being in response to violation of an 
individual’s human rights. Furthermore, the decision to initiate the case rests with the 
state, rather than the individual, in accordance with the “classic concept of diplomatic 
protection as a discretionary power of a State to make an international claim on behalf 
of its injured national on the basis that an injury to its national is an injury to it”.1098 
The state is under no obligation to make a complaint, as “diplomatic protection 
remains the prerogative of the state to be exercised at its discretion”1099 and the 
decision to do so is subject to political rather than humanitarian considerations.1100 
The individual is reduced to a passive object, rather than being the central subject and 
active participant in the case. Such structures consequently reflect both representative 
and passive forms of individual participation.
Nevertheless, there are some opportunities for direct participation by individuals in 
human rights accountability structures. Expert individuals may participate in certain 
bodies through amicus briefs; for example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone sought 
submissions from two prominent international lawyers regarding the question of the 
immunity of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, from prosecution.1101 
Individual amicus submissions are, though, usually from experts. The exception is the 
European Court, whose practice indicates that it allows participation by persons other 
than the applicant with a clear interest in the proceedings, as well as amicus 
submissions from legal or factual experts.1102 In general such forms of direct 
individual participation are analogous to that found in law-making; participation by an
1098 Bartholomuez, 2005: 216; see also Mavromatis Palestine Concessions case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 
1924, para. 12
1099 Constitutional Court o f South Africa, Kaunda v. President of South Africa, CCT 23/04, Judgement 
of 4 August 2004, para. 29
1100 Kamminga, 1992: 57
1101 Bartholomew, 2005: 253-254
1102 Bartholomew, 2005: 236-240
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elite rather than being general and inclusive. Fundamentally, this does not constitute 
a mode of individual participation in response to a violation, but a means for a Court 
to seek specific advice and information.
Direct individual participation is also obviously reflected in those structures that are 
directly accessible to individuals. As noted above, almost all of the major human 
rights treaties provide for an individual complaint procedure1103 and individuals may 
also bring cases before most of the regional mechanisms. By bringing a case before an 
international or regional body, the individual is actively and directly engaging with 
their rights, through asserting them via a complaints mechanism. As McGoldrick 
notes in the context of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the concept of individual 
complaint was “revolutionary” because it recognised the individual as a proper 
subject of international law;1104 an active entity acting in their own interests. When 
bringing a complaint, individuals are participating directly and on their own behalf. 
Consequently, there is considerable potential for direct individual participation 
through having access to complaints mechanisms. However, as noted, this access is 
fundamentally restricted by state consent, and individuals are unable to actively and 
directly participate in determining whether they are able to have access to these 
procedures.
It is clear that direct individual access to human rights accountability mechanisms is 
limited. Certain structures are reliant on representation by the state as they do not 
allow for individual participation. Those structures which do reflect direct individual
1103 Chapter 4, section 2.1.
1104 McGoldrick, 1991: 198
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access are subject to state consent.1105 Yet human rights law is intended as a means by 
which individuals are protected by setting limits on the action of the state. It is 
therefore inherently contradictory for decisions concerning the extent to which 
individuals can participate directly to be taken by the state, or for the individual to be 
reliant on the state to make a complaint on their behalf, as this subsumes individual 
interests to those of the state. As Bianchi identifies, states may be reluctant to trigger 
human rights accountability mechanisms which may later backfire on them.1106 For 
example, although most human rights treaties provide for an inter-State complaint 
procedure,1107 these have rarely been used. The procedures under the ICAT and 
ICCPR have never been used.1108 The use of such procedures would be considered a 
politically hostile act,1109 and consequently States have avoided opening what Alston 
has termed a “Pandora’s box”.1110 This demonstrates the danger in reliance upon 
structures of complaint which are dependent on state action.
Unlike participation in law-making, NGOs’ representative role is minimal. There are 
some ways in which NGO representation can extend individual access; for example 
one interviewee described bringing a case in the name of the NGO because it would 
be dangerous for the victims to have their names on it.1111 However, in general NGO 
representation does not substantially increase individual access, because although 
NGOs may represent a victim, this is only in forums where individuals also have a 
right to bring a complaint. Whilst NGOs can bring a case in their own right under the
1105 The exception is the complaints procedure under the Charter mechanisms; however the extent to 
which this reflects direct participation via access to a complaints mechanism is limited as it is not 
directed towards an individualised remedy.
1106 Bianchi, 1997: 190
Chapter 4, section 2.1.
1108 Arambulo, 1999: 183
1109 Arambulo, 1999: 183-184
1110 E/C. 12/1996/CRP.2/Add.l, 1996, para 12
" ID 25, 03/12/07
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African and American systems, individuals also have access to these systems. It is of 
value however to note that NGOs may bring such cases without the consent of the 
victim or their family,1112 which could result in passive forms of participation.
NGOs’ participatory role is more greatly oriented to enabling direct individual access 
than to representing individual concerns. NGOs assist individual access to complaints 
mechanisms primarily through providing general information concerning the 
existence and structures of complaints procedures, and also through providing free 
legal advice and representation, as further discussed below.1113 Whilst NGO 
participation in this way constitutes assistance to victims rather than representation of 
victims, there may still be an unequal power relationship between the victim and the 
NGO, which can translate into how the case is pursued. As identified in Chapter 3, 
NGOs use strategic litigation to put certain issues onto the regional or international 
agenda. This could potentially lead to the case being developed in a manner which the 
victim did not support. This was identified by one interviewee, who described how 
various organisations had taken over a case on reproductive rights, to the extent where 
the woman concerned had completely lost control.1114 In addition, it may be hard for 
the victim to follow the case; as one interviewee identified “the problem obviously is 
that litigation is complicated... sometimes the legal arguments...are very difficult, so 
its quite difficult for some of the clients who aren’t necessarily legally literate to 
really understand what’s going on”.1115 Furthermore, although NGOs may work on 
cases, they may not have direct contact with the victims, as they work with local
1112 Odinkalu. 1998: 378-379
1113 Chapter 4, section 3.3.
1114 ID 25, 03/12/07
1,15 ID 25, 03/12/07
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lawyers who present the case.1116 They then have an indirect relationship with the 
victim, and it is likely that this means that the victim has less input into the way the 
case is developed than if there was a direct relationship with the NGO.
However, several NGOs described their case work as oriented around the desires of 
the victim: one stated “to our mind the victim is always in charge of what happens in 
each case”,1117 others that “when we do a case, we always look at the demands of the 
victims... we always ask the victims if they want [the organisation] to intervene”,1118 
and “we do not take any case that has not been specifically requested.. .from us, so we 
only investigate cases that were reported to us either by the people who were directly 
affected... or from people who work with them directly”.1119 Another interviewee 
considered that it was “absolutely vital [that] the community understands the case; 
that any decisions/negotiations represent their views”.1120 This indicates recognition 
from the NGO community of the need to include the victim as fully as possible in the 
process, and consequently of the importance of the victim having direct participation 
in the development of their case.
2.4: Levels of participation: international rights of access?
Individuals need to be able to make a complaint regarding violation of their rights at 
the international level. This is of particular importance as the state is usually the 
violator of individual rights; therefore, the individual needs access to accountability 
mechanisms beyond the level of the state in order for their rights to be protected. It is
11,6 See for example ID 24, 15/11/07
1117 ID 25 ,03/12/07
1118 ID 10, 13/12/07
1119 ID 35, 22/01/08
1,20 ID 9, 17/10/07
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essential that individuals have access to international complaints procedures, which 
“allow individuals to seek redress against their own government if national remedies 
have failed them -  a consideration that is especially valid in countries where the 
administration of justice in is crisis or the judiciary lacks independence”.1121 The 
importance of such structures was also identified by one interviewee as being in 
“circumstances when there is absolutely no chance of bringing cases at home. People 
then have got no possibility of agitating for change within the country itself’.1122 As 
De Waart observes, the effectiveness of international supervision of human rights 
depends on the capacity of rights bearers to bring international claims.1123 It is 
therefore vital that individuals are able to access international structures of complaint.
However, the right of access to justice does not extend beyond the level of the state. 
Where a right o f access to justice is provided for in a human rights treaty, the right 
extends downwards from the level of the state; it does not provide a right of access to 
international mechanisms. There is no right of access to international complaints 
mechanisms, and no state obligations to enable such access. International access 
remains conditional upon state consent, and is therefore preferential rather than 
obligatory for the state concerned. For example, an individual has no right to demand 
that they should have the right of complaint to a treaty body if their state has not 
accepted the respective procedure. This means that the individual has no international 
right to bring a complaint against their state regarding abuse.
1121 Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 69-70
1122 ID 3, 18/10/07
1123 De Waart, 1995: 52
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2.5: Discussion
The analysis in section 1 has shown that the principle of state consent fundamentally 
restricts individual access to and therefore participation in human rights mechanisms. 
States clearly dominate modes of participation concerning both the applicability of 
obligations and access to structures of complaint regarding human rights. There are 
several structures from which individuals, and NGOs, are completely excluded, yet to 
which states have access. In addition, individuals are generally unable to participate in 
determining whether they have access to human rights structures. There is no right of 
access to international complaints mechanisms; rather, access is dependent on state 
consent. Furthermore, where individuals are excluded from participation, they are 
reliant on the state to make a complaint on their behalf.
This leads to a number of contradictions to the types o f participation identified as 
appropriate for human rights in Chapter 1. Firstly, human rights requires universal 
participation, and therefore universal access to complaints mechanisms. However, 
access to individual complaints structures is inherently partial, due to the necessity for 
state consent both to human rights obligations for which it may be held responsible, 
and to the mechanisms which would enable individuals to hold it accountable. In 
consequence, there are significant disparities of access and thus protection. This 
results from the lack of a universal right of access to international human rights 
complaints mechanisms.
Examination of individual access to human rights structures thus illustrates an 
essential contradiction within human rights. Chapter 1 identified that structures of 
participation in human rights should centralise the protection of the individual and the
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advancement of individual interests. However, state dominance in determining the 
applicability of obligations and accessibility of complaints mechanisms clearly 
contradicts this. Human rights are intended as a means by which limits are placed on 
state behaviour towards individuals, yet states retain control of the applicability of the 
means by which they may be held accountable. Modes of participation regarding 
access to human rights structures therefore do not demonstrate the orientation to 
empowerment required by human rights.
The lack of individual participating in decision-making concerning their opportunities 
for access to international human rights furthermore conflicts with the requirement 
that the individual have meaningful influence over matters which affect them. The 
individual cannot participate meaningfully and effectively in international human 
rights law if their access to complaint mechanisms is dependent on states, because 
they have no control over the processes.
Finally, structures of access to human rights mechanisms do not enable participation 
above the level of the state. This was identified as essential in Chapter 1 to ensure that 
the individual is not reliant on the state for the protection of their rights. The purpose 
of human rights is to give the individual protection beyond the level of the state. 
However, the analysis demonstrated that both individual rights and the corresponding 
obligations of states concerning access to human rights information require 
clarification. The result o f this ambiguity is that formal rights of access are 
incomplete, as there is no clear right of access to information at the international level. 
Neither is there a right of access to international complaints mechanisms as access is
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dependent on state consent. This fails to reflect the type of participation required by 
human rights and results in a lack of vital protection for the individual.
Although participation in human rights as manifested in access to complaints 
mechanisms does not generally reflect the forms of participation most appropriate for 
human rights, there is one area where it goes some way towards providing acceptable 
types of participation. Where individuals have access to human rights complaints 
structures, a form of direct participation is found which was almost entirely lacking 
from the modes of participation examined in relation to human rights law-making. 
Bringing a complaint against a state is an important way for the individual to directly 
engage with human rights, thus bypassing the state, and, moreover, is an active 
assertion of their rights. But it must be reiterated that the opportunity for the 
individual to participate in this way is subject to state consent. The individual has no 
prospects for direct participation in determining whether particular complaints 
mechanisms are available, which would then enable this direct form of participation. 
Although there is informal NGO participation in determining the applicability of 
obligations and state acceptance of the jurisdiction of the various complaints 
mechanisms, this does not constitute direct individual participation, but rather 
participation through representation. Those structures to which the individual does not 
have access reflect an inherently representative and passive model of individual 
participation. It is important for the individual to participate directly in complaints 
structures because it is their rights that have been violated, and they who have 
suffered the harm, violence or degradation as a result. An injury to state interest is not 
the same as a violation of individual rights.
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It is of value to note that human rights complaints structures offer far greater 
opportunity for individual participation than other structures of international law, 
from which access to individual complaints mechanisms is entirely absent. Whilst 
such structures do not reflect the level and forms of participation ideally required by 
human rights, they do offer the potential for development.
Part 3: The feasibility o f participation: practical barriers to access
Section 2 has discussed the legal and structural barriers to individual participation in 
human rights through access to complaints mechanisms. It has shown that 
opportunities for individual access are limited in comparison to those of states, and 
are fundamentally restricted by the principle of state consent. This section will now 
consider the two main practical factors which affect individuals’ ability to make use 
of these structures: lack of access to information, and lack of resources. It will also 
examine NGOs’ role in enhancing individual access through overcoming these 
barriers to participation.
3.1: The role of information, education and knowledge in access to human rights 
mechanisms
Access to information has been identified as a fundamental factor affecting 
participation in human rights, as it enables the individual to become aware of and to 
claim their rights. It is essential for people to be able to make informed decisions 
about their rights,1124 and also strengthens mechanisms to hold governments
1124 Callamard, 2006: 8
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accountable for their promises, obligations and actions.1125 The ability to access 
information and make use of complaints mechanisms is therefore dependent both on 
the availability of and the ability to make use of knowledge regarding human rights.
Two forms of human rights knowledge are fundamental to enable access to human 
rights structures. Firstly, the individual must be aware that they have rights and of the 
procedures for the protection of these rights. One interviewee identified the 
importance that “the victims themselves have a clear understanding of human rights, 
and refer to human rights, learn to use human rights, which is far from natural, 
unfortunately”.1126 As Niemi and Scheinin note, if people are not aware of the 
existence of the system they do not use it.1127 Access to information about human 
rights therefore enables individuals to hold states accountable, as it provides them 
with knowledge regarding both their individual rights and what means are available to 
hold the state responsible for its actions. As one interviewee identified, “there is a 
right to assert your rights...it’s as much about raising people’s awareness that they do 
have these rights”.1128
Secondly, specific knowledge is required to enable individuals to make use of the 
human rights mechanisms available. International human rights law is a specialised 
subject, and as such knowledge regarding its existence and practices is not 
widespread. It uses particular terminology, and has complex and contested principles. 
For effective participation in human rights structures, expert knowledge is required 
regarding the content of rights, the structure of the law and the requirements of
1125 Callamard 2006: 7
1126 ID 10, 13/12/07
1127 Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 45-46
1128 ID 24, 15/11/07
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complaints mechanisms concerning the issues of obligations, consent, complaint and 
jurisdiction. As Sohn identifies, there is a multiplicity of obligations within 
international human rights law, encompassing the UDHR, the first two covenants, and 
subsequent declarations and covenants.1129 This results in a multi-layered and 
confusing system, which in turn reduces its accessibility to the average individual. As 
one interviewee identified, “what we do is so complicated... most lawyers don’t 
understand what we do let alone the victims themselves who are not legally 
trained...so it becomes more difficult for everyone to understand”.1130 Another 
considered the level of information itself as a problem; “[a] big issue... is just the 
amount o f information that’s coming, and trying to keep on top of it. It’s a very fast
• • 1131moving environment”.
Education is consequently fundamental in enabling participation through access to 
human rights structures. As recognised in the ICESCR Article 13 (1), the purpose of 
education is to “enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society”.1132 
Education is identified both as a right of itself and a means to realise other human 
rights,1133 including rights which enable participation. Education is essential for 
access to human rights mechanisms for several reasons. It equips the individual with 
the tools required to seek, receive and impart information. It provides the knowledge 
required to understand and to make use of human rights provisions and protections. 
For example, a great deal of information about human rights law and accountability 
mechanisms is available in written form, primarily via the internet. The individual 
must therefore be literate in order to access and make use of such information. In
1129 Sohn, 1979: 188
1130 ID 25 ,03 /12 /07
1131 ID 50 ,29/01/08
1132 See also CESCR, General Comment 13, E /C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999, para 1
1133 CESCR, General Comment 13, E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999, para 1; Tomasevski, 2003: 1
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addition, to make a written complaint, as required by, for example, the HRC and the 
CEDAW,1134 literacy is required. The illiteracy of victims has been identified as a 
barrier to the use of individual complaints mechanisms.1135 These knowledge 
requirements for access complaints mechanisms may therefore potentially exclude a 
number of groups: those with little or no education, the illiterate, or the mentally 
disabled.
Furthermore, it is clear that there are significant barriers to the universal enjoyment of
the right to education, resulting from economic, social and political factors. These
particularly affect already vulnerable groups.1136 As recognised in the 2006 report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Expression, reporting on the
implementation of the right to access to information, even where national access to
information legislation is in force, marginalised or excluded groups may still have
difficulties in practice in requesting and receiving information.1137 The additional
problems faced by vulnerable groups in accessing human rights information is also
reflected in the Decade of Human Rights Education Plan of Action which states
Special emphasis shall be given in human rights education activities under the 
Decade to the human rights of women, children, the aged, minorities, refugees, 
indigenous peoples, persons in extreme poverty, persons with HTV infection or AIDS 
and other vulnerable groups.1138
These comments reflect the further problem that while access to information and to 
justice may be protected in national and international instruments, the social and 
economic status of certain groups may hinder their ability to access information
1134 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 2; Optional Protocol to the ICED AW, Article 3. This is 
also required by the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (not yet in force), Article 3(2)(g).
1135 Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 39
1136 This problem is reflected in emphasis within human rights instruments on the protection o f  the right 
of access to information for particular groups; see for example the DRD, Article 12, ICPD, Article 9(1) 
(b).
1137 E/CN.4/2005/64, 17 December 2004, para. 37
1138
A /51/506/Add. 1, 12 December 1996, para. 23
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concerning their human rights. For example, gender discrimination which prevents 
girls from attending school1139 results in their lacking the ability to access information 
about their rights, and thus to complain in case of violation. Dissemination of human 
rights information via education only in the majority language may inhibit cultural 
minorities from accessing it.1140 A lack of education restricts the ability to access and 
make use of information about human rights, and constitutes a significant barrier to 
the accessibility of complaints mechanisms for individuals, particularly those 
vulnerable groups who are in most need of protection.
3.2: The effect of economic status and resources on access to human rights 
structures
Economic status is a further fundamental factor in influencing the extent to which the 
individual is able to access human rights mechanisms. Firstly, the financial resources 
available to the individual affect their ability to access these mechanisms due to the 
need in some cases to provide counsel in order to access international human rights 
accountability structures. Whilst legal council may not be a statutory requirement for 
access, it is a practical necessity for those who, as noted above, may struggle to 
understand and make use of the complexities of the protection mechanisms 
concerning international human rights. Legal aid may therefore be required to enable 
access to justice for those who cannot afford legal advice or representation. Whilst 
several human rights instruments require states to provide legal assistance to all 
including legal aid if required,1141 without discrimination,1142 this applies solely on the
1139 E/CN.4/2005/50, 17 December 2004, paras. 73-84, 132
1140 E/CN.4/2005/50, 17 December 2004, para. 90
1141ICCPR, Article 14(3)(d); ICRC, Article 27(d), Article 40(2)(b)(ii); ICMW, Article 18(3)(d). See 
also CESCR General Comment 7, 20 May 1997, para 15(h)
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national level. There does not appear to be a requirement for states to provide legal 
aid for applicants to bring a complaint at the international level. The majority of the 
regional judicial mechanisms have no legal aid facility, with the European system the 
only exception;1143 applicants to the African and American systems must finance their 
own travel and representation costs, although the African Court may provide free 
legal representation.1144 The lack of availability of financial resources thus constitutes 
a major barrier to access to judicial structures. However, non- or quasi-judicial UN 
treaty body mechanisms require few financial resources for the individual to make a 
complaint, as they do not require representation in person but rather written 
communication. Financial resources therefore represent less of a barrier to access for 
non-judicial proceedings. Despite this, Niemi and Scheinin identify lack of financial 
resources as a barrier to use of treaty body mechanisms by individuals in developing
1145countries.
The socio-economic status of the individual also affects their ability to access human 
rights structures by influencing the amount of time that they are able to use to do so. 
As one interviewee identified, “international litigation, it goes on forever”.1146 This 
entails significant commitment from the individual. Consideration of a 
communication by the HRC commonly averages four to five years.1147 Consideration 
of complaints within the European system can be a particularly lengthy process, 
especially given that the Court in 2005 had a backlog of around 27,000 cases which
1142 HRC General Comment 28, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.lO, 28 March 2000, para. 18; CERD General 
Recommendation 29, 1 November 2002; para.21
1143 Butler, 2007: 105
1144 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment o f  an African 
Court o f  Human and Peoples’ Rights Article 10(2)
1145 Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 50
1146 ID 25, 03/12/07
1147 Schmidt, 1992: 648; Bayefsky, 2001: 25
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have exceeded the required time limits for processing, and that this is expected to 
increase.1148 Regarding access to information, the individual must again have the time 
available to find information and to assimilate it, even before they may be able to act 
upon it. This is compounded by the requirement common to all individual complaints 
procedures that domestic remedy must have been exhausted prior to the instigation of 
an international complaint.1149 This adds to both the time and the resources burdens on 
the individual.1150
Secondly, financial factors, essentially income, influence the degree to which the 
individual is able to access sources of human rights information. As Callamard 
observes “it is those communities most affected by poverty which are least able to 
impart and obtain information, especially relating to basic services”.1151 
Consequently, reduced access to information resulting from poverty affects the 
individual’s ability to participate in human rights mechanisms as it affects the extent 
to which they may access information about the existence and workings of these 
structures. Poorer communities have greater difficulties in accessing human rights 
information for a number of reasons. A fundamental barrier to the ability to access 
information is lack of education, as discussed above. If the individual is not literate, 
they are unable to access much human rights information which is provided in written 
form.
In addition, a great deal of human rights information is provided via the internet. For 
example, the website of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights contains
1148 Woolf, 2005: 49
1149 Chapter 4, section 2.2.3.
1150 Niemi and Scheinin, 2002: 50
1151 Callamard, 2006: 8
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details of all human rights instruments and complaints mechanisms. Similar 
information is provided by NGO websites.1152 If this information is not provided by 
the state, this can be a useful form of individual access. As recognised in the United 
Nations Development Programme Report 2001 “The Internet, the wireless telephone 
and other information and communications technology enable people to communicate 
and obtain information in ways never before possible, dramatically opening up 
possibilities to participate in decisions that affect their lives”.1153 However, access to 
and therefore use of communications technology remains unequal both within and 
between states. This ‘digital divide’ -  “the uneven diffusion of information and 
communications technology”1154 - results in inequalities of access to information. For 
example, around 2 billion people do not have access to electricity;1155 they therefore 
will not have access to the internet.1156 Access to the internet furthermore requires a 
level of income which enables the purchase of a computer and funding an internet 
connection. The level of resources available to the individual thus directly impinges 
on their ability to access human rights information, which in turn affects access to 
complaints mechanisms.
3.3: The role of NGOs in overcoming practical barriers to access
Access to information and the availability of resources have been identified as two
major practical barriers to individual access to complaints mechanisms. However,
NGOs play a vital role in enabling individuals to overcome these restrictions. Firstly,
1152 See for example International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims 
http://www.irct.org/Default.aspx?ID=67, International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, 
http://www.iglhrc.org/files/iglhrc/Fact%20Sheet%20- 
%20Individual%20Complaints%20Mechanisms.doc
1153 United Nations Development Programme, 2001: 2
1154 United Nations Development Programme, 2001: 38
1155 United Nations Development Programme, 2001: 42
1156 Schemes for the distribution o f wind-up laptops, which could help to overcome this problem, are 
being developed. See Twist, 2005.
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NGO participation is hugely important in enabling individual access to human rights 
mechanisms through the provision of information. NGOs provide information about 
both the content of rights and the structures of complaint available and how to use 
them. Some international NGOs provide basic information on human rights to a broad 
community, distinct from thematic or country reports.1157 Wedgewood highlights 
NGOs’ role of ‘intermediation’; explaining UN documents to a wider public.1158 For 
example, the ‘Every Human Has Rights’ campaign provides more information about 
the various rights contained in the UDHR,1159 Amnesty International has produced a 
video about these rights to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Declaration1160 and 
FrontLine have produced a manual for human rights defenders on the use of 
international and regional mechanisms for the protection of civil and political 
rights.1161
NGO reports also greatly contribute to the dissemination of human rights 
1 1information. For example, both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
provide annual human rights reports. The provision of basic information and the 
development of more detailed and specific reports are forms of NGO participation 
which inform people both that they have rights, and what those rights include. As one 
interviewee identified, “the question is that sometimes they don’t know they have the 
rights” (sic).1163 The role of NGOs in providing information about the obligations 
undertaken by state is crucial in enabling individuals to hold them accountable for 
those undertakings, as recognised by one interviewee: ’’it’s a long way from home to
1157 Steiner, 1991:46




1162 Bianchi, 1997: 188
1163 ID 35, 22/01/08
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Geneva...and governments can do whatever they like here and no-one would ever 
know. So part of what we do is that the governments are accountable back home for 
the actions that the representatives take in Geneva”.1164 In addition, NGOs play a 
major role in facilitating individual complaints through making the procedures 
known.1165 It has been contended that individuals in states which are more greatly 
embedded in civil society have a greater awareness of their rights and how to claim 
them,1166 indicating the importance of NGOs in enabling individual participation 
through access to information.
Secondly, NGOs can help to overcome the resource constraints which limit individual 
access. NGOs can assist with the costs of legal advice and representation in a number 
of ways. NGOs may bring cases directly before the African and American 
Commissions, thus removing the need for the victim to commit any resources. The 
complaints procedure before the African Commission has mainly been used by NGOs 
rather than individuals.1167 NGOs may also provide direct financial assistance. For 
example, the International Commission of Jurists Access to Justice Initiative offers up 
to $3000 to selected NGOs to help with litigation costs concerning human rights cases 
in Africa, in order to help overcome the problem of a lack of free legal advice and 
representation for victims.1168 NGOs also directly provide legal expertise and/or 
representation to the victim. For example, the NGO COFIRE provides free legal 
advice to individuals, communities and other NGOs,1169 and the NGO Interights 
provided legal advice to the victim in Tysiqc v Poland, brought before the European
1164 ID 3, 18/10/07
1165 Brett, 1995: 103





Cout in 2007.1170 They enable access to human rights mechanisms by assisting 
victims or other NGOs with submissions to the appropriate accountability
1171structure. They may also support and/or train local lawyers to bring human rights 
cases both at the domestic and regional or international levels.1172 All of these 
activities, through enhancing the legal expertise available to the victim, can help to 
overcome the need for the victim to pay for legal counsel, and can therefore help to 
overcome the lack of legal aid available at the international level.
3.4: Discussion
There are clearly considerable practical barriers to individual access to human rights 
complaints mechanisms. Broadly, these reflect the generic barriers to participation as 
identified in Chapter 1: lack of resources, motivation, and discrimination against 
particular groups. Of particular importance is the role of access to information, and 
the way in which barriers to the acquisition of knowledge concerning both the content 
of rights and the correlating state obligations, and regarding the existence of and 
access to complaints mechanisms, indirectly restricts individual access to human 
rights structures. For example, issues of discrimination against particular groups are 
clearly identifiable concerning access to domestic complaints mechanisms,1173 but less 
so regarding direct access to international structures. However, discrimination and 
marginalisation of certain groups affects their access to information, which then 
affects the extent to which they can access human rights procedures. Such exclusion is 
a clear contradiction to the forms of participation required for human rights.
1.70 Interights Annual Review, 2006/07: 11
1.71 ID 26, 30/10/07
1172 ID 24, 15/11/07
1173 See for example Avellanal v. Peru (202/1986), A /44 /40 ,28 October 1988, 196, paras. 10.1, 10.2 
and 11
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Whilst section 1 identified that NGOs have a limited representative role concerning 
individual access to human rights complaints mechanisms, it is clear that they have an 
essential role in enabling access. NGOs play a vital role in overcoming the two main 
barriers of lack of access to information and lack of resources. They are therefore 
more able to enhance individual access through overcoming practical barriers than in 
relation to the legal or structural limitations on access identified above. Consequently, 
the primary role of NGOs concerning individual participation in human rights through 
access to complaint mechanisms is enabling such participation through the provision 
of information and legal representation.
Chapter 1 identified the need for assistance concerning the practical barriers to 
participation in human rights. However, it is not clear that states have any obligation 
to assist individuals in bringing a claim before an international body, as the provision 
of legal counsel only applies to the national level. Furthermore, as was also discussed 
in section 2 ,1174 the extent of state obligations concerning the content of human rights 
education also affects individual access to human rights mechanisms. To enable 
universal or at least more widespread access to human rights structures, education 
must be firstly universally available and accessible, and secondly must be more 
specifically targeted to making individuals aware of their rights and of structures for 
complaint. As the right to education is subject to progressive realisation, it would be 
of benefit to develop the core minimum obligations concerning the right to education 
to include forms of education targeted at enabling access to human rights structures.
1174 Chapter 4, section 2.2.2.
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Part 4: Norm ative participation in the development of individual
complaints mechanisms
Sections 2 and 3 have examined the practical, legal and structural factors which affect 
the extent to which individuals can participate in human rights law through accessing 
complaints mechanisms. It is also necessary to examine how the norms of access to 
these structures have been constructed, and who has participated in this, as 
participation in the construction of norms inherently affects the resultant structures of 
participation. As the norms of access to human rights complaint mechanisms are 
primarily found in treaties, this section will discuss participation in law-making. The 
analysis differs from that in Chapter 3 as it is concerned with participation in human 
rights law-making as it relates to the construction of the norms of operation of human 
rights structures, rather than the development of the content of human rights 
principles.
Whilst sections 1 to 3 have focussed on structures of individual access to human 
rights complaints mechanisms, this section, which considers participation in 
determining the norms of individual access, does not directly consider the role of 
individuals. As Chapter 3 identified, individual participation is extremely limited 
concerning the construction of human rights law, and this pattern is repeated 
regarding the development of the norms of individual complaints mechanisms. 
Individuals have little opportunity to determine the structure and applicability of 
complaints procedures, or their operating practices. Such participation is therefore 
analogous to that found in Chapter 3, where individual participation is predominantly 
manifested through NGO participation. This section will therefore examine 
participation by states, NGOs and the bodies themselves in determining the norms of 
individual access to human rights complaints structures.
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Firstly, participation in determining the norms of the formation and application of 
obligations must be considered. Participation in the determination of norms 
concerning the content of obligations was discussed in Chapter 3,1175 which identified 
the primary role of states but also the important influence of NGOs in human rights 
law-making, and consequently in determining the content of the obligations deriving 
from human rights treaties. In addition, the treaty bodies and regional structures also 
play a vital role in elaborating and elucidating the content of human rights obligations 
through their participation in the interpretation of the law.1176
Norms which determine the applicability of obligations vary depending on whether 
the obligations concerned derive from treaty or customary law. Whilst obligations 
deriving from customary law are less dependent on express state consent, there are no 
international structures for individual complaint concerning violation of customary 
norms, and therefore their applicability is to a large extent irrelevant. Treaty based 
obligations, as identified above, cannot apply to a state without its consent. The 
principle of state consent is fundamental to international law. It is codified in the
1 1 77Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and its centrality was identified in the 
Lotus case.1178 Consequently, state consent is the central norm of participation 
concerning the applicability o f human rights obligations. It is a foundational norm of 
international law, and clearly reflects the centrality of state power and interest. 
However, there is some potential for challenge or redefinition of this norm through 
the development o f the concept of ju s  cogens principles, which are binding on all
117^
Chapter 3, section 4.1
1176 Chapter 3, section 1.1.
1177 Article 34
1178 PCIJ, The Case o f  the S.S. "Lotus”, Series A, No. 10, Judgement o f  7 September 1927, 18
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states regardless of consent. Whilst there is considerable uncertainty regarding the 
exact content of these principles, and who participates in their development1179 and, as 
with customary law, the structure by which an individual could potentially make a 
complaint regarding their violation, their existence does indicate the possibility of 
norms concerning the applicability of obligations that are less state-directed and 
oriented.
Secondly, analysis of participation in determining the norms of individual complaints 
procedures in international human rights is required. States clearly played, and 
continue to have, a huge role in determining the structure and operation of human 
rights complaints mechanisms. The mechanisms contained in the treaty bodies, the 
Optional Protocols and regional structures were constructed through processes of 
treaty negotiation, in which states were major participants. Furthermore, the 
development of new structures, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR is reliant 
on state participation. Equally, any change to existing structures, such as allowing 
direct individual access to the European Court via Protocol 11 to the ECHR, is 
primarily dependent on states.
However, there is also clear evidence of NGO participation in determining the 
structure and function of human rights complaints mechanisms, and therefore of the 
norms of participation through complaint to these bodies. NGO influence can be 
identified regarding the development of the concept of human rights accountability 
mechanisms. A call for effective international human rights mechanisms was part of 
the initial appeal in 1961 by Peter Benenson, the founder o f Amnesty
117Q
Danilenko, 1993: 214 ,219
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International.1180 The importance of implementation mechanisms to enable 
accountability both to promote a stable society and to uphold the rule of law was also 
highlighted by the founder of HRW, Aryeh Neier.1181
In addition, as Chapter 3 identified, NGOs participate in human rights law-making in
a number of both formal and informal ways. Consequently, they are able to influence
the development of human rights complaints mechanisms created by law-making
processes. A clear example is participation by NGOs in the ongoing development of
an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. Representatives of eighteen NGOs participated
in an early workshop to discuss a draft Optional Protocol, which was organised by the
OHCHR in cooperation with the International Commission of Jurists.1182 More
recently, the International NGO Coalition campaigning for this Protocol has
participated in the Working Group which has produced a draft of the Protocol, both
through written submissions,1183 oral presentations1184 and meetings with 
1 1delegates. NGOs also participated in the development of the Optional Protocol to 
the ICED AW. It is clear that their views were sought during the drafting process,1186 
and they participated in the Working Group which drafted the Protocol.1187 NGOs 
also participate through calling for the development of additional complaints 
mechanisms, as demonstrated by NGO coalition campaigning for a communications 
procedure for the ICRC.1188
1180 Zagorac, 2005: 11
1181 Korey, 1998: 309
1182 Mahon, 2008: 627; E/CN.4/2001/62/Add.2, 22 March 2001, paras. 1 and 2
1183 See for example http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdfsubmission.pdf 
http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/2556.html
1185 See http://www.opicescr-coalition.org/fourthreport.htm
1186 E/CN.6/1996/10, 10 January 1996, paras. 54-60
1187 E/1997/27 CSW, 10-21 March 1997, Appendix II, para. 3
1188 A/HRC/8/NGO/6, 26 May 2008
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There is also some evidence for NGO participation in the development of the regional 
structures. For example, NGOs participated in drafting the AfCHPR, which 
established the African Commission.1189 The Commission itself has acknowledged the 
role of NGOs in exerting pressure on the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to 
develop a human rights protection mechanism.1190 Furthermore, NGOs may influence 
the development of such bodies’ procedural norms; one interviewee described how 
they participated in a working group to revise the rules of procedure in a regional 
body.1191 This gives NGO potential scope to contribute to the construction and 
redefinition of norms of individual access at the regional level.
As with law-making, NGOs clearly participate in constructing informal modes of 
individual complaint. This is illustrated by the development of the technique o f  
shaming’ governments. Korey describes how, until the 1970s, NGOs were prevented 
from specifically naming abuser regimes before UN bodies, and even outside the UN; 
should they do so, they were threatened with loss of their UN credentials. This 
resulted in the development of alternative means to document and publicize abuses: 
the use of the international media.1192
Thirdly, the regional courts and commissions and the treaty bodies have themselves 
participated in determining their own norms of operation, and consequently how 
individuals are able to participate in them. The ‘special procedures’ of the Inter- 
American Commission, which allows for investigation, reporting and 
recommendations on specific cases of abuse, was created by the Commission itself,
1189 Motala, 2002: 246
1190 www.achpr.org/english/information_sheets/ACHPR%20inf.%20sheet%20no. 1 .doc
1191 ID 26, 30/10/07
1192 Korey, 1999: 156-158
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and only later endorsed by the OAS.1193 The African Commission is empowered by 
the AfCHPR to use appropriate methods regarding the protection of human rights, and 
whilst these methods are not determined by the Charter the Commission has used its 
right to determine rules of procedure to enable the consideration of individual 
communications.1194 Whilst as noted in section 1, these procedures are still ultimately 
subject to state consent to the initial treaties which gives the Inter-American and 
African Commissions their powers, this indicates significant independent 
participation by these bodies in determining some of the specificities of individual 
access.
The regional courts and commissions therefore constitute a way for some individuals 
to participate in the development of the norms of individual complaint. The members 
of treaty bodies and the regional courts are explicitly not state representatives; they 
must be independent.1195 Such individuals can influence how the norms of individual 
complaint are developed, through the work of the relevant body. However, it must be 
noted that this is an exclusive and limited form of participation, as it is not open to 
any individual, only to specialists.1196 It is analogous to the types of individual 
participation identified in Chapter 3 which are only open to experts. NGO 
participation remains the primary way in which individual can participate in 
determining the norms of access to human rights structures.
1193 Tardu, 1976: 783
1194 Odinkalu, 1998: 372-373
1195 inter alia  Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 21(2) and (3); AmCHR, Article 36(1); AfCHPR, 
Article 31(2); ICERD, Article 8(1); ICPD, Article 34(3); ICCPR, Article 28(3)
1196 inter alia  Protocol 11 to the ECHR, Article 21(1); AmCHR, Article 34; AfCHPR, Article 31(1); 
ICERD, Article 8(1); ICPD, Article 34(2); ICCPR, Article 28(2)
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4.1: Discussion
Consideration of participation in determining the norms of access to justice in human 
rights shows that states and NGOs both participate, as with law-making. As with all 
other aspects of individual access to human rights structures, states remain the 
dominant participants in determining the norms of individual participation. However, 
it is clear that, unlike in other areas, NGOs have an important and active role. There 
are opportunities for both direct NGO participation in the construction of complaints 
mechanisms, and for NGO influence over their development by states. Furthermore, a 
third key group of participants may also be identified: the treaty bodies and regional 
structures which consider individual complaints. These entities have had an important 
role in developing certain norms of individual access. There is, however, little 
opportunity for individuals to participate in determining the norms of access to human 
rights procedures, other than through representation by NGOs, or as experts working 
for the treaty bodies or regional mechanisms. Consequently, individuals are 
predominantly unable to participate in development of the various rules and principles 
which govern their access to human rights structures.
This demonstrates a contradiction with the type of participation required by human 
rights as identified in Chapter 1. It is essential that individuals are able to participate 
in constructing and redefining the norms of their own participation, in order to ensure 
that such norms are oriented to their interests. Consideration of how the norms of 
individual access to human rights structures have been developed demonstrates this. 
The norm of state consent, which is the basic norm of participation concerning the 
both the applicability of obligations and access to complaints mechanisms, is clearly a
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principle developed by states with regard to state interest, and is consequently ill- 
suited to safeguarding the concerns of individuals.
Concluding Remarks
This Chapter has examined individual access to complaints mechanisms as a means of 
participation in human rights, as consideration of this mode of participation offers the 
clearest means by which individuals may participate in the application of international 
human rights law. It is clear that although access to human rights complaints 
mechanisms offer considerable opportunities for direct, active and empowering 
individual participation, this participation is fundamentally limited by the principle of 
state consent. This is evident concerning the content and applicability of obligations, 
the jurisdiction o f the various bodies, and the structures which individuals may use to 
bring a complaint regarding violation of their rights.
It should be noted that there are a number of issues which received only peripheral 
treatment in this Chapter; notably customary law and Charter based accountability 
mechanisms. These would merit further analysis, although this is beyond the scope of 
this project. It would also be of particular value to consider means by which 
individuals could hold states accountable for violations of obligations resulting from 
norms of ju s cogens, as these have universal application, thus bypassing the need for 
state consent.
The fundamental contradiction identified through this examination of participation as 
access to human rights is that whist human rights are conceptually and theoretically
286
universal, human rights protection mechanisms are not. Similarly, whilst human rights 
are a means to protect the individual from the abuse of state power, means to 
challenge that abuse remain primarily controlled by states. Individual access to human 
rights mechanisms has the potential to fulfil the forms of participation required by 
human rights as identified in Chapter 1, but without an international right of access 
this remains inherently limited. A further contradiction is that certain complaints 
structures are reliant on state representation, although states are notoriously reluctant 
to bring complaints regarding human rights violations against each other.
Chapter 5 will expand on these contradictions, as well as those identified in previous 
Chapters.
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Chapter 5: Contradictions and Implications
This Chapter will focus on key issues which have arisen from the analysis of 
participation in relation to the principles and structures of human rights as examined 
in Chapters 2-4. It will highlight particular areas of importance where the type of 
participation examined in these Chapters deviates from the forms of participation 
required by human rights, as identified in Chapter 1, and will explore the problematic 
implications arising from these divergences. The main contradictions arising from the 
preceding analysis are centred on issues of universality and legitimacy, representation 
by both states and NGOs, empowerment, and the structures of both international law 
and international human rights law.
Part 1: Participation, universality and human rights legitimacy 
1.1: Participation and universality in human rights
The essential contradiction arising from this analysis of participation in human rights 
revolves around the principle of universality. As Chapter 1 identified, universality is 
the fundamental characteristic of human rights, as reflected in numerous international 
instruments and further illustrated through the principles of equality, non­
discrimination and inalienability.1197 Freeman rightly states that to say human rights 
are universal “is to invoke the principle of non-exclusion... that no human being may 
be excluded from this protection”.1198 Human rights universality is therefore not a
1197
Chapter 1, section 2.1.11QQ 1 7
Freeman, 1998: 38
288
conceptual construct but a real characteristic requiring universal protection, and 
consequently universal participation. However, participation in human rights, 
particularly concerning being subject to human rights protection through access to 
human rights structures, is comprehensively partial and exclusive.
As Chapter 4 illustrated, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the theoretical 
universality of human rights principles and the legal obligations for which entities 
may be held accountable. Consequently, access to human rights mechanisms is not 
equal, universal and inclusive as all individuals are not protected by reference to the 
same obligations. Regarding state obligations, the principle of state consent results in 
selective applicability of the protection afforded by treaty based obligations. 
Individuals are unable to directly hold foreign states or non-state actors accountable 
for human rights violations, as it is at best unclear what structures of obligations exist 
regarding these relationships. Whilst customary obligations are potentially more 
inclusive, how far these obligations extend and to what extent they may be challenged 
by states is currently indeterminate.
Furthermore, effective individual participation in human rights via access to human 
rights procedures requires the existence of avenues for individual complaint. 
However, the structure of international human rights law regarding individual 
complaints is exclusive rather than universal, being limited by state consent or 
geographical application. This consequently excludes some individuals from such 
protection and creates disparity rather than equality of access. This further illustrates 
the contradiction between the principle of universality within human rights and the 
reality of participation in human rights.
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1.2: Participation and human rights legitimacy
Human rights universality is intrinsically linked to its legitimacy, and consequently 
the lack of universal participation in human rights enables challenges to this 
legitimacy. The link between participation and the legitimacy of human rights is 
demonstrated by critiques concerning both the construction and the application of 
human rights principles.
The importance of the relationship between participation and the perceived legitimacy 
of human rights principles is best illustrated by the relativist-universalist debate. For 
example, the dispute concerning the participation of non-Westem states in the 
development of the UDHR as discussed in Chapter 3 clearly illustrates how both the 
universalist and relativist positions use participation to either attack or defend the 
legitimacy of human rights law.1199 Relativist perspectives contend that current 
human rights principles are inherently Western in character,1200 and consequently that 
they fail to represent universal concerns by excluding the specific values of particular 
cultures or societies.1201 Because they lack this universality, they are contended to be 
illegitimate. As Penna and Campbell recognise, “the notion of Western proprietorship 
of human rights... puts the global movement at risk”.1202 It must however be noted 
that it is not necessarily the specifically Western character of human rights that leads 
to their being considered illegitimate, but that because they are Western they are not
1199 Chapter 3, section 3.4
1200 Woodiwiss, 2003:21; Cema, 1994: 740; see also Mutua, Pannikar
1201 See for example Ibawoh (2001: 59) concerning an Africanist prioritisation o f  economic and social 
rights over political rights, and Davis regarding the ‘Asian values’ argument which rejects democracy 
and human rights on the ground that Asian societies emphasize principles o f  authority, social hierarchy, 
order and the group rather than the rights o f the individual (2000: 140-141).
1202 Penna and Campbell, 1998: 7; see also Brown, 1997: 42
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considered universal. It is this universality, and consequent requirement of universal 
participation, that is inherent to the legitimacy of human rights.
It is important to emphasize that the relativist position has itself been challenged as a 
means to advance particular political interests rather than the reflection of genuine 
concern for the non-representativeness of and lack of participation in human rights
190Tprinciples. The appeal to cultural practices is manipulated by cultural elites to 
mask their own self-interest and arbitrary rule.1204 However, the fact that relativist 
arguments use participation or lack thereof to attack the legitimacy of human rights 
shows that participation is regarded as important for human rights to be perceived as 
legitimate, and therefore that the legitimacy of human rights may be challenged on the 
grounds of non-universal participation. Whether utilised for political gain or not, the 
relativism debate identifies the importance of participation either in rhetoric or reality 
to the legitimacy of human rights.
Moreover, refutations of the relativist critique of human rights also demonstrate the 
centrality of participation to the legitimacy o f human rights. Whilst acknowledging 
some elements of the relativist position, the universalist perspective asserts that 
human rights principles do represent universal norms and consequently reflect the 
shared values of humanity.1205 Human rights is perceived as a dynamic concept with 
multiple Western and non-Westem actors participating in its evolution.1206 The 
universalist position therefore indicates that human rights are legitimised by
1203 See for example Brems, 1997: 149; Higgins, 1994: 96-97; Harris-Short, 2003: 132-133
1204 Ibawoh, 2001: 55-56
1205 See for example Baderin (2001: 74) who contends that that the concept o f  human rights is present
and perceivable within every human civilisation, despite the impetus for the creation o f  standards 
originating form the West. See also Freeman, 1998: 27; Ibawoh, 2001: 58; Panikkar, 1982: 78, 87.
1206 Merry, 2001: 35
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participation, both in their application and their construction, as they argue that 
multiple actors were participants in the definition of human rights principles and those 
principles either do or are capable of representing universal concerns. This indicates 
recognition of the importance of participation either directly in the construction of 
human rights or indirectly through human rights representing universal principles. If 
universality was not important for human rights to be regarded as legitimate, there 
would be no need to refute the relativist position on these particular grounds.
Furthermore, participation has been recognised as important for the practical 
application of human rights. If a particular society does not recognise particular 
human rights principles as their own, and therefore see them as lacking in legitimacy, 
they consequently do not support them and implementation even with official state 
support is extremely problematic.1207 Law reform in relation to human rights
1 90ftprinciples is ignored, as “the effectiveness of human rights depends to a large 
extent on their being alive in civil society and public opinion”.1209 Clearly, 
international human rights principles have a greater chance of being widely respected 
if they broadly reflect cultural ideals,1210 conversely conceptual differences regarding 
the content and scope of human rights contribute to the difficulties regarding their 
universal observance.1211 In order to be effective, human rights norms must be
1919considered legitimate from within the framework of a particular culture; they will 
be resisted if they are seen as the imposition of ‘outside’ beliefs or interests. Cultural 
and social participation via the inclusion of different perspectives in the construction
1207 Harris-Short, 2003: 134; see also Coomaraswamy, 1994: 39-40
1208 Banda, 2003: 9
1209 Brems, 1997: 158
1210 Howard, 1993: 320
1211 Baderin, 2001; 72-73
1212 An-Na’im, 1992: 3
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and application of human rights norms is thus considered to contribute to their 
perceived legitimacy and this in turn impacts on their successful implementation and 
continuing respect. This was discussed in Chapter 2, which demonstrated that human 
rights principles recognise the importance of participation in the development of 
policies and programmes for the implementation of human rights, and the contribution 
that such participation makes to the efficacy of human rights strategies.1213
Participation is therefore identified as an important contributing factor to the 
legitimacy of human rights. Both participation in the social and cultural construction 
of the norms that are codified in human rights instruments, and participation in the 
actual construction of the documents concerned are considered as having an effect on 
human rights legitimacy. Human rights are derided as illegitimate because they are 
exclusive, or are propounded as legitimate because they are inclusive. Human rights 
legitimacy is thus intrinsically linked to participation. In turn, this illustrates that the 
legitimacy of human rights can be challenged on participatory grounds. For human 
rights to be considered legitimate, the process by which such principles are 
determined must be participatory and inclusive, and/or the resulting principles must 
be accepted as universally representative.1214 Current human rights principles are 
argued to be illegitimate as a universal discourse because they do not represent 
universal principles, and can therefore be legitimately rejected. The contradiction 
between the universal basis of human rights and the lack of universal participation in 
human rights enables such challenges to the legitimacy of human rights, and 
consequently facilitates justifications for abuse.
121 3
Chapter 2, section 2.4
1214 Similarly, Brems identifies that the feminist critique o f human rights views them as illegitimate 
because they represent male concerns to the exclusion o f  women (1997; 137); see also Peterson, 1990 
on this issue.
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Part 2: The limitations o f participation via representation
The second major contradiction between the participation appropriate for human 
rights and that reflected in human rights principles concerns the prioritisation of 
representation. As Chapter 1 identified, human rights requires direct forms of 
participation if it is to be effective, active and meaningful. However, participation as 
reflected in human rights principles centralises representative forms, particularly in 
relation to rights of political participation. Although there are some elements of 
human rights which indicate recognition of the value of more direct forms, most 
understandings of participation consider it in political terms, and political 
participatory rights focus on representation.1215 This approach is replicated in 
participation in law-making, where the primary actors are states and NGOs, with 
extremely limited opportunities for direct individual participation, fundamentally 
limited to experts.1216 Regarding access to human rights, accountability structures and 
access to human rights information does provide for more direct forms of 
participation by individuals; nonetheless, certain modes of access to justice are reliant 
on state representation.1217 The centrality of participation via representation thus 
presents an important contradiction to the type of participation determined as 
appropriate for human rights. Furthermore, this focus on representation has significant 
implications for human rights protection.
1215 See Chapter 1, section 1.1.1, and Chapter 2, section 1.3.
|216 Chapter 3, 1.3.
Chapter 4, section 2.3
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2.1: Limitations of representative democracy
Participation in decision-making as conceived within international human rights is 
premised around structures of representation within a democratic state. The right to a 
democratic system of political participation is centralised as the primary mode by 
which citizens exercise influence over decision-making processes which affect them, 
including participation in decision-making concerning human rights. This includes 
determination both of the content of human rights and whether they are applicable, 
and consequently whether and how citizens may access them. In theory, the state is 
the representative of the people, and consequently makes decisions on their behalf as 
directed by them.
However, this centralisation of representative democracy is an inadequate
representation of international politics. Firstly, this system is premised around
individuals’ interests being given adequate representation at the international level via
structures of representation. Individuals are assumed to participate internationally via
their state representatives. As Simonovic identifies
T he state is also  becom in g an interm ediary between its citizens and the international 
com m unity. It is through state representatives that interests o f  citizen s are represented
in international organizations, during deliberations in various associations or w h ile
* 1 2 1 8participating in the creation o f  international treaties.
To operate meaningfully and effectively, this structure consequently requires the 
existence of a democratic political system at the national level. However, whilst there 
is some evidence for a developing universal norm of the right to democratic 
governance,1219 this is certainly not practiced universally. Many states simply do not 
have even theoretically democratic systems of government, and the political
1218 Simonovic, 2000: 401
1219 See Franck, 1992
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participatory rights of their citizens are violated on a regular basis. Wapner argues that 
only slightly more than sixty percent of the world’s states are democratic, and points 
to the many “kleptocracies, theocracies, and warlord regimes” whose power structures
1 9 9 flleave many unrepresented. Van Boven agrees that “in many instances 
governments cannot be considered the genuine representatives of the people over
199 1whom they exercise authority”, and that a great deal of international human rights
• 1999law is created by entities acting without democratic control or input.
In addition, so-called democratic states may not provide for effective and meaningful 
participation by their citizens. For example, a state may hold elections, but if the 
result is disregarded by one party, as was recently seen in Zimbabwe and Kenya, 
having a theoretical democratic system does not translate into democracy in practice. 
Furthermore, voting structures may be manipulated in both direct and more insidious 
ways. Individuals may be threatened with violence if they vote for a particular 
candidate, as was seen in the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe, or may be obstructed from 
voting at all. Alternatively, as Chapter 1 discussed, particular requirements for 
political participation within democracies have been used to disenfranchise certain
1223groups.
Furthermore, there is a major contradiction between the concept of state legitimacy to 
participate in the international system propounded by democratic theory and that 
found in international law. According to democratic theory, state legitimacy is 
dependent on the extent to which it represents the interests of its citizens and the
1220 Wapner, 2002: 198
1221 Van Boven, 1989:221
1222 Van Boven, 1989: 223
1223 Chapter 1, section 1.3.
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degree to which it is accountable to them.1224 Democratic theory therefore presents a 
concept of legitimacy dependent on participation via representation. However, this is 
contradicted by international law which requires neither national nor international 
democracy to legitimise state participation. State legitimacy under international law is 
centred around the concept of state sovereignty, which is dependent on power. Article 
1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States presents the 
following characteristics as determinants of a state’s international legal personality 
giving legitimacy to participate: a permanent population, a defined territory, 
government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states. Such government is 
not required to be participatory or democratic. State legitimacy is thus affected by but 
is not dependent on how far the state is internally democratic. This means that a state 
can legitimately participate in human rights on behalf of its citizens without them 
having given it the authority to do so or having the opportunity to hold the state 
accountable for its action or inaction. Consequently, individuals may be legitimately 
excluded from participation in international human rights as the state is not required 
to enable such participation in order to be a legitimate participant itself.
This fundamentally excludes those living within undemocratic states, or states where 
the democratic process is bypassed or manipulated, from participation through state 
representation on the international level and therefore in international human rights. It 
illustrates an elementary contradiction between the theory and practice of 
participation in human rights. It is those individuals whose state neither allows them 
the means to influence its actions, nor who respects their human rights, who are most
1224 Teson, 1997: 117; Cohen, 1996:95
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in need of access to the protection afforded by international human rights, yet 
conversely, they are those who are most excluded from participation.
The increasingly globalised and interconnected nature of the international system can 
impact on the ordinary lives of individuals in ways that were previously 
inconceivable. Decisions taken by states and other organizations exert influence over 
individuals and groups over great distances; global interdependence is increasing. 
Whilst global forces outside the state structure clearly impact on forms and effects of 
participation for both groups and individuals, participation in such global forces is 
restricted. Although individuals, minorities and states are all in principle equal 
subjects of international law, the only entities with participatory rights are state 
governments. This means individuals are dependent on their state to represent their 
concerns and enable their indirect participation at the international level. However, if 
the state is to be this conduit for the opinions and needs of the individuals within its 
jurisdiction, through representing their concerns at the international level, it must have 
the ability to do so. If the state is unable to participate, then it is unable to represent 
the concerns of its people, and they are consequently also excluded from participation.
Whilst state participation in international law is theoretically equal, such equality 
is one of the great deceptions of international law.1228 Firstly, the principle o f the 
sovereign equality of all member of the UN is overruled by the veto powers of the 
permanent members of the Security Council.1229 The veto rights, designed to protect 
what were then the Great Powers both from each other and from challenge by a
1225 Keohane, 2005: 121
1226 Brunckhorst, 2002: 687
1227 UN Charter, Article 2(1) “The Organisation is based on the sovereign equality o f  all its Members”
1228 Krisch, 2003: 135
1229 UN Charter, Article 27(3); Cassese, 1986: 129; Brunckhorst, 2002: 687
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19^ 0 •majority rule thus codify and perpetuate particular power relations within the 
international system. Secondly, member states are clearly not equal in political or 
economic terms, and indirect intervention via trade, aid and so forth means that states’ 
power of consent may be manipulated by more powerful actors, both political (states) 
and economic (corporations). Consequently, reliance on representation to enable 
individual participation via state participation at the international level results in a 
democratic deficit regarding globalised structures of participation,1231 in turn resulting 
in inequalities of access to participation. Due to the lack of universal democratic 
structures on both the level of national governments and within the international 
decision-making system, entire populations may either be entirely excluded from 
influencing the construction of human rights, or may have their interests inadequately 
represented. The clear democratic deficit in international relations means that 
participation through representation at the national level cannot guarantee 
representation at the international level.
Representative forms of participation may also not best serve the interests of human 
rights protection. Chapter 1 identified some of the problematic elements of 
participation realised through representative structures.1232 These problems are clearly 
applicable to the human rights context. As Cohen notes, there is a danger in reliance 
on majoritarian structures to enable legitimate decision-making; “some democratic 
collective decisions are too execrable to be legitimate”.1233 Whilst Petersmann 
correctly identifies that to avoid such ‘tyranny of the majority’, democracy must be
De Visscher, 1957: 109; KOchler, 2006: 325 
1231 Benner, Reinicke and Witte, 2004: 195; Scholte, 2004: 428-429; Otto, 1996: 127
1239




limited by “inalienable rights of citizens”,1234 the inability of citizens to participate in 
determining what those rights should be, and whether they should apply, functions to 
remove this fundamental limitation. It is therefore possible to have democracy without 
effective human rights protection, due to the lack of guarantees for individuals to 
participate in human rights. Consequently, representation at the national level cannot 
necessarily equate to human rights protection.
The inadequacy of majoritarian forms of decision-making is also illustrated at the 
international level as the decisions of the Security Council bind all states, including 
those that disagree.1235 This means that even if those states are representing the will of 
their peoples that will can be overruled by other members of the world community. 
Representative systems which operate under the principle of majoritarianism therefore 
restrict participation in human rights at both the national and international levels.
In conclusion, participation through representation does not enable the effective, 
meaningful and active individual participation required by human rights, and 
representative forms rely on a concept of democracy that does not function in 
practice. As Allott argues
The p eop les o f  the w orld  are represented externally by their state-system s and by the 
governm ents w hich  speak for them . But the idea and the ideal o f  dem ocracy has 
evo lved  and the peop le have matured w ith  it. They demand not m erely to be
• 1236represented but to p articipate...
There is consequently a need for forms of participation which go beyond the 
representative model to enable effective participation in human rights by individuals 
on both the national and international levels.
1234 Petersmann, 2001: 13
1235 Bodansky, 1999: 597
1236 Allott, 1990:251
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2.2: Problematic elements of NGO representation
NGOs may enable participation via representation, as was particularly identified 
regarding participation in human rights law-making,1237 where NGOs were the 
primary conduit for (indirect) individual participation. This role of NGOs has also 
been recognised by the (formal) Secretary-General, whose 1994 Review stated that 
NGOs provide “the closest approximation to direct popular participation in the 
intergovernmental machinery of the UN”. In addition, as both Chapters 3 and 4 
identified, private forms of participation in human rights are primarily represented by 
NGOs, and the ways in which they participate are predominantly informal. NGOs can 
therefore provide a means for individual participation where democratic
191Qrepresentation by the state is absent, as they offer alternative structures of 
participation in international human rights to those of the state. Consequently, NGOs 
are an important means to broaden individual participation in human rights through 
representative structures.
However, the extent to which representation by NGOs actually enables effective and 
meaningful participation in human rights by individuals must be investigated. There 
are three main areas of concern. Firstly, the extent to which NGOs are themselves 
representative must be evaluated, as they do not necessarily operate in a participatory, 
inclusive or democratic manner. In addition, numerous questions have been raised 
concerning the degree to which NGOs are accountable to their various constituencies 
and these require consideration, as their legitimacy as participants has been 
challenged on this basis. Finally, the efficacy of NGO participation must be 
examined, as the degree to which they are successful affects how far the indirect
1237 Chapter 3, section 1.3.
1238 E/AC.70/1994/5, 26 May 1994, para 33
1239 Schoener, 1997: 551
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individual participation enabled by representative NGO participation is itself 
effective.
2.2.1: NGO representativeness
As identified, NGO participation constitutes a primary means for individuals to 
participate in international human rights law through structures of representation. 
However, it is debateable how far NGOs are themselves representative and inclusive. 
The degree to which NGOs are a conduit for actual individual influence over the 
development and application of human rights is therefore affected by how far those 
individuals can influence the ways in which the NGO participates, and consequently 
how far it represents their concerns.
Firstly, there is no guarantee that NGOs are truly representative of those on whose 
behalf they participate. Crucially, most NGOs are self-appointed rather than elected or 
chosen by their beneficiaries.1240 There are examples of organisations which have 
developed from the grassroots level and were a response by victims to the abuse that 
they had suffered, or others in the community acting on behalf of victims,1241 but most 
of the major human rights organisations were established by individuals who had no 
initial connection with those on whose behalf they speak and act.
There have also been critiques of the extent to which the NGO sector is dominated by 
particular perspectives. Amnesty International has been described as being “mainly
1240 Pearce, 1993: 223; Lindblom, 2005: 525
1241 For example, the international organisation La Via Campesina, the Nigerian NGO Child Rights and 
Rehabilitation Network and the Kosova Women’s Network
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white, male and able-bodied”.1242 Similarly, one interviewee identified that their 
organisation tended to be seen as predominantly middle-class, and had a problem 
engaging with working class people and minorities.1243 This indicates that the 
perspective of such groups may not be adequately represented within the NGO, and 
subsequently through NGO participation in international human rights law. In 
addition, Connors argues that traditional and established NGOs have been slow to 
recognise the specific claims of women, as they conform to the traditional human 
rights discourse which focuses on civil and political, rather than private, rights.1244 
Furthermore, she contends that “the NGO human rights establishment is dominated by 
men and, accordingly, concerns itself predominantly with issues of central importance 
to men”.1245 This is however contradicted by the argument that women’s rights 
became a major part of the international agenda due to the efforts of NGOs.1246
Human rights NGOs have also been considered to represent a particularly Western 
perspective.1247 For example, Mutua contends that the major human rights NGOs 
represent a principally Western viewpoint favouring universal human rights and 
liberal democracy, and that their mandates, policies and strategies are developed by a 
predominantly Western leadership and focus on civil and political rather than ESC 
rights.1248 The largest and most well established NGOs are Western in origin, and 
continue to have their headquarters based in Western countries: the International 
Secretariats o f Amnesty and FIAN are based in London and Heidelburg respectively,
1242 Amnesty International Cultural Diversity and Equal Opportunities Policy, quoted in Hopgood,
2006: 161
1243 ID 18,30/10/07
1244 Connors, 1996: 165-7
1245 Connors, 1996: 167
1246 Chapter 3, section 1.2.
1247 Friedman et al, 2005: 36-9
1248 Mutua, 2001: 153-156
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and that of Human Rights Watch in New York. Hopgood identifies that Amnesty staff 
and researchers are principally Western.1249 Steiner does note however that whilst the 
staff and membership of Amnesty are predominantly Western, its International 
Executive Committee has a cross-section of Third World members.1250 Northern 
NGOs are more dominant and numerically overrepresented at UN conferences than 
those from the South. States have expressed concern at the predominance of NGOs 
based in the developed world, considering that they represent a biased perspective.1251 
Some NGOs have expressed similar concerns.
There is no guarantee that the internal political structure of NGOs will truly represent 
the interests of either its membership or its beneficiaries. NGOs vary in the extent that 
they include the participation and perspectives of their constituents in the 
development and implementation of policy. Certain NGOs have structures whereby 
members are able to influence or contribute to the position of the organisation on a 
particular issue, which includes campaigning for the development of legal standards 
on that issue. Some interviewees described how their organisations conducted 
consultations of members regarding a particular issue before adopting a position for 
the organisation as a whole.1253 One interviewee described how a particular issue, now 
one of the main policy areas of the organisation, originated from individual 
members.1254 The ability of individual members to influence the direction of one 
organisation as a whole was considered variable, and to a great degree dependent on
Hopgood, 2006: 162-164
1250 Steiner, 1991: 61
1251 Lovald and Jenie, 2005: 5; see also A/57/387, 9 September 2002, para 139(d)
1252 Steiner, 1991: 61
1253 ID 1, 05/05/07; ID 6, 10/08/07; ID 33, 15/01/08
1254 ID 10, 13/12/07
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both individual motivation or concern regarding a particular issue, and on internal 
power structures within the organisation.1255
However, some interviewees at the lower levels of NGOs indicated that they did not 
feel included to a great extent in how organisational policy was formulated: “in 
general how [the organisation] make their policy is still a mystery”.1256 For this 
interviewee this did not seem to be considered negative, although other interviewees
1 7 57found it more of a concern. A contradiction may be identified between the degree 
to which an organisation may try to take account of the perspectives of the 
membership when formulating policy, and the extent to which the membership 
perceives the central organisation to be doing this.1258 Concerns were also raised 
regarding an organisation adopting a position on a particular issue which may 
contradict the feelings of some members.1259 For example, Baehr notes how the issue 
of extending Amnesty International’s mandate to include campaigning on behalf of 
persons imprisoned on the basis of homosexuality “threatened to split up the 
organisation along multicultural lines”.1260
Structures of decision-making within an NGO can also be influenced by funding 
sources. The NGO is often accountable to the funder in a way that it is not to the 
beneficiaries of its work.1261 There may be conflict between the interests of the NGOs 
membership and or/funders, and the resulting policies of its leadership, and the
ID 10, 13/12/07
1256 ID 1,05/05/07
1257 ID 7 ,24 /10 /07
1258 ID 7, 24/10/07
1259 ID 25, 03/01/07
1260 Baehr, 1994: 18
1261 Pearce, 1993: 223
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interests of its beneficiaries.1262 This can restrict the work of the NGO, and 
consequently the degree to which it is able to represent the concerns of its 
constituents.
The importance of enabling effective participation, as far as possible, by beneficiaries
in the work of NGOs has been persuasively argued:
International human rights standards are already relatively clear on the need for 
consultation, and listening to people’s views before taking action that will affect 
them...However difficult it is for NGOs to establish and maintain contact with those 
who are expected to benefit from their activities, NGOs should be ready to listen to 
their views if and when they are expressed. They should also feel an obligation to 
react to those views, and should not simply dismiss them, even if they believe they 
are irrelevant or inappropriate. Very few human rights NGOs seem to have 
established procedures to determine how, once contacted, they will create conditions 
in which they will dialogue with, and be answerable to, such beneficiaries.1263
The interview data does, to some extent, reflect these positions. With regard to the 
general lobbying work of NGOs with regard to human rights law-making, problems 
were identified regarding how far the voice of beneficiaries is heard in the 
determination of NGO policy. Several NGOs identified a lack of inclusion of the 
voices and perspectives of victims in the development and evaluation of campaigns, 
including those relating to human rights law-making.1264 It was also identified that 
there can be a lack of clarity in demonstrating that an individual has given consent for 
their case to be used as part of a broader campaign.1265 This indicates recognition of 
the inclusion and appropriate representation of beneficiaries as important goals.
Direct inclusion of beneficiaries in policy making seemed to be associated more with 
specifically development organisations than with human rights NGOs which focussed
" Keohane, 2002: 447
1263 Archer, 2003: 122, paras. 390-391
1264 ID 49, 08/02/08; ID 50, 29/01/08
1265 ID 33, 15/01/08
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on research and/or campaigning.1266 This is reflected in Archers’s assertion that NGOs 
who provide services tend to recognise the need to be accountable to their ‘clients’, 
whereas those who work mainly through campaigning and advocacy tend not to think 
of those whose rights they defend as active participants.1267 Nonetheless, one 
interviewee described how a campaign on a particular issue had undergone some 
major changes due to the input of victims,1268 demonstrating the potential for 
beneficiaries to influence NGO policy-making. It was also identified that whilst there 
were few formal mechanisms for victims’ to influence policy-making, there were a 
number of informal structures of participation.1269
Significant barriers were identified to enabling beneficiary participation in the work 
of the NGO, although most interviewees would have liked to encourage this. For 
example, it might be dangerous to work too closely with some victims,1270 particularly
1271concerning issues which could be perceived as an imposition of foreign values. It 
could be problematic balancing the desires of the beneficiaries with accountability to 
donors.1272 The lack of capacity of smaller, local grassroots organisations was also 
identified as limiting their participation.1273 A further difficulty was determining who 
to work with and how far local groups were themselves representative of victims’
1274concerns.
ID 33, 15/01/08
1267 Archer, 2003: 62-62, para. 94
1268 ID 32, 15/01/08
1269 ID 50, 29/01/08
1270 ID 33, 15/01/08; ID 18, 30/10/07
1271 ID 4, 05/11/07
1272 ID 4, 05/11/07
1273 ID 31, 06/02/08
1274 ID 31, 06/02/08
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The question of NGO representativeness therefore highlights a contradiction in that 
NGOs have a fundamental representative role in participation in human rights, due to 
their more developed rights and abilities to participate, but they are not, in general, 
representative organisations, as usually they are not elected and have a small
• 177^membership base. Amnesty International is a key exception here, as it has a large 
membership and a democratic internal structure. Nonetheless, these decision-making 
processes are predominantly structured around enabling the views of the membership 
to influence the direction of the organisation, rather than also including the views of 
the beneficiaries. Whilst there is significant recognition from within the sector of the 
importance of the inclusion of beneficiaries’ voices in the development of NGO 
policy, this issue has not yet been adequately addressed. In consequence, 
representation by NGOs is, with some exceptions, currently failing to enable 
appropriate forms of participation by individuals in international human rights law.
2.2.2: NGO accountability
The importance of NGO accountability has been increasingly identified as an 
essential aspect of NGO participation in international human rights. Archer argues 
that while there is a tendency for human rights activists to perceive themselves as 
‘’’clean” and immune to the negative tendencies of other decision makers; however, as 
NGOs become more powerful, there is a need to make sure that they are properly 
accountable.1276 Interviewees also observed that the issue of NGO accountability has 
become more prominent in recent years.1277
Archer, 2003: 8, para. 26
1 0 * 7  f.
Archer, 2003: 2-3, paras. 7-11
1277 ID 50, 29/07/08; ID 13, 18/10/07
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The degree to which NGOs are representative is one means by which NGO 
accountability is assessed. It is argued that in order to be legitimate, NGOs must 
represent the concerns of their constituents and be accountable to them for the 
decisions made by the organisation.1278 Yet, as discussed above, the extent to which 
NGOs are representative of and accountable to their various constituents is extremely 
variable. As Aston identifies, NGOs represent particular interests, and there is no 
democratic control over their activities as there is (in theory) with governments1279. It 
has been asserted that NGOs are only accountable to, at best, their funders and 
members1280.
Challenges to NGO legitimacy have therefore been made on the basis of a lack of 
accountability,1281 based on a lack of representation. This is further reflected by 
NGOs’ recognition that that in order to defend their credibility they must justify their 
participation in terms of ‘voice’; their authority to speak on behalf of the poor and 
marginalised. NGOs are criticised for being white, middle-class and Western, rather 
than composed of representatives of the communities on whose behalf they speak,1283 
and as such have been accused of having an interest in keeping the poor voiceless.1284
However, NGOs’ legitimacy as participants in international human rights should not 
solely be evaluated on the degree to which they are representative of and accountable 
to their constituents. Other means by which the legitimacy of NGO participation may 
be assessed include peer accountability between participants from the same sector,
1278 Slim, 2002: paras. 4, 16
1279 Aston, 2001:961
1280 Grant and Keohane, 2005: 38; Mutua, 2007: 614
1281 Archer, 2003: 8, para. 27
1282 Slim, 2002: para 8
Slim, 2002: para. 15
Slim, 2002: para. 18
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and reputational accountability from the wider public.1285 Such forms of 
accountability are crucial to NGOs’ continued participation, as if their credibility is 
undermined they risk losing their political status and authority to participate.1286 
Keohane agrees that these forms, rather than democratic structures, are the primary 
way in which NGOs can be held accountable; if an organisation were shunned by its 
peers, or its reputation with the general public was poor, it would struggle to 
participate and would lose support. Wapner agrees that NGOs can be accountable 
to their members in the absence of democratic structures of participation, because 
NGOs must act in ways which satisfy and even excite members and gamer additional 
support; if they fail to do this, members will “vote with their feet” and the NGOs will
1988lose support and consequently institutional strength. It has also been argued that 
some NGOs gain their authority to participate in human rights based on their
• 198Qexpertise, rather than their role as representatives.
Although the degree to which NGOs are representative and inclusive of the concerns 
of both their members and beneficiaries has a profound impact on individual 
participation in international human rights due to the centrality of representative 
forms of participation in human rights, this should not necessarily permit challenges 
to NGOs’ authority as participants. NGOs are legitimate participants in their own 
right. Furthermore, due to the centrality of representative forms of participation, if 
NGOs were excluded as legitimate participants, this would mean that they were 
unable to enable individual participation through representation, and a far broader 
constituency would consequently also be excluded. NGOs do need to enhance the
1285 Benner et al, 2004: 199
1286 Wapner, 2002: 203
1287 Keohane, 2002; 478; see also Wapner, 2002: 201-202; Hilhorst, 2003: 145
1288 Wapner, 2002: 201; see also Spiro, 2002: 163-164
1289 ID 13, 18/10/07
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extent to which beneficiaries in particular are directly and meaningfully included in 
the determination of the strategy and policy of the organisation, but this need for 
improvement should not be used as justification to exclude NGO participation. It is 
also notable that that many challenges to NGO legitimacy have come from states, 
many of whom have an particular interest in limiting NGO participation, and who 
themselves have a poor track record of representing the concerns of their citizens.
2.2.3: NGO efficacy
As NGOs enable individual participation via structures of representation, as well as in 
other ways the efficacy of NGO participation must be examined. If NGO participation 
is ineffective, then so is the participation of those individuals who participate 
indirectly through the actions of the NGO. For such individuals this would result in 
exclusion from human rights as their opportunities to participate directly are so 
limited. The effectiveness of NGO participation has therefore had implications for 
individual participation, due to the centrality of representative structures of 
participation in international human rights.
A number of issues affect NGO efficacy, as identified in Chapters 3 and 4. These 
include availability of resources, timescale, knowledge and the specific political 
context.1290 Such resource problems could potentially be addressed simply through the 
provision of more resources, and the lack of resources, particularly core funding, was 
specifically identified as a barrier to NGO participation.1291 The two issues which
Chapter 3, section 2.1.
1291 Chapter 3, section 2.1.
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will now be discussed indicate structural or conceptual contradictions in relation to 
participation in human rights.
Firstly, it is extremely problematic to assess the degree to which a particular campaign 
has been effective. This was identified by a number of interviewees. As NGOs often 
either work in coalition, or there are several groups working on the same issue, it was 
not possible exactly assess the contribution of a single organisation.1292 It was difficult 
to assess how far the outcome was the result of action by NGOs, and how far other 
factors were involved.1293 One interviewee considered that “if you were to say give 
me one thing that has happened just because of you, I would say nothing”, but 
stressed the cumulative effect of NGOs as a sector.1294 The intangibility of impact on 
the enjoyment of human rights was also identified, especially compared to 
development objectives, such as building a certain number of schools or clinics.1295 
As one interviewee identified, it was easier to measure NGO impact in terms of input, 
rather than output.1296
Secondly, as both Chapters 3 and 4 identified, as formal structures of participation 
clearly centralise states and governmental actors to the exclusion and detriment of 
individuals, NGOs predominantly participate in informal ways. Their informal modes 
of participation seek to influence decision-makers regarding the development and
ID 33, 15/01/08
1293 ID 18, 30/10/07; ID 31, 06/02/08
1294 ID 13, 18/10/07
,295 ID 31, 06/02/08
1296 ID 18,30/10/07
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application of international human rights law,1297 and to apply informal structures of
1298accountability, in the absence of extensive formal rights of participation.
There are both advantages and disadvantages to the primacy of informal means of 
participation for NGOs. The use of informal means of participation provides NGOs 
with greater flexibility than participation via formal rights, in terms of both the 
methods they use and the interests they promote. Whilst formal methods of 
participation are defined primarily by states, informal means are developed by NGOs 
themselves, and can therefore potentially be more suited to achieving the objectives of 
NGOs.1299 NGOs can be more creative in the stances they take as they are not tied to a 
particular government position.1300
Informal participation also contributes to the development of an alternative public 
sphere, which may present a different and potentially more inclusive model of 
international human rights law. Informal modes of participation are more inclusive 
than formal participation requiring accreditation by ECOSOC, as any NGO can 
participate in this way. For example, the “non-status” of NGOs under international 
law means that the criteria for participation is not rigorously regulated, which presents 
more inclusive opportunities for participation by a variety of actors.1301 Similarly, the 
lack of a definitive definition of an “NGO”1302 also enables greater inclusion; “closed
• * 1303  . •categories tend to control rather than encourage participation and creativity”. This 
alternative sphere also creates different structures of participation and legitimate
1297 Chapter 3 , section 1.2.
1298 Chapter 4, section 2.2.3.12QQ
See Chapter 3, section 4.1
1300 Chamovitz, 2006: 361
1301 Martens, 2003: 2
1302 Introduction, Part 4.
1303 Otto, 1996: 112
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constructions of meaning that are not dependent on state acceptance. For example, 
NGO participation in human rights through the spread of information concerning a 
state’s failure to respect human rights standards can and does create hostility towards 
that state, regardless of its formal participation in particular treaties.1304
However, the efficacy of such methods of participation remains dependent on factors 
including the political influence and resources that the NGO has, and on the 
sensitivity of the government concerned to citizen or international pressure.1305 As 
Falk notes, “the Westphalian box can still be tightly closed in a variety of 
circumstances, and even a generally mobilised civil society cannot pry it open”.1306 
Whilst the mobilisation of public opinion is a potentially powerful tool its 
effectiveness is predicated to a great extent on the democratic nature of states. If a 
state is repressive, it is unlikely to be pressured by its own citizens to implement or 
respect human rights norms. Furthermore, the position of the state concerned in the 
international hierarchy and its relationships with other states also affects how far such 
methods can both directly affect its behaviour and influence other states to bring 
pressure to bear on the offending state. Brett identifies various instances where NGO 
campaigns do not translate into action at the UN level due to the powerful status of 
the state in question, or due to political expediency concerning relationships between 
states.1307 Simply, NGOs have a limited ability to influence powerful states,1308 and 
this influence varies depending on the political and economic resources available to 
the particular NGO. For example, influence via lobbying at conferences is variable, 
depending on how developed a particular state delegation’s position is, what resources
1304 Bianchi, 1997: 191
1305 Clapham, 2000: 184, see also Smith et al, 1994: 143
1306 Falk, 2004: 39
1307 Brett, 1995: 104
1308 Call, 2002: 123
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the delegation has available and the personal positions of the members of the 
delegation.1309 As one interviewee observed, “you don’t always control outcomes... 
[there is] no certainty that what you do or what you say will be used”.1310
Consequently, reliance on informal methods can result in exclusion. The degree of 
informal influence that NGOs can have is variable and unequal. The reliance on 
informal methods means the degree of influence that an NGO has over human rights 
decision-making is very much dependent on the resources and status of the NGO. 
Whilst NGOs can exert huge influence via informal participation, such influence is 
inevitably variable and effects cannot be guaranteed. Such exclusion of NGOs 
translates into wider exclusion of the constituencies that NGOs represent, especially 
in cases where NGOs provide structure of representation when the state does not.
Informal structures do have the possibility of codification, as Article 71 of the UN 
Charter formalised customary NGO participation under the League of Nations.1311 
Current proposals for improving the legal status of NGOs include enhancing the role 
of NGOs with consultative status, recognising NGOs as creators of customary law,
1019
and permitting NGO participation as amicus curaie before the ICJ. However, the 
exclusion of NGOs from formal structures of law making, including those which 
govern the development of international rules of participation, limit the potential for 
extension of NGOs formal role. Any development of NGOs’ formal rights of 
participation is ultimately dependent on state consent. Whilst NGOs can influence 
state conduct, they are unable to change legal norms without the support of at least
1309 Lindblom, 2005: 474-475
1310 ID 20 ,25 /01/08
13,1 Chamovitz, 1997:250, 258
1312 Schoener, 1997: 541-547.
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some states. Furthermore, whilst the importance of NGO participation is recognised
1313by the UN, there is suspicion and at times outright opposition from some states to 
any extension of NGOs’ participatory rights.1314 Indeed, there have been attempts by 
some states to restrict NGOs current rights of participation.1315
Furthermore, it is arguable how desirable the extension of NGOs formal rights of 
participation would be. The formalisation of informal methods can lead to a 
restriction of participation; Article 71 limited NGOs’ participatory rights to a 
consultative role.1316 Any extension of formal participation would remain embedded 
within a context of state consent; thus formal norms of participation would continue 
to be controlled by states. As demonstrated, the use of informal methods gives NGOs 
greater flexibility and greater control over the development of alternative norms of
1317participation, whereas more formal participation would run the risk of cooption. 
NGOs have been forced to be innovative in developing means to participate due to 
their exclusion from formal participation. Extended rights of participation could
1318potentially stifle this creativity. This could limit the ways in which NGOs 
participate and therefore in turn restrict indirect participation by those whom NGOs 
represent.
In addition, greater formalisation of NGO participation could have implications for 
NGOs’ accountability. Formalising NGOs’ international legal status would not only 
recognise their rights o f participation but also enable them to be held accountable for
1313 Breen 2005: 116; see also Clapham, 2000: 181; Van Boven, 1989: 207
1314 Aston, 2001: 960
1315 Breen, 2005: 125; Aston, 2001: 956
13,6 Butler, 2007: 264
1317 Chamovitz, 1997: 284
1318 Schoener, 1997: 548 considers that expansion o f rights o f participation for NGOs with consultative 
status could in practice limit their participation
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what they do.1319 Spiro argues that full inclusion of NGOs in formal decision-making 
institutions would “have the effect of outing NGO power and advancing a 
transparency objective...it would also hold NGOs... accountable to institutional 
bargains”.1320 This illustrates that whilst greater formalisation of NGO participation 
could be positive as it might enable greater accountability to their constituents, it 
could also restrict their freedom of activity, which would in turn limit indirect 
participation via NGOs by their constituents.
In summary, it is problematic to rely on NGO representation as one of the major ways 
in which individuals can participate in international human rights law. NGOs are at 
best variable in the extent to which they are representative of their various 
constituents, and there is a particular lack of input from the beneficiary community. 
However, this should not undermine NGOs’ legitimacy as actors within international 
human rights; rather, greater emphasis should be placed on structures other than 
NGOs which enable greater direct forms of individual participation, as well as 
encouraging greater inclusion of beneficiaries in NGOs’ internal decision and policy­
making structures. A further problem of reliance on NGOs is that this form of 
individual participation is dependent on the degree of influence that NGOs have. 
NGOs’ formal rights of participation are limited, and extension is dependent on states 
and therefore unlikely. It is also debateable how far an extension of formal rights o f 
participation would be advantageous to NGOs. In consequence, it is likely that NGOs 
will continue to depend on informal modes of participation. Whilst these offer 
significant potential for the development of NGO participation, and therefore
Maragia, 2002: 332
1320 Spiro, 2002: 162
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participation by those whom NGOs represent, care must be taken in order to prevent 
the perpetuation of existing structures of power and exclusion.
Part 3: Participation as empowerment: the contradiction of 
normative participation
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, human rights are intrinsically oriented to the
1991empowerment of the individual. Furthermore, for participation to be effective, 
active and meaningful it must be empowering. Chapter 1 showed that participation 
oriented to individual empowerment requires that people take active control of their 
life, rather than being the passive subjects of other entities’ decision-making. Forms 
of participation oriented to the interests of the state consequently cannot fulfil this 
goal of individual empowerment, which further requires that individuals are able to 
determine, challenge and redefine the norms of participation. The role of 
participation in engendering empowerment is reflected in participatory human rights 
principles, as discussed in Chapter 2, which identified the empowering facets of the 
rights to education, legal participation, development and the rights of marginalised 
groups.
However, the examination of structures of participation in human rights illustrated 
various contradictions concerning how far such participation is oriented towards 
empowerment. Firstly, the over-reliance on structures of representation as a means for 
individuals to participate in human rights limits the empowering potential of 
participation. Representative forms do not enable the individual to actively participate
1321
Chapter 1, section 2.1.
1322 Chapter 1, section 2.2.4.
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on their own behalf; rather, they remain dependent on decisions taken by others. For 
example, all representative democracy empowers individuals to do is vote for 
representatives; they then remain passive until the next election. Most structures of 
participation in international human rights leave the individual dependent on the state 
to participate on their behalf; the state is the key participant in determining the content 
and applicability of rights, and the extent of individual access to structures of 
complaint. Furthermore, certain structures of complaint concerning human rights 
abuses are entirely dependent on the state; the individual has no rights and no means 
to participate actively on their own behalf. This emphasis on representation 
contradicts the requirement of active and empowering forms of individual 
participation.
As discussed above, NGOs constitute an alternative means to states for individuals to 
participate in international human rights law. However, whilst some NGOs act to 
facilitate the empowerment of their beneficiaries in order to enable them to take a 
more active role in decision-making processes, other NGOs act in a more 
exclusionary way which results in the empowerment of the organisation rather than 
the beneficiaries.1324 Few NGOs are able to show a truly participatory track record of
• 1325promoting facilitation rather than creating new structures of dependency. Pearce 
asserts that true empowerment requires more than the development of intermediary 
organisations which represent the concerns of the “poor and the weak”; rather it 
necessitates enabling them to “fight for their own rights as citizens”.1326 
Consequently, structures of participation in human rights where individual
1323 Chapter 4, section 2.3.
1324 Pearce, 1993:224
1325 Ginther, 1992: 61
1326 Pearce, 1993:225-226
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participation only or predominantly occurs though NGO participation cannot be 
considered truly empowering. This further illustrates the limited potential of 
representative forms of participation to truly enable empowerment.
Furthermore, the emancipatory potential of participation in human rights is limited by 
the centrality of states and state power as participants in the international system, and 
by their use of structures of participation as a means of control and assertion of power. 
For example, both participation in law-making and access to human rights 
mechanisms were identified as areas where power is contested between states,
1 T97individuals and NGOs. The dominance of states within these structures is both a 
manifestation of state power and a means to perpetuate this supremacy.
This presents a contradiction between the emancipatory orientation reflected in human 
rights principles, which conceive of participation in human rights as a means to 
empower the individual in their relationship with the state, and the structures of 
human rights, which permit state participation as a means of control. This is 
illustrated by the centrality of the principle of state consent, which promotes state 
interest in the construction and application of human rights. The achievement of the 
human rights goal of empowerment is significantly restricted by structures in which 
state interest is the overriding power. The particular structures of international law 
and human rights which promote the power of states to the detriment of individual 
participation are further discussed in section 4 below.
1327 Chapter 3, section 3.3; Chapter 4, section 1.3.
320
Finally, the dominance of states to the detriment of individual empowerment presents 
a further contradiction. For participation to be truly empowering there needs to be 
participation in determining what the ends and forms of participation itself are. 
Determination of these norms is a means to protect or to challenge power 
relationships, because participation is a means of asserting power. Therefore, for 
participation in human rights to be oriented to individuals, it must be designed to do 
so. Norms of participation which serve the interests of states are unlikely to enable 
individual empowerment. As Hartwick identifies “states dictate the rules of 
participation in international organizations like the UN”.1329 This was clearly 
illustrated in both Chapters 3 and 4. Regarding law-making, states determine who 
may formally participate1330 and the extent and manner of such participation. 
Individuals and NGOs therefore have little opportunity to extend their participation. A 
similar pattern is found concerning access to human rights structures. Participation in 
human rights through use of these is hugely important for individual access to justice 
at the international level, yet such access is subsumed to state consent. The modalities 
and accessibility of this form of participation is primarily determined by states, and 
those states which do not want those within their jurisdiction to have this opportunity 
for complaint can legitimately exclude this form of participation. Whilst individuals 
are unable to determine or redefine the norms of their participation, states retain 
tremendous control, and the ability of these structures of participation to enable 
individual empowerment is restricted. The empowering potential of participation in 
human rights is therefore contradicted by the exclusion of individuals from 
determination of the norms of participation.
1328 cross ref Chapter 1, section 1.4.
1329 Hartwick, 2003:221
1330 As Chapter 3, section 1.2 identified, NGOs have been able to extend their influence through the 
development o f  informal modes o f  participation.
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Part 4: Contradictions arising from structural elements of human 
rights and international law
4.1: The structure of human rights protection and levels of participation
A participatory analysis of human rights also highlights internal contradictions 
between the principles of human rights and structures of human rights protection. 
There is a fundamental contradiction between the concept of participation reflected in 
human rights on the national level, and the application of that conception of 
participation in human rights at the international level. The individual has a range of 
participatory rights that are political, social and cultural.1331 However, these all 
operate solely on the national level, because human rights law regulates the 
relationship between a state and its citizens. This excludes individuals from 
international participation in human rights, regarding both construction and 
application, as demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4. The individual has no right to 
participate in the construction of human rights at the international level, nor a right to 
access international human rights protection mechanisms.
Consequently, the individual is unable to participate in human rights decisions which 
affect them, despite such participation itself being implied as a human right by various 
principles of international human rights law.1332 Whilst the rights of the individual 
exist outside the domestic jurisdiction of states,1333 individual participatory rights 
operate only on the national level, although there may be international obligations to 
protect the enjoyment of these rights. The individual cannot assert their rights of 
participation above the national level, because participation as a right is viewed as 
being something that occurs on the national level. The only international aspect is the
1331
Chapter 2, section 1.1.
1339
Chapter 2, section 1.4.
1333 Orakhelashvili, 2001:242
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role of the international community to enable such national participation. There is no 
concept of such individual participation extending to the international level.
This means that participation in human rights cannot ultimately be active and 
meaningful, as it depends on indirect influence over states via either representation by 
states or NGOs, or via the operation of political, social and cultural participatory 
rights on the national level. Human rights therefore presents two conflicting concepts 
of participation; participation as broad, active and empowering on the national level, 
and participation as representative and restricted, as applied to the role of individuals 
on the international level.
All participatory rights operate under this restriction, although the resultant problems 
for promoting effective and meaningful participation are most clearly illustrated via 
the right of access to human rights structures. As identified in Chapter 4, there are no 
international rights regarding either the existence of obligations for which a state may 
be held accountable nor concerning access to accountability mechanisms which 
provide for individualised forms of complaint. These are both subject to state consent, 
and consequently participation in this way is dependent on state participation. There is 
no means for the individual to bypass these state-centric norms of participation and 
participate directly at the international level.
Consideration of participation via access to international human rights mechanisms 
therefore illustrates a fundamental contradiction. Whilst a right of access to justice 
may be clearly identified within human rights principles, this right does not extend 
beyond the national or regional levels into the international arena. Whilst the principle
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of access to justice is protected by international human rights law, it is not applicable 
to the structure of that law itself. This means that if rights are not protected on the 
national level the individual has no guaranteed right of access to international 
structures of protection, resulting in an internal contradiction as human rights reflects 
the principle that the state may not treat individuals with impunity, yet fails to provide 
a means for international access to justice and consequent state accountability which 
would prevent state abuse of human rights.
In addition, states are the primary participants in determining the content of human 
rights law, and the particular elements of it by which they will be bound. However, 
states are also the entities held accountable under human rights law. This 
demonstrates a further contradiction. States have significantly less interest in 
developing a comprehensive and effective system of human rights protection and 
accountability than the individuals whom such a system is designed to protect. If 
human rights are to be successful, individuals, as the target of human rights 
protection, should participate in their construction, including both the content of 
human rights principles and the structure and applicability o f human rights 
mechanisms.
As human rights are structurally limited to the national level, individuals are also 
unable to participate effectively in decisions that affect them concerning the actions of 
non-state actors or a foreign state. The relationship between the individual and such 
actors is mediated through the home state. Individuals therefore remain reliant on 
their state to take action, as they are unable to break the national barrier and claim 
their own rights as regards these actors at the international level. This is particularly
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problematic within the context of globalisation, as extra-territorial factors are 
increasingly affecting individual human rights enjoyment, yet the individual has no 
means to directly participate in mitigating or challenging how these issues will 
impinge on them.
This presents a fundamental contradiction concerning the purpose of human rights. If 
participation in human rights is limited to the level of the state, and does not extend 
beyond the state onto the international level, then the primary purpose of human rights 
to go beyond the barrier of state sovereignty and provide international protection to 
individuals is neutralised. Decisions concerning the content and applicability of 
international human rights law are by definition taken at the international level; if  
individuals are excluded from participation at this level then there is no guarantee that 
human rights will protect them appropriately or effectively.
The essential reason for this contradiction is that the structure of human rights law 
traditionally concerns the relationship between the state and those individuals within 
its jurisdiction. It does not take account of relationships which transcend this 
structure, and consequently does not provide for forms of participation which are 
required to enable individual rights to be protected beyond this traditional paradigm. 
Consequently it is clear that although human rights requires, and human rights 
principles promote, comprehensive forms of participation that are wide ranging with 
regards levels and actors, the structures within which it operate serve to restrict this in 
practice.
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4.2: The effect of international law
Contradictions between the types of participation required by human rights and those 
enabled by the traditional structure of international law can also be identified. Several 
of the discrepancies between the type of participation appropriate for human rights 
and the forms actually found within human rights are related to its position and 
development within broad structures and principles of international law. 
Fundamentally, these contradictions arise due to the traditionally state-centric 
structure of international law, which presents an exclusive and limited model of 
participation.
International law has traditionally been the law of states and the relationships between 
them, and has therefore historically prioritised state interest and consequent 
participation. Alston argues that even the terminology used, “non-state actors”, “non- 
govemmental organisations” intentionally reflects the marginalisation of these entities 
and the consequent centrality of states within international law.1334 The principle of 
state sovereignty is the primary definitional ideology of international law; the “basic 
constitutional doctrine of the law of nations”.1335 The corollary of sovereignty is state 
consent, which centralises state participation in the construction and definition of 
international law.
Because human rights are a part of international law, they reflect these structures of 
participation and inclusion. Examination of structures of participation in human rights 
law-making and access to human rights clearly demonstrated both the dominance of 
state-centric forms of participation, and the centrality of state interests in determining
1334 Alston, 2005: 3
1335 Brownlie, 1998:289
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norms of participation. In consequence, the contradiction between the universality of 
human rights and the partiality of access to human rights results from the principle of 
state consent which controls the structures and formation of human rights obligations. 
The restrictions on participation at the international level also stem from the centrality 
of states as the only international actors: decision-making at this level is solely their 
concern.
Fundamentally, the state remains central in determining both what human rights law 
is, and whether individuals can participate in human rights by having access to 
structures of complaint. The individual has no right to decide what their rights should 
be. They have no right to develop the content of the law, or to determine how it 
should be developed to best protect their rights. They have no right to demand that 
they are protected by particular aspects of international human rights law. All of these 
forms of participation in human rights are subject to state consent. Individual 
participation oriented to extensive and effective protection of human rights is 
therefore severely limited by the centrality of the principle of state consent within 
international law.
Concluding Rem arks
It is clear that there are a number of major contradictions between the types of 
participation appropriate for human rights and that actually reflected in the principles 
and structures of human rights. There are significant discrepancies between the 
principle of universality in human rights and the realities of access to human rights, 
and this disparity enables challenges to the legitimacy of human rights. Human rights
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require active, effective and meaningful participation; in practice, participation in 
human rights is over-reliant on representative forms, which are unable to provide this. 
The key human rights goal of empowerment is restricted by norms of participation 
primarily determined by and oriented to state interest. Fundamentally, it is this 
centrality of states in international law that restricts the ability of structures of human 
rights to reflect appropriate forms of participation. There is consequently an inherent 
contradiction between the participatory requirements of human rights and the 
structures of international law within which human rights operates.
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Conclusion
Part 1: Addressing the Research Questions
The relationship between participation and human rights has not received sufficient 
development or attention, despite participation being identified as a human rights 
issue in itself as well as providing a conceptual connection between several different 
human rights concerns. This thesis has remedied this deficiency, by significantly 
expanding understandings both of the concept of participation and what it both should 
and does mean in a human rights context.
It is clear that there is no single way to conceptualise ‘participation’; rather it is 
complex, contested and contextual. There are various different forms which 
participation may take and diverse ends to which it may be oriented. There are also 
clearly different levels o f participation by diverse actors. In addition, the particular 
form of participation found in a given situation is affected by its practical feasibility. 
The forms and purposes of participation are also inherently determined by the 
underlying norms of participation which establish the particular structures of 
participation in a given context.
Similarly, approaches to and understandings of the basis, meaning, purpose and 
content o f human rights are varied and disputed. However, four key characteristics of 
human rights can be identified: universality, empowerment, dignity and justice. 
Assessment of participation through the application of these principles provides the
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type of participation most appropriate to human rights, in terms of the modes, 
purposes, feasibility and norms of participation. Such participation is oriented to the 
concerns of the individual; it is fundamentally active, effective and meaningful, rather 
than passive, tokenistic and manipulated. It therefore requires broad-ranging and 
direct rights o f participation, including access to justice and to human rights 
information, and must enable individual participation at the international level; thus 
implying the needs for ‘international’ rights of participation. It is universally 
inclusive, which requires equality of opportunity and access without discrimination to 
participatory structures and processes. Finally, participation in human rights must be 
oriented to the empowerment of the individual and the accountability of the state, 
which further requires inclusion in the determination and redefinition of the norms of 
participation itself.
The establishment of these criteria enables comparison between the type of 
participation appropriate for human rights and that manifested by the principles and 
structures of international human rights law. Human rights legal instruments largely 
reflect acceptable forms of participation. A broad range of participatory rights are 
protected, and the importance of active, effective and meaningful forms of 
participation is identified. Participation is recognised as a form of individual 
empowerment and a means to hold states accountable for their actions. Non- 
discriminatory access to participatory processes is considered essential, although the 
principle of progressive realization indicates that state obligations concerning the 
fulfilment of some participatory rights are not absolute and may vary between states. 
Finally, principles of international human rights law recognise the importance of 
normative participation, although the principles which actually protect such forms of
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participation currently appear to potentially have specialised rather than general 
application, and are in need of further development.
There is, however, a lack of clarity regarding the extent to which political 
participatory rights protect direct modes of participation, due to the lack of 
development of the content of the right to participate in public affairs compared to the 
right to vote. Principles of human rights law clearly focus on representative rather 
than direct forms of participation, through the centralisation of the right to vote and 
the right to democracy. Furthermore, international human rights legal principles do 
not protect the right of the individual to participate at the international level. This 
limits the ability of participation in human rights to fulfil an essential function; to 
provide protection above the level of the state.
Examination of participation in structures of international human rights law also 
reflects these, and other, contradictions. Participation in human rights law-making is 
dominated by states as the principle actors in international law. Prospects for 
individual participation in law-making are extremely limited, and consequently their 
predominant means of participation is via representation by NGOs. NGO participation 
in human rights law-making has been extensive, although their formal rights are 
hugely restricted compared to those of states. Participation in human rights law­
making therefore reflects a power struggle between NGOs and states over the content 
of human rights, the consequent state obligations and the norms of participation in 
law-making.
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Individual access to human rights mechanisms is more extensive than individual 
participation in law-making, with various opportunities for direct participation 
through individual complaint mechanisms. However, states still dominate the 
accessibility of human rights, as state consent determines whether individuals may 
participate in structures of human rights protection. State participation determines the 
existence and content of obligations, and decides whether individual complaints 
procedures are available. Furthermore, the ability of NGOs to extend individual 
participation through representation is far more limited than within human rights law­
making. Regarding access to human rights, NGOs’ role is primarily that of enabling 
individual participation, as they are generally also excluded from forums to which 
individuals do not have access. This enabling role of NGOs is however vital, 
especially concerning the provision of human rights information concerning the 
content of rights and obligations and the details of complaints mechanisms. This is 
particularly important because state obligations regarding the dissemination of human 
rights information are unclear, and such information is essential for other forms of 
individual participation.
Consequently, underlying contradictions are identified between the type of 
participation appropriate for human rights and that manifested in the principles and 
structures of international human rights law. Firstly, both principles and structures of 
participation in international human rights law prioritise participation via 
representation over more direct forms. This limits the potential for participation to be 
active, effective and empowering. Furthermore, for representative structures to be 
effective, successful representative democracies are required at both the national and 
international levels, and these are clearly not present in practice.
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Although NGOs do provide an important counterbalance to the centrality of state 
power and interest manifested in participation in human rights, there are also 
problems with reliance on NGO participation as a means for individuals to indirectly 
participate. The extent to which NGOs are truly representative, in particular regarding 
their beneficiaries rather than their membership, must be questioned. Furthermore, 
whilst NGOs are important participants in human rights, particularly with regard to 
law-making, their influence is limited compared with that of states. Considering 
NGOs as a means to ensure individual participation therefore places individuals 
within these same restrictions.
Finally, the centrality of the principle of state consent within international law and 
consequently within structures of international human rights law fundamentally limits 
the extent to which participation in human rights can be equal, universal and 
inclusive. Both the obligations for which states may be held responsible and the 
complaints mechanisms used to ensure such accountability are determined by state 
rather than individual participation. States are also central in determining the norms of 
participation in human rights. Consequently, the ability of human rights to protect and 
empower individuals and to ensure justice and dignity is fundamentally restricted. 
Furthermore, the discrepancy between the principle of universality and the partiality 
of access enables challenges to the legitimacy of international human rights law. The 
essential contradiction regarding participation in human rights, between the principle 
of state consent and the orientation of human rights to the protection of individuals, is 
therefore the result of a wider conflict between the ideology of human rights and the 
context of international law within which human rights structures have developed.
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Part 2: Resolutions: reform and research
The aim of this thesis has been to explore the relationship between participation and 
international human rights law, and to identify inherent tensions and contradictions 
through comparing the ideal of participation in human rights with the participation 
found in practice. It is beyond the scope of this project to comprehensively consider 
all of the potential ramifications and implications of the relationship between 
participation and human rights, especially given the paucity of existing research on 
this topic. However, there are a number of issues currently under discussion within 
human rights and international law analyses which could offer ways to more fully 
explore the interaction between participation and human rights and to potentially 
resolve some of the identified contradictions resulting from current structures of 
participation within international human rights law. It is therefore of value briefly to 
identify and explore those areas which would benefit from enhanced analysis.
2.1: Reform of the UN
As identified, the UN is profoundly undemocratic, and this affects how far individual 
concerns regarding human rights can be represented and addressed. The democratic 
deficits of the UN are well-recognised, and there have been various approaches to 
reform of the UN formulated. Some approaches focus on the exclusion of individuals 
from UN decision-making processes, and advocate the establishment o f new UN 
bodies to enable greater inclusion. For example, Held argues that the UN, as an inter­
state organisation, is currently unable to operate as an effective institution to represent 
the people of the world. For the UN to fulfil this role, it therefore requires the 
“establishment of an independent assembly of democratic peoples, directly elected by
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them and accountable to them”.1336 Others commentators have discussed the 
development of a People’s Assembly for the UN as a means to make it more 
democratic, and there are considerable debates concerning the exact nature and 
function of this body.1337 It is argued that good governance within the UN requires 
inclusion of, participation by and engagement with both all states and broader society, 
including NGOs, academic institutions, the business community and the general 
public.1338
Such approaches certainly offer the potential of a more democratic international 
system, albeit a form of democracy centred on representation. They would, however, 
also potentially offer more opportunities for direct individual participation at the 
international level and consequently in decision-making regarding the construction 
and application o f international human rights law, because they envisage a role for 
individuals that is not reliant on state participation.
Other proposals advocate internal reform of current UN institutional mechanisms in 
order to make them more democratic. Suggestions include reform of participation in 
the Security Council; the abolition of the veto1339 and the redefinition of permanent 
membership to enable greater global balance o f power.1340 Whilst this would make the 
internal decision-making processes of the UN more democratic, and enhance states’ 
ability to represent the concerns of their citizens at the international level, it would 
nonetheless still be predicated on the existence and efficacy of representative
1336 Held, 1995:273
1337 Newcombe, 1991: 83-91 surveys the various proposals for a ‘People’s Assembly’; see also Held, 
1995: 273-275; Childers, 1994: 205; Hoffman, 1991: 52-56
1338 De Waart, 1995: 59
1339 KOchler, 2006: 337; Koechler, 1991: 238-244
1340 Kdchler, 2006: 337
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democracy at the national level if it were to enable individual participation in 
international human rights law.
However, it seems unlikely that the UN will either reform existing mechanisms or 
develop new ones in ways that would enable more appropriate and effective 
participation in human rights. Existing unequal structures of participation militate 
against such change. The power of the veto and the interests of more powerful states 
in restricting participation indicate that progress is unlikely. For example, Paul notes 
that in the 1996 meeting of the Working Group on the reform of the Security Council, 
four of the five Permanent Members vigorously defended its retention.1341 This 
illustrates the importance of participation in the construction of the norms of 
participation, and further highlights how the inequalities of state participation in the 
UN system not only restrict individual participation via representative forms, but also 
limits the potential for change. Nonetheless, it would be of value to further develop 
analyses exploring how the individual could participate more directly in international 
organisations, and could therefore have a more active and effective relationship with 
the development and application by these structures of international human rights law. 
A greater emphasis on individual participation would provide at least a conceptual 




2.2: Deliberative approaches to participation
The analysis above has shown the problematic aspects of reliance on representative 
forms of democracy as a means of participation in human rights. However, more 
deliberative approaches to democracy could provide more appropriate types of 
participation in human rights. Whilst, as noted in Chapter 1, there are many 
perspectives on the concepts of deliberative democracy,1342 certain common themes 
can be identified which may provide for a more appropriate form of participation in 
international human rights.
Firstly, direct or deliberative democracy presents a more active conception of the role 
of the individual, rather than their role being restricted to voting for representatives. 
Gaventa argues that truly inclusive democracy requires more than elections.1343 In 
addition, deliberative forms allow for greater inclusion of minority interests, which 
may be excluded by an aggregative system. Wheatley argues that greater recognition 
of the deliberative nature of democracy would provide for greater participation by 
minority and marginalised groups, as it would enable them to bring issues onto the 
political agenda.1344 Furthermore, deliberative forms emphasize consensus and 
cooperation, rather than competition,1345 which raises the potential of a more widely 
acceptable outcome.1346 In consequence, deliberative approaches promote a more 
active, inclusive and collective concept of participation.
Deliberative forms of participation therefore appear to fulfil many of the human rights 
criteria concerning the forms and purpose of participation. Although significant
1342 Chapter 1, section 1.1.3.
1343 Gaventa, 2002: 10
1344 Wheatley, 2003: 527
1345 Cohen, 1996: 111-112
1346 Wheatley, 2003: 527
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challenges have been identified regarding the practical applicability of more direct or 
deliberative forms of decision-making,1347 it would be of value to further consider 
what these approaches could offer and how they could potentially be applied within 
the human rights context. A fully deliberative human rights structure appears unlikely, 
but these more direct modes of participation could offer a means to enhance some 
bottom-up forms of decision-making, which would be both more inclusive and would 
make human rights more meaningful to those whom they affect. In addition, more 
active and direct forms of participation would assist individual empowerment, and, if 
translated to the international level, would decrease reliance on the state to represent 
the concerns of individuals.
2.2.1: Direct participation in practice: localised definition and application of 
human rights
One potential means to apply deliberative concepts of participation to human rights is 
through more localised processes of interpretation and implementation. Although the 
legitimacy of human rights has been challenged by applying a participatory critique, a 
more participatory approach to the construction and application of human rights could 
enhance their legitimacy and consequent respect. This form of participation is 
understood as ownership over human rights principles and embodies their cultural and 
social resonance. Participation as ownership over human rights can be expressed in a 
number of ways: either by direct involvement in the development of principles, by 
agreeing that those principles are representative, and/or by participating in processes 
of implementation. Gaventa argues that in order to ‘make rights real’; that is in order 
for rights to have meaning to people, individuals and groups must participate in
1347 Chapter 1, section 1.1.3.
338
determining what those rights are and how they should be implemented.1348 
Furthermore, a sense of ownership of human rights principles entails greater 
commitment to the achievement of those principles. By expanding the concept of 
ownership of human rights across and between cultures and societies there is a greater 
chance of universal understanding of human rights standards and their 
implementation.1349 As Freeman observes, there can be no effective rights without 
supportive institutions and communities.1350 This particular need for local support in 
order for human rights to be effective was also specifically identified by 
interviewees.1351
In addition, it is contended that ratification of human rights instruments, frequently 
with reservations, is “an assertion of membership in the world community and not a 
commitment to the implementation of these rights or their legitimacy”. It is also 
argued that although states may have a genuine commitment to human rights 
principles, and will sign conventions with the intention of putting them into practice, 
this aim is impeded by local cultures which do not recognise such human rights
i o c o
principles as their own, and consequently do not support them. Both of these 
perspectives indicate that the sole participation of governments is insufficient to 
create a true human rights culture, with effective respect for these rights, within 
different societies. For both global and local human rights culture to be meaningful 
and effective, norms of participation must be widened to produce greater inclusion of
Gaventa, 2002
1349 Penna and Campbell, 1998: 22
1350 Freeman, 1998: 37
1351 ID 3, 03/03/07; ID 4, 05/11/07
1352 Pollis, 2000: 15
1353 Harris-Short, 2003: 134
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different perspectives, which may not necessarily correspond with those currently 
dominant in the human rights discourse.
This indicates that greater participation and inclusion of individuals and communities 
in the development and implementation of human rights would enhance their 
legitimacy and consequent respect. This approach therefore emphasizes a ‘bottom-up’ 
rather than ‘top-down’ approach to participation as a determinant of human rights 
legitimacy and implementation, entailing direct involvement of individuals, rather 
than reliance on governments. It is suggested that such enhanced participation should 
come via processes of internal cultural discourse and cross-cultural dialogue1354 to 
explore the possibilities of cultural reinterpretation and reconstruction of human 
rights. Such dialogue would be inclusive, representational and non-hierarchical, and 
would aim to enhance participation both within and between different cultures in the 
construction and application of human rights norms. An international legal system 
which includes participation by non-state actors opens the possibility of both national 
and international dialogue between governments, non-state individuals, communities 
and groups.1355 Dialogue is preferable to coercion, and it must be remembered that so- 
called human rights intervention may be motivated by political, cultural or economic 
imperialism.1356 Such dialogue requires certain guaranteed rights if it is to be effective 
and inclusive; a level of material and psychological wellbeing is necessary for 
participation in dialogue, and it must not be monopolised by governments.1357 By 
extending the concept of ownership of human rights to non-Western societies via
An-Na’im, 1992:3
1355 McCorquodale, 2004: 485
1356 Freeman, 1998: 33
1357 Freeman, 1998: 35
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cross-cultural dialogue there is a greater chance of universal understanding of human 
rights standards and their implementation.1358
It would therefore be of value to not only develop research into the concept of cross- 
and inter-cultural discourse concerning the definition and application of human rights, 
but also to expand assessment of how far this is reflected in practice. This would also 
allow consideration of what, if any, forms of deliberative participation are being 
utilised in these processes. Such analyses would also enable consideration of the 
extent to which grassroots forms of participation contribute to universal 
understandings and acceptance o f human rights principles, and whether such 
expanded participation in turn enhances the legitimacy of international human rights 
law at the local level.
2.3: Challenges to traditional structures of participation in international law
Finally, the central factor restricting participation in human rights is, as has been 
demonstrated, traditional structures of international law. These inherently restrict 
participation by promoting a state-centric understanding of participation. However, 
there are certain evolving perspectives which challenge these traditional structures, 
and in doing so offer the potential for a reconfiguration of the norms of participation 
in international law and consequently in human rights.
1358 Penna and Campbell, 1998: 22
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2.3.1: Contrasting theoretical approaches to international law
Different theoretical approaches to international law provide contrasting accounts of 
participation in international law. The theoretical position adopted therefore affects 
how participation is understood, and how such understandings may be developed to 
become more acceptable and appropriate. The positivist account, currently the 
dominant philosophical approach within international law1359 emphasizes that all 
legitimate law emanates from a law-making authority; the sovereign will of states.1360 
A fundamental principle of international law is that states may not be legally bound 
without their express (via treaty) or implicit (via custom) consent; thus the positivist 
requirement of a law-creating sovereign will is satisfied. In this way international law 
centralises the will and interest of states in the creation of binding positive legal rules. 
This includes the legal principles which determine how law itself is made; 
consequently state participation is a self-replicating structure. The positivist account 
therefore centralises state participation and centralises states as the only legitimate 
participants in international law.
However, whilst positivism still dominates international law in theory and practice, 
other approaches provide the potential for competing and more progressive accounts 
of participation. A natural law position presents a different account of legitimacy and 
participation in international law. It considers that legal principles derive their 
authority from their basis in general moral standards, which have universal 
applicability;1361 the “basic human goods” discovered via the application of 
reason.1362 Natural law thus argues that justice is the condition for legal legitimacy
1359 Goldsmith and Posner, 2005: 82, also Brownlie, 1998: 289
1360 Ward, 1998: 102-3; Lee, 1989: 135
1361 Brown, 1997:44-45
1362 Finnis, 2002: 25
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rather than state consent; unjust law is no law at all.1363 Both international law and 
human rights are therefore determined by the application of reason, which is assumed 
to produce a universal account. In consequence, natural law approaches imply 
universal participation; that these just principles are a communal creation that serves 
collective interests, rather than being the product of particular state interests.
Critical analyses1364 explicitly examine minority and/or marginalised perspectives on 
international law, and consequently identify multiple understandings and meanings of 
human rights. Critical approaches consider international human rights to be the 
product of a particular discourse, context or philosophical or political perspective, 
which thus contests claims of universality. This challenges understandings of the 
norms of participation as fixed, and rather seeks to interrogate who has been excluded 
from participation in the construction of human rights law and why. Critical 
approaches therefore indicate the possibility of a reconstruction of international law 
discourse and methodology in order to incorporate other world views. This 
indicates that the norms of participation are flexible, and open to challenge or 
development.
However, none of these perspectives presents a complete and appropriate account of 
participation in human rights. Through determining the validity of law solely in 
relation to its emanation from the sovereign will, the positivist account presents an 
inadequate and partial account of the power structures of the international system, and 
consequently of the role of power in the norms of participation in law-making. For
1363 Cotterrell, 2003: 15
1364 Critical analyses include, inter alia feminist and third world accounts o f  international law and law­
making; see Boyle and Chinkin, 2007; Rajagopal, 2003; Charlesworth et al, 1991; Fellmeth, 2000; 
Charles worth and Chinkin, 2000; Mutua 2000
1365 Charlesworth et al, 1991: 644; Wheatley, 2003: 519; Mutua, 2000: 31
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example, Carty questions the basis of the positivist account of the sources of law, 
arguing that the drafting of Article 38 of the Statute of the ICC must be considered in 
the context of the post World War I attempt to institutionalise relations among 
States.1366 Legal positivism can only offer a partial and inadequate account of the 
norms of participation as it necessarily excludes from consideration the multiplicity of 
informal participants who, as shown in the analysis above, have a major influence 
over the construction and application of international human rights law. In addition, 
the positivist account serves to legitimise states’ actions in their own self-interest1367 
and thus does not take account of how issues of power and justice impact on norms 
and structures of participation.
Natural law presents a more inclusive account of participation, but is unable to give 
an adequate account of the source of human rights norms. Reason as a source of 
natural law principles assumes that the concept of public reason is universal and that it 
will thus result in universal principles. As George and Wolfe identify, the idea of 
reason is subject to manipulation by elites, who may control what is included in 
public discourse.1368 In assuming that the natural law account is available and obvious 
to all, restricted participation in the identification and application of norms of human 
rights is ignored. Whilst contending that unjust law is illegitimate, natural law theory 
does not explain who participates in the assessment of the legitimacy and justice of 
norms of human rights, and therefore does not overcome structures of power and 
control.
Carty, 1986: 14
1367 Kosicenniemi, 1989: 132
1368 George and Wolfe, 2000: 54
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Critical accounts imply a far more inclusive and reflexive account of participation in 
human rights than either natural law or positivism. However, critical approaches 
fundamentally raise questions rather than provide answers. They seek to deconstruct 
the dominant human rights discourse, and although they identify the need for an 
inclusive and participatory reconstruction of the norms of participation in human 
rights, critical accounts do not clearly identify the processes by which this could take 
place, nor the specific changes required within current practices regarding the 
construction o f international law. Consequently, whilst they are useful in identifying 
the importance of a participatory evaluation, they do not detail how such an approach 
can be applied to the reconstruction of participation in international law and 
consequently in human rights.
Examination of different theoretical approaches to international law is of value 
because it demonstrates that accounts of participation are not rigid but are open to 
interpretation and challenge. Whilst none of these perspectives presents an ideal 
account of participation in international human rights law, there are elements which 
would merit further development. Firstly, it is clear that the positivist account is 
inadequate as a reflection of the realities of participation in international human rights 
law. In consequence, because positivism is so dominant within international law, 
challenges to this account promote a reconception of the fundamental structures and 
norms of participation. Natural law is of value because it promotes a universal 
concept o f participation in determining the principles of human rights law, although 
the way in which it does this is contradictory. However, this principle of universal 
participation is worthy of further development. Finally, critical approaches are of 
value due to their centralisation of participation beyond the state, and their
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identification of underlying power relationships and normative assumptions, but 
require further development of their practical implications regarding enhanced 
inclusion.
2.3.2: The role o f NGOs
NGO participation in international human rights constitutes a challenge both in
practice and in principle to state-centric norms of participation. It is well recognised
that the role of NGOs in international relations is increasingly important.1369 This is
affecting norms and structures of participation in human rights in several ways.
Firstly, it challenges the dominance of state participation in international law. NGOs
have affected the norms of international law in terms of both content and process,1370
and their participation has introduced new voices into the international law discourse
1 1beyond those of states and the international organisations established by states. 
Consequently, their participation has redefined norms of participation in international 
law and therefore in international human rights law to be more inclusive.
Therefore, understandings o f participation in the creation, development and 
implementation of international law can no longer be limited to states. Perspectives on 
participation which incorporates NGO participation therefore in turn challenge 
traditional, positivist perspectives of participation in international law. As Maragia 
identifies “there is little doubt that the presence and growing importance of NGOs in 
international politics today, assaults the states assumed monopoly of the system -  in
1369 Otto, 1996: 127; Suter, 1991: 12; Cakmak, 2008: 7; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002: 4
1370 Chamovitz, 2006: 361
1371 Cullen and Morrow, 2001: 31
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particular sovereignty, and statehood”.1372 Furthermore, this role of NGOs requires a 
reconceptualisation of international law, which has “not yet fully caught up to the 
reality of NGO participation”.1373 International law must be expanded to take account 
of NGO participation as state-dependent understandings of the system are no longer 
coherent or sustainable.1374 NGO participation therefore presents a fundamental 
challenge to the ways traditional understandings of international law conceive of 
participation, and consequently promotes significant redefinition of the norms of 
participation as reflected in principles of international law.
Secondly, it has been contended that NGO participation makes the international 
system more democratic and accountable. As identified above, the institutions of the 
UN can be considered neither democratic nor representative, meaning that individuals 
are unable to indirectly participate in human rights through their state’s participation 
at the UN. Van Boven considers that NGOs go some way towards filling a 
‘democratic gap’ in international law-making, as they provide a means for the 
interests of peoples, rather than states, to be represented.1375 Similarly, Scholte 
suggests that civil society activism offers the potential to reduce the democratic deficit 
in global governance through enabling expanded opportunities for public 
participation, representation and accountability.1376 In addition, NGOs offer an 
opportunity for those individuals whose state is undemocratic and whose interests will 
therefore not be represented by it in international forums to participate, by acting as
1177“surrogate representatives of people from undemocratic countries”. Although there
1372 Maragia, 2002; 312; see also Otto, 1996: 128
1373 Chamovtiz, 1997: 278
1374 McCorquodale, 2004: 485
1375 Van Boven, 1990:224
1376 Scholte, 2004: 420
1377 Willets, 2000: 111
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remain issues to be resolved concerning the degree to which NGOs are themselves 
representative and accountable, and therefore the extent to which they can overcome 
the deficiencies of the international system, there is no doubt that their activities have 
enabled greater individual participation in international human rights, and that this has 
improved its accountability and representativeness.
Although there is increasing research directed towards NGO participation in 
international law and in human rights,1378 current analysis primarily focuses on 
participation by NGOs in their own right, and the implications of this participation as 
a challenge to the norms of international law.1379 However, certain elements and 
implications of NGO participation would merit greater attention. The nature of the 
relationship between NGOs and individuals and the extent to which it is 
representative or enabling requires further exploration, in order to determine how far 
NGO participation does or can facilitate enhanced individual participation in 
international human rights law, both within international organisations, and as a 
counterbalance to state power and interest.
2.3.3: The dynamism o f international law and human rights
Finally, neither international law nor human rights are static and fixed systems. 
Rather, both are in a constant state of evolution, development and redefinition. The 
changing nature o f the mutually constitutive relationship between human rights and 
international law has therefore affected both principles and structures of participation 
in international human rights law, and offers opportunities for further improvement.
1378 Introduction, Part 4.
1379 For example, Butler (2007, 145-193) explores how NGO participation impacts on the norm o f state 
sovereignty in relation to participation in law-making.
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The development of human rights has had a major effect on participation in 
international law, notwithstanding the restrictions that still exist, as discussed above. 
As Bianchi notes, the development of international human rights “has inevitably and 
irrevocably altered the main tenets of the traditional paradigm of international
1 1 O A
law”. Fundamentally, the human rights doctrine has changed the status of the 
individual and the nature of the relationship between individual and state within 
international law. It has conceptualised the individual as an active participant with 
their own interests rather than a passive object of international law. The recognition 
within human rights o f the individual as a subject, rather than the object of 
government policies, requires a reconstruction of international relations to enable a 
bottom-up approach, rather than the top-down structure of traditional international 
law.1381 This demonstrates expansion of participation in international human rights to 
include individuals, at least in principle. In consequence, the state is no longer the 
only subject of international law,1382 thus constituting a major challenge to state- 
centric norms of participation.
Furthermore, through centralising the individual, human rights require that the 
individual replaces the state as the primary normative unit of international law. 
Understandings of human rights as inherent and inalienable challenge the dominance 
of state consent, and centralise the rights of the individual over the interests of the 
state. The human rights discourse has therefore sought to limit state participation 
through the principle that certain actions of the state are legitimately subject to
1380 Bianchi, 1997: 182
1381 Petersmann, 2001: 15-16
1382 Simonovic, 2000: 397
1383 Petersmann, 2001: 23
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international scrutiny and judgement. Again, this has challenged traditional norms of 
participation by seeking to limit the power of the state in relation to the rights of 
individuals rather than of other states.
However, whilst the development of human rights within international law has 
enabled major challenges to established norms of participation, a number of 
problematic aspects remain, as have been detailed in the preceding analysis. 
Consequently, significant challenges remain if participation in human rights law is to 
fully embody that required by the fundamental principles of human rights.
Firstly, the nature of obligations needs to be reconceptualised in order to ensure 
universal access to human rights: “The traditional human rights paradigm, according 
to which individuals are subjects of rights and states holders of obligations, does not 
fully reflect present-day tendencies”.1384 Most importantly, there is a need to 
reconsider both the structure and formation of obligations in orientation to the 
underlying principle that power should entail human rights obligations, irrespective of 
territory, type of actor, or consent. This would overcome the lack of applicability of 
human rights and the consequent lack of access to them caused by both the 
restrictions of state consent, and the gaps in protection entailed by the deficiencies in 
obligations held by non-state actors.
This thesis has not considered state obligations concerning participation in great 
depth; there remains a need for research which addresses this issue. Current 
developments in obligations theory have been directed towards establishing the
1384 Rosas, 1995: 77
350
theoretical basis and practical application of extra-territorial obligations.1385 However, 
as Chapter 2 noted, such analysis has focused on the extra-territorial obligations of 
states. The logical extension of the individual right to participate in all matters that 
affect the individual is the concept of extra-territorial participatory rights concerning 
the actions of states which will have extra-territorial effect. Research on extra­
territoriality in international human rights law should be expanded to explore this 
hypothesis.
In addition, there is a lack of clarity concerning particular participatory rights 
including the right of access to information, the right to participate in public affairs 
and the right to self-determination. Analysis directed to more fully exploring the 
participatory aspects of these rights, and developing their relationships with each 
other is therefore required. The concept of participatory rights and how this equates to 
or is distinct from a specific right to participation, would also merit further attention, 
as would the relationship between rights of participation and participation in human 
rights.
Furthermore, the concept of the expansion of human rights to the international level 
links both extra-territorial obligations research and analysis of the content of rights. 
Fundamentally, the ‘right to have rights’ needs to be determined in international law. 
This right entails the right to participate in determining the content and applicability 
of all other human rights, and a right of access to an international complaints 
mechanism. This thesis has demonstrated that individual participatory rights at the 
national level, particularly concerning access to justice, are fundamentally limited as a
1385 inter alia  Skogly, 2006; Gibney, 2008
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means to ensure state accountability. The development of international human rights 
has been posited as a means to address this. Further analysis is therefore required to 
determine how rights might function in this supra-national and extra-territorial way, 
and what the content and resultant obligations of truly ‘international’ and 
participatory human rights would be.
Finally, the power of the state remains central in international law. International law is 
still dominated by states, despite the fundamental changes brought about by the 
development of human rights and the expanding role of NGOs. If individuals are to be 
able to truly participate in human rights in active, effective and meaningful ways, then 
a significant redefinition of the power relationships between states and individuals is 
required, and a greater balance of power directed towards the needs, interests and 
participation of individuals. States will always be a fundamental actor in international 
law; however, the development of human rights has shown that the role o f individuals 
can be expanded. There is clearly an ongoing tension between the traditional 
structures of international law and the more revolutionary aspects of human rights 
concerning norms of participation. Therefore, there is a need for further research into 
how this tension can be overcome, through examining the ways in which human 
rights has influenced and can further redefine the structure of international law in 
order to enable appropriate forms of individual participation.
In consequence, there is a fundamental need simply to centralise the participatory 
perspective when considering human rights and international law. This in itself will 
challenge the traditional and dominant state-centric norms of participation, which, as 
identified, are the source of the majority of contradictions concerning participation
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and human rights. Writings of academics do, as has been discussed, at least have the 
potential to influence the ways the concepts and practice of international law are 
understood. Analysts and jurists perhaps need to be reminded that the central 
participant in human rights is the individual, not the state. This reflects an underlying 
tension between the purpose of human rights and the international legal context in 
which it has been developed. It will not be easy to resolve this conflict, but it is a 
worthwhile and essential challenge.
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Appendix 1: NGO interviews
The interviews are held on file with the author.
Fifty individuals from twenty-five organisations w ere approached, of whom thirty-two 
from sixteen organisations agreed to be interviewed. Of these , tw en ty -six  in terv iew s in 
total w ere conducted, from thirteen different organisations, a s  it did not prove possib le to 
find mutually convenient tim es for som e, or no further resp on ses other than the initial 
accep tan ce w ere received.
Nineteen interviews w ere conducted in person and sev en  by email. Of the former, five 
were face-to-face and fourteen by telephone.
Six follow-up interviews w ere conducted, on e in person and five by email.
The interviews conducted in person w ere all recorded except one, due to equipment 
problems. Fifteen of the recordings w ere transcribed verbatim, and three in note form. 
Detailed notes w ere taken for the interview that w as not recorded. The email interviews 
took the form of a questionnaire, which provided a record of respon ses. The follow-up 
interview conducted in person w as transcribed in note form.
O ne individual w as interviewed from each  of sev en  organisations, two from four 
organisations, three from on e organisation and eight from on e organisation.




Of the national organisations, one w as the national branch of an international 
organisation.
Head office:
B ased in UK: 7
B ased in Europe (not UK): 5
Based elsew here: 1 (Africa)
O ne organisation w as based in the UK but w as entirely concerned with the protection of 
human rights in an African state.




Note: on e interviewee w as a volunteer at the time of the first interview, but by the follow- 







Appendix 2: Example questionnaire/interview schedule 










■ Looking at th e  c o n c e p t o f participation in hum an rights.
■ A s  part o f th is, research in g  th e  role o f N G O s in hum an rights.
■ C onducting  in terview s with m em b ers  o f N G O s to  g e t  a  ra n g e o f p e r sp e c tiv e s  
on participation.
■ In terested  in firstly, how  N G O s participate th e m se lv e s  in th e  construction  and  
protection  o f hum an rights, and  sec o n d ly , h ow  th ey  m ay help  o th ers  to  
participate.
Protocol
•  In terview s will b e  record ed  & transcribed
•  D ata for u s e  in PhD  th e s is  & p o ss ib le  pub lications
•  I w ould  like to u s e  unidentified d irect q u o te s  -  is th is ok?




General information about the organisation, its aims and methods -  how does it 
participate? The way in which an NGO determines, pursues and evaluates its goals 
contributes to the construction of human rights law. For all questions try to distinguish 
between ‘organisational’ view and ‘personal’ view.
1. What is your role within the organisation? How long have you been  involved?
This is an easy opening question
2. Tell m e about the aim s of your organisation.
What rights d o es  your organisation focus on?
This is to identify which (if any) participatory rights the organisation is concerned with
3. How d o es  your organisation determine its aims, goa ls and strategies? (in partnership 
with those affected? Top down or bottom up process?). Is this the m ost appropriate way 
to do it? Why?
4. What m ethods d o es  your organisation u se  to ach ieve its aim s? Do you think that 
th ese  m ethods are effective? How could they be improved?
This is both to identify the broad ways in which the organisation participates and whether 
it uses participatory methods, also to introduce discussion of problems
5. Do you think that your organisation fa ces  any problems in achieving its aim s?
This is to identify the restrictions (on participation) under which the organisation may 
operate
6. How is your organisation funded? Do you think that this has an effect on policy? How? 
Why?
7. How d o es  your organisation evaluate its work? Is this the m ost effective way to do it? 
Why? (ie in partnership with those affected? Top down or bottom up process?)
8. What influence do you feel that you/your organisation have over the developm ent of 
human rights?
9. Do you think that you/your organisation has contributed to the protection of human 
rights? How?
This is to identify if/how the organisation participates in the definition & application of 
human rights.
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10. D o es your organisation work in partnership with others? How? Why?
This is to explore issues of facilitation/inclusion/representation
11. Do the people on w h ose behalf your organisation works participate in its work? 
Should they? Why? How?
Do you (personally) feel connected to the people that the organisation is working for? 
This is to explore issues of facilitation/inclusion/representation
Part 2:
More conceptual issues regarding the nature of both participation and human rights
12. What d o es  ‘participation’ mean to you? For example, is it political, economic, social, 
cultural?
Different perspectives on the meaning of participation -  wider than just political decision­
making? Further exploration of facilitation of participation.
12. What d o es  ‘human rights’ m ean to you?
This is to explore different meanings of human rights -  narrow/broad? Law/discourse? 
Also to define different ways of defining and constructing ‘human rights’ -  by who? What 
criteria?
13. Do you think that participation is important for human rights? Why? How?
Is this som ething that you/your organisation feel that you do/should cam paign for? 
Link participation and human rights.
(Return to questions 8 & 9 in follow up interview to allow reflection by interviewee?)
14. Is there anything e lse  that you would like to tell m e about that you think is relevant? 
Open ended question allowing respondent to determine subject matter.
Checklist “go back to, tell me more about”:
•  W a y s  in w hich  th e  organ isation  d eterm in es, p u r su e s  & e v a lu a te s  its g o a ls  
and  m e th o d s?
•  P ro b lem s fa ced
•  W ork with o th ers?
•  In fluence o v er  d evelop m en t/p rotection  o f hum an rights
•  D iscu ss io n  o f ‘participation’
•  D iscu ss io n  o f ‘hum an rights’
•  Link participation and  hum an rights
Thank you for participating. 
Possibility of follow-up interview? 
Is there anyone else that you think it might be useful for me to talk to?
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